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## WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 *tical* (or *kyat*) = 252 grains

100 *ticals* = 1 *viss* = 3·6 lbs.

1 *tola* = 180 grains.

80 *tolas* = 1 *seer* = 2·057 lbs.

40 *seers* = 1 *maund* = 82½ lbs. approx.

1 basket of paddy—usually 46 lbs, but weight varies.

1 basket of rice—usually 75 lbs, but weight varies.

1 bag of rice = 3 baskets.

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## GLOSSARY.

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*Adipadi* = Head of the State.

*Ahpwe* = Association.

*Akunvun* = Revenue official.

*Bama Khit* = Burmese Era (name of a newspaper).

*Chettivars* = A caste of bankers and moneylenders from Madras.

*Crore* = 10,000,000.

*Dah* = a long knife,— used for many purposes.

*Dhall* = a kind of pulse.

*Dobama Asi Ayon* = “ We Burmans ” League (name of *Thakin* party organisation).

*Dobama Sinyètha Asi Ayon* = a party combining the *Thakin* and *Sinyètha* parties.

*Ganja* = a narcotic preparation of hemp.

*Gaung* = a leader or head.

*Hlawzaye* = a liquor fermented from rice.

*Jaggery* = a kind of brown sugar.

*Kayaing* = a division, or (under Dr. Ba Maw's Government) a district.

*Kayaing-gaung-saung* = a district leader.

*Kayaingwun* = District Commissioner.

*Kyanta-ga* = Same as *jaggy-gy*.

*Lakh* = 100,000.

*Let-yon-tai*. = Labour Corps

*Longyi* = a skirt of cotton or silk, worn by both sexes.

*Myo-ok* = Township Officer.

*Ngapi* = a kind of fish paste.

*Okkita* = President.

*Pongyi* = monk.

*Pongyi-kyauing* = monastery.

*Saki* = Japanese rice beer.

*Sangha* = monk.

*Sayadaw* = monk.

*Sin-yè-tha* = poor men (name of Dr. Ba Maw's party).

*Soorki* = pounded bricks.

*Tari* = fermented juice of toddy palm.

*Thakins* = a political party with communist ideas.

*Thamadi* = assessor.

*Thathanabaing* = the head of the Buddhist priesthood.

*Wunsa* = rice etc. grown for family consumption.

*Yoma* = a range of hills.

*Ywa* = village.

## CONTENTS.

PAGE.

INTRODUCTION .. .. .	1
----------------------	---

## PART I.

1. The Burmese Government .. .	4
2. The <i>Anglo-Burmese</i> .. .	12
3. The Privy Council .. .	15
4. The Cabinet .. .	16
5. Territorial Jurisdiction .. .	18
6. The State Services Board .. .	21
7. Governmental Boards .. .	22

## PART II.

1. District Administration .. .	27
2. Law and the Courts .. .	32
3. Police .. .	37
4. Jails .. .	41
5. Education .. .	46
6. Public Health and Medical .. .	50
7. Forests .. .	54
8. Agriculture .. .	59
9. Irrigation .. .	62
10. The Veterinary Department .. .	64
11. The Transport Bureau .. .	70
12. Posts and Telegraphs .. .	71
13. Commodity and Price Control and Commodity Distribution .. .	73
14. Minor Activities of the Government .. .	74
15. Government Servants and Pensioners .. .	75
16. The Shan States .. .	78

## PART III.

## Finance and Revenue—

1. Customs .. .	84
2. Income-tax .. .	86
3. Forests .. .	87
4. Excise Duties .. .	87
5. Land Revenue—	
(a) Ordinary Revenue .. .	90
(b) Fisheries .. .	92
(c) Petroleum Royalties .. .	94
(d) Mining Royalties, etc. .. .	94
6. Excise (Liquor, Opium and other drugs) .. .	97
7. Registration of Deeds .. .	101
8. Betting Tax .. .	101
9. Taxes on Motor Vehicles .. .	101
10. Mill Production Tax .. .	102
11. Succession Tax .. .	102
12. Stamps .. .	103
13. State Lottery .. .	103
14. State Bank .. .	104
15. Public Debt .. .	107



	PAGE.
N. Money and Banking—	
1. Currency . . . . .	231
2. Banking . . . . .	233
O. Public Finance . . . . .	234
1. Salient policies . . . . .	235
2. Revenues . . . . .	235
3. Expenditure . . . . .	236
4. Deficits . . . . .	238
APPENDIX A TO PART VI.—Government Accounts and Budget . .	239
APPENDIX B TO PART VI.—Rangoon Market Prices . . . . .	241
APPENDIX C TO PART VI.—Prices Outside Rangoon . . . . .	242
APPENDIX I.—The Constitution Act . . . . .	247
APPENDIX II.—The Declaration of Independence . . . . .	253
APPENDIX III.—The Declaration of War . . . . .	256
APPENDIX IV.—The Form of Oath . . . . .	258

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*Note.—The contributors' names are given under various section headings. The remaining sections were compiled by Mr W. H. Payton, I.C.S. Though this book is published under the authority of the Governor of Burma, the contributors and the compiler alone are responsible for the opinions expressed in it.*

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## INTRODUCTION.

Since Vol. I of "Burma during the Japanese Occupation" was written, a large quantity of more trustworthy information, including newspapers and many valuable documents, has been received, which has enabled former unconfirmed reports to be accurately valued, and has furnished material for deeper research. Accordingly it has been decided to publish a second volume, which avoids traversing the same ground as the first, except where necessary for the sake of clarity. This book assumes that the reader is acquainted with Volume I, and that he has some knowledge of the methods of administration in Burma before the invasion; but for those who have not, a few of the salient facts are given below. Fuller recent accounts are given in Christian's "Modern Burma" (University of California Press), the "Burma Handbook" (1943) published by the Government of Burma, and the series of "Burma Pamphlets" published by Longman's.

The constitution of Burma is laid down by the Government of Burma Act, 1935, which not only liberalised the form of Government but also effected the separation of Burma from India, of which it had previously been a province. The Act came into force on the 1st April 1937, and from that date the Governor became responsible to the Secretary of State for Burma directly, and not to the Government of India. The offices of Secretary of State for India and Burma are combined in one person, but the Burma Office in Whitehall is distinct from the India Office, and the Secretary of State has a different body of advisers for Burma. The Governor is appointed by the King, and exercises executive authority on his behalf, but in law and in fact many powers which purport to be exercised by the Governor are exercised by the Ministers, of whom there are not more than ten. This arrangement often misleads those who are not familiar with the Act: for instance, a notification that "the Governor has been pleased" to do a certain act in most cases means that a Minister has decided to do it; and the act may be done without the knowledge or even against the personal opinion of the Governor.

The Governor cannot overrule a Minister merely because he thinks the action intended wrong. In most of the activities of Government the Governor is required by the "Instrument of Instructions" to follow the advice of his Ministers; in a limited class of cases he acts "in the exercise of his individual judgment", which means that he must consult his Ministers but need not accept their views; or "in his discretion", which means that he need not even consult them. He can also in an emergency pass legislation in the form of ordinances or Governor's Acts. Governor's Acts can be passed only in matters affecting the discretionary or individual judgment powers. Ordinances, if issued when the Legislature is in session, are subject to the same restriction; if the Legislature is not in session they can be applied to a wider field, but in either case the duration of ordinances is limited. Before the evacuation of Burma very few Governor's acts were passed, besides a number of ordinances arising out of war emergencies.

"Discretionary" powers include the power to choose or dismiss Ministers, or to grant or refuse assent to legislation, and powers in relation to defence, ecclesiastical affairs, the government of the Shan States and other scheduled areas, currency, coinage and foreign relations. The most important of the Governor's decisions "in the exercise of his individual judgment" are those taken when his "special responsibilities" are involved; these responsibilities include the protection of the peace and tranquillity of Burma against any grave menace, the safeguarding of the financial stability of the Government and of the legitimate interests of minorities and public servants, and the prevention of discrimination against imports from the United Kingdom or India. It was, however, rarely necessary to invoke these "special responsibilities". Where the Governor acts in his discretion or in his individual judgment, though he may override the Ministers he is subject to the general control of the Secretary of State. As regards the discretionary functions relating to defence, scheduled areas, currency, coinage, foreign re-

lations, etc., he is assisted by not more than three Counsellors nominated by himself. Joint consultation between Ministers and Counsellors in defence matters was secured through a Defence Council before and during the campaign in Burma.

The fact that "discretionary" and "individual judgment" powers are laid down in detail in the Government of Burma Act makes them appear to bulk larger than they are; actually the Ministers have almost unfettered authority outside the scheduled areas as regards customs, excise, income-tax, land revenue, stamps, forests, registration, irrigation, general administration, jails, police, ports, education, medical administration, public health, agriculture, veterinary services, the co-operative movement, industries, civil works, and famine relief. An outbreak of dacoities would have to be very serious indeed before it could be dealt with by the Governor in his individual judgment as a grave menace to the tranquillity of Burma. Till that stage was reached the direction of the police would remain in the Ministers' hands, though the Governor would, as a matter of practice, consult them and express his views regarding the action to be taken.

The Ministers' functions are sufficiently clear from what has been said above. They must be members of the Legislature, but a Minister who loses his seat, or who is not a member of the Legislature when appointed, is allowed six months' grace. Ministers normally belong to the lower Chamber, the House of Representatives, but may take part in the proceedings of the Senate, though they cannot vote in a Chamber of which they are not members. Members of the House of Representatives are elected on a wide franchise, the majority representing general constituencies and the others particular communities or interests. Half of the Senate are elected by members of the House of Representatives and half are chosen by the Governor in his discretion. The maximum life of the Senate is seven years and of the House of Representatives five years. Subject to a few restrictions both houses can ask questions, pass resolutions and Bills and discuss the budget; but only the

House of Representatives has the power to grant, refuse or modify demands for expenditure contained in the budget. Certain expenditure, *e.g.*, on defence, is "charged on the revenues of Burma" and is not subject to the Vote, though it may be discussed by either House.

If the constitution breaks down, the Governor may, as in the Provinces of India, take over the reins of government by proclamation. Before the evacuation of Burma it was never necessary for him to take this step, since there was no difficulty in finding Ministers to carry on the government ; but as the majority of the Ministers and of the members of the Legislature remained in Burma the Governor assumed executive and legislative powers by a proclamation, dated the 10th December 1942.

There are three authorities in Burma more or less independent of the executive Government, namely, the High Court, the Auditor-General and the Railway Board. Judges of the High Court are appointed by the King, and their salaries and conditions of service are fixed by His Majesty in Council. All courts, civil and criminal (but not revenue courts) are subject to its control, though judges and magistrates are also under the control of the executive Government as regards pay, appointment, discipline and other incidents of service. The Auditor-General is given the same sort of protection against undue influence by the executive as are High Court Judges, but the status of the accounting officers under him, and their staff, differs in no way from that of Government servants in other departments. The Auditor-General's reports, including a review of the past year's financial transactions and an analysis of the financial position of the Government, are laid before the Legislature, which is thereby enabled to call the executive to account for any extravagance or irregularity. The Railway Board exercises wide financial and executive powers delegated to it by the Government of Burma Act, in order that it may be free to operate the railways on business rather than political principles ; but the Government is entitled to lay down the policy to be followed by the Board, on which it is also represented.

The Public Service Commission also has a considerable degree of independence. The Commission, whose members are appointed by the Governor in his discretion, is consulted regarding the recruitment, promotion and punishment of the higher Government services, and also holds examinations for appointment; but in the main its functions are advisory, and Government is not bound to accept its advice.

The Ministers are assisted by Secretaries, who are permanent officials drawn from the civil services, with appropriate staffs. Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and most of the Under-Secretaries are interchangeable with the district staffs, so that the Secretariat may have adequate experience of the system which it administers. The Chief Secretary, who is nearly always in charge of the Home Department, which is concerned with district administration and the police, ranks as a Commissioner, and other Secretaries as Deputy Commissioners.

General administration is conducted by Commissioners, of whom there are eight, including the Commissioner, Federated Shan States, Deputy Commissioners (one for each district), Subdivisional Officers and Township Officers. Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners mostly belong to the Burma Civil Service, Class I, but the Burma Frontier Service supplies a few Deputy Commissioners and occasionally the Commissioner, Federated Shan States. Members of the Burma Civil Service, Class II, who fill most of the posts of Subdivisional Officers, are also eligible for promotion to Deputy Commissionerships. Township Officers belong to the Subordinate Civil Service. The Class II and Subordinate Services provide Treasury Officers and *Akunwuns* (revenue officers at district headquarters). In the Shan States and some of the hill tracts the system is rather different; the arrangements in the Shan States are described in the section of this report under that heading.

Commissioners are mainly supervising and inspecting officers, and in revenue matters, in which they are subordinate to the Financial Commissioner, they hear appeals from decisions of officers subordinate to them; they have no judicial functions except in respect of the

Shan States and hill tracts. They are also largely concerned with local bodies such as municipalities and district councils. The Deputy Commissioner is the man-of-all-work in his district and is responsible for its peace and general wellbeing. As District Magistrate he tries a certain number of criminal cases and supervises the magistrates' work. His functions in connection with law and order necessitate his co-operating closely with the District Superintendent of Police ; he is responsible for the Treasury administration (receipt and payment of public funds and accounting for them). As Collector he is responsible for revenue collection (land revenue, town land rents, excise, etc.), and he is in charge of land records, including survey and assessment of revenue. If a famine or a flood occurs in the district, the Deputy Commissioner must see that relief measures are taken.

In all this work he has the help of qualified officers, such as the subdivisional and township officers, the treasury officer, the *Akunum*, and the Superintendents of Excise and of Land Records. Some departments, such as the police and those concerned with education, medical services, public health, forests, income-tax, jails, agriculture, veterinary services, co-operative societies, civil works and irrigation, have their own district staffs, and the Deputy Commissioner is not responsible for their administration ; but he inspects jails and police-stations and is generally on the alert to see that departmental action has no undesirable effect on the district as a whole. Except in a few instances, the Deputy Commissioner is not a civil judge.

The keystone of judicial administration is the District and Sessions Judge, who is answerable to the High Court. He exercises original and appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, supervises the work of magistrates and judges, and inspects their courts. Some of the whole-time magistrates and judges belong to the judicial services and have no executive functions ; but many executive officers, such as headquarters assistants (to the Deputy Commissioners), treasury, subdivisional and township officers, are also magistrates, though they are not often civil judges.

In the professional departments, each of which has its own head, responsible to one of the Ministers, the Deputy Inspectors-General of Police, the Superintending Engineers (Irrigation Branch or Buildings and Roads Branch of the Public Works Department) and the Conservators of Forests are supervising and inspecting officers like the Commissioners ; among the officers of " district " rank may be mentioned District Superintendents of Police, Executive Engineers, Divisional Forest Officers, Inspectors of Schools, Civil Surgeons, and Deputy Directors of Agriculture and Veterinary Services.

The number of British officers in the higher services is much smaller than is usually imagined ; in the Burma Civil Service, Class I, the proportion of British officers is about 50 per cent. and is decreasing, and when allowance has been made for Secretariat and specialised posts, not more than one-third of the districts have British Deputy Commissioners. This fact often surprised newcomers during the Burma campaign of 1941-42, if they realised it at all ; but those who were in a position to judge are aware that Burman Deputy Commissioners stood up to the strain of war as well as their British colleagues. The higher posts in the Secretariat are divided equally between British and Burman officers. The Burma Police, Class I, contains a slight preponderance of British officers ; other services are more completely Burmanised. Responsible Government officers are distributed far and wide through the country, partly because distances and the state of communications would make a centralised system very slow in operation, and partly because of the tradition (and indeed necessity) that some representative of Government should be easily accessible to every member of the public. Thus most of the 41 districts have two or more subdivisions each, and anything from two to nine townships, each with a resident official ; while police stations are even more numerous than the townships.

A township is divided into a number of village tracts, each usually embracing several villages or hamlets and administered by a village headman and a village committee. The headman and the committee are elected by



the villagers, though the Deputy Commissioner has limited power to exclude undesirables. The headman is not a Government servant, but the representative of the villagers ; he is remunerated by certain fees and by a commission on the revenue which he collects for Government. The headman and committee try petty civil and criminal cases, and the headman is responsible for village sanitation and measures to prevent the spread of human and cattle disease, the registration of vital statistics and minor police duties. He is thus a very important part of the machinery of Government, and it has always been a point of policy to develop his authority and status.

Local self-government by elected municipal and town committees has been established for very many years ; rural self-government by district councils, circle boards and rural hospital committees is a more recent growth. The local bodies have charge of roads in their areas, except the more important roads, which are the responsibility of the Government ; vernacular schools ; some hospitals ; markets, ferries, slaughter houses and cattle pounds ; and the prevention of human and cattle disease. In towns they are also responsible for water-supply and lighting and scavenging services. The municipal committees raise most of their income from rates, stall-rents and license fees of various kinds, while the district councils are mainly dependent on Government grants. The rural bodies, with few exceptions, have not been a great success : there has been much corruption and maladministration in their services. The municipal committees are better, but are not free from corruption. Other local bodies include the Rangoon Port Trust and the Port Committees of other ports, the Rangoon Development Trust, and the University of Rangoon.

This short account does not do full justice to the important work performed by the Education, Police, Agricultural and Forest Departments, to mention only a few, but their activities are so varied that it is impossible to describe them adequately in small compass. It was on this carefully articulated, bureaucratic and on ~

the whole effective system of Government that the Japanese invasion burst in 1941. The result was to scatter it in pieces, which the Burmese Government, sometimes helped and sometimes obstructed by the Japanese, is making painful efforts to put together in a new form.

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## PART I

## 1. The Burmese Government.

Volume 1 of "Burma during the Japanese Occupation" gives in Chapter 1 an account of the successive establishment of the "Bakō Government", the Japanese Military Administration and the Burmese Executive Administration in the years 1942 and 1943. It also describes how an Independence Preparatory Commission was set up to make proposals for the constitution of an "independent" Government, which duly came into existence, under Japanese auspices and Japanese control, on the 1st August 1943. One of the main results of the Commission's deliberations was the Constitution Act (Appendix I), referred to in Volume 1 as "the Basic Law"; and the first task of the present survey of civil administration since the grant of "independence" is to describe the structure of the Government under the Act.

In theory all powers of Government and all authority are derived from the people (Art 3). The powers of Government are concentrated in the Head of the State (*Adipadi*), "who shall have full sovereign status and powers" (Art. 4). To assist him in the discharge of executive business there is a Cabinet of Ministers. The Head of the State is advised by the Privy Council "in such matters of public importance as may be referred to them;" and taxation, the budget, national loans, ordinary legislation and certain treaties and agreements must be referred to them (Art. 11).

Article 3 calls for some comment. The origin of the present Government, as described in Volume 1 of "Burma during the Japanese Occupation", proves that the powers of the Head of the State were derived not from the people, but from the Japanese Government and Military Command. There was not even a pretence of an election or referendum or other consultation of the people before Dr. Ba Maw was proclaimed *Adipadi*. The Constitution Act was "approved" by the State Assembly on the day of the declaration of Burma's independence (1st August 1943); but the State Assembly was only the Burma Independence Preparatory Commission under another name, and there is no suggestion that that Commission had any popular foundation. In any case, the State Assembly seems to have passed into oblivion on the day of its birth; its only other recorded function was to hear Ba Maw read out a declaration of war (Appendix III) against the United States and Great Britain. The declaration of independence (Appendix II) contained the passage "The Burmese people therefore, by this

their national will by a Constituent Assembly representing them, publicly proclaim....." but the passage is at variance with the facts as known. A Japanese broadcast in Japanese said "Lt-General M. Kawabe has ordered the dissolution of the Burmese Independence Preparatory Commission and convened the assembly instead.... By recommendation Dr. Ba Maw was elected President;" but even if this version were true, the reference to election would not show that the Constitution Act and Ba Maw's elevation rested on the popular will. The electoral body was a Japanese creation.

If a vacancy occurs in the headship of the State before the new constitution is framed, Article 5 provides for an election by the Cabinet and Privy Council, but these are not responsible to the people, who would therefore have no more voice in the new election than in Ba Maw's appointment.

Article 3 of the Act may be intended only to describe the fundamental authority for the permanent constitution of Burma after the war (cf. Article 56), but it looks more like the well-known claim that a totalitarian regime expresses the people's will, though nothing can be more abhorrent than democracy. The New Order Plan, an incoherent statement of policy issued in August 1943 (not reproduced), abjured democracy, though three months later Ba Maw could call himself "a symbol and expression of the will of the people and also the instrument for carrying out that will."

The part played by the State Assembly, the Privy Council and the Cabinet in the declarations of war and of independence made on the 1st August, 1943, is not accurately known. The State Assembly met in the morning of that day, after which Bandoola U Sein read out the declaration of independence. There would scarcely have been time to discuss or amend the declaration at the State Assembly's meeting, but in its previous capacity of Independence Preparatory Commission the Assembly probably discussed the terms. The declaration itself states that it is made by the Constituent Assembly, which was the same body, and there is other ground for believing that the terms were laid before the Preparatory Commission. The Cabinet and the Privy Council were appointed on the 1st August; neither of them seems to have met before the declaration of independence, but between this and the declaration of war both the State Assembly and the Cabinet met, though not, apparently, the Privy Council. The Assembly met at 3 p.m. and the declaration of war was read out by Ba Maw at 3-30. It seems reasonable to assume that the Ministers were cognisant of the declaration of war, though they may have had no voice in it; the

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State Assembly, as the Independence Preparatory Commission, probably had a larger share in both documents, while the Privy Council apparently had none at all.

## 2. The *Adipadi*.

Article 4 of the Constitution Act says—"Burma shall be ruled over by the Head of the State, who shall have full sovereign status and powers". Japanese control, of course, is not mentioned; the pretence is that Burma's relations with Japan are governed by treaty or agreement. There is no limit on the tenure of the appointment, but Article 5 (already cited) provides for the election of a successor by the Cabinet and Privy Council, should a vacancy occur before the new Constitution comes into force.

It is not clear whether an *Adipadi* is intended to be a permanent feature of the new Constitution. Articles 60 and 63 seem to indicate that the constituent body will have a free hand to decide this, but Article 62 assumes that there will be a new Head of the State. The Head of the State at the time of convening the Constituent body could ensure compliance with his wishes by using his powers under Article 58 to "pack" that body.

Ba Maw's present position, at any rate, is clear. He appoints and dismisses the Ministers and appoints the Privy Councillors, though he must consult the Prime Minister on the appointment of other Ministers (Arts 7 and 9), and the Cabinet on that of Privy Councillors (Art. 14). (At present Ba Maw is his own Prime Minister and a member of the Cabinet; but this may be only a temporary arrangement, adopted, it is said, because the Japanese insisted on it against the wishes of the Burmese. The Constitution Act treats the two appointments as separate, and the "New Light of Burma" stated on the 16th January 1944, that the "New Order Plan" provided for the appointment of the Premier by the *Adipadi* at his own discretion).

The *Adipadi* is the legislative authority, though ordinarily he must consult the Cabinet, and they the Privy Council, before making laws (Arts. 19-21). His position resembles that of the Governor under the Government of Burma Act in promulgating Ordinances, or Governor's Acts, rather than in granting assent to the Acts of the Legislature. Ba Maw promulgated Ordinances as Prime Minister (or Chief Executive) of the Burma Executive Administration before the present Government was formed or the Constitution Act enacted, but the laws that he has passed since then are described as Acts.

The *Adipadi* appoints the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme Court (Arts. 29 and 31), the State Services

Board (the equivalent of the Public Service Commission) (Art. 38) and the Auditor-General (Art. 44), after consultation with the appropriate authorities. All appointments in the services of the State are derived from the Head of the State (Art. 37).

The language used in some of these passages is obviously copied from the Government of Burma Act, where the Governor is the repository of all executive power, though the actual decisions may be made by the Ministers or other authorities. It is not necessary, therefore, to read the Constitution Act as intending that complete autocratic control should be personally exercised by the *Adipadi*. He has the power of control, so far as the Japanese authorities permit it, and it is not limited by any prescription that he must accept the advice of his Ministers or Privy Councillors. The extent to which he defers to them, against his own views, probably depends in practice on the strength of his personal ascendancy and on the undercurrents of intrigue against him. His position may vary from time to time between that of the independent autocrat and that of the constitutional Prime Minister. On the Military side the *Adipadi* is Supreme Commander of the Burmese Armed Forces, with all the paraphernalia of a War Cabinet, a War Minister, and Chiefs of the General Staff (Arts. 48 and 51). This part of the Constitution Act probably represents aspirations rather than facts.

It will not surprise anyone who knew him that Ba Maw regards himself more as a sovereign than as a Prime Minister. Burmese newspapers show that he is referred to by titles more appropriate for a King. (*Adipadi Ashin Mingyi Kodaw*). In his address to the Privy Council on the 30th November 1943 he reminded it that a Privy Council was "an innermost Council from whom the Sovereign seeks aid and advice"; and he repeated his reference to the Sovereign, as if to emphasise it. In the same address, it is true, he explained that the Leader must cease to be a person, and become a symbol and expression of the will of the people and also the instrument for carrying out that will; but similar assertions have been made by other totalitarian leaders without affecting their practice as dictators. Ba Maw draws a distinction between himself and "the Government", by which he apparently means the Cabinet. He meets each Minister once a fortnight, or at any time if a case is urgent. It is not clear whether as Prime Minister he takes part in Cabinet discussions; the Prime Minister is not mentioned as a member of any of the numerous boards of Ministers announced in the *Adipadi's* review of the first stage of the New Order Plan (October 1943).



The Oath (Appendix IV) prescribed for Ministers and Government servants promises loyalty to the people of Burma and the Supreme Head of the Burmese people, the *Anashin* (Dictator) *Adipadi*. The "New Light of Burma" (30th September 1943) explains loyalty to the *Adipadi* as meaning "devotion to the *Adipadi*, who has taken on himself the responsibilities for Government, for defence", etc.

This survey is hardly concerned with political and party moves under the surface of the constitution, but the statement of the *Adipadi*'s constitutional position and of his own opinion of his status may be supplemented by the note that Ba Maw is personally unpopular and sometimes an object of ridicule for his airs and eccentricities. His "one party" the Dobama Sinyetha Asi-Ayon, (D.S.A.A.), is beginning to disintegrate. A trustworthy observer attributes to Kawabe, Iida's successor as Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Burma, the policy of disrupting Burmese nationalism, which showed signs of becoming too strong, and this he does by fostering opposition to Ba Maw as well as divisions among the Thakins. While Ba Maw's position is weakening, Kawabe is increasing the Japanese hold on administration, and to this end was reported early in 1944 to be aiming at reducing the number of Ministers. The appointment of Japanese advisers is dealt with under the heading "The Cabinet".

Ba Maw's title of Dictator appears to be more closely connected with his leadership of the sole party officially acknowledged to exist than with the Headship of the State. The consolidation of parties and the unanimous election of Ba Maw as dictator were announced in the "Sun" of the 8th August 1942. He signed the New Order Plan and similar documents as *Adipadi*, not as Dictator, though the two titles are brought together in the Oath referred to above. A statement issued by Thakin Nu, the Foreign Minister, says that as *Adipadi* and Commander-in-Chief Ba Maw directly controls the Cabinet, the Privy Council and the Burma Defence Army; while as Dictator, he controls all civilian activities, including various labour, youth and other organisations and the D.S.A.A. He has also set up a Dictator's Council as an advisory body parallel to the Privy Council on the administrative side. This dualism, which roughly follows the division between State and Party, is probably copied from the practice of the totalitarian States. Ba Maw's statement at a conference of District Commissioners and District Superintendents of Police on October 4, 1943—"I am not a political leader now"—can hardly mean that he has relinquished control of the D.S.A.A.; but it would be futile to speculate about the precise meaning of so exuberant an orator.

### 3. The Privy Council.

The Privy Council's constitution and main functions are described in Articles 11—18 of the Constitution Act ; it is a consultative body and apparently has no right of initiating legislation or executive action. It must be consulted on certain specified matters including the budget, and it has functions connected with the election of the *Adipadi's* successor (Art. 5), ordinary legislation (Art. 20), the scrutiny of the Auditor-General's reports (Art. 47), the appointment of the Constituent Body (Art. 58), and the amendment of the constitution (Art. 64). The President or Vice-President has the right to take part in the proceedings of the War Cabinet without the right to vote (Art. 51).

The members are appointed by the Head of the State, but there is no provision, as there is for the Cabinet, that they hold office during his pleasure. Like that of the Cabinet, however, their tenure expires when the new constitution comes into operation (Art. 63).

Some twenty members have been appointed, for the most part former Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, together with U Set and a couple of newspaper editors. The Privy Council is set up to advise the *Adipadi*, but exceptionally, as regards ordinary legislation, it advises the Cabinet. The Cabinet also, in addition to its executive duties, advises the *Adipadi*, and it may be surmised that the reasons for having two advisory bodies are (i) to provide a counterweight to the Cabinet in the form of an irremovable Privy Council, so that the former may not become too powerful, (ii) to provide offices of emolument and honour for supporters and potential supporters ; and (iii) perhaps to placate former Senators.

More information is needed about the working of the Privy Council. It holds "sessions" and is "convened" and "prorogued" by the *Adipadi*. Ba Maw addressed it in November 1943, on his return from Tokyo ; and in reply it "submitted" to him a message thanking him for his address, and for the fact that the Council was the first to learn of the work that had been done at the Greater East Asia Conference. The wording suggests that the Privy Council was anxious to assert its superiority to the Cabinet. It passes resolutions on sundry matters, and sent a telegram of good wishes to the Greater East Asia Conference. It was after a session of the Privy Council that changes in the grading of districts were announced. In August 1943 it "unanimously passed" the Constitution Act ; and in December it approved the laws and regulations of the Burma State Bank. Domei describes it as "approving" the

budgets for the last eight months of 1943-44 and for the year 1944-45, which were sent to it after being passed by the Cabinet ; and it approved the 1944-45 budget only after partial revision. According to the " New Light of Burma " of the 6th November 1943 it held a joint session with the Cabinet to discuss certain legislation and the general budget policy.

In the address mentioned above, Ba Maw gave his own conception of the Privy Council's functions, prefacing it with the remark, " I have been informed of the excellent work you have done during this session ". This may mean that the Council deliberates without the *Adipadi* being present, but more probably it refers only to the fact that Ba Maw had just come back from Japan and Thakin Mya had been acting for him. Ba Maw went on, " The Privy Council of a State is not a public body or forum but an innermost council from whom the Sovereign seeks aid and advice. Your duties are therefore organically different from those of a popular assembly or legislature. You do not represent but weigh and advise. You act for yourselves and not for others..... Your proceedings..... should be informal and realistic in a way befitting the deliberations of men whose duty is to give private counsel to the Sovereign."

The President of the Privy Council is given a prominent position at official ceremonies.

#### 4. The Cabinet.

The Cabinet of Ministers, according to Arts. 6—9 of the Constitution Act, is appointed by the *Adipadi* and holds office during his pleasure. The Prime Minister is appointed by the *Adipadi* at his discretion, according to a report in the " New Light of Burma " of the 16th January 1944. The other members are appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. As the *Adipadi* has hitherto been his own Prime Minister the question whether the latter's recommendations must be accepted has presumably not arisen. The Cabinet is responsible, collectively and individually, to the Head of the State, and not to any representative body. Ordinarily it is to be consulted before laws are passed, and it has functions connected with the election of the *Adipadi's* successor, the appointment of Privy Councillors, the sessions of the Privy Council, the appointment and constitution of the State Services Board, the scrutiny of the Auditor-General's reports, the setting up of a constituent body to plan a post-war constitution, and the amendment of the interim constitution. Though the Constitution Act does not say so, other sources prove that the Cabinet passes the budget before it is submitted to the Privy Council.

The term of office of all Ministers expires when the new constitution comes into force ; otherwise there is no period fixed for their tenure.

The provisions regarding collective and individual responsibility indicate that the method of working is much the same as under the former regime, with the important difference that the Ministers are not answerable to any representative body or to public opinion. Departments, or Bureaux, are allocated to the charge of individual Ministers as before. According to Ba Maw's review of the first stage of the New Order Plan, certain Ministries are experimentally grouped in boards to deal with important questions of common interest. Some of these boards appear to be temporary, corresponding with the *ad hoc* Committees frequently set up in former times, and others more or less permanent. Ministers are enjoined to leave as much of the day-to-day business as possible to their secretaries, so that they may have more time for their duties on the boards.

Sixteen Ministers, including the Prime Minister, were appointed when the "Independent" Government was inaugurated on the 1st August 1943, but it is reported that this wide distribution of responsibility hinders Japanese control, and that the Commander-in-Chief is trying to reduce the numbers. The Government of Burma Act, 1935, provided for not more than ten Ministers and three Counsellors.

A well-informed observer stated that in January 1944 the administration was only a paper one ; and indeed effective control in the districts, except by the local Japanese Commanders, appears to be wholly lacking. This may be partly because the "discussion groups" with which the administration is overloaded are sub-consciously regarded as a substitute for executive action. It is however also due to the subordination by the Japanese of all civil life, including transport and distribution, to military needs.

The Cabinet was consulted on the proposal, which it unanimously approved, to recognise Mussolini's new Fascist Government in September 1943. Probably it was also consulted regarding the recognition of the Government of the Philippines and the "Provisional Government of India", for Domei said that the second session discussed diplomatic policy towards Axis and co-prosperity countries ; at any rate, the customary messages of congratulation were sent by Thakin Nu, the Foreign Minister. It is not clear whether the Cabinet had any say in the second treaty with Japan, whereby the Shan States and Karenni were transferred to the Burmese Government. It could not have had any say in the treaty of alliance with Japan, which was signed on the day that the Cabinet was appointed

It seems, then, that the Cabinet machinery is working, to some extent, as it did under the Government of Burma Act, but it is unable to make its decisions effective in the districts. Legally, it is powerless against the *Adipadi*, and in fact it must carry out the wishes of the Japanese. Before the "Independent" Government was constituted it was reported that each Minister of the former Government had a Japanese Adviser, while Ba Maw had two. Berlin on the 3rd August 1943, immediately after the grant of "Independence", quoted a Japanese newspaper as saying that there would be no Japanese advisers, but if any attempt was made to implement this policy it was soon modified. In December 1943 a financial expert named Ogawa was appointed "Supreme Adviser to the Burmese Government", and according to a report of Japanese origin in July 1944 he selected 30 experts in agriculture, industry, mining and transportation to aid the Burmese Government. "The latter", added this report, "originally intended to manage its own affairs without foreign assistance, but this policy has been modified in the light of the rapid pace of national reconstruction." It is not clear that these advisers are attached to the separate Ministries; they are probably to advise the Planning Board (item 17 under the heading "Governmental Boards").

## 5. Territorial Jurisdiction.

Before the grant of "independence" the Shan States, Karenni and the Wa States were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Burmese Government and were administered directly by the Japanese. The two Shan States of Kengtung and Mongpan, however, were handed over to Siam in July 1943. On the 25th September 1943, a treaty signed by Ba Maw and the Japanese Ambassador at Rangoon agreed to incorporate the remaining Shan States, Karenni and the Wa territory in the territories of Burma, and the transfer was carried out on the 23rd December. The change is said to have been welcomed by the Shans, who were not happy under direct Japanese rule; it may have been less welcome to the people of Karenni, which was not included in British Burma formerly. "The New Light of Burma" announced in August 1943 that there was to be freedom of travel and trade between the Shan States, Karenni and Burma; imports from one to another were not to be taxed and Burmese coins and notes were to be used. Information relating to the early part of 1944 says that the Burmese administration does not include frontier war zones, where the Japanese military authorities have a free hand. From the civil list of April 1943, however, and from later information it is clear that the usual district officers were

appointed in such districts as Akyab, Myitkyina and Mawlaik (Upper Chindwin) ; and in Myitkyina, at any rate, the *Kayangwun* (District Commissioner) was actually performing administrative duties, under close Japanese control. *De facto* government did not extend to the Kachin Hill Tracts, because the Kachins could not be brought to heel. Apparently it was not much more effective in the areas bordering the Chin Hills, from where it was reported in October 1943 that the administrative system was not properly organised and that village administration was being carried on by headmen.

So far as official announcements show, the whole of Burma, except two Shan States, is governed by Ba Maw's Government.

The previous territorial divisions have been mostly preserved. The posts of Commissioners of Divisions were abolished in 1942 or early 1943, but in January 1944 the *Adipadi*, after holding conferences with Deputy Commissioners and District Superintendents of Police, decided to create four new divisions, Northern, Western, Southern and Kaulawza. The newspaper "Bama Khit" ("Burmese Era") says that the first three comprise the following districts :—

Northern—Headquarters, Mandalay.—Mandalay, Kyaukse, Pyinmana, Meiktila, Myingyan, Yenangyaung, Minbu, Pakokku, Chin Hills, Sagang, Shwebo, Katha, Bhamo, Myitkyna, Mawlaik and Monywa Districts.

Western—Headquarters, Bassein —Akyab, Kyaukpyu, Sadoway, Arakan Hill Tracts, Bassein, Henzada, Maubin, Pyapon, and Myaungmya districts.

Southern—Headquarters, Rangoon —Rangoon, Hanthawaddy, Insein, Pegu, Tharrawaddy, Prome, Moulmein, Toungoo, Thaton, Tavoy, Mergui, Papun, and Thayetmyo districts.

The Kanbawza Division is elsewhere stated to include the Shan States and Karenni ; and as the former Japanese Governor lived at Taunggyi, it is probable that that is the headquarters of the division.

This list accounts for all the former districts except the Naga Hills. The Northern Division includes the former Mandalay, Magwe and Sagaing Divisions, except Thayetmyo and the Naga Hills Districts. The Western Division combines the former Arakan and Irrawaddy Divisions and the Southern Division includes the former Pegu and Tenasserim Divisions, *plus* Thayetmyo District.

A few changes have been made in the names of districts. Yamethin district becomes Pyinmana, corresponding with an actual shift of the district headquarters, which many officers

had long advocated. Magwe district has been renamed Yenangyaung, following a similar shift ; Magwe is now only a township. The Upper and Lower Chindwin districts become Mawlaik and Monywa respectively ; Amherst becomes Moulmein, and Salween Papun. In the last four cases the new names of the districts are those of the former district headquarters.

It was announced that the object of creating the four divisions was to expedite the work of Deputy Commissioners in connection with winning the war and building up the New Order, in consultation with the Commissioners and without reference to the Central Government. Japanese broadcasts emphasised that the new arrangements would facilitate the mobilisation and distribution of labour and goods. The Commissioners were to have " extensive administrative rights, including the right to collect taxes " and police, financial, educational and engineering officers were to be posted under them.

Commissioners of Divisions have for many years been attacked as " useless " and " mere post offices ", and it is interesting to see that a Burmese Government has been driven to revive four out of the eight posts. The Home Ministry's report for 1942-43 says that without Commissioners there could be no proper supervision of district work. The centralisation of civil authority in Rangoon must have meant great delay, especially in wartime conditions, in communications with the districts ; and this is probably one reason why a report from Burma speaks of Government officers " just sitting back ". From that point of view the creation of four Commissioners with large delegated powers should be an improvement, though it will take a long time for Yenangyaung or the Chin Hills to obtain orders from Mandalay, or Mergui from Rangoon. It is plain from the extent of the Commissioners' charges that theirs will be mainly a paper administration ; the Commissioners could not tour effectively or maintain close touch with their officers. This aspect may be less important than that revealed by Domei, namely, the forced levy and transfer of labour and the exploitation of produce. What the " right to collect taxes " amounts to is not known ; there is nothing to show that the Commissioners have the right to impose taxes, and the duty of collecting them presumably remains with the district officers as before. A further duty laid on the Commissioners, according to the " New Light of Burma ", is to weed out undesirable officials and stamp out bribery and corruption.

Domei announced on the 17th April 1944, that the Government of Burma had decided to reform the Prefectural administration by classifying the existing 34 Prefectures (excluding two) into 15 A class, 15 B class and 4 C class Prefectures. " Grouped into A class will be those Prefectures which are on

the border of enemy territory and are in need of special war-time measures. In A class Prefectures, the Governors will be assisted by Vice-Governors invested with the power to appoint and dismiss, as well as remunerate, lower Government officials, and also grant rewards to those who co-operate in the war effort." "Prefectures" are districts, and "Governors" are District Commissioners; the "Vice-Governors" would therefore seem to be Headquarters Assistants or something of the kind, unless they are Japanese officials intended to control the District Commissioners. An earlier Domei message said that the 34 districts excluded Rangoon and two other special districts; but in neither case do the numbers add up to the 38 districts listed above under the Northern, Western and Southern Divisions. Further details of this grading are lacking.

## 6. State Services Board (Public Service Commission).

A Public Service Commission is reported to have been created some time in 1942, with Dr. Ba Han (Ba Maw's brother) as President, and his son Norman Ba Han as Secretary. There seem to have been two other members; the total strength would then be the same as that of the Public Service Commission established under the Government of Burma Act.

Since the grant of "Independence," the Public Service Commission is governed by Articles 38 to 42 of the Constitution Act, and the regulations made thereunder. No copy of the regulations has been brought to light.

Article 38 is based on section 119 (1) of the Government of Burma Act; but it provides that the *Advisory* shall consult the Cabinet regarding the appointment of the Chairman and other members, whereas appointment by the Governor was made in his discretion. The old Commission was in no way amenable to Ministerial control, but on the other hand the Minister were not bound to accept its advice on matters within the Ministerial sphere. The proviso under the Government of Burma Act that at least one-half of the members must have held office for ten years or more under the Crown in Burma or India has been omitted from the Constitution Act.

Article 39 is based on section 119 (2) of the Government of Burma Act. Section 119 (3), regarding the subsequent employment of the Chairman and members under the Crown in Burma, has been omitted.

The Preparatory Commission which drafted the Constitution Act recommended adopting the essence of section 120 (2) (a) (b) and (c) of the Government of Burma Act, laying down the cases in which the Public Service Commission must be consulted. These provisions were not inserted in the Act as finally



passed. The Preparatory Commission did not recommend the insertion of the substance of Section 120 (2) (d)—claims to recover legal costs. (e)—claims to injury pensions and (f)—claims arising out of the separation of Burma from India.

Article 42 purports to secure the independence of the Board, a provision that is nullified by the Articles governing appointment and the making of regulations, as well as by the totalitarian structure of the Government.

It has been laid down that the State Services Board shall advise the Minister concerned regarding appointments to posts in the Class I & II Services and posts of equivalent rank. In case of a disagreement between the Minister and the Board, the decision rests with the Premier. We find the Board issuing advertisements calling for applications, *e.g.*, for posts of District Civil and Criminal Magistrates ; it is not clear whether, like the old Public Service Commission, it is responsible for holding examinations for admission to the public service.

According to Thakin Myn, the Board was in 1943 taking drastic measures to deal with bribery ; if it follows the former practice this could be only by advice regarding the disciplinary action to be taken in cases referred to it.

## 7. Governmental Boards.

The New Order Plan of 1943 stated that the board system together with expert advisers and technicians would be adopted wherever practicable ; the most important of these boards would be the General Planning Board. Ba Maw's review of the first stage of the Plan (October 1943) went into more detail, and named the following ten boards :—

Name of Board, etc.	Composition.	Task.
1. State Services Reorganisation Board.	Home, Judicial & Foreign Ministers.	To reorganise the State Services & purge them of corrupt members.
2. State Services Salaries Committee.	Deputy Prime Minister and "some other members".	To deal with salaries & dearness allowances.
3. State Services Rules Committee.	Revenue Minister, Forest Secretary, Excise Director & President of State Services Board.	To consider administrative procedure, rules of executive business, relations between different administrative powers and organs.
4. Economic Board	Ministers for Commerce, Forests, Agriculture, Communications & Public Works	To deal with "all economic questions connected with production, supply, distribution, etc."
5. Publicity and National Welfare Board.	Ministers for Publicity, Foreign Affairs, Education and Forests.	To mobilise mass support by undertaking local and national public works, charities or reforms & erecting monuments to local heroes.

Name of Board, etc.	Composition.	Task.
6. Finance and Revenue Board.	Ministers for Finance and Revenue	To deal with "the budget, State Bank, State Insurance, State Loan, State Currency, etc."

These six boards were mainly groups of Ministers formed to expedite interdepartmental consultation.

7. Commodity Supply Control and Distribution Board	Minister for Commerce & Industry, several officials & members of Privy Council, Burmese Chamber of Commerce & National Service Association.	As denoted by title. Works in cooperation with a similar Japanese Board. The Economic Board (No. 4) co-ordinates this work with that of "food production and distribution, cotton growing & weaving, cattle & horse-breeding, transport, etc."
8. Shan & Karenni Board.	. . .	To prepare for the reorganisation of Shan States & Karenni in Burma. Probably a temporary board
9. Enemy Properties Board.	Deputy Prime Minister and members chosen by him.	To arrange for the transfer of enemy properties to the Burma Government.
10. Literature and Translation Committee.	....	To produce useful translations, a Burmese dictionary and a Burmese encyclopaedia.
11. Central Labour Board	Japanese and Burmese Government representatives.	Organisation and welfare of the Sweat Army or <i>Let-yan-tat</i> .
12. National Resources Mobilisation Board.	.. ....	. . .

Thakin Mya, speaking in November 1943, mentioned a number of these Boards and Committees, and in addition—

Most of these Boards are described as already in existence. The Central Labour Board was "reconstituted" in January 1944 under the presidency of the Minister for Co-operation, Labour and Miscellaneous Affairs. Earlier, in August 1942, Ba Maw had established a Central Labour Control Bureau, as the recruiting organisation for the "Sweat Army" or *Let-yan-tat*

13. The Compassionate Allowance Board, under the Chairmanship of the Finance Minister, considered 2,531 applications from pensioners up to July 1943, and granted them compassionate allowances totalling Rs. 28,827. This may have ceased to exist when the Government decided to continue the payment of pensions (see "Government Servants and Pensioners").

14. About September 1943, an enquiry committee was set up to make plans for the State Bank, but this was only an *ad hoc* committee such as all Governments form from time to time.

15. In May 1944, a special committee consisting of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and the Governor of the State Bank, with the Manager of the Bank as Secretary, was appointed to deal with inflation.

There is not much evidence of any work actually accomplished by these Boards and Committees, though the published decisions of the individual Ministries may have been taken after consultation with the Board concerned. In January or February 1944 the Rangoon Police was purged of 73 members for inefficiency or dishonesty, and this may have been due to the work of No. 1. If it seriously tackled the question of corruption, it would be kept very busy indeed. As regards No 9, Japanese broadcasts in March 1944 claim to have transferred all enemy property to the Burmese Government, and according to earlier announcements these were to include industrial undertakings of all kinds, mines, railways, telephones, and telegraphs. There is ground, however, for suspecting that the oilfields and many other undertakings have not been handed over at all, and the transfer of others has not meant a slackening of Japanese control.

16. In February 1944 Domei reported the formation of the First and Second Committees of the Japan-Burmese Joint War Co-operation Commission. The Commission itself appears to have been established in January 1944 to meet the Burmese complaint that the enforcement of measures of co-operation was one-sided. The First Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Minister for Co-operation (*i.e.*, Japan-Burmese Co-operation), is to take charge of political problems and the maintenance of peace; the Second Committee, whose first Chairman was the Minister for Commerce and Industry, is to be in charge of economic problems. There are to be equal numbers of Japanese and Burmans on each Committee. The Minister of Supplies, Thakin Than Tun, succeeded the Minister for Commerce and Industry as Chairman of the Second Committee in May 1944.

The Second Committee absorbed the Japan-Burmese Commodity Distributing Association, "which had played an active role in promoting economic relations between the two countries." This Association is probably the "similar Japanese board" mentioned under item 7 above as working with the official Commodity Supply, Control and Distribution Board. If so, it was a union of Japanese trading firms which, in conjunction with the *Kaybotaing*, controlled the rationing of sugar, salt and matches and dominated wholesale and retail trade. The identification of the Japan-Burmese Commodity Distributing Association with the Commodities Distribution Association, listed under the heading "Other non-official Organisations", is more doubtful.

It is not stated that the First Committee absorbed any of the previous official or non-official boards and committees, but it may have done so.

17. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Dr. Ba Maw spoke of the creation of a Planning Board in August 1943, but it did not come into existence until several months later. On the 12th May 1944, a message from Domei announced that Dr. Ba Maw had approved the appointment of a special Research Commission, consisting of Dr. Ba Han, U Soe Nyun and U Ba Nyein. They were charged with the duty of visiting certain countries in the Co-prosperity Sphere to study such aspects of their national reconstruction and civilian war effort as might be of use to Burma. The Commission reached Tokyo on the 14th May and settled down to work; afterwards they proposed to go to Manchukuo, China, the Philippines and other countries. The detailed subjects of study include—

(1) Land, including soil, the conservation of forests, population and cattle;

(2) Water, including flood control, irrigation and fisheries;

(3) Resources, including power generation, raw materials and minor resources;

(4) Labour, Agriculture and Industries, including the organisation and rationalisation of commodity price control, transport and communications;

(5) Trade, domestic and foreign;

(6) Finance, including currency, foreign exchange and banking;

(7) Public Finance, including taxation and State expenditure;

(8) Education, both general and technical.

About the same time Dr. Ba Maw approved the constitution of the Planning Board, the members of which were Dr. Ba Han, U Saw Lwin and U Illa Min. (U Soe Nyun and U Ba Nyein, members of the Research Commission, are not mentioned). The Planning Board is to undertake the reconstruction and complete regeneration of Burma and to put into practice the valuable knowledge and experience obtained by the Research Commission. It is to operate with the aid of Japanese advisers, who are perhaps the same as the 30 experts selected by Ogawa, the Chief Adviser, as mentioned under the heading "The Cabinet". The advisers may provide the key to the rather mysterious Planning Board and its antecedent Research Commission. It is obvious that no three men, however gifted, would be qualified, or have the time, to devote intelligent study to a

range of subjects covering practically the whole field of Government ; nor could a Board of three profitably co-ordinate and supervise so many varied and technical activities. If, however, the aim is to strengthen the Japanese hold on a more closely planned Burmese economy without antagonising the people too much, what better way could be found than the appointment of a Board with Japanese advisers to reconstruct and regenerate Burma ? There is plenty of evidence that Burmans are not satisfied with Burma as it is, and the promise of a new order might allay discontent for the time being. From a practical point of view, too, Ba Maw realised that he needed Japanese advisers to furnish the technical and other knowledge which was not otherwise at his disposal. In addition to the advisers, Ba Han, while in Tokyo, asked for professors of medical, scientific, engineering, legal and economic subjects to be sent to the newly-reopened University of Rangoon and these too are apparently being selected.

The variety of Governmental Boards is bewildering, and the line dividing their functions from those of the non-official organisations is not clear from the information available to us. The Economic Board, the Commodity Supply, Control and Distribution Board (working with a "similar Japanese board" and with the non-official Commodities Distribution Association) and the National Resources Mobilisation Board must largely overlap, and their joint and several consultations cannot but delay action. When to these are added the Planning Board and the Japan-Burmese Joint War Co-operation Commission (the Second Committee of which is "in charge of economic problems") one can only conclude that the machinery of economic administration in Burma, except where the Japanese take control in their own interests, is as confused as the conditions with which it has to deal. The chaos has largely been created by Japanese action, and the multiplication of boards by the Burmese Government has not helped to straighten it out.

## PART II.

### 1. District Administration.

*Organisation and Powers.*—At the head of each district there is an executive officer called, in Burmese, *Kayaingwun* and, in English, District Commissioner. In rank he corresponds with the Deputy Commissioner of former times, but he is shorn of nearly all the functions of District Magistrate, which are now transferred to the District (Civil) Judge, also called the Divisional Magistrate. The *Kayaingwun*, however, retains his powers under the "preventive" law to band down people of bad livelihood, and so forth. Though we have not an up-to-date list of officers of the Burmese Government, it appears that most of the *Kayaingwuns* are former Deputy Commissioners or men who would have been eligible for promotion to the rank of Deputy Commissioner. Before Ba Maw's Executive Administration was formed in August 1942 a certain number of Thakins, pleaders and school-masters were appointed to district posts, including some of *Kayaingwun*, and some of these remained in office even after the grant of "independence" in 1943. An order of the *Kayaingwun*, Mawlaik, states that he was appointed by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief on the recommendation of the Burmese Executive Administration; but this was before the days of the "independent" Government.

The same divorce of magisterial and executive functions extends to the smaller units of administration. The subdivisional and township officers have no magisterial powers; these are exercised by the "subdivisional magistrates and judges" at subdivisional headquarters and by "headquarters magistrates and judges" at township headquarters. There are also wholetime magistrates and judges at district headquarters. All these try civil as well as criminal cases.

The separation of magisterial and executive functions is unassailable in theory. The question has been examined more than once by previous Governments, but the expense, for one thing, was always found an insuperable difficulty. The introduction of the change by the Ba Maw Government is no test of its practicability in normal times, for evidence from several sources shows that the volume of civil litigation has greatly decreased. The Home Ministry's report for 1942-43 in the Financial & Economic Annual says that the new arrangement evoked a crop of protests from executive officers, and that experience showed that it weakened their control of law and order. It was hinted that this defect might have to be corrected.

The *Kayaingwan* is given the help of a Headquarters Assistant, who is also Treasury Officer, and an *Akunwun*. The post of Treasury Officer used generally to be combined with that of Headquarters Magistrate under the old regime, while the Headquarters Assistant was also a Magistrate. It should be easy to combine the non-magisterial duties of Treasury Officer and H. Q. A.

The Civil List of April 1943 shows H.Q.A.s appointed even to small districts like Kyaukse and Sandoway; but as explained under the heading "Territorial Jurisdiction" it seems that only 15 districts are to have H.Q.A.s in future.

From the existence of an *Akunwun* (revenue officer of Class II or lower rank) in the same Administration Bureau as the *Kayaingwan* it may be inferred (as is indicated by other information) that the *Kayaingwan* exercises the same powers in revenue matters as the Deputy Commissioner used to do. The Rangoon *Kayaingwan* is also Collector.

The *Kayaingwan*, H.Q.A., *Akunwun*, Subdivisional Officer and Township Officer form part of the Administration Bureau (or Department), while the Divisional Magistrate and all other magistrates and judges belong to the Judicial Bureau. There seems to be (in April 1943) no Director of the Administration or of the Judicial Bureau; apparently, therefore, as in the days before evacuation, the executive Civil Services (Burma Civil Service Classes I and II and Subordinate Civil Service) are not under a Head of a Department; while for the Judicial Services the place of the Head of the Department is taken by the High Court (Supreme Court). On the revenue side the *Kayaingwan* comes under the General Revenue Bureau.

In January 1944 the following emergency powers were conferred on *Kayaingwuns* :—

1. Power to transfer officer of any department within the district ;
2. Power to require any officer of any department in the district to furnish the *Kayaingwan* with his tour programme in advance, and to stop him from going out on tour or to recall him from tour if any matter of importance arises in connection with the war ;
3. Power to direct any officer of any department to suspend his normal work temporarily, and to assign him to any important war work.

These emergency powers are much less extensive than the emergency powers of Deputy Commissioners in 1941-42; but there is a clause laying down that if Government declares a

state of emergency owing to the war in a district, the *Kayangwun* must at once assume emergency powers and carry on the administration. This is presumably intended to cover more than the three powers specified above.

*Recruitment and Pay.*—An advertisement issued by the Public Service Commission in October 1943 called for candidates for a post of District Civil and Criminal Magistrate on Rs. 300 per mensem. It is not quite clear what this post is, the pay would be very low for even a subdivisional magistrate with any experience. Township Judges were told that they were eligible to apply. Other sources speak of the following levels of pay.

	Rs.
<i>Kayaingwun</i>	.. 800
Secretaries to Govt	.. 600 to 800.
Heads of Bureaux ..	.. 400 to 600
D.S. Ps.	.. 500
D.F. Os.	.. 250 or 300
S. D. Os.	.. 250 or 300.
Supdts. of Excise ..	.. 300
Township Officers ..	.. 200
Sub-Insprtr. of Excise ..	.. 150

These do not all relate to the same period. The question of pay-scales apparently gave a great deal of trouble, and there are many references to their impending revision. As mentioned in the section "Governmental Boards", a special committee was formed to deal with pay and dearness allowances, but it is not known whether it has succeeded in introducing regular and consistent scales, or whether the new scales apply to officers already in service. Article 43 of the Constitution Act appears to confirm them in their old scales.

In January 1944 it was announced that a training school for the Burma Civil Service was to be opened about 4-1/2 miles from Rangoon, and that a three months' course would begin on the 1st February. Admission to the course seems to have been by selection, not by examination. As noted elsewhere, appointment to the Class I and II Services is to be made on the advice of the State Services Board.

### Political control of district administration.

As early as 1942 representatives of the Dobama Sinyetha Asi-Ayon are stated to have been appointed to each district, subdivision and township. They are apparently paid by the Party, and not out of Government funds; their names do not figure in the Civil List for April 1943. Their duty is to form



branches of the party, to shape public opinion, to watch administrative officers and stamp out opposition to the party policy. The district leader is known as the *Kayaung-gaung-saung*, and is in practice more powerful than the Government representative, the *Kayaungwun*, who is obliged to consult him regarding his dealings with the public. In October 1943, the "New Light of Burma" printed a candid article saying that in some districts officers even in the performance of their duties cannot go against the *Kayaung-gaung-saung*. Officers of township rank, it said, are called upon to furnish him with supplies, and otherwise to do as he tells them; if they resist, he threatens to report them to the *Adipadi*. Other information is that transfers of officials on account of *Gaung-saungs'* reports are numerous. In January 1944 we find the *Kayaung-gaung-saung* of Thayetmyo making arrangements to distribute food and other commodities by cart in Thayetmyo, Prome and Muibu districts—a task that would ordinarily be discharged either by Government officers or by one of the many boards dealing with supplies.

The *Kayaung-gaung-saungs*, as has been stated, are representatives of the Party, but unfortunately for Ba Maw he cannot rely on the complete loyalty of the Thakin elements in the Party. He therefore maintains secret agents, or secret police, of his own in the districts. These are described as a sort of Gestapo, and they watch the officials for signs of disloyalty to Ba Maw. They are not concerned with corruption, which is said to be very bad. No reports have been received of their inflicting any punishment; probably they are mere informers.

### Japanese control of district administration

The Japanese had military and administrative officers in the districts from the beginning of their rule, and the Civil List for April 1943 shows Nippon district officers, who were civilians, at many, but not all, district headquarters. There is a report in January 1944 of a Japanese administrative officer at Myaungmya and one or two at Moulmeingyun, though there were none at Labutta or Hlaingbon in the same district. Administrative officers, therefore, may have remained after the grant of "independence"; but, whether they did or not, it is known that Japanese control has, if anything, been tightened. One informant says that once the independent Government had been set up the Japanese cut out the civil administration, such as it was, and increased their direct exploitation. The Japanese control transport, for instance, which is vital for district administration, and when Ba Maw tried to obtain more transport to distribute food, he was allowed only one

railway wagon a day. In the districts, besides transport—which includes cattle taken from the plough—the Japanese requisition food, clothing and livestock. The informant last mentioned describes the relations between district officials and local Japanese Commanders as follows :—

“ Principally owing to bad communications, *Kayaing-wuns* and *Ye-Boh-Hmus* (District Superintendents of Police) are at the beck and call of the Japanese Army and have no chance to appeal to the Government in Rangoon. They spend their time obtaining labour for the Japanese, and in doing whatever the local Japanese want. Any protest, hesitation or failure results in face-slapping, both in their offices and in public. The *Kayaingwun* of Pinyinmana, for instance, personally accompanied a batch of labourers he had enlisted to Thanbyu-zayat to see that they really arrived and to save himself a slapping. District officials were enthusiastic about obeying Ministers’ orders in 1943, but very quickly lost all inclination because they became very “ browned-off ”—they hate the Japanese, hate Ba Maw, hate the situation and conditions, and hate the war ”.

In the war zones, at any rate, the Japanese Army has a free hand, and throughout the country the Japanese are the rationing authority for sugar and salt for the general public, (not for Government servants), and acting through the Japanese Commodity Distributing Association, which has almost a monopoly of trade, they charge what prices they like for these and other commodities. Japanese officers control recruiting for the Sweat Army and the *Heiho Tat*, while Japanese military police conduct house-to-house searches, maintain order and deal with spies.

### Practical results of district administrative system.

From the facts and opinions recited above, it seems that effective powers in the districts reside above all in the Japanese military and civil officers, next in the party leaders (*Kayaing-gaung-saungs*), with the District Commissioners, the Government representatives, filling only the third place. The resulting loss of enthusiasm has already been mentioned. The observer previously quoted remarks—“ Officers take jobs for ‘ *awza* ’ (prestige), but do no work and rely on bribes to cover the cost of living. District officers from up-country take ten days annual leave and go to Rangoon and laze away their time for a couple of months or so. Many officers who should be in their offices at Rangoon go to a safe village up country and laze away their time, only appearing in Rangoon in time to draw their pay. Ba Maw is quite powerless to stop this ”. Elsewhere he says, “ Government servants, who are nearly all

anti-Japanese and not a few pro-British, are just sitting back. Communications are so bad that Government orders rarely reach them, and if they do, can safely be ignored. Many D.Cs. are doing their best to arrange food supplies for the people, but are not having much success owing to Japanese opposition and Japanese requisitioning not only of food and clothing, but of the all-important transport....The only administrative functions performed at all are those performed voluntarily by the East Asia Youth League, who receive wholehearted co-operation wherever they go."

Corruption as is openly admitted by members of the Government, is rife. The State Services Board and the four newly appointed Commissioners are enjoined to stamp it out, and the revision of pay-scales is contemplated with the same object in view.

It would, however, be wrong to infer that the wheels of Government have stopped altogether, though they move slowly and ineffectively. The working of the civil and criminal courts is dealt with in another section; and there is evidence of other activities of Government officers in the districts. Reports of police investigations and arrests commonly appear in the newspapers. A certain amount of land revenue has been collected in spite of difficulties caused by the loss of records. In January 1944 the Government remitted town land rents at Minbu on account of destruction caused by enemy action; apparently, therefore, they had at least been assessed. Auctions are held for the sale of leases and licenses for liquor shops, ferries, markets and fisheries, and arms licenses are issued. Crop reports from many districts appear in the newspapers, though, owing no doubt to poor communications, they are belated, and there are none from Arakan; but at least they show that the Land Records Department is at work. Similarly the reopening of treasuries and sub-treasuries is proved by several reports and newspaper items. Excise and opium cases are sent up for trial by the Excise Department in Rangoon and the districts, and the Township officer Letpadan, held a conference of headmen in March 1943. Newspaper reports of such matters are scanty, it is true; but even in peace-time few reports of commonplace events appeared in the Rangoon papers, except those occurring in Rangoon and a few other favoured centres.

## 2. Law and the Courts.

As a general rule, the law in force in Burma before the evacuation has been continued. A proclamation by the Japanese Military Commander in Burma in 1942 confirmed

the old law and procedure, but excepted from the jurisdiction of the Burmese courts cases triable by Japanese Military Courts, civil cases between Japanese and "foreign" subjects, civil cases between Japanese subjects, and criminal cases against Japanese subjects. The excepted cases were to be tried before Japanese Military courts or special courts or by the Japanese Police. By the same order the High Court of Rangoon and other courts in and outside Rangoon were reopened; and it was laid down that the Japanese Military Commander had the right to revise decisions of the High Court. The language of the Courts was to be Japanese or Burmese, but "owing to present circumstances" English could also be used. Some provision was made for the trial of cases pending before the courts at the time of the evacuation of Burma. In February 1943 the High Court was transformed into the "Supreme Court", and a Chief Justice and three other Judges were sworn in. The Chief Justice and one other Judge had been Judges of the High Court before the evacuation.

The Supreme Court is the highest Court of Appeal (save for the Japanese Commander), and all death sentences passed by the subordinate courts must be referred to it for confirmation; but it has been deprived of its original civil and criminal jurisdiction.

The Constitution Act generally confirmed the arrangements introduced in the preceding February. Burmese is to be the official language of the New State; the language of the Courts is not specially mentioned, but the Supreme Court is said to deliver its judgments in Burmese. A complaint appeared in a newspaper in September 1943, that English was still being used in the Tharrawaddy Courts. The Japanese extra-territorial rights are secured by Article 35\*; but Article 34 states that the decision of the Supreme Court shall be final and conclusive, which, if meant literally, implies the surrender of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief's right of revision.

The use of existing laws, subject to the provisions of the Constitution Act, is prescribed in Article 23. The number of Judges of the Supreme Court is at the Head of the State's discretion (Article 29). The legal qualifications of a Judge [cf. Section 81(3) of the Government of Burma Act], have not been laid down in the Constitution Act, but the first appointments were evidently made with regard for legal experience. Like the Government of Burma Act, the Constitution Act prescribes that a Judge may not be removed except for misbehaviour or for infirmity of mind or body (Article 32). The salaries of Judges are not mentioned.

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\*See, however, the Nipponese Nationals (Trial of) Act, mentioned below

Notices in the newspapers show that advocates and pleaders have been registered in the Supreme Court under the Legal Practitioners Act, and there is evidence of their appearing in Courts. Advocates' and Pleaders' examinations were to be held in July, 1944. Court fee stamps, as well as non-judicial stamps, appear to be in use, but the volume of litigation is small.

The former Penal Code, Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure and other Laws, including even the Defence of Burma Act and Rules, are still in force.

In the days of direct Japanese administration the Commander-in-Chief issued ordinances. Later, ordinances were enacted by the *Adipadi*, but since the Constitution Act was passed, the method of legislation is usually by Acts of the *Adipadi*.

There is no complete list of these ordinances and acts, but the following may be mentioned :—

*The Burma Monetary Arrangements Ordinance, No. 1 of 1942.*

Legal tender and adjustment of values of currency in circulation with those of Japanese currency notes.

*The Money-lenders Ordinance, No. 2 of 1942*

To regulate the business of Money-lenders and to ameliorate the position of debtors

*The Income-tax Ordinance, No. 5 of 1942.*

Apparently related to the establishment of Courts.

*The Income-tax Ordinance, No. 5 of 1942.*

Apparently authorised the collection of income-tax in advance.

*The Losses of Government Funds Enquiry Ordinance, No 6 of 1942.*

Conferred powers of a Court on a special officer appointed to investigate the losses of Government funds consequent on the British retreat

*The Tenancy Ordinance, 1943.*

Reduced agricultural rents by 50% for 1942-43.

*The Mill Production Tax Ordinance, No. 3 of 1943.*

Imposed taxes on production of rice mills, saw mills, oil mills, and wheat flour mills. Full text is available.

*The Burma Municipal Ordinance, 1943.*

Reconstituted municipalities.

*The Burma Constitution Act, I of 1305 (Burmese year).*

See Appendix I.

*The Burma Laws (Suitable Reform) Act, 1305.*

Adapted existing laws to the new Independent State.

*The Burma Bank Act, 1305.*

Established a State Bank.

*The Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1305.*

Enabled Sessions cases to be tried without assessors or juries.

*The Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1305*

Excluded the period between the cessation of the old Courts and the opening of the new in calculating the period of limitation in certain suits.

*The Indian British Subjects (Allies) Act, 1305.*

Provided that Indian nationals living in Burma or in friendly countries and members of the Indian National Army are to be regarded as nationals of a friendly country.

*The Burmese Stage Plays, Dramas and Orchestras Registration Act, 10 of 1305.*

Provided for compulsory registration. Full text is available.

*The Ratification Act, 1305.*

Authorised the reopening of cases pending in courts of law at the time of the British withdrawal, and the hearing of appeals from and revisions of orders passed by courts duly constituted at the time of the withdrawal.

*Nipponese Nationals (Trial of) Act, 1305.*

Conferred jurisdiction on any Burmese court of law to try Nipponese nationals prosecuted for offences punishable with imprisonment for not less than six months.

(The "Burmese Era" states that the Government has empowered all subdivisional judges under section 4 of the Act to try all cases which are not exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, in which the accused or one of the accused is a Nipponese national, with effect from the 30th December, 1943)

*Burmese Nationals and Domicile of Foreigners Act, 1305.*

Defined the words "Burmese National" and prescribed qualifications for foreigners who wish to be naturalized.

An Act or Bill called "The Criminal Courts Act" is mentioned in a newspaper of the 27th January, 1944. It provides for sessions cases to be taken up direct by Sessions Courts (Divisional Magistrates) without committal proceedings, and

for empowering selected magistrates to try summarily all offences not punishable with death or transportation for life. It is not clear whether the Bill has been passed into law.

"The newspapers from time to time report judgments and sentences passed by the Supreme and subordinate courts in criminal cases. One interesting judgment of the Supreme Court (Ba U & U Myint, JJ) touching the preservation of the existing law, was reported on the 31st August, 1943. A dacoity with murder took place in Mergui District in 1940, long before the invasion of Burma. The Mergui Police arrested a number of men, and sent them up before the Mergui "Peace Committee", which had taken on itself the responsibility for law and order after the invasion and before the Japanese established regular government. The Thakin who was at the head of the Mergui Peace Committee sentenced some of the accused to death under Section 396, Penal Code, others to be whipped and others to two years imprisonment. To quote the report :—

"The Judges said that when the British troops left Burma, although the officials appointed by their Government had run away, their laws had not disappeared. They existed as before. But as there were no courts the light of the law had been dimmed. But it would be wrong for any man to say that a crime may be committed with impunity before the country becomes settled. According to the ruling laid down in Appellate Case No. 130, all cases shall be tried and judged according to the existing law. In this case Thakin Tun Sein convicted the accused on the statements of witnesses recorded by the Police Officer, and none of the witnesses was examined on oath. Accordingly the conviction and sentences were set aside and it was ordered that the case be retried by a Special Power Magistrate."

Shortly afterwards the Supreme Court set aside another conviction, where the District Superintendent of Police sentenced a man for murder under Section 302, Penal Code, to pay a fine of Rs 300, or in default of fine to suffer three years imprisonment. Apart from its having been passed by a Police Officer, this sentence, if correctly reported, was a very odd one indeed. The Supreme Court appears to be making an effort to reaffirm established principles of law.

The jurisdiction of the District Judge (Divisional Magistrate) corresponds in area with that of the former District and Sessions Judge, not with that of the former District Magistrate, who was in charge of only one District. Thus in April 1943 the Divisional Magistrate, Moulmein, is shown as responsible for Moulmein, Thaton, Tavoy and Mergui Districts. The highest magisterial and judicial officer stationed in Tavoy

and Thaton Districts was a Joint Divisional Magistrate, whose jurisdiction extended to the same group of districts *plus* Papun ; Mergui had to be content with a subdivisinal magistrate and judge. There was a rather similar arrangement in the Pyinmana-Yenangyaung-Minbu group of districts ; the Divisional Magistrate had his seat at Pyinmana, Yenangyaung had a Joint Divisional Magistrate and Minbu one subdivisinal magistrate and one subdivisinal magistrate and judge.

The Divisional Magistrate and District Judge is said to have the old powers of the District and Sessions Judge. The terms of the ordinance by which the powers of Sessions Judge and of District Magistrate have been combined in one person are not known. According to information relating to 1942-43 all subdivisinal magistrates have "special powers" and all township magistrates ("headquarters magistrates and judges") have "summary powers". As the previous laws continue in force, these powers are presumably the same as the special and summary powers described in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Reported decisions by Courts include some by the Divisional Magistrate, Pakokku, the Joint Divisional Magistrate, Toungoo, the Subdivisinal Magistrate, Myaungmya, and the Township Magistrates, Toungoo, Kyangin and Paungde. The T. M. Toungoo passed a sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 489 (C) Penal Code. A notice to a party in a suit, published by the Township Judge, Meiktila, shows that this court was at work and following the Code of Civil Procedure. The existence of honorary magistrates is mentioned in the Financial and Economic Annual, 1943.

The Upper Chindwin District, or parts of it, according to one report are not under normal judicial administration. The headmen appointed by the Japanese are said to try all petty criminal cases and punish offenders, while serious cases are sent to the Japanese authorities at Tunbin.

A report from Lower Burma, relating to the end of 1943, states that penalties are more severe. Bail is not allowed, cases are tried much more summarily, but there are frequently long delays in trials. Some of this delay is no doubt due to difficulty in securing the presence of witnesses.

### 3. Police.

By A. H. Watson, I.P.

There has not been very much information forthcoming regarding the Police in Burma since the first volume was published.



Two publications, however, namely the Burma Civil List and the Financial and Economic Annual, July, 1943, have come to light and a certain amount of helpful information has been gained therefrom.

(a) *Administration*—The old set up seems to have been followed with very few changes, the head of the Police being now known as the Director of Police Administration ; assisted by a Deputy Director of Police Administration. Before the granting of so-called ' Independence ' however there were no less than 7 Japanese Police Officers placed above the senior-most Burma Police Officer, U Ohn Gyaw. The compilers of the Economic Annual, who evidently desire to paint a rosy picture of conditions in Burma under Japanese-granted " independence ", are forced in their report on the Police Bureau to admit that the discipline and conduct of all ranks of the police left a lot to be desired and that there was much room for improvement. They also admitted that the strength of the police had to be increased by 20 per cent above the 1939 figures and that there was a sad lack of equipment, particularly of fire-arms.

It is interesting to note that two important recommendations made by the Inspector-General of Police, Burma, Simla, in his reconstruction proposals have already been carried out in Burma. Station Inspectors are reported by one source to have been placed in charge of Police Stations in Burma assisted by Sub-Inspectors of Police for investigation purposes. In addition, under the regime now existing in Burma a District Superintendent of Police is no longer subject to such control as was previously exercised by District Magistrates/Dy. Commissioners.

A certain amount of information regarding the Police has come to light from perusal of Burmese papers. In the ' New Light of Burma ' a farewell function was reported on while the 5th batch of students passed out of the Police Training School. Much advice was given to the students by the Home Minister to do their best to eradicate bribery and corruption. These were stated to be the chief evils of the former Police Force.

At the end of 1943, a long editorial came out in the New Light of Burma intended to educate the public to better relations with the police, in which everything bad in the police was blamed on the previous British control. All sources agree that the Burma Police is very badly off as regards uniform. No new uniforms appear to have been issued since their re-establishment. Later reports regarding uniforms even state that the civil police wear civilian jackets and *longyis*, being distinguished only by a strip of white cloth with a Japanese inscription

in red worn on the right shoulder. The rank and file of the Police seem to be mostly those who were Police Constables under the old regime, and from what can be gathered those officers and men who were good workers under the old regime appear to be working well in the new administration and for the Japanese.

There have been large scale removals in some districts. According to one source no less than 73 members of the Rangoon City Police were removed for dishonesty and inefficiency in December, 1943.

The pay of the senior officers is said to be less than before and the pay of Station Writers, Head Constables and Police Constables has been raised. In December, 1943, the following was reported to be the pay of the Police Force :—

			Rs.
District Supdt of Police	..	..	500
Inspector of Police	..	..	150
Sub-Inspector	..	..	75
Station Writer	..	..	75
Head Constable	..	..	65
Police Constable	..	..	40
Head Clerk	..	..	100
Upper Division Clerk	..	..	75
Lower Division Clerk	..	..	65

It is interesting to note that the Budget Estimates for 1943-44 amount to Rs 1,12,93,464. The figures for the whole of the Police and no charges in England, which means, if these roughly Rs. 1,50,00,000. There are, however, no Burma Military Police and no charges in England, which means, if these charges are deducted from the previous figure, that the present Government budget estimates are only 13 lakhs short of our budget figures in spite of the hopes that large reductions would be effected in the Police budget. In addition, the Government do not appear to have provided the Police with uniform and equipment, always a costly item in the budget.

(b) *Crime*.—The Annual admits that it has not been possible to obtain accurate statistics of crime. Even with the figures it has been possible to obtain, however, an enormous increase of crime in Burma is apparent. During a 10 months period, for instance, there were 2,093 murders reported, compared with a usual 1,200 annually under the old regime, whilst under dacoity the increase has been even more phenomenal, 7,909 dacoities in 10 months having been reported compared with 679 in one year before.

In the districts of Maubin, Tharrawaddy and Henzada for the same period of 10 months referred to there were between

750 and 1,000 cases in each district. Slightly lesser numbers were reported in other districts and it can, I think, be taken for granted that there must have been, in addition to these reported figures, a good volume of unreported crime.

A very reliable source who came out of Burma recently paints a very dismal picture of administration in the districts. District Commissioners and District Superintendents of Police have lost any inclination for any efficiency they might have had on their first appointment, and have to spend most of their time working for the Japanese and carrying out whatever orders the local Japanese Commanders may have, on pain of their faces being slapped for non-compliance. The same source reports that owing to inflation, salaries are quite inadequate and officers accept jobs merely for 'Awza' (prestige) and rely on bribes to cover the cost of living; Police Constables often resign their appointments and drive trishaws.

Another reliable source who escaped from Upper Burma at the beginning of this year (1944) paints a similar chaotic picture of conditions in Upper Burma. He stated that as regards Upper Burma certainly, none of the Courts appear to be functioning and that cases as far as he could see were sent up by the Police and decided by the local Japanese Commanders. He also stressed that a great deal of dacoity and theft was taking place and that a large number of fire-arms and grenades are being used by the dacoits. There are still plenty of arms and ammunition available, although the Japanese are trying their best to withdraw arms and ammunition and punish heavily anyone having unlicensed firearms. The penalty for being found carrying unlicensed firearms is reported to be death, and frequent searches are carried out by the Japanese on travellers all over Burma for this purpose. A report from the Bassein area during early 1944 reports execution as the usual penalty for dacoity and murder whilst in cases of lesser importance sentences much heavier than in British times are given, with whipping more common and more severe.

All this points to the fact that though the Police are now established in name and in certain places in large numbers, and although many deterrent sentences have been passed, they are comparatively ineffective as a body in stopping crime. Their task, it must be fairly admitted, must be a formidable one, in view of the fact that the 'Adipadi' has recently set free many prisoners from the jails in order to celebrate Burmese Independence; and in view of the economic distress which must have reached a pitch never before attained in Burma. In addition, the Police have to deal with all the old prisoners who were in jail under our administration and released on evacuation.

(c) *Japanese Military Police*.—The Commander of this organisation is again reported to be Major-General Kinoshita and there is no doubt that the Japanese Military Police wields great power all over Burma and is greatly feared not only by the Burmans but by Japanese soldiers themselves. A favourite punishment practised by the Japanese Military Police consists in the pulling out of finger nails, and the expression “are your nails hurting you” is a common joke nowadays. The Japanese Military Police also apparently assists in the administration of health laws, particularly in the beating up of those householders who do not catch at least one rat a month. The result of its persistence has been that a flourishing trade in dead rats has grown up. The Japanese Military Police seems to have all the characteristics of the ‘Gestapo’ in Germany with complete freedom to bully and punish as it pleases. The Japanese Military Police is also particularly concerned with so-called sabotage, especially in the stealing of telephone and telegraph wire. Any cases discovered of this nature usually end in the death penalty.

#### 4. Jails.

By Lt.-Col. P. K. Tarapore, I.M.S. (retired).

##### Administration and Management of Jails.

The Judicial Department controls the Prison Department. Theoretically this is the same arrangement as the British Government had before evacuation.

The head of the prison department under the designation of “Director of Burma Prisons Bureau” is U Ba Thain, formerly Superintendent of the Combined Borstal & Senior Training School at Thayetmyo. His departmental experience was confined to that school and he had never been in charge of a jail. Under the former regime every jail was in the charge of a Superintendent paid on different scales according to the importance of the jail. The Civil List of April 1943, however, shows that certain jails were in the charge of subordinate officers such as Chief Jailors. It may be further noted that the Prison Bureau is classed as a “Subordinate Service”, and that the salary of the Deputy Director has been fixed at Rs. 300 per month.

##### Jails (Number and Classification).

Of the seventeen jails open up to April 1943, five were in charge of Deputy Superintendents and twelve in that of Chief Jailors. Three more jails were opened by November 1943. But beyond their names, no other information is available. An

attempt has been made to classify jails but none to classify offenders. There are four classes of jails. Class I is supposed to confine a population of over 1,000 prisoners, Class II between 300 and 1,000, Class III between 100 and 300, Class IV below 100. Police Lock-ups are now under the Prison Bureau. What arrangements exist for the inspection of these Lock-ups (over 360 under British rule) is not mentioned.

The Borstal School at Thayetmyo has not been re-opened. Juvenile offenders therefore are confined in the same jails as adult prisoners, though the Bureau claims that they are segregated within the jails.

### Prison Population.

According to the Director the population of jails is 50 per cent of what it used to be under the British regime. Considering the disturbed state of the country and the bad economic condition, one would expect the prison population to increase. The explanation of the reduction of the population is probably to be found in the methods of dealing with offenders. Apparently very few of them are sent to prison. The rest are dealt with summarily either by flogging, tying up to a tree and starving for three days, by hanging or beheading.

### Staff (including training).

In his broadcasts the Director does not let go any opportunity of telling his audience how much better trained his present staff is than what the British Government had. That this is not correct can be gathered from some of the broadcasts in which the Director proposes to start a training class for prison officers at the Insein Jail and to depute State scholars to Japan, one of these scholars to learn prison administration. From an advertisement dated the 5th November 1943 for a jailor "urgently required" for an unimportant jail like Bhamo, it does not appear as if old jailors are very anxious to co-operate with the prison authorities.

### Revision of sentences.

There is an amusing method of revising the sentences of prisoners. An order was issued in August 1943 through the Director, Publicity and Propaganda Department, as follows:—

"On the day of the winning of Burma's independence the *Adipadi* in token thereof ordered that prisoners should draw lots for release from jail and thus 320 prisoners have been set at liberty.

But the *Adipadi* was not satisfied with setting free only 320 prisoners. He therefore issued the following orders so

that prisoners in jail may rejoice as much as others over Burma's independence :

(1) On the 1st Waxing of *Wagaung* (1-8-43) Government will select five of the worthiest cases among prisoners awaiting sentence of death and commute that sentence to penal servitude for life.

(2) On the 1st Waxing of *Wagaung* the unexpired portion of the sentences of all undergoing imprisonment will be reduced by one-third ”.

### Discipline.

A claim is made by the Director in one of his broadcasts to the effect that all oppressive methods (not named) under British administration were abolished. There is ample evidence however that flogging is very frequently resorted to by the new regime, that penalties are very severe and that treatment of prisoners in jails is cruel.

Discipline amongst members of the staff also does not appear to be good. For example six prisoners escaped from the Toungoo jail on 25-3-43. It was stated that warders on duty “were absent”. “The escapees in conjunction with ten other prisoners had time to remove the floorboards of the wards, to secure a ladder which they placed against a wall and with the help of a blanket made their escape good.”

### Industries.

The industries mentioned are of a primitive type such as :— Making of coir and hemp rope, bamboo and canework, growing of vegetables, manufacturing *khamauks* (bamboo hats), breeding of cattle and *soorki* pounding. There were some well-established industries in the jails of Burma such as spinning and weaving on handlooms which are not mentioned. Even taking the present population as 50 per cent. of the prison population under British rule, the income from industries is a fraction of that of pre-evacuation days. The total income from industries during the financial year 1st April 1943 to 31st March 1944 is given as Rs. 76,600. With double that number the income during 1940 was a little over Rs. 6 lakhs.

### Medical and Health.

There is no definite information on this subject. “Doctors” seem to have been appointed for duty in jails for the first time during January 1943. How many have actually been appointed to look after the health of the jail population is not known. There is a talk about “improvement of water supply” during February 1943. This points to the occurrence of water-borne

diseases such as cholera, dysentery and typhoid, though no specific mention has been made of these diseases. We know, however, from other reports that epidemics of cholera and small-pox did occur in parts of Burma and forcible inoculation and vaccination were resorted to by the Japanese authorities. One report says that the health of prisoners was bad, many of them suffering from boils and sores.

#### **Jail Budget ("Financial and Economic Annual—July 1943")**

Only rough figures of the budget estimates for 1943-44 are available. The estimated expenditure for the period is given as Rs. 20,14,980 which is about the same figure as we spent during 1940 for double the number of prisoners.

The number of prisoners or that of the members of the staff is not obtainable. But expenditure per head seems to have gone up tremendously, as in one of the broadcasts the Director says he has got only half the number of prisoners the British Government had. The increase in expenditure is the more remarkable in view of the fact that no jail clothing is supplied and the food is of a poor quality.

The new regime can be said to be spending two rupees at least to our one. This is not surprising, as the cost of necessities such as rice and cooking oil has gone up several hundred per cent.

#### **Clothing, bedding and feeding.**

According to one report "In jail, convicts were allowed to wear the clothes they came in. When these became unserviceable they either wore gunny bags or went about naked". Another report states that rice and curry are of a poor quality. There is no information regarding a scale of diet.

#### **Propaganda.**

There are some incorrect statements made with the obvious object of glorifying the present regime such as :—"The present department is manned by personnel who have been properly trained. These trained men are in charge of your prisons". Where these properly trained men were obtained from is not mentioned. As a matter of fact, the Burmese Civil List April 1943 shows that 29 jailors out of 42 are ex-jailors trained by the Prison Department under the British regime.

"During the previous regime the expenditure of the jail department was Rs. 34 lakhs. It is only Rs. 13 lakhs now, (11-4-44), though since there are now only half as many prisoners as there were during the previous regime the figures should be Rs. 17 lakhs." The Director has made an error of no

less than Rs. 13 lakhs in calculating the expenditure on jails before evacuation. During the year 1940 the maintenance charges for prisons amounted to just under Rs. 21 lakhs. So the new regime has not practised such great economy as the Director claims to have done.

There are one or two amazing statements apparently made with the object of running down the previous regime. They are as follows :—"Formerly during the time of the English, prison administration was very poor. Although petitions were allowed to be forwarded through the committees formed it was found to be of no use". "It was seen that as there was no association to give him help and he was not taught a livelihood in jail, the ex-convict could not work for a living". Both the statements are incorrect. Petitions were forwarded not through a committee, but through the Superintendent of Jail to the Judicial Department. Every case was considered on its merits and final orders of Government were communicated to the petitioner in each case. There were two excellent un-official institutions, one to assist released adult prisoners and the other to help Borstal boys released on license. The Burma Prisoners Aid Society intended for assisting adults had functioned for very nearly 20 years in Rangoon. The Borstal Association intended for assisting boys released from the Borstal school was inaugurated soon after the school was started and assisted hundreds of boys, over 90 per cent. of whom were found on investigation to have made good. Even if the Director did not know of the existence of the Prisoners Aid Society, he certainly knew the Borstal association because he had constantly to deal with it. He was moreover an *ex-officio* member of the managing committee.

As to the statement that prisoners "were not taught a livelihood in jail", there were innumerable industries carried out by the department under the British regime from the crudest to those requiring great manual skill. To mention just a few, jails used to teach prisoners to spin and weave, carpentry and cabinet making, carving, smithy and tin smithy. Apart from these, they were taught to use simple machinery making stockings, putties, blankets and so on, while the jail branch press and the boot factory at the Insein Jail provided training in the use of delicate and intricate machinery. About 500 prisoners were also employed at the Tharrawaddy Jail in tailoring, which included the art of cutting out garments. There was a special officer whose sole business was to develop industries. He was in turn assisted by a staff of technical experts at various jails.



### Conclusion.

The department does not seem to get much attention from the Japanese Government, who probably leave the treatment of offenders to Burmese officers. Discipline amongst prisoners is being maintained by ruthless and cruel methods. The staff, including the Director, are ignorant of the principles of jail management though at the same time they try to run down the previous regime. Very little attention, if any, is paid to important measures like the classification of casuals and habituals, and the complete separation of young from grown-up offenders. The excellent Borstal School at Thayetmyo has not been reopened. Medical arrangements do not appear to be satisfactory. Expenditure on jails seems to be much higher than previously in spite of the claim of the Director to the contrary. Receipts on the other hand are much lower, pointing to lack of organization and technical knowledge at both the head office and jails.

### 5. Education.

By A. E. J. McLean, I.E.S.

“ The youth of a nation are the trustees of posterity ”.

Heaven help the nation whose youth are despoiled. After the Japanese conquest of Burma General Iida, Supreme Commander, was not slow in announcing his policy for the reconstruction of the educational system of the country. He declared it was his policy to establish at least one National School in every village but it soon became evident that the real object of his policy was designed to eradicate all British and American influence and train the youth of the country to become good little Nipponese. All references to British and American ways of life have been expunged from text books, which now teach children to emulate the Japanese master-race and to copy their ideas regarding *bushido*, honourable suicide, and the use of trickery when the end justifies the means. The Japanese language has been made compulsory or is at least strongly encouraged in all schools, while English has been abolished. The new system has been much advertised in the press and on the radio, special emphasis being laid on the teaching of discipline, patriotism, and noblemindedness. Those who remember the widespread indiscipline of school children and the school strikes of recent years will welcome this drive for greater discipline, but it is open to conjecture whether the discipline aimed at is self-discipline or the discipline of the Japanese jack boot. In fact however there are few innovations in the structure of the new system except that some of the

proposals of the Campbell Report have been put into effect. The old heterogeneous system of Vernacular, Anglo-Vernacular and English Schools, Government and aided, has been replaced by a unified and homogeneous system of primary, post-primary, and University Preparatory Schools (known in the Campbell Report as pre-University schools) all under the control of a central authority. Schools under local bodies have been eliminated, except those under the Rangoon Corporation, and there appear to be no other aided schools. It is reported that teachers are to be paid a minimum wage of Rs. 50 per month. Schools were first opened at Tavoy, Mergui, Moulmein, Rangoon and in the Delta area and the latest reports indicate that some 47 high, 157 middle and 2,588 primary schools have been established with an enrolment of some 2,50,000 pupils. When we left Burma over 6,00,000 pupils were receiving instruction in 392 high, 977 middle and 5,485 recognised primary schools of all kinds. It is difficult to gauge the measure of success achieved but one remark in regard to a certain district may be typical of most. It was reported that "no schools are opened, Inspectors are seldom seen and teachers struck work because they got no pay." In order to remedy this state of affairs Teachers Associations have been formed in the following districts: Bassein, Tharrawaddy, Hanthawaddy, Maubin, Moulmein, Kayan and Amherst, while it is proposed to increase the numbers in the near future. No doubt the *Hpongys* *Kyaungs* are functioning as usual in the villages off the lines of communications. It appears that some Indian and Chinese schools have been permitted to re-open. The former nine charges of Inspectors of schools have been retained together with 94 sub circles under deputy Inspectors. The Education Department is under the control of U Cho, formerly Additional Assistant Director of Public Instruction, as Director of Education with U Ba Win as Education Minister. Most of our former inspectors and deputy inspectors of schools have been recalled to their old jobs. A grandiose scheme has been evolved to utilise the radio and the cinema in all schools but it is doubtful whether these projects have actually been implemented. Little news has been received regarding the syllabuses in force and the standard of attainment achieved but it has been stated that vocational training will play a prominent part in the school curriculum. It has also been stated that particular attention will be devoted in future to physical training. Lady Physical Training Instructors have also been appointed to give physical training to future mothers. In addition to the ordinary schools enumerated above we are told that the following special schools have been or are to be opened; a Co-operative Training School for instruction in Agriculture, Cottage

Industries, and animal husbandry, a Livelihood Training School for special vocational training, an All Burmese Commerce School teaching commercial subjects, and a State Polytechnic. While for women and girls a school for domestic management or home arts was opened in Rangoon as well as special war time instruction classes for sewing and weaving. A school of Domestic Science has been opened with 29 students on the rolls. The "*Adipadi*" is reported to have made a donation to the Blind School, Kemmendine. There is of course nothing new in all this, except that some of the names have been changed.

After some misfires the University of Rangoon, i.e., University College without of course Judson College, was formally opened in February 1944 at St. John's Convent, Commissioner Road, with Professor Pe Maung Tin as President or Chancellor. A list had previously been published of those who had been successful in the Intermediate examination. It is stated that 200 men and 30 women students were admitted in the first term and that the Teachers Training College was opened during the previous year with 221 students on the rolls under its former Principal U Ba. Thirteen subjects were scheduled for study in the University. These include Mathematics, Science, Economics, History, Geography, Engineering, Pali and Biology. It was proposed to engage a number of Japanese Professors from the Kyoto Imperial University, but as the medium of instruction is Burmese and as most of the European and Indian Professors of the old University evacuated to India it is difficult to see how a high standard of learning can be maintained. In an interview the Chancellor stated that the fundamental aims of the University would be to wipe out the old "slave mentality" fostered by the British and inculcate a National consciousness harmonious with the basic ideals of Greater East Asia while educating the future Burmese leaders who would bring the nation to the fullest fruition of its aspirations. It was intended to open the Engineering College, the Forestry College, and the Agricultural College as soon as possible. Some reports state that the Medical College has been opened but details are lacking.

In pursuance of their policy to establish the Greater East-Asia (Japanese) Co-prosperity Sphere in Burma as quickly as possible an intensive campaign was launched to make every one learn Japanese. Teachers were imported from Japan and special Japanese schools were set up all over the country, 50 such being established in Rangoon alone. Government servants have to learn Japanese and even the clerks in the Secretariat have to attend lessons every day before commencing their work. Lessons were given daily on the radio and prizes were

offered to those who made themselves proficient in the language. As already stated Japanese has been made compulsory in all schools, although other languages such as French, German, Chinese, Shan and Thai may be permitted as optionals.

A state translation bureau has been set up with a view to translating the world's most famous books as well as Japanese books into Burmese. The Burmese Writers Association is stated to be compiling a Burmese Dictionary and a world encyclopaedia. A state library is to be established in Rangoon and libraries opened in all important towns. It may be noted that in pre-war days some 5,000 books were published annually, consisting chiefly of books on religious topics by learned *Sayadaws*. There were also the usual number of novels of doubtful literary quality on sex and social subjects, and many translations of Western books mostly relating to education.

A Burmese Cultural Mission of 28 members headed by U Ba Lwin formerly Headmaster of the Myoma National School was sent to Japan and conducted round a carefully selected tour of all the principal towns, factories, and sites of National importance. The members of the Mission were entertained by high ranking Japanese officials and were duly impressed by all that they were allowed to see. It has been proposed to send 50 influential Burmans every year to study the life and culture of Nippon.

It is recorded that 15 State Scholars have already been sent to Japan for technical training and plans are afoot to send 200 students every year for industrial training. In addition the Government of Burma will grant state scholarships to 25 selected candidates for the study of the following subjects; Banking, Radio, Engineering, Boilers and Steam Turbines, Electricity, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, Rubber, Railways, Hydro-Electric Works and Canal Engineering.

Further sidelights on the Japanese administration show that a military College has been established to train officers for the Burma Independence Army and Indians have been trained in Japanese to act as interpreters when India has been conquered. *Hpongys* have been encouraged to sit for the *Vinaya* and *Patamabyan* Examinations. Arrangements have been made for holding tenth standard and Teachers Training Examinations. The following societies have been sponsored by Government, the Burmese East Asia Youth League, to train boys and girls in war work, the Burmese Non-Partisan Volunteer Youths Organization to launch a campaign against illiteracy, the National Service Women's Association and the Girls East Asia Association, the Servants of Burma Society to encourage various patriotic activities, and the Nippon Burma Cultural Society.

## 6. Public Health and Medical.

By Colonel M. L. Treston, C.B.E., F.R.C.S., I.M.S.

*Public Health.*—After the withdrawal of the British the general health of the populace has deteriorated. Malaria began to take an increased toll in the Akyab, Kyaukpyu, Upper Chindwin, Lower Chindwin, Chin Hills, Salween, Prome and other districts. This disease is bound to increase and there is the danger of the malignant type previously confined to certain areas, spreading over the country. A disease new to Burmans is called 'Formosan Malaria' and its symptoms are high temperature and hardening of the neck and throat. Death very often ensues in three days. This disease seems to be a form of epidemic poliomyelitis. Beri-beri is reported from Insein, Hanthawaddy and Pegu districts. Translations of captured documents reveal that towards the end of 1943 cases of smallpox were occurring among Japanese troops and cases of cholera in Rangoon and among the coolies of the Railway force on the Sittang river and in the Rangoon, Pegu, Bassein area. There were fatal cases of plague in the Upper reaches of the Salween river, in the Lower Irrawaddy area and many cases South and North-West of Mandalay. Epidemics are obviously the order of the day. Plague is well established in Rangoon, where previously it was only sporadic. Smallpox seems to be general. Cholera is widespread and a further big outbreak may be expected with the rains. Venereal disease has also increased through lack of medicines. Burmans now refer to venereal disease as "Japanese typhoid," insisting that the Japs have introduced a new and virulent type. Admittedly an imported type would thrive. The so-called Japanese Typhoid is almost certainly one of the varieties of Pseudo-Typhus, as venereal disease does not normally give rise to fever. The Japanese military authorities seem to have taken prompt steps to combat epidemic diseases primarily to protect the troops. Outposts for compulsory vaccination and inoculation were established at the Scott market, Insein, Prome-road, Kamayut, Taikkyi, Hlegu, and other places to protect the people proceeding to Rangoon. Volunteers moved about the streets of the City and compelled the people to appear before a doctor in the street to be inoculated and vaccinated. The military out-posts in road-crossings in districts also checked up the refugees and travellers, and inoculated or vaccinated those who did not possess certificates showing that they were already protected. An outbreak of plague in Rangoon started late in 1942 and was very bad till June 1943. All houses suspected of plague were railed off and to prevent people from coming or going to such houses the

A.R.P. and the police went to great trouble in isolating them. Rat traps were distributed on a large scale and a fee of 10 cents. was paid for every rat killed, and anti-plague inoculation was extensively given. The incidence of small-pox, cholera, and plague during the period January to May 1943 as recorded in a report by the Burmese Government was as follows :—

		Smallpox.		Cholera.		Plague.	
		Attacks.	Deaths.	Attacks.	Deaths.	Attacks.	Deaths.
Rural	.	13,096	2,719	2,357	2,012	2,140	1,755
Urban	..	6,244	3,233	902	770	1,078	894
Total	..	19,340	5,952	3,259	2,782	3,218	2,649

These figures relate to a period of 5 months and should be considered to be a gross under-estimate. It is unlikely that the reporting agencies, who are for the most part the Headmen of villages, would have resumed their duties after the change-over of Governments.

The figures of inoculation, as reported in the periodical reports of the Burmese Government, are given below .—

	Vaccination.	Anti-Cholera inoculation.	Anti-Plague inoculation.	No. of rats killed.
Half month ending 31-10-43	36,187	10,282	19,792	14,690
Half month ending 15-11-43	..	36,690	13,619	22,592
For the month of December 1943	.	144,860	115,554	69,754

With the exodus of the Indian day and night conservancy sweepers, there was great difficulty in keeping the urban areas clean. In Rangoon the streets were cleaned by the small number of Indian coolies who have remained behind. The water-borne system of sewerage does not seem to have been restored and the Municipal Health Officer issued a notice in September 1943 insisting that all householders should provide buckets in the latrines and that on failure to do so the Corporation would supply the bucket and recover the cost from the house owner. The members of the East Asia Youths Association among other things are reported to have made a drive to clean the latrines and make new ones themselves and the Servants of Burma Society (probably the same as the National Service Association) seem to have paid much attention to the sanitation of Rangoon, especially the clearing of refuse in the city. Another notice issued by the Rangoon Corporation in November 1942 stated that owing to the non-availability of water-purifying medicines the public should be careful with the water they drink.

Chlorine and other disinfectants seem to be scarce. No information is available regarding other areas. Sanitation at best must be of a primitive type and reports pointed to dysentery being endemic, which is what one would expect. In addition there seems to be general malnutrition, which lowers the resistance to all diseases, and beri-beri, at one time confined to the coastal areas, seems to be general throughout the country.

As is to be expected, a number of gazetted officers and Sub-Assistant Surgeons of the Public Health Department have rejoined duty with the Burmese Government.

The Central Health Examination Institute was opened in May 1943. The 'Preparation' section of the institute manufactures plague, cholera and smallpox vaccines with the help of the key personnel from the Japanese Army Medical Department. The 'Examination', 'Education' and 'Research' sections have not been developed for want of skilled officers. It was announced that the Public Health Inspectors Training class would be reopened and candidates were advised to send in their applications before 2nd October 1943 and classes probably commenced in January 1944. The Vaccinators training class does not seem to have been opened. The Civil Surgeon of one district is stated to have instructed the Village Headmen to perform vaccinations and supplied them with lymph for the purpose. Registration of vital statistics, which was brought up to a high level in towns and to a satisfactory standard in 30 out of 40 districts, has been very badly neglected and the registering agencies do not appear to have been supplied with the necessary registers for this purpose; and it is feared that this work will have to be started anew.

The budget estimate of the Burmese Government for expenditure on Public Health for the year 1943-44 is Rs 14.42 lakhs. It is presumed that this figure includes the expenses of some of the local bodies on Public Health. During the year 1939 the expenditure of the Government of Burma on Public Health was Rs. 12 lakhs and the expenditure by local bodies was Rs. 105 lakhs. The Burmese Government is issuing broadcasts on Public Health subjects and has sponsored and helped a fitness campaign movement..

#### *Medical.*

(a) *Hospitals*—Against the 315 hospitals open in Burma at the time of evacuation Japanese-occupied Burma has managed to open only 96 hospitals

(b) *Medical Stores*—Evidence of the scarcity of this item is shown in all reports. A considerable quantity of medical

stores was left behind on evacuation. Granted it could be got hold of, there were sufficient drugs in Burma to last for about 12 months. After that it would be necessary to import them, and it seems that that has not been done in sufficient quantities for the civil population. It is possible that a large quantity of medical stores in hospitals and Chemists' and Druggists' stores were taken away by looters, etc. The Burmese Government is making frantic efforts to get these on to the market, but considerable difficulty is being experienced to get these 'dealers' to be reasonable in their prices.

(c) *Medical Personnel*.—A number of those who were left behind in Burma are working for the Burmese Government, but there is still a very great dearth of such personnel.

(d) *Professional and Technical Education*.

(i) *Medical College*—The Medical College which used to turn out the graduate in Medicine has been opened. Details of the courses of instruction are not to hand but judging from a "Notice" in a local paper requesting persons who own books, apparatus, instruments, etc., to sell these to Government, it would appear that the Medical College is hard pressed for some of the bare necessities of equipment, etc., and the standard of the courses must therefore be much lower than in pre-evacuation Burma.

(ii) *Medical School*—This institution seems to have been opened in January 1944. No indication has been given as to the nature of the course or the qualification of the candidates admitted.

(iii) *Nurses Training*—Some training in this direction has been resumed, but the details of the course are not known.

(iv) *Compounders*—No training is being given but an examination has been held for those who had completed or almost completed their training, presumably, in pre-evacuation Burma.

*Finance*—The Budget Estimate of expenditure of the Burmese Government on the Medical Bureau for 1943-44 was Rs. 12 36 lakhs. The expenditure of the Government of Burma on the Medical Department during the year 1939-40 was Rs. 43 lakhs: and in addition Hospital Committees, Lepet Asylums and Private Aided Hospitals spent about Rs. 40 lakhs a year for medical relief.

From the medical standpoint there is a great dearth of hospitals, hospital equipment, drugs and staff. The efforts of the Japs where the Medical College is concerned, will be to turn



out glorified dressers, who will probably be better than nothing. There is little doubt that any hospital equipment and drugs which were not taken into Japan are used for the Army, and as a consequence there can be little for the civilian. Equally doctors who have been conscripted seem to be mainly employed in military hospitals.

From a Medical and Public Health standpoint, Burma will be in a parlous state, when the Japs run out. Semi-starvation will be universal, and epidemics of plague, cholera and small-pox, an all round the clock occurrence. Malaria in its most malignant form will have swept through the whole of Burma and the lack of sanitation will result in dysentery being an every-day occurrence.

To add to this, there will be legacies in the shape of pseudo-typhus, and venereal disease of a virulent type. Drugs will be practically nil, and there will be little equipment, and none of the more advanced and important.

## 7. Forests.

By F. T Morehead, I.F.S.

*Administration.*—Early in April 1942 the Burma *Baho* Government was set up in Rangoon under the leadership of Thakin Tun Ok. The first order issued by this 'Government' on 7th April 1942 included the following section under "Forests":—

"No one may cut Teak, *Pyinkado*, *Thingan*, *Thitka*, *Kanyin*, *Thitya*, *Ingyin*, *Thitse*, *In* or *Pyinma* Nothing may be cut in plantations. Anyone disobeying this order will be severely dealt with."

There is no evidence to show that anything was done to put this order into effect and the general picture of Burma from April to August 1942 in respect of all aspects of administration including that of 'Forests' was one of chaos.

On 1st August 1942 a Japanese-sponsored Administration was set up under Dr. Ba Maw which included a Ministry of Forests and Mines under U Hla Pe (Karen) as Minister with U Soe Nyunt (I.C.S.) as Vice Minister and U Hla Shein (since reported dead) as Secretary. U Thein Lwin, a Deputy Conservator of Forests of the Burma Forest Service, Class I, was appointed Director of the Forest Bureau from 1st August 1942; in September U Hman and U Saw Sein Tin both of the B.F.S. Class I, were appointed Deputy Directors in charge of the Upper and Lower Burma Forest Circles respectively: by December 1942 District Forest Officers and assistants had been appointed to 25 newly constituted Forest

Districts. A comparison between the British Forest set-up of 1941 with that of Dr. Ba Maw of 1942 is given below :—

*Burma excluding Federated Shan States.*

British 1941.		Dr. Ba Maw's 1942.	
Forest Department.		Forest Bureau.	
Chief Conservator ..	1	Director .. ..	1
Territorial Forest Circles under Conservators .. ..	5	Forest Circles under Deputy Directors .. ..	2
Specialist Circles under Conservators	2		..
Territorial Forest Divns. under Divisional Forest Officers .. ..	31	Forest Districts under District Forest Officers .. ..	25
P.A. to C.C. Forests ..	1	Headquarters D.F.O. .. ..	1
Extraction, Sales and Depot Divisions under D.F.Os. ..	4		..
Specialist posts of Forest Economist, Silviculturist and Forest Entomologist	3		..
Actual strength of Gazetted Forest Officers .. ..	144	Gazetted Forest Officers ..	105

Out of the total of 105 gazetted forest officers shown in the Forest Bureau 45 are traceable as former gazetted officers of the Burma Forest Service, Class I and II.

According to a Domei message from Rangoon, dated 16th April 1944 the Ministry of Forests and Mines was about to be amalgamated with those of Public Works and Reconstruction. No reasons were given for this

2. *Forest Organisation and Protection.*—According to a report of the working of the Ministry of Forestry and Mines for the period 1st August 1942 to 31st July 1943 there was no regular organised forest administration from April to August 1942 and “a certain amount of unscientific exploitation, theft and depredation took place which caused considerable damage to reserved forests, but all such losses are the natural consequences of war and must therefore be accepted as part of the price the country will have to pay for its freedom.” The Ministry issued special instructions for “.....the re-establishment of offices, the recovery of the scientific records such as Working Plans, of live and dead stock and for the disposal of forest crimes committed during the period of disorder.” The Report complains that Budget provision for Conservancy, Maintenance, and Regeneration was “necessarily inadequate” and of the handicaps of working without quinine, baggage elephants, and guns. 15,484 forest offence cases were stated to have been detected during the period of the report. Although local reports up to the middle of 1943 indicated that in some Upper Burma areas there was little effective check of illicit felling by villagers it is reasonable to assume that the Forest Bureau had achieved fairly effective general protection of Reserved Forests and of teak both in unclassed and reserved forests by the end of 1943.

### 3. Exploitation.

#### (1) Stocks of timber left in Burma in April 1942.

A rough estimate of these is as follows :—

Description.	Number.	Tons of 50 cubic feet.
<i>Teak.</i>		
Standing girdled trees .. .. .	806,000	1,600,000
<i>Logs</i>		
(i) Partly extracted .. .. .	850,000	850,000
(ii) At Rangoon Depots .. .. .	350,000	350,000
Converted teak timber .. .. .	.	15,000 (converted)
<i>Hardwoods (very rough estimates only).</i>		
<i>Logs</i> .. .. .	250,000	250,000
Converted timber at mills & depots .. .. .	..	75,000 (converted)

(2) *Exploitation Agencies.*—The Nippon-Burma Timber Union, which was a commercial combine including the Japanese concerns of Mitsui Busan Kaisha, Mitsubishi, Ataka Shokai and Menka, appears to have come into being in 1942 for the purpose of exploiting Burma's timber. Expert forestry, sawmill and shipbuilding personnel were called for from Japan as early as May 1942 and during 1943 sawmill personnel were advertised for in Rangoon. U Kyaw Myint, formerly a forest assistant of Messrs Steel Brothers in their Northern area, Myitkyina and Bhamo, was called down to Rangoon and returned to Myitkyina with authority as a forest manager of the Union to requisition all the available elephants, collect staff, and to start extraction of teak. A report of October-December 1943 mentioned that the Nippon-Burma Timber Union was also working in the Prome forests and doubtless its activities covered the extraction of teak from forests previously worked by the 5 big European lessees whenever this was feasible.

(3) *Girdling of teak.*—As teak has to stand for 3 years after being girdled before it becomes light enough to float any girdling undertaken from 1942 onwards would be with the long-term object of securing continuity of supplies after the huge stocks left in April 1942 had been exhausted. Girdling of teak during 1943 was reported in the Bhamo-Shwegu area but a report of March 1944 stated that this had been stopped ; no information is available regarding girdling in other areas but it is probable that as the operation was being carried out in forests as far north as Bhamo it was also carried out in the more accessible forests of Lower Burma.

(4) *Extraction*.—The report of the Ministry of Forests and Mines referred to in para. 2 above states that the Forest Bureau has been meeting the demands of the military in more ways than one by supplying firewood to the Railways and telegraph poles direct to various units of the Army and co-operating with the Nippon-Burma Timber Union for the supply of teak and hardwoods. Local trade in bamboos, firewood and thatching materials was reported to have become brisk but “.....trade in timber has not been what it used to be”.

In January 1943 the villagers of Lonhaw, Zahaw, and Sainghu were extracting green teak and large quantities of bamboos for supply to the Japanese army at and near Gangaw. During the first half of 1943 employees of Messrs. Steel Bros., were engaged under Japanese direction in extracting made teak logs from the Myitkyina forests and by June had started felling of girdled trees in forests near the mouth of the Mogaung River. A forest officer who accompanied air-borne forces into Burma reported in March 1944 that Forest Department employees told him that no extraction was going on in the Katha District either of teak or hardwoods ; an alleged reason for this was lack of elephant power.

In view of the great quantity of made logs, both of teak and other timbers, left in Burma and either already partially extracted or available at main depots, it is probable that ‘new’ extraction from the forests has been on a relatively small scale and confined to meeting both Army and Civil demands in areas where ‘made’ logs were not already available.

(5) *Sawmilling*.—The pre-evacuation sawmilling capacity of Burma was about 800,000 round tons yearly. 20 per cent. of this was estimated to have been destroyed, and 40 per cent. immobilised for 6 or 9 months, at the time of evacuation. As early as July 1942 sawmill engineers from Japan were being called for. Photographs and ground cover indicated that timber was moving through depots and that sawmills were restored and operating on a considerable scale during 1943 both at Rangoon, Mandalay, and Moulmein, and at smaller outlying centres. Advertisements appeared in the “New Light of Burma” in September and November 1943 calling for personnel to work in Rangoon sawmills. Recent (March-April 1944) air cover however indicates that several of the larger Rangoon mills which had been working during 1943 are now closed down.

(6) *Disposal of timber*.—Reports and air photographs indicate that timber has been used extensively by the Japanese in Burma for repairs and new construction of bridges, for hutting, for railway sleepers, telegraph poles, and for defence purposes generally. As already mentioned where neither

'made' logs nor converted timber were readily accessible to the site of work it was probably easier to extract new logs from the forest and rough fashion or handsaw same on the spot. It is likely that large numbers of teak logs went adrift down the main Irrawaddy River and the Rangoon river during the rains of 1942 ; a notice issued by the "Nippon Burma Timber Union" about the middle of 1943 offered high rates for the collecting of teak logs stranded on the banks of the Rangoon River from Monkey Point to the sea and rafting of same on high tides to Obo log depot near Syriam. It is probable that large numbers of drift teak logs were collected and utilized for domestic purposes by villagers both along the main rivers and in the Delta : many logs will have drifted out to sea. In April 1943, 8 small wooden vessels were reported as under construction at the Government Dockyard at Dawbaung, Rangoon, a report of July 1943 stated that landing craft, about 100' long, were being constructed at sawmills along the river bank at Moulmein ; a more recent report states that up to March 1944, 10 wooden vessels had been completed at the Dawbaung dockyard, at the foreshore near Botataung Pagoda and at the B. B. T. C. Dunneedaw mill.

Little information is available regarding export of teak, and seagoing steamer shipping has been almost absent from the Port of Rangoon since August 1943. Penang was reported in June 1943 to be the scene of great activity in building wooden ships over 1,000 of which were said to have been seen in that port. It is possible that Burma teak has been carried by small vessels from Rangoon to Penang and other shipbuilding centres along the west coast of Malaya and the Netherland East Indies. The Japanese have been short of steamer shipping and have used small craft extensively for their operations in the Pacific and elsewhere. The fact that considerable stocks of teak and hardwoods were available from Siam and Indo-China would not lessen the desirability of keeping west coast boat and shipbuilding ports supplied with Burma teak for new construction and repairs.

4. *Elephants*.—Prior to the evacuation there were about 6,000 timber-working elephants in Burma of which about 4,500 were owned by the big teak lessees and Government, and 500 by indigenous private owners. Except for one report dated November 1943 to the effect that 39 elephants were working timber in Bassein no information is available regarding timber elephants in Lower Burma. In Upper Burma however reports indicate that elephants were collected and used there extensively by the Japanese army for transport purposes. Elephant men called up to work teak in Messrs. Steel Brothers'

Myitkyina forests for the Nippon-Burma Timber Union were required to sign an agreement that they would follow the Nippon Army when called on to do so. It is unlikely that many of the elephants used for Army transport purposes will survive the campaign and one can only hope that a fair proportion of the animals left behind in Upper Burma in 1942 will have escaped and reverted to wild conditions of living. In Lower Burma it is reasonable to suppose that the reorganisation of timber extraction will have ensured some care being taken of lessees' working animals and that indigenous elephant owners will have taken steps to look after their own elephants.

5. *Game*.—Conditions prevailing after the evacuation *i.e.* lack of law and order, the existence throughout the country of almost unlimited supplies of firearms and ammunition, and a general shortage of food supplies, were ideal for the widespread destruction of game. It was reported in December 1942 that animals in the Pidaung Game Sanctuary near Myitkyina were being shot to provide meat for the Japanese troops and that villagers were encouraged to shoot wild elephants and to hand over the ivory to the Japanese at a nominal rate; venison was being hawked in and around Myitkyina. By the middle of 1943 however the Japanese were said to have reappointed Game Rangers and to have closed the reserve to the public. No further information is available regarding game preservation.

## 8. Agriculture.

By R. Watson, I.A.S.

Large areas have been thrown out of cultivation throughout the country due to

(i) shortage of cattle for ploughing (see the section under the heading "The Veterinary Department"),

(ii) shortage of labour,

(iii) lack of transport for distribution of surplus produce, and

(iv) lack of confidence and security.

*Paddy*.—Paddy is by far the most important crop in Burma. Before the war approximately 12½ million acres, representing 70 per cent. of the total cultivated area, were under paddy. Rice is the staple food of the local population, and the surplus over local requirements is exported. The normal exportable surplus in pre-war years stood at 4½ million tons of paddy, equivalent to 3½ million tons of rice and rice products.

After the outbreak of the Japanese war, the Burmese cultivator was left with almost the whole of the exportable surplus of paddy from the 1941-42 crop on his hands. It was difficult to dispose of this surplus in countries within the "Co-prosperity Sphere", as French Indo-China and Thailand, both with big exportable surpluses, are better situated for this purpose. Disorganisation of markets naturally led to a reduction in paddy acreage in the following cropping season. The 1942-43 crop was estimated at 4 million tons of paddy, *i.e.* about 30 per cent. of the normal. This, together with the 3 million tons carried over from the previous year, gave a total supply of 7 million tons, leaving some 4 million tons as exportable surplus for the year. The problem of disposing of this remained unsolved and led to further deterioration of the paddy market and a further reduction in paddy acreage in the 1943-44 season.

To relieve agrarian distress and to avoid the probability of a food crisis, which a progressive reduction in acreage might in time bring about, Government had to introduce a paddy purchase scheme in December 1943. Under this scheme they promised to purchase 52,000,000 baskets of paddy during the year.

At the same time a "grow more food" drive was started. Government advanced crop loans and promised to buy all surplus paddy, and a production target of four million tons was aimed at. Estimates based on aerial cover and other sources of information placed the cropped paddy area at some  $7\frac{1}{2}$  million acres, or 60 per cent. of the normal.

Indifferent cultivation due to shortage of cattle and unsatisfactory rains are said to have reduced the outturn to some 40—50 per cent. of normal.

*Fibre Crops.*—Before the war cotton was the only fibre crop of any real importance in Burma, but attempts seem to have been made first by the Japanese military administration and subsequently by the Ba Maw Government to introduce jute cultivation in Lower Burma. Jute, if grown successfully, would provide an alternative crop to paddy and would also help to relieve the situation arising from an acute shortage of containers. These are essential for the easy movement of certain kinds of produce within the country and for export. About 10,000 acres were said to be under this crop in 1942-43 and a big extension of the area in subsequent years was contemplated. At the same time cultivators were encouraged to grow other fibre crops, such as sann hemp, roselle, lady's finger, &c. The success of these attempts is very doubtful and particularly so with regard to jute.

Cotton, with a normal area of about 400,000 acres, was an important crop of the dry zone in pre-war Burma. The annual production is estimated at about 18,000 tons of *kapas* valued at Rs. 1,12,23,000. Most of this crop was exported to Japan before the war. After the occupation of Burma, Japan showed an immediate interest in the cotton crop. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture appointed three Japanese firms "to control the growth and harvest of cotton" and a Five Year Plan to increase its production by 400 per cent. in three years is said to have been introduced. The produce was bought through the agency of the above firms and in spite of shipping difficulties attempts were made to export the crop. Three thousand five hundred tons are said to have arrived in Japan in January 1943 and another 3,500 tons were reported to be on the way.

At the time of evacuation about 17,800 tons of cotton were left in the country. The acreage in 1942-43 was reported to be 285,720 acres with an estimated outturn of about 8,500 tons. Acreage appears to have remained the same in the following year, but the Japanese claim that the figure of 528,000 acres was reached in the planting season for 1944-45.

While the Japanese are undoubtedly in urgent need of cotton, the Burmese are interested in retaining a portion of the crop in the country to relieve somewhat the acute shortage of textiles in Burma. The Japanese military administration found it necessary to use an anti-hoarding ordinance to force stocks into the market. Ba Maw's Government is said to have organised a spinning and weaving industry to supply the internal needs of the country. 150,000—300,000 Japanese spindles are reported to have been imported and in May 1943 the Japanese firms agreed to release a sufficiency of baled cotton for internal consumption. In spite of these expedients, however, the clothing problem in Burma appears to be far from being solved.

*Oil-seeds.*—Vegetable oils form an essential article of diet in Burma. These are obtained mainly from groundnut and sesamum. In pre-war years the normal acreages were about 700,000 acres groundnut and 1½ million acres sesamum, producing 40,000 tons and 22,000 tons of oil respectively, after allowing for seed requirements, &c. The pre-war internal consumption of vegetable oils is estimated at a little over 69,000 tons, including 1,200 tons of cotton-seed oil and 500 tons of mustard oil. The deficit of about 5,000 tons was mainly met by imports of groundnut both in the seed and the oil forms.



Market reports from occupied Burma reveal abnormally high prices for cooking oils. In September 1943 a price of Rs 1,000 per 100 viss was quoted in Rangoon as against a pre-war average of Rs. 75, pointing at least to serious local shortages. Disorganisation of transport and milling facilities and currency inflation are no doubt important contributing factors. Acreages for 1942-43 are reported as 718,390 acres for groundnut and 937,000 acres for sesamum with estimated outturns of 169,000 tons and 47,300 tons respectively. After allowing for seed and other purposes, these should give a total oil production of about 50,000 tons, which leaves a deficit of about 19,000 tons. If the drive for increased production of cotton has succeeded as the Japanese have claimed, there is no reason to believe that the cooking oil situation will have improved during the 1943-44 season, as any increase in the cotton acreage must generally be at the expense of groundnut cultivation.

*Other Crops*—The country was almost self-sufficient in sugar, of which about 40,000 tons were produced annually. In addition, about 17,000 tons of cane jaggery and 50,000 tons of palm jaggery were consumed. One sugar factory at Zeyawaddy (Toungoo District) and another at Sahmaw (Myitkyina District) shared the production of white sugar. Both were immobilised at the time of evacuation, but the Japanese were reported to have brought them into working order, and also the factory at Hninpale, which had been lying idle. The Sahmaw factory is now believed to have been put out of action by allied bombing. White sugar manufacture appears, therefore, to be confined to the Pyinmana-Toungoo and the Bilin tracts. Pre-war sugarcane acreage stood at about 48,000 acres. The present acreage is not known. Sugarcane requires very good cultivation and is one of the most expensive crops to grow, and shortage of cattle and credit are likely to have affected the acreage considerably.

Other crops of importance are beans (1,350,000 acres), millets (550,000 acres), maize (186,000 acres), tobacco (95,000 acres) and chillies (73,000 acres). Little information on these crops is available.

## 9. Irrigation.

By N. T. C. Hay, I.S.E.

There is very little information available as to what is happening to works of the Irrigation Department, but the general indications are that the activities of the Department are going on along much the same lines as before. An "Irrigation

Bureau" has been set up under the Ministry of Communications, Labour and Irrigation. The Director is U Ba Gyaw, B.Sc., and there is now little doubt that this is U Ba Gyaw, Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Department, who was left behind in Burma at the time of evacuation. An unknown person, U Kyaw Sein, was appointed as Assistant Director, but later information indicates that the Assistant Director is now U Ba Hli, who was at one time an Irrigation Engineer, but who had been Superintendent of the Government Technical Institute, Insein, for some years prior to evacuation.

The Quarterly Civil List corrected up to April 1943 indicates that a considerable number of permanent Irrigation personnel is employed in areas with which they are familiar. In general it is noticed that Subdivisional Officers are employed as Executive Engineers, and Overseers are employed as Subdivisional Officers. In addition there are a considerable number of unknown people employed.

A report on the working of the Ministry of Communications, Labour and Irrigation for the period from 1st August 1942 to 30th June 1943 gives a summary of the main functions of the Irrigation Bureau. It states:—"The main functions of the Irrigation Bureau are construction and maintenance of irrigation works, construction and maintenance of embankments, control of embankments constructed and maintained by the villagers, training of hill streams, control of inland waterways and construction of new channels, maintenance of two important navigation canals, viz, Twante Canal and Pegu-Sittang Canal, maintenance of a minor canal in Upper Burma, viz Shweta-chaung Canal, dredging and reclamation works carried out for the Government, as well as for other public bodies and the collection of tolls from crafts and rafts passing through the navigation canals."

This statement covers pretty well the whole field of pre-war Irrigation Department activities and what evidence there is goes to show that the efforts being made are not altogether a failure. Inspection of aerial photographs shows that most of the Irrigation systems are working satisfactorily, and, incidentally, odd details indicate that the rules for the regulation of various headworks that were in force before are still being followed. However, statements made from Tokyo in the course of talks in Thai and Malay to the effect that "a new system of irrigation involving the Irrawaddy River" had been started and that "canals have been built and a dam constructed across the Irrawaddy", should be treated with extreme caution. The damming of the Irrawaddy anywhere below Myitkyina would

involve a work of great magnitude which could scarcely have been carried out since our departure, even under ideal conditions. No mention is made of any such scheme in the report of the ministry referred to above.

Serious damage is said to have occurred at the Man Canal Headworks at Aingma in October 1942, for the repair of which 30,000 was allowed in the following season. This weir was badly damaged in 1941 also, and it is probable that some extensive repairs may be necessary there on our return.

The sum of 1,00,000 sanctioned for repair work on the Mandalay foreshore indicates that the erosion that was occurring there in the early months of 1942 has persisted to a serious extent. This place is just upstream of the steamer ghats and at one stage before evacuation, it was proposed to sink an old I.F. flat in the scour hole. The fact that this work is under the Executive Engineer, Kyaukse Irrigation Division, is another indication that the old order is continuing.

There is practically no information to show what is happening to works in the Irrawaddy Delta, but there have been no reports of any major damage to embankments. The Twante Canal appears to be functioning and tolls are being collected, but all Japanese military vessels are exempted from paying tolls. Vessels belonging to Japanese firms are supposed to pay tolls, but it is observed in the Report of the working of the Ministry of Communications, Labour and Irrigation, that "steamers belonging to Nipponese firms did not stop and give tolls and therefore only entries are being made in the daily traffic return for presentation of bills at a later date".

Aerial photographs taken in March 1944 show that the Pegu-Sittang Canal has a very low water level. The Moyingyi Reservoir which is used to maintain the water level in the canal during the dry weather is completely empty, and therefore it seems that very little use is being made of the canal except perhaps for very shallow draft vessels or small rafts. The reconstruction of the Sinchedaing sluice in the Moyingyi Reservoir bund had been started before the evacuation but only the foundation work had been completed. A notice appeared in "The Sun" of December 26th, 1943 calling for tenders for cement for this work, but the aerial photographs of March 1944 showed that nothing appreciable had been done since we left in 1942.

## 10. The Veterinary Department.

**By Captain S R. Rippon, M.R.C.V.S., I.V.S.**

A Veterinary Bureau has been established, apparently on very similar lines to the pre-war Civil Veterinary Department, the

main difference in the general organisation being in the grouping of some of the districts, certain of these having been taken out of their former Circles and placed in others, while several headquarters have also been changed. There is a Director, who is a veterinary officer as before, being in fact the former senior Deputy Director who actually reached the normal retiring age on the 1st July 1942. Under him are Deputy Directors in charge of the three Divisions, formerly known as Charges Upper, Lower and Central respectively, while Arakan which used to be a Circle in the charge of a Class II officer coming directly under the Director, is now called a Division although it is still looked after by an Assistant Director and not a Deputy Director. There appear, however, to be four Deputy Directors altogether, as one is shown as being stationed at Pegu, in spite of the fact that Pegu is not the headquarters of a Division or even of a Circle and that the incumbent was a very junior Veterinary Inspector in the Class III Service before evacuation. Each of the other three Deputy Directors has in his Division two Circles with an Assistant Director in charge of each, which is the same arrangement as the old one of having the Charges divided into Circles with a Veterinary Superintendent in charge of each Circle. The Districts comprising each Circle have Veterinary Inspectors as before, 31 being on duty on the 1st April 1943, the majority being former Veterinary Inspectors of the Department, though in one or two cases very junior Veterinary Assistants appear to have been unaccountably promoted to Inspector rank, and there are even one or two Inspectors who by their names were not in the Department before. It is not known how many Veterinary Assistants have been re-employed, but it may be assumed that a number are working in township charges as before.

2 Some attempt has been made to produce prophylactic vaccines, for a former officer of the department who has some experience of laboratory work was appointed as Veterinary Research Officer in August 1942, and he is assisted by an Assistant Director and two Veterinary Inspectors. Work on vaccine production could not start until December 1942, as up to then the Japanese Army was occupying the Laboratory buildings, which were in the Veterinary College compound at Insein. Within a few months, in spite of difficulties in obtaining the requisite equipment, some vaccine was apparently being manufactured and issued to the field staff for use where there were serious epizootics. Reports indicate that the vaccines being produced are those to prevent rinderpest, anthrax and haemorrhagic Septicaemia, and they are said to be effective. A newspaper report states that the Veterinary Research Department has discovered a new vaccine for the cure of these diseases, but

this is patently absurd, as each disease requires its own specific vaccine, which prevents and does not cure. There is, in fact, little doubt but that the Research Officer is preparing the same vaccines as were being prepared continuously at the laboratory for years before the evacuation. Nevertheless disease, notably rinderpest, has continued to exact a heavy toll, especially in Upper Burma and Arakan, the field staff apparently being inadequate to cope with the widespread outbreaks. Probably, also, dislocation of communications may have resulted in delays in transport of the vaccines from the laboratory to the districts, with the result that on arrival in the outbreak areas the vaccine may often have deteriorated to such an extent as to be useless.

3. There is no indication that the Veterinary College has re-opened as a teaching institution for the training of more Veterinary Assistants, so presumably no steps are being taken so far to replace casualties and keep the field staff up to strength.

4. Early reports stated that veterinary hospitals had been established throughout Burma, yet months later it was said only that a plan was under preparation for the establishment of veterinary dispensaries at all district headquarters during 1943 or the beginning of 1944. The first reports probably referred to the posting of Veterinary Assistants to townships, with a small stock of drugs and instruments, as had been the ordinary procedure previously, and it is most unlikely that hospitals or dispensaries in the ordinary sense have been set up on anything like the scale which the reports suggest. It all sounds like mere propaganda for the benefit of those ignorant of the true conditions. In any case the opening of veterinary hospitals is not going to assist much in the control of outbreaks of contagious disease in the villages, which one would have thought would have received prior consideration. True, there has been talk of making vaccination of cattle compulsory, annually in certain cases and triennially in other cases, owing to the reluctance of cattle owners to have their cattle vaccinated. The annual vaccination would probably be against anthrax, on account of the immunity lasting only one year, and the triennial vaccination would probably be against rinderpest. On the other hand there are known to have been complaints by villagers that no action was being taken to have anti-rinderpest inoculations carried out, so that the necessity for any compulsory measures would hardly arise. This too, therefore, seems to amount to nothing more than propaganda or an attempt to boost the activities of the Veterinary Bureau.

5. The information regarding cattle-breeding operations is most interesting and illuminating. Although it is well known that the indigenous breed of Burmese draught cattle is emi-

nently suited to the country for the kind of cultivation which is required, no less a person than the Chief of the Veterinary Services—presumably the present Director in Burma—announced in a broadcast talk in December 1942 that the stock is not of a good strain, but that the Nipponese would improve this by importing cattle from other countries. Later on, however, in July 1943 we find a reference to the pre-war cattle breeding farm at Inbaung as being working, and carrying out breeding operations with animals of the pure Burmese breed. Incidentally, the Japanese themselves appear to have thought that, so far as Burma is concerned, the measures to increase the cattle population which they intended introducing in other of the Southern Regions would not be necessary, as they declared that in Burma “for the most part a natural increase is awaited”. How this natural increase is to come about when everything points to a very serious shortage due to their depredations, it is difficult to understand. Tokio went so far as to say in November 1942 that the pre-war cattle population of 5 millions had risen to 10 million, the reason given being that the Burmese did not kill cows. Why, in that case, the cattle population had not risen before it was not attempted to explain, but the underlying reason for this patently absurd piece of propaganda is clearly revealed by the statement immediately succeeding it, which was that Burmese beef is fit for packing and that a project for a packing works was under way. It was no doubt intended to export the meat to Japan. Strangely enough only a month after this broadcast the Chief of the Veterinary Services in Burma was announcing that owing to an indiscriminate slaughter of cattle, plus lack of attention paid to them in the past, the numbers had sadly decreased, but that the Government would take rapid measures to meet all demands. To what extent the cattle-breeding farm is functioning is not known. There was said to be a scheme for increasing the existing herd and for extending breeding operations to include goats, sheep and swine (for mutton and pork), and poultry, Government granting a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs for the purpose. The aforementioned Research Officer has also appeared in the role of Animal Husbandry Officer, but it is thought extremely likely that any scheme exists only on paper as nothing has been heard of it since.

6. Pony breeding was first being conducted by the Japanese Military Authorities, the Veterinary Bureau being concerned only in an advisory capacity on matters connected with hygiene. Later an eight year plan was devised, full details of which are not known, but according to which after the first five years there were to be 3,000 horses and mules produced each year. For this purpose a horse-breeding branch of the Land and

Agriculture Department was created, with a special officer in charge. This officer is believed to be a Burman who was interested in racing in Rangoon. Later it seems that a separate Horse Breeding Bureau was formed, with this man as Chief Officer. The Nippon Army, however, was still to assist in the horse-breeding scheme. It was intended to start horse-breeding associations, and to open stud-farms in many districts ranging from the Lower Chindwin to Thaton, and including the Shan States, Nippon Army officers assisting in their administration. The *Adipadi* is said to be greatly in favour of the scheme and to be willing to spend large sums of money to give it a start. In December 1943 sixteen supervisors were advertised for, as well as three superior officials for the larger stud-farms at Rangoon, Pyawbwe and Taunggyi, while in January 1944 horse-trainers and an N.C.O. for the branch of training horses for war were also called for by the War Ministry. About the same time a first batch of stud horses arrived from Japan and was awaiting distribution to the stud-farms. How the plan is developing is not known.

7. The Veterinary Bureau has continued the pre-war publicity measure of publishing articles in newspapers on contagious diseases, methods of their control, and so on, and has announced a new scheme of distributing pamphlets widely throughout the country. Actually there is nothing new in this scheme, which had been adopted many years ago.

8. The main fact, however, which emerges from beneath this facade of boosting and of propaganda, much of it false or merely bluff, is that the cattle population of Burma has become very seriously diminished and that there are now not enough cattle to carry on ordinary cultivation. The reasons for the grave shortage may be summarised as follows —

(a) Outbreaks of contagious disease, particularly rinderpest, but also anthrax and haemorrhagic septicaemia, combined with lack of facilities for preventive inoculation and inadequate segregation measures,

(b) indiscriminate slaughtering for food by the Japanese and others, which reached such lengths that newspapers were urging the people to refrain from eating beef. The Government have in fact passed a law forbidding the killing of cattle below the age of 10 years, while local movements have been set on foot to collect money in order to bid highest for auctioned slaughter-house licences and then to close down the slaughter-house,

(c) requisitioning of cattle by the Japanese for transport purposes, and their subsequent overloading and over-working,

(d) driving of cattle into the jungle to avoid them being requisitioned,

(e) cessation of the normal seasonal import from Siam and the Shan States,

(f) bombing and shooting up of cart transport by allied aircraft.

The position is so serious that the people are being told that the remaining cattle must be made to do 50 per cent. more work, that only one animal should be used in a yoke instead of a pair as hitherto, and that if sufficient cattle are not available the cultivators must be prepared to take their place and drag the plough instead.

9. So far as the Veterinary Department of the Rangoon Corporation is concerned, the former Veterinary Officer is again on duty, and in December 1943 or January 1944 by order of the Japanese Military authorities an inspection of horses and mares in the Rangoon area was to be held, at which the animals would be stamped. Defaulters were to have their horses confiscated, and henceforth all ponies without stamps were to be confiscated without notice, again by order of the military authorities. Periodic inspection of the gharry ponies of Rangoon was always a duty of the Corporation Veterinary Officer, particularly with a view to detecting cases of Glanders by the application of the Mallein test. It may be that this is the reason for the inspection and stamping now ordered by the Japanese, or there may be some ulterior motive connected with the acquisition of horses suitable for war work.

10. It is evident that the Jap has sought to convince listeners on the wireless that he is taking active measures to improve the livestock of Burma, for the benefit of the people; and some Burmese Veterinary Officers also, either from compulsion or choice, are lauding Nippon as the originators of measures for increasing the efficiency of the Veterinary Department, while all the time there has been practically nothing new introduced which would serve any useful purpose, and the Jap so far from caring for the welfare of the cattle has actively participated in their wholesale destruction. At the same time he has undoubtedly had an eye on the exploitation of the leather industry, as there are Nippon firms operating in Rangoon, Moulmein, Bassein and the Shan States and buying hides in large quantities. In other occupied countries too the Japanese attach great importance to the leather industry and doubtless their efforts to advance stock-breeding and rapidly increase the numbers of cattle in those countries are mainly directed towards the provision of hides for leather. It has already been stated



that they have an eye on the Burma cattle as suitable subjects for a meat-packing industry. Very clearly they care nothing for the cattle or the cultivator, and are out all the time merely to exploit.

### 11. The Transport Bureau.

The difficulties of transportation, and their effect on the Burmese economy, have been described in sections A, J, K and L of Dr. Andrus's report, and it is necessary here to add only a few words about the functions of the Bureau. This seems to have been established immediately after the Burmese Executive Administration had been formed on the 1st August 1942, and its work, according to the Financial and Economic Annual, 1943, was to obtain for civilians all possible facilities for travel and transport from the military authorities, to supervise ports, highways, motor vehicles and ferries and to license and regulate inland water transport. It apparently had no responsibility as regards railways except to co-operate with the Japanese control so as to secure accommodation for civilian passengers and goods. It also issued permits, in consultation with the military authorities, for raising sunken vessels. During the first year of its operation, the Bureau claimed to have enforced the registration of public and private motor-vehicles, sea-going vessels and river craft, except those used by the Japanese military administration, which were exempt; and the report says that steps were being taken to open all ports in Burma except Rangoon and Moulmein, which were under direct military control. The rest of the report emphasises the dependence of the Bureau on the Japanese; e.g. the Military Administration was requested to return motor and steam launches to their Burmese and Indian owners if it was not against the military interest, and to pay hire for the vessels that were still required; to release some launches for the use of district officers and to supply them with petrol and kerosene. The Government sanctioned the running of four passenger buses between Rangoon and Prome with a monthly ration of 45 drums of petrol; but the supply of petrol was stopped, and the bus service had to be suspended.

The Civil List for April 1943 shows that the Bureau had a considerable number of officers in the districts, but they were not very efficient, for in November of that year it was found necessary to open a class for training assistant transport officers. The Minister for Roads, Communications and Irrigation complained on that occasion that the department lacked experienced officers and vehicles, and that the officers showed no enthusiasm because they were looking out for better employment. Trans-

port was difficult because of the scorched earth policy carried out by the British, the prices of foodstuffs were rising and the despatch of mails was impeded. Later the newspapers reported that goods were being exchanged between Upper and Lower Burma by road and waterway, and ten big Government lorries were being used in this service. Private information from Rangoon, however, is that the Transport Bureau is a complete failure, without either vehicles or petrol. In April 1944 it was placed under the direction of the newly formed Ministry of Commodity and Transport, but it is not known whether the transfer resulted in any improvement. From ground sources we know that there is a trolley bus service from Tamwe to Ahlone, run by the Corporation of Rangoon, and infrequent bus services, owned by Japanese, between Rangoon and Letpadan, Letpadan and Prome, and Rangoon and Pegu. A few motor-bus routes in Rangoon have been opened, and there are also some Burmese buses, running on black market petrol and spirit distilled from rubber. Coastal shipping is mentioned, and apparently vessels plying on the rivers are available for civilian goods.

## 12. Posts and Telegraphs.

**By Brigadier R. Nesbitt-Hawes, C.B.E.**

The importance of the restoration of telecommunications and postal facilities to the resumption of normal life in Burma appears to have been fully realised by both the Japanese Control and the present Burma Government, and though reports of the extent to which this restoration has been achieved vary considerably it is evident that in spite of the lack of telegraph facilities and transport arrangements reasonably good work has been done.

2 The Telecommunications Service is variously titled "THE TELEGRAPHS & WIRELESS ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT", "THE BURMA TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT" and "THE BURMA TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUREAU", while the Head of this Bureau is referred to sometimes as the DIRECTOR-GENERAL and at others as the DIRECTOR.

3 The Postal Branch is referred to as "THE POSTAL BRANCH", "THE BURMA POSTAL DEPARTMENT" and "THE POSTAL BUREAU" operating under a DIRECTOR. There is only one reference, in a broadcast talk on the 24th February 1943, to a Posts and Telegraphs Department and this talk itself refers only to postal matters.

4 It appears therefore that the Telecommunications and Postal Departments work under two directors as separate

departments or bureaux in the Ministry of Communications, Labour and Irrigation, and one reference placed the Telecommunications Department under the Electrical Affairs Bureau. There is information to the effect that most of the Indian employees of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs were re-employed by the Japanese, and that many young Burmans were being trained in telegraphy.

5 The Director of the Postal Bureau is U TUN TIN, formerly an energetic and efficient Assistant Director-General in the Burma Posts and Telegraphs Department, and though according to official reports he has apparently managed to open, by December 1943, 258 of the 600 odd post offices, the possibility of transporting mail between these was somewhat problematical and always a very slow process.

Postage rates are reported to be about the same as before the evacuation, but in addition to the decimalisation of the rupee the Ba Maw Government has adopted the metric system of weights for postal purposes. Postage stamps are poorly printed on inferior paper. It is said that all letters are censored in the post.

Postal rates have been fixed and postal arrangements made with other Japanese-owned territories, though in all cases the services appear to be of a very limited nature.

6. The Director of the Telecommunications Bureau is U MAUNG MAUNG TIN, formerly a young Assistant Divisional Engineer with two years probation behind him when we left Burma. It is however, very doubtful whether any telegraph or wireless services function under the civil organisation which he controls. It is reported from a doubtful source that telegraphs and telephones are operated by a Japanese company. If so, they are presumably operated primarily for the benefit of the Japanese military authorities. The New Light of Burma in January 1944 contained a report from Kyaiklat that a telephone or telegraph unit of the Japanese Army, with the help of "postal officials", had repaired the telephone system, and that before long it would be possible to telephone between Dedaye, Pyapon, Bogale, Moulmeingyun and Maubin. A ground source describes the telephone service at the beginning of 1944 as practically out of use, except for the military authorities and the Ministers. Limited telegraphic facilities appear to be available for the public; for example, a broker at Pegu advertised his telegraphic address in the New Light of Burma of the 30th October, 1943, and in March of the same year it was said that telegrams between Rangoon and Prome, though nowhere else, were accepted from the public. It is

significant that no rates for telegrams have been published and that though official broadcasts refer to services having been established unofficial reports comment on their absence. Volume I of "Burma during the Japanese Occupation" mentioned telegraph services between RANGOON, TOUNGOO, MOULMEIN, PEGU, PROME, MANDALAY, MYINGYAN, TAUNGGYI, BAWDWIN, and MAWCHI. Later these services have been extended to BASSEIN, HENZADA, TAVOY, MAGWE and INSEIN. Mention is also made of telegraph services having been opened to SHWEBO, THANBYUZAYAT, THATON and MOKPALIN.

7. Information from all sources has been lacking during the last year and it is possible that considerable difficulty has been experienced in the building up of a telecommunications service with no trained staff from top to bottom.

### 13. Commodity and Price Control and Commodity Distribution.

The system in 1942-43 as it existed in theory is described in an extract from the Financial and Economic Annual reproduced in Section H2 of Dr. Andrus's report.

Other reports indicate that the real control of distribution and rationing was exercised by the (Japanese) Commodity Distributing Association in conjunction with the *Kaybotaing*, which, according to one observer, although an A. R. P. service so far as its Burmese rank and file were concerned, was a business organisation for its Japanese officers. (For an account of the *Kaybotaing*, see "The *Kaybotaing Ahpwe*".) The basis of rationing was a census held by the orders of the Japanese in Rangoon; a similar census was ordered in the districts, but it is doubtful whether it was ever taken. Government issued coupons to its own servants; the public received theirs from the Commodity Distributing Association, which also issued supplies to selected retailers. Sugar, salt and matches could be obtained at these shops at controlled prices; other goods could be bought only at prices which bore no relation to the controlled prices, while outside the appointed shops control did not operate even in respect of sugar, salt and matches. Complaints about the rationing system, high prices and the black market are frequent in the newspapers. The usual effect of imposing control was to drive goods off the market, and in some areas an attempt was made to meet the situation by removing the control temporarily. The control referred to in the Financial and Economic Annual was lifted for this reason in

August 1943, but an attempt was made to revive it by piecemeal orders issued in and after November. In January 1944 the Commodity Control Bureau (a Government department) is reported to have seized some hoarded goods and sold them at controlled prices, and from time to time there are accounts of prosecutions for profiteering. The system of issuing coupons appears to have been revised in January 1944, when a large number of "chief elders and elders" were appointed by the Commodity Distributing Association to help in their issue to residents of Rangoon. Generally the picture is one of inefficiency and distress.

#### 14. Minor Activities of the Government.

The Government Press and Stationery Bureau was reopened about August 1942, with supplies from Japan, and according to the Financial and Economic Annual 1943, propaganda formed a large part of its outturn. The same authority is responsible for the statement that the Jail Branch Press had been re-established. The former Superintendent of Government Printing, U Wa Gyi, who is in charge of the Bureau, said in a broadcast talk in January 1943, that the Japanese Army authorities kept his staff busy, and he alluded to the shortage of paper, from which newspapers and Government offices are also suffering.

Newspaper announcements show that U Lu Pe Win was re-appointed Director of Archaeology in June 1943, and that the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies had opened an office in Rangoon about the same time. The Maritime Affairs Bureau,\* mentioned in Osako's statement (page 38 "Burma during the Japanese Occupation", Vol. I) as operating schools for training seamen and shipbuilders, has not been heard of again in this connection, but private information from Rangoon states that about 100 small wooden boats, the size of sampans, have been made at Dawbon and Dalla in Rangoon, and some more in Mandalay, to be fitted with outboard motors by the Japanese. Private enterprise in boat-building is dying out because the Japanese requisition the boats as soon as they are built.

The existence of the special survey party, which was mostly concerned with mine survey, is shown by an advertisement for its old surveyors; and the District Commissioner and Collector, Rangoon, gave notice that a new register was to be opened

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\*A Propaganda Bureau article in January 1944 reveals that the Maritime Affairs Bureau is under military control and deals with ocean shipping.

of priests licensed to perform marriages under the Christian Marriages Act. This was in August 1943, and in the following January the *Adipadi* cancelled the licenses of nine Burmese and Karen pastors.

The results of the *Patamabyan* examination (a Government examination in Buddhist scripture and religious law) were published in March 1943, but in September it was announced that this was to be replaced by an examination in the *Vinaya* (laws of the priesthood), and that the papers would in future be set and marked by monks instead of laymen.

The Civil List for April 1943 gives the names of the Mines and Geology Bureau, with an Assistant Director; the Industry Bureau, with a number of special officers; a Chief Inspector of Boilers and Factories, and the Labour Bureau, which has officers in Rangoon, Mandalay, Moulmein, Yenangyaung and Henzada. There is however, no accurate information about their activities.

## 15. Government Servants and Pensioners.

The State Services Board and various incidents of Government service have been mentioned under the relevant headings. Other information of a more general nature is set down here. As soon as a regular administration was established in 1942, Dr. Ba Maw issued an advertisement recalling all Government servants to duty, but there was considerable delay before those who reported could take up their posts in the districts and replace the Peace Committees and other self-constituted authorities which continued to operate in some parts up to nearly the end of 1942.

The New Light of Burma of 16th January 1944 contains a summary of the authorities competent to make appointments. Ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, Privy Councillors and the Auditor-General are appointed by the *Adipadi* in accordance with the constitutional rules in force for each class of appointments. Secretaries to Government, Directors of Bureaux, Commissioners, District Commissioners, District Superintendents of Police and some other officers of equivalent rank are appointed by the Premier after consultation with the Minister concerned. Other officers are divided into two classes—

- (1) The Class I and II Services and their equivalents
- (2) Subordinate Services, Clerks, Peons, etc.

Appointments to posts in the first of these classes are made by the Minister concerned on the advice of the State Services Board. If the Minister and the State Services Board disagree,

the decision is to be made by the Premier. Appointments to posts in the subordinate services are made by the Director of the Department concerned; and clerks and menials are appointed by the Head of the Office. It was announced that the pay of the lowest ranks of Government service had been raised on account of high prices, and an attempt was being made to revise other scales of pay. The wide extent of bribery and corruption was one reason for increasing the scales. It was stated elsewhere that all appointments were made on probation for three months

Some of the scales of pay in force have been mentioned under the headings "District Administration", "The Co-operative Movement", etc. The following are further examples :—

Chief Jailors	..	..	Rs. 150—250.
Warders	..	..	Rs. 30 <i>plus</i> Rs. 20 dearness allowance.
Secretariat	Assistants,		
Upper Division	..		Rs. 100—10—200 <i>plus</i> Rs. 30 dearness allowance.
Lower Division	..	..	Rs. 75—5—150 with Rs. 25 dearness allowance.

It was added that these last two scales were likely to be enhanced.

Assistant Secretary, Foreign  
Department, who must  
be qualified in econo-  
mics .. ..

Rs. 300.

Superintendent in the same  
office .. ..

Rs. 200.

Senior Clerks .. ..

Rs. 100.

Junior Clerks .. ..

Rs 75 *plus* Rs. 15 dearness allowance.

In general, the scales of pay appear to be too low for present conditions in Burma.

Other information is to the effect that no discrimination is to be made between Vernacular and Anglo-vernacular qualifications for appointments in Government Service. Government offices can employ girls but, if married, a girl must show that her husband's income is not sufficient for their maintenance and, if unmarried, she must show that she must work to support herself or her parents or her dependent close relations. The Thakins, whose own efforts at establishing district administration

were swept away when the Japanese put Ba Maw in office, claimed a percentage of the posts for which previous experience was not essential. The Township Officer, Tharrawaddy, in October 1943 was a Thakin; so was at least one District Commissioner.

All Government servants down to clerks have to take an oath of loyalty to the *Adipadi* and the constitution; and service either in the Burma Army Reserve or the N.S.A. is compulsory for all. This, at least, is the theory; but Government servants who absent themselves from duty for months at a time, as many do, are not likely to be punctilious about their military or other national service. Secretariat clerks are obliged to spend two hours a day before their office hours in learning Japanese, and other Government servants are encouraged to do so by the grant of rewards.

Efforts to attract candidates for Government service included a scheme announced in 1943 for the payment of compensation for war damage and the promulgation of a scale of injury and family pensions for those who were injured in the performance of their duties and the dependants of those who were killed. The pension scheme corresponds more or less with that for Extraordinary Pensions which has been in force for many years. There is also a War Risk Insurance Scheme under which all Government servants must insure their lives, and apparently may insure against accidents or loss of property. All these measures together appear to have been insufficient to keep subordinate and menial ranks at work. It was reported in January 1944 that the Government was having great difficulty in obtaining and keeping clerks. Many clerks leave Government service to drive gharries, which are more remunerative. Police Constables resign and take to driving trishaws, while peons in the Rangoon Secretariat can hardly be obtained for Rs. 60 p.m. No doubt the fear of bombing attacks has something to do with this situation, but apart from that it seems that Dr. Ba Maw's efforts to run Government service on the cheap have not been successful.

In May 1943 a notice appeared in the papers of Government's intention to pay compassionate allowances to pensioners of the former Government; and in July 1943 a scheme was sanctioned by which pensions of Rs. 25 or less would be paid in full and two-thirds of pensions over Rs. 25 p.m. would be paid subject to a minimum of Rs. 25. The Government of Burma established in India has already stated its intention of taking such payments, as well as those of salaries, into consideration in settling arrears due to Government servants and pensioners who remained in Burma.



## 16. The Shan States.

Before the evacuation of Burma, the Shan States were ruled directly by their own Chiefs, the most important of whom were known as Sawbwas and others as Myosas or by other titles ; and the local customary law of the Shan States governed most of the inhabitants' dealings. The Chiefs had civil, criminal and revenue jurisdiction in their individual States; they also combined in a Federation, of which the deliberative body was the Shan Chiefs' Council, meeting periodically under the chairmanship of the Commissioner, Federated Shan States, to decide matters of policy and interest common to all States. Each State had its own Courts and Police, with jurisdiction over the subjects of the State. Advice and supervision on behalf of the Governor of Burma were provided by the appointment of Assistant Superintendents, usually members of the Burma Frontier Service, to individual States or groups of States. Assistant Superintendents in the Northern Shan States were subordinate to the Superintendent, Northern Shan States at Lashio; those in the Southern Shan States were subordinate to the Commissioner, Federated Shan States at Taunggyi, who also had control over the Superintendent, Northern Shan States. The Commissioner was responsible to the Governor of Burma and not to any Minister, for when the Government of Burma Act, 1935, was being drafted, the Chiefs were strongly averse to any control by popularly elected Ministers in Burma.

The assignment in 1943 of Kengtung and Mongpan States to Siam and the transfer of the remaining Shan States, Karenni and the Wa territory from direct Japanese administration to the Burmese Government are mentioned under the heading "Territorial Jurisdiction". Kengtung and Mongpan, according to a Domei message, were brought under Siamese military rule. There were references to the presence of Siamese troops and police in this area at various dates, and there was some attempt to encourage Siamese immigration. In July 1943 the Siamese Government deputed 41 high officials to take up posts in the two Shan States, but an informant speaking of conditions about September 1943 said that although the Japanese were willing to hand over the two States to Siam the transfer remained ineffective because the Siamese could not provide the staff. About the same time the Siamese legislature passed a bill authorising administrative officers from among the local inhabitants to be appointed in the two Shan and four Malay States incorporated in Siam, to prevent inconvenience to the people on account of their unfamiliarity with the Siamese system. Little is known about the character of the Siamese

administration, but in June 1943 the Siamese claimed to have collected money, rice and salt for distribution to the poor. It is not clear whether the collections were made in Siam or in Kengtung and Mongpan.

As regards the remaining Shan States, the attitude of the Chiefs and the people towards the Japanese Army, which arrived in April 1942, varied in different places. A Myosa in the South Hsenwi area refused to have dealings with the Japanese, and extended his protection to Chinese refugee families; for this he was arrested, but he escaped and fled to the Wa States, where he organized an armed band of about 100 men in June 1943. The Kachin Duwa (Chief) of Wawchon (Northern Shan States) helped escaping prisoners of war and Chinese. On the other hand, a Myosa and his brother from the South Hsenwi area co-operated with the Japanese in April 1942 and led them to attack the rear of the Chinese troops round about Lashio. Subsequently the Myosa is said to have killed a Chinese Battalion Commander and 30 soldiers. A Myosa near Kutkai in the Northern Shan States and the Sawbwa of North Hsenwi State were reported in 1943 to be actively co-operating with their new rulers. The Shan States are not inhabited exclusively by Shans; in 1931, there were about 64,000 Kachins, whose Chiefs (Duwas) practically all remained loyal, though some were compelled to help the Japanese.

The occupation of the Shan States came as a shock to the inhabitants, and most of the Chiefs were so uncertain of their position that they fled into hiding till they were recalled by the Japanese and reinstated with their old powers. Thereafter succession to the Chiefship seems to have been on normal lines, for when a vacancy occurred in the South Hsenwi State (whether by death or retirement is not known) the old Sawbwa was succeeded by his adopted son, though part of the State was given to a pro-Japanese Shan. In December 1942 the Chiefs were required to swear to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Japanese administration, and it is stated that though watched by the Japanese they are not subject to much interference. Customary law is still applied by the State Courts, which were re-opened in 1942, and in November of that year it is said that at Hsipaw taxes were collected as before and that there was no Japanese political officer there. The New Light of Burma announced in January 1944 that the Shan States were to send two representatives to the Privy Council, one on behalf of the Chiefs and the other on behalf of the people. The Chiefs' practice of exacting forced labour and receiving money and other offerings from their subjects was to be discouraged,

and gambling was to be permitted only under restrictions, one of which was that only half the profits were to go to the Chiefs and the remainder to war funds.

Like that of their Chiefs, the attitude of the Shan people probably varied a good deal at first between opposition and complete collaboration. Most of the inhabitants are rather more primitive than the Burmese cultivator, and are untouched by politics; their main concern was to secure a livelihood from the soil. The conditions of life under Japanese control apparently created a more decided public opinion, and there is information from three separate sources relating to North Burma and the Shan States about March-May 1943 that the attitude of the Shans and Burmans, including many who were formerly pro-Japanese, had turned strongly against the Japanese. The reasons for this attitude included the failure to establish civil authority and the consequent insecurity of life and property, the stagnation of trade, the inability to sell surplus crops and the requisitioning of supplies and labour.

In other words, the people's reaction was governed more by economic and social conditions than by the national consciousness which in Lower Burma, at least, and in the more sophisticated parts of Upper Burma exercised an important influence on the people's reception of the invaders. A hint that the Shans were not co-operating whole-heartedly is given by the orders issued by the Ba Maw Government in several dialects in the hill areas of the Northern Shan States in 1944 warning the people not to aid the Anglo-American forces under penalty of death. When the National Defence Corps in South Hsenwi State helped to capture an Allied airman in June 1944, its action received such publicity and commendation from the Japanese as to suggest that co-operation of this kind was rare.

There was at first nothing of the nature of the Burma Independence Army in the Shan States, and when a detachment of that Army wished to march up from Burma in May 1942 the Japanese stopped it. In the following year, however, the presence of Shan and Burman forces, well armed, was reported both from the Chinese border at Tengchung and in the Lashio neighbourhood; and in November 1943 some 5,000 Shans are said to have been sent to Mingaladon to be trained for the Burma Defence Army. It was definitely a part of the Burmese Government's policy to strengthen the war front, on which its continued existence depends, and the Shan States, having been integrated with Burma, could not hope to escape the consequent civil and military coercion.

When the Shan States were handed over to the Burmese Government, the Home Minister was appointed High Commissioner for the States in addition to his other duties; and local administration was entrusted to a Deputy High Commissioner, U Khin Mg Pyu, I.C.S., an officer of Shan parentage who was Deputy Commissioner, Tharrawaddy, at the time of the evacuation. The Deputy Commissioner (or Superintendent) at Lashio was a Burman officer of the Burma Frontier Service, and the "New Light of Burma" in January 1944 foreshadowed the appointment of other administrative officers. These would probably consist, as in the previous regime, of officers to supervise the Chiefs' administration and a limited number of educational, medical, engineering, agricultural and other officers and staff. Municipal administrations were set up by the Japanese at Lashio and Taunggyi in 1942, but there is no report of a Municipal Committee at Kalaw.

The majority of the police in the Lashio and Namtu areas were at work in March 1943, and there are reports of police in other places. An Inspector-General of Police was appointed for the Shan States about the beginning of 1944, and Honorary Magistrates are heard of at Taunggyi, Kalaw and Loilem in the Southern Shan States. Before administration was transferred to the Burmese Government, the Japanese controlled the civil police at Lashio and probably at other places of importance to them, but there was little crime. Theft of military property and other important thefts, according to one source, were punished with death, while civil disputes and petty criminal cases in which Indians were involved were dealt with by the Indian Independence League at Lashio, according to a report relating to January 1943. The police administration and criminal courts were presumably put on a regular footing after the transfer to the Burmese Government.

Branches of the Indian Independence League were started at Taunggyi, Lashio, Bawdwin and Namtu. The East Asia Youths League was established at Taunggyi in November 1943 and Domei said in January 1944 that a National Service Association was to be organized in the Shan States. All these, and possibly other Associations, were on the lines of the corresponding bodies in Burma proper.

Several hospitals were at work from 1942 onwards. Vital military communications by road, rail and ferry were kept open, though minor routes fell into disrepair. A fairly large number of motor buses plied for passengers, but passenger traffic by rail was severely restricted. Trade conditions were bad and prices

were high. Most of the civil population left Lashio and Hsipaw on account of air raids, and grass was growing in the streets of Hsipaw in May 1943. The Lashio Town Committee attempted to control the prices of food and other bazaar merchandise in 1942, but the prices rose very high there and elsewhere. As in Burma proper, paddy cultivation declined, largely owing to widespread cattle disease, and there was a great shortage of rice, approaching famine conditions at Namhsan, Tawng Peng State, where rice was sold at Rs 26 a basket and paddy at Rs 10 a basket in the latter part of 1943. At Momeik, Hsipaw and Kyaukme rice was then about Rs. 16 a basket, salt Rs. 2½ or more a viss, matches anything up to Rs. 1¼ a box, and fish and *nyapi* were very dear. Clothing too was scarce and some of the Palaung tribes-people were seen wearing gunny bags. Old stocks of Government opium, where available, were being sold by Chinese licensees at Rs. 8 a tola.

A report of conditions in South Hsenwi State in July-August 1943 states that the rice crop (presumably that of 1942-43) was only about half the normal and the cotton crop about average. The tung oil crop, under Japanese control, was good, and labour was being paid the normal rate of 8 annas per day. Pre-evacuation wages, however, had far less than their previous purchasing power. There was a great shortage of buffaloes and pigs as a result of disease; flour, beef and pork were scarce, but there was no rationing. The State officials collected 30 per cent of the rice and cotton crops in kind, and a house tax was also collected. It is probable that conditions in the areas of which we have knowledge are representative of the whole, and distress must have been great. The Ba Maw Government was apparently alive to the need of improving food supplies, for the "grow more paddy" campaign was extended to the Shan States early in 1944.

Japanese attempts to exploit the mines at Namtu and Bawdwin in the Shan States and at Mawchi in Karenni have been dealt with in other sections of this report. Other forms of exploitation included the forcible recruitment of labour and the requisitioning of bullocks and ponies, which were reported from Momeik and Tawng Peng States at the end of 1943. Currency policy was much the same as in Burma; Japanese paper notes of denominations from Rs 10 to 1 pice were introduced and circulated in the Shan States from 1942 onwards, but were not forcibly substituted for the previous Burmese currency, except that Japanese soldiers insisted on using them to pay for their own purchases. Sometimes, as in Burma proper, these notes were printed locally; the Japanese are reported to have been

seen printing them at Hsipaw at a date which is uncertain. In some towns the Japanese tried to exchange one Japanese rupee note for five Burma rupees, but away from the towns the old Burma rupee coins circulated freely. Burma currency notes remained in use side by side with the new currency; those seen at Taunggyi in July 1942 are said to have been over-printed by the Japanese. People in Kokang State in June 1944 valued a Japanese ten-rupee note at Rs. 1|8 in Burmese coin, but such an unfavourable rate could not have prevailed anywhere under effective Japanese control.

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## PART III

### Finance and Revenue.

The following sections contain notes on some of the principal heads of revenue ; the budget as a whole has been dealt with in Dr. Andrus's report. The figures for 1942-43 relate only to the period of eight months from the 1st August 1942 ; and those for the 1943-44 estimates were modified when a new budget was drawn up beginning from the 1st August 1943, the date of the declaration of independence. Details of the second budget for 1943-44 and of the budget for 1944-45 are lacking. It was notified by the Japanese Embassy in Rangoon in December 1943 that all Japanese civilians residing in Burma were to be subject to the land, income, fishing, production and consumption taxes and customs duty on the same level as Burmans with retrospective effect from the 1st August 1943. Japanese Army supplies, *e g*, of salt, appear to be exempted from taxation.

There is a published account of a financial adjustment for 1942-43 between the Government and the Japanese Military Administration, which appears to show that the latter incurred expenditure and received revenue on behalf of the former, but the meaning of the account is not clear. For what they are worth the figures of the adjustment are shown against some of the revenue heads dealt with here.

Little is known about the working of the Audit and Accounts Department. The Auditor-General's appointment is provided for in Arts. 44 and 45 of the Constitution Act. He has the power to prescribe the form of accounts (Art. 46) and his reports are to be laid before the Cabinet and the Privy Council by the *Adipadi* (Art. 47). He obviously has not the same degree of independence of the Executive as under the Government of Burma Act. The staff of the Audit and Accounts Department is said to have been greatly reduced, and the accounts offices for railways, posts and telegraphs and the army have been amalgamated with that for civil accounts generally.

#### 1. Customs.

				Rs.
1940-41 (Accounts)	..	..	..	3,99,37,764
1941-42 (Revised Estimates)	..	..	..	5,81,86,000
				<hr/>
1942-43 (Revised Estimates)	Export duty on rice			10,50,000
	Import duties	..	..	2,00,000
				<hr/>
				12,50,000
1942-43 (Actuals)	..	..	..	1,77,295
1943-44 (Estimates)	..	..	Customs not shown.	

The information about Customs receipts and administration is scanty and obscure. In 1942 Customs were in the hands of the Japanese, who were reported to be levying import and export duties. The suggestion made in Vol. I of "Burma during the Japanese Occupation" (page 54) that the export tax was directed at the Japanese loot sent out of Burma may well be correct. Even in January 1944 an informant said that the Customs Department had not been re-established; while an account from another source was to the effect that there was a Collector of Customs with a small staff for collecting dues on occasional shipments from Penang and other places, but that, generally speaking, consumer goods were not being imported. A third statement, relating to the same period, was that there were no exports or imports. In 1943, however, there is information that all boats from Victoria Point were obliged to put in at Mergui, where the Burmese Government levied a duty on coconuts and sesamum.

The "New Light of Burma" states that the Customs Bureau was set up on the 1st October 1943, that regular custom houses have been opened at Rangoon and some other ports, and that it was intended to open one on the Siamese land frontier. Japanese officers and traders were co-operating in the work of the Bureau.

The figures showing the Customs Revenue of the Ba Maw Government, which are taken from the Financial and Economic Annual, 1943, are puzzling. There is a great difference between the revised estimates and the actuals for 1942-43. A note on the budget for 1943-44 says "Customs revenue is not shown in the budget for 1943-44; but it is likely that a considerable sum is forthcoming as the revenue realised under this head for the previous financial year is nearly Rs. 3 millions" (30 lakhs). In another place the Finance Ministry remarks, "Customs receipts seem to be promising"; which is certainly not true of a total revenue of Rs. 1,77,295, even though these figures are for only eight months of the year. There is, however, an account of the financial adjustment between the Japanese military Administration and the Government for 1942-43, containing the items "Export duties (excluding additional duties specially levied)—Rs. 9,59,655. Import duties Rs. 18,72,757." This corresponds with the round figure of Rs. 3 millions mentioned above. The conclusion seems to be that the Japanese still take the Customs receipts, except for a small portion which under some unknown arrangement accrues to the Burmese Government. It will be remembered that as early as March 1942 the Japanese Commander of the Burma Independence Army published the terms of an agreement with Burmese



representatives by which for 15 years Japanese and Siamese goods would enter Burma duty free, and Japan would control all Customs (page 3, "Burma during Japanese Occupation", Vol. I.).

## 2. Income-Tax.

			Rs.
1940-41 (Accounts)	..	..	1,65,01,427
1941-42 (Revised Estimates)	..	..	2,95,89,000

The Burma Executive Administration remitted income-tax for the year 1941-42 ; much of it had, of course, been collected by the legal Government in the course of the year. The Financial and Economic Annual, 1943, gives the following post-evacuation figures :—

			Rs.
1942-43 (Revised Estimates)	..	..	10,00,000
1942-43 (Actuals)	..	..	22,07,322
1943-44 (Estimates)	..	..	80,24,000

An Income-Tax Ordinance was passed in 1942, providing for "the levy of income-tax in advance". This probably refers to the calculation of income-tax on the income of the year of assessment, and not on that of the previous year. Other changes were also made, possibly by the same Ordinance. The minimum taxable income was reduced from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 1,200 per annum, and income from agricultural sources, which was previously exempt because it was subject to land revenue, was made liable to tax. Early in 1944 the scale of taxation on incomes of Rs. 50,000 per annum and over was made steeper, with retrospective effect from the 1st August 1943, the new rates being :—

Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 1,00,000	..	..	30 per cent.
Rs. 1,00,000 to Rs. 2,00,000	..	..	40 per cent.
Over Rs. 2,00,000	..	..	50 per cent.

Surcharges and super-tax are not mentioned, but the new rates appear to be inclusive. The total taxation, including income-tax, super-tax and surcharges, under the Finance Act, 1942, passed shortly before the evacuation of Burma, amounted to the following approximate percentages on incomes of Rs. 50,000, Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 2 lakhs :—

Income Rs. 50,000	..	..	21 per cent.
Rs. 1 lakh	..	..	25.7 per cent.
Rs. 2 lakhs	..	..	30 per cent.

It was proposed in 1943 to levy a succession tax and a tax on gifts *inter vivos*. It is not stated whether these will be under the Income-Tax Bureau ; the items Succession Tax (Rs. 1,00,000) and other Taxes and Duties (Rs 10,000) for 1943-44 are shown under separate heads in the estimates.

### 3. Forests.

				Rs.
1940-41 Accounts	..	..	..	1,42,11,755
1941-42 Revised Estimates	..	..	..	1,64,19,000
1942-43 Revised Estimates	..	..	..	3,00,000
1942-43 Accounts	..	..	..	4,62,324
1943-44 Estimates	..	..	..	76,23,000

Forest administration is dealt with in a separate note by Mr. F. T. Morehead.

### 4. Excise Duties.

These duties, which do not include excise on liquor, opium or narcotic drugs such as *ganju*, were levied on motor spirit, kerosene, sugar, cigarettes, matches, mechanical lighters, salt and silver before evacuation. There was also an excise on the production of iron and steel, a legacy from the time before India and Burma were separated ; but as there was no iron and steel production in Burma there was no revenue. The revenue figures of excise duties are as follows :—

	1940-41 Accounts.	1941-42 Revised Estimates.	1942-43 Revised Estimates.	1942-43 Accounts	1943-44 (Financial Estimates, Adjust- ment 1942- 43)	
1. Motor Spirit	71,97,821	96,00,000	..	}	4,70,000	{ 2,47,896)
2. Kerosene	29,09,252	30,80,000	..		3,20,000	
3. Silver	*	*	..		..	
4. Sugar	12,21,094	15,00,000	4,00,000		7,50,000	(1,77,324)
5. Matches	23,16,182	23,84,350	6,00,000		5,82,000	(1,31,000)
6. Lighters	*	*	..		1,000	
7. Cigarettes	*	*	..		1,000	
8. Salt	34,34,919	40,04,860	10,00,000		35,05,000	(6,86,770)
9. Other heads (Net).	18,539	8,290	..	} Deduct Trans- fer to Shan States.	2,81,000	
	1,70,97,807	2,05,78,000	20,00,000		53,48,000	

\*Included in " Other heads (net) ".

†Not shown separately. Excise and Excise Duties are said to have realised Rs. 27,44,997 and over Rs. 24 lakhs of this was derived from liquor.

As far as is known, all excise duties except those on lighters remain at the rates in force before the evacuation. It is not stated whether the motor spirit distilled from rubber is subject to excise duty.

*Motor spirit and kerosene.*—Excise duty is imposed on the production of motor spirit and kerosene, at the pre-war rates of 11 annas per gallon of motor spirit and 2 annas 9½ pies per gallon of kerosene, which were still in force in 1943. Imports of motor spirit used to pay the same rate in the form of customs duty, and imports of kerosene 3 annas 9 pies per gallon. The oil industry, like other mining undertakings, is also taxed by way of royalties on outturn and rents and fees for mining leases and prospecting licenses; but these receipts are classed as Land Revenue. Figures are given under the heading "Land Revenue—Petroleum Royalties".

It is not known whether the Japanese companies now working the oil fields on a much diminished scale pay any of these imposts; the revised budget estimates for 1942-43 provide nothing for petroleum royalties, and the estimates for 1943-44. only Rs. 2,07,000. These figures, together with those for excise duties on motor spirit and kerosene, may merely embody the hope that the Japanese would return the oil fields to the Burmese Government in 1943, but that hope was not fulfilled. Besides the deep wells under Japanese management there are hand-dug wells worked by Burmese traditional methods, but though their production of crude oil is reported to have increased owing to the demolition of the deep wells, their outturn and the revenue they paid were always insignificant and they could not possibly account for the estimated royalties of Rs. 2,07,000.

An account of the state of the oil fields and their production under Japanese management is given in Dr Andrus's Report on Burmese Economy during the Japanese Occupation, Section E 1.

*Silver.*—The absence of any estimate for silver excise duty suggests that the Bawdwin Mines (see "Land Revenue—Mining Royalties, Rents and Fees") were not producing silver, owing to the denial policy applied in 1942.

*Sugar.*—Production, rationing and price control are dealt with in Dr. Andrus's report.

*Matches and Mechanical Lighters.*—These are also dealt with by Dr. Andrus. The duty on matches appears to have continued at the former rates, but that on lighters was reduced early in 1944 from the pre-war rate of Rs. 1½ (Re. 1.50 cents) to Re. 1 per lighter. The revenue from lighters was always insignificant.

*Cigarettes.*—There was no large-scale industry in Burma, nearly all cigarettes being imported ; and the excise revenue was only a few hundred rupees *per annum*. The estimates suggest that some small manufactures are expected, and an increase in production is claimed as a result of experiments made at the Agricultural College, Mandalay.

*Salt.*—The *Baho* Government (Thakin) administration in April 1942 allowed manufacture free of restriction, but Ba Maw's Burmese Executive Administration imposed a tax of Rs. 90 per pan, which appears to be still in force. This represented a slight increase on the former rate of Rs 70 per 1,000 viss, if it is correctly assumed that the pan is of 10 gallon capacity, producing 1100 viss (3960 lbs.) a year. The levy of a tax per pan, instead of on the amount actually issued from bond, indicates a change from the former direct duty system to the composition duty system, which can be administered with a smaller staff. The Financial and Economic Annual claims that new areas have been opened for manufacture under the composition duty system, and that Burma now produces all the salt she needs. This is possible, for with a production of 90,000 tons in 1941 the country was nearly self-sufficient, but it is evident from several sources that during most of the Japanese occupation salt has not been well distributed or freely sold at a reasonable price. Price control, actual prices and rationing are dealt with in Dr. Andrus's report : though salt was rationed and controlled it was scarce and sold at high prices in the black market. A Domei message in November 1943 promises an "early solution of the salt question in Burma", which is thus officially admitted to exist ; and the Burmese Government declared its intention of cheapening production by substituting solar evaporation for boiling, which consumes a good deal of fuel.

An independent report from Tenasserim stated that the manufacture of salt between Ye and Pa-nga was controlled by the Japanese Military authorities, and that production was only 70 per cent. of the pre-war normal, because of the shortage of labour for cutting fuel. The salt was mainly taken by boat to Moulmein or Rangoon. Prices in January-February 1944 were :—for local purchase Rs. 250 per 1,000 viss (3600 lbs.), including the duty of Rs. 90 per pan ; for the Japanese Army Rs. 60 per 1,000 viss, including duty. The Japanese preferential rate was very low : the controlled price in Rangoon at that time was Rs. 500 per 1,000 viss, and actual prices quoted were Rs. 1,500-3,000 in Rangoon, Rs. 1,180 at Tharrawaddy, Rs 1,000 at Bassein, and higher rates at more remote places.

## 5. Land Revenue (a) Ordinary Revenue.

This head excludes Petroleum revenue, mining royalties, etc. Fishery revenue and some other receipts of less importance that were classed under the major head "V—Land Revenue".

	Rs
1940-41 (Accounts) .. ..	4,22,41,205
1941-42 (Revised Estimates) ..	3,92,00,000
1942-43 (Revised Estimates) ..	1,50,00,000
1942-43 (Accounts) .. ..	64,84,220*
1943-44 (Estimates) .. ..	2,92,56,000

The "Baho Government" under Thakin control, which attempted to set up an administration in 1942, issued an order that land revenue would be fixed by the Government. No serious attempt was made to collect it, though here and there headmen may have recovered some of the revenue that had been assessed for 1941-42. After Dr Ba Maw's Executive Administration had been formed in August 1942, there was an abortive order that revenue for 1941-42 should be collected at reduced rates, coupled with provision for payment in kind; but finally, owing to the hardship involved, it was announced that the outstandings for 1941-42 were remitted, though land revenue would be collected for the future. Dr. Ba Maw stated that this would provide one quarter of the Government's income. It would be no easy matter to reorganise the collection, which depends on annual assessment in accordance with rates fixed at settlement and on the state of the crops, fallows and so forth. In many places the assessment rolls, maps, tax-tickets, records of ownership and tenancies, etc., must have been destroyed during the campaign. The Ministry of Lands and Agriculture claimed that much progress was made in 1942-43 in reconstructing such records. Throughout 1942 and 1943, however, there is information from many areas that no land revenue or other taxes were being collected. Collections of 1942-43 land revenue, or proposals to collect it, are mentioned from Monywa, Myitkyina, Pakokku, Sandoway, East Bassein (but not West Bassein), Myaungmya and Katha. *Taungyas* (hill cultivation) in Katha District were assessed at Rs. 2|8|0 each and very few remissions were granted. In Pakokku District fallow land was not exempted from assessment and no remission was given, according to one source, on the other hand, there is information of a special officer being sent to enquire into the assessment in that district, though whether his business was the usual form of remission for damage to or failure of crops, or a "revision settlement" of rates is not clear. There were various obstacles to the collection of land revenue for 1942-43, although

\*For the whole of the major head "Land Revenue".

some reduction of rates appears to have been sanctioned at the beginning of the revenue collection season. The Thakins objected to any collection being made, on account of the resentment that it would cause, but Ba Maw seems to have over-ruled this objection. At Masein, south of Mawlaik, the Township Officer's attempt to collect was stopped by a local Japanese officer, on the ground that winning the war was more important than the collection of taxes. Lower Burma paddy cultivators who asked to be allowed to pay land revenue in kind were assured in June 1943 that they would be able to do so when the Government purchased rice. The paddy purchase scheme (see "Agricultural Credit and Finance") was being started about that time, but it was many months before any paddy was bought by the Government, and presumably the revenue, long overdue in June, remained uncollected. Cultivators complained that Government had suddenly asked them to pay the full revenue without giving them time to warn their tenants, and as the latter had not paid them they could not pay Government. A meeting of land-owners at Yedashe in March 1943 passed resolutions urging that as they had no money, Government should either wait until the paddy was sold or accept payment in kind. Two resolutions complaining of the demands made for 1941-42 throw some doubt on the official statement that revenue for that year was remitted. The Director, Propaganda Bureau, stated in January 1944 that the Government had accepted paddy in payment of revenue at Rs. 80-0-0 per 100 baskets, and that it was considering accepting paddy at enhanced rates for 1943-44. Fallows were to be assessed at two annas an acre. The higher fallow rates mentioned in Section O. 2 of Dr. Andrus's report may have been meant to penalise cultivators who failed to till their land.

Revenue for 1943-44 was not collected in Sandoway and Katha districts up to March 1944, but in the former district cultivators were ordered to hand over a part of their produce to the Japanese. This probably had nothing to do with the official land revenue.

The Revenue Secretary, in a broadcast talk from Rangoon on the 22nd January 1943, said that no land revenue was collected for 1941-42, and that applications for remission for 1942-43 would be considered in special cases. He added that the taxes and revenue fixed for certain districts were higher than in others, and that the Government of New Burma was arranging a uniform rate for all places. Literally taken, this would be impossible, but it is a fact that settlement rates, fixed at widely varying periods, are on a much higher scale in some districts than in others. Pending re-settlement, it used to be

the practice to meet these anomalies by specific annual reductions; presumably the Revenue Secretary referred to some more general revision.

The collections of land revenue for 1942-43 were very disappointing, even compared with the very moderate revised estimate. The difficulties, however, that the Ba Maw Government had to face might well have defeated a stronger and more independent Government, for poverty, the draining away of labour and the drying up of exports all affected the cultivator's ability to pay. The falling off of paddy cultivation has been mentioned under "Agricultural Credit and Finance". Japanese and Burmese authorities boasted loudly of the success attending the campaign for growing jute and cotton in the Delta and of the use of rubber, which is an important crop in Tenasserim, for distilling motor spirit. An independent observer, however, reports that rubber production had declined, and that many estates were not being worked. The cultivation of jute in the Delta is denied, and the claims regarding the extension of cotton cultivation were, to say the least, much exaggerated. The report regarding rubber cultivation is confirmed by a notice in "*Bama Khat*" in January 1944 to the effect that land revenue on rubber estates for 1942-43 had been reduced because of the low price of rubber and the lack of important materials and skilled labour. The date of the notice shows that the revenue was much in arrear. From some sources it is reported that the outturn of raw cotton had increased, but that the Japanese took it all. No attempt, it is said, had been made to increase the acreage under sessamum or ground-nuts, dry zone crops that furnish the essential cooking oil. Even the Agricultural Department's farms, where experimental crops are tried and information and instructions are disseminated among the cultivators, are described as more or less idle, though there are Deputy Directors of Agriculture and Agricultural Assistants at various places. In such conditions the prospect of realising the revenue estimated for 1943-44 was far from bright.

The Land Revenue Estimates for 1943-44 provide Rs. 1,00,000 as revenue from "land registration," a new sub-head which is not explained. It is distinct from the registration of deeds

### Land Revenue—(b) Fisheries.

			Rs.
1940-41 Accounts	..	..	26,41,507
1941-42 Revised Estimates	..	..	25,25,000
1942-43 Revised Estimates	..	..	10,00,000
1942-43 Accounts	..	Not given separately.	
1943-44 Estimates	..	..	25,75,000

The Financial and Economic Annual, 1943, makes scarcely any comment on this revenue, except that the Bureau of Lands and Fisheries had in view a scheme for the industrialisation of fisheries which, when it materialised, would afford a large increase in revenue. Hence no doubt the optimistic estimate for 1943-44. Other information is not so encouraging.

The *Baho* Government (Thakin) administration issued orders in April 1942 for the carrying on of fisheries according to the previous arrangements. Fishery revenue was to be fixed by the administration, but if leases of fisheries were, as formerly, put up to auction, there would be little scope for fixing the rates of revenue, except a revision of the license fees for nets and other implements used in open fisheries. There is no evidence of such a revision. Moreover, it seems that no fishery rents were collected in 1942.

The Burmese Executive Administration, established in August 1942, paid some attention to fisheries and fishery revenue. Fishery leases were sold by auction in March and April, 1943, and at Letpadan, Tharrawaddy District, they are reported to have fetched Rs. 6,000, against Rs. 1,800 in previous years. It is not stated which "previous years" are meant. A Domei message in April 1943 said that fish caught (probably by Japanese) in Burma waters was being salted in large quantities and sent to the front, in addition to that supplied to the general public. Fresh water fish (fresh fish?) was also plentiful.

The abundance of fish in May 1943 is confirmed from an independent source. The market price of *ngapi*, (fish paste), a staple article of diet prepared with salt, was very high, but was probably ruled by the price of salt rather than by that of fish. Salt was scarce, and when the Japanese army had taken what it required for salting fish and other uses, there may not have been much left for *ngapi*. There is no information about sea-fishing, including coastal and estuarine fisheries, except in the Tavoy-Mergui area, where it was carried on by several Japanese firms.

The lack of materials for nets began to make itself felt, and in October 1943 the Director of Propaganda of the "Independent" Government said that the cultivation of hemp for fishing nets, as well as gunny bags, was being encouraged. In November, Domei proclaimed that the development of fisheries was remarkable, and that catches had been tremendously increased by the use of drag-nets instead of hand-lines and casting nets. (Drag-nets were always in use where they could



be permitted without ruining the fishery). There is, however, no reason to fear that the fisheries are being worked to exhaustion owing to the scarcity of other food and the needs of the Japanese troops. Independent observers, speaking of the early part of 1944, report that there was little fishing, because of the fear of bombing and machine-gunning from the air, the lack of labour, the requisitioning of all the larger boats by the Japanese, and the want of twine for nets. The Japanese used their motor-boats, when not otherwise employed, for fishing with drag-nets, the catches being iced and sent to the Army. Certain small lake and river fisheries were also being worked, but very little fish or *ngapi* reached the public. *Ngapi* in Rangoon was fetching six times its normal price, and price control made it unprofitable to sell fish except in the black market. The "Sun" reported in January 1944 that in Lower Burma riverine villages fish oil was being used as a substitute for sessamum or groundnut oil for cooking, but the use of this by-product in a limited area does not disprove the evidence that fishing is on a small scale. The abundance of 1943 has disappeared, although Domei in March 1944 was still claiming the new development of fishing along the coasts.

### Land Revenue—(c) Petroleum Royalties.

			Rs.
1940-41 Accounts	..	..	41,66,154
1941-42 Revised Estimates	..	..	40,00,000
1942-43 Estimates	..	..	Nil
1942-43 Accounts	..	Not mentioned separately.	
1943-44 Estimates	..	..	2,07,000

In addition to royalties, the oil industry pays excise duties on the production of motor spirit and kerosene. Further particulars are given under the heading "Excise Duties", and reference should also be made to Dr. Andrus's note on Burmese Economy during the Japanese Occupation, Section E-1.

### Land Revenue—(d) Mining Royalties, Rents and Fees.

The figures exclude Petroleum Royalties.

			Rs.
1940-41 Accounts	..	..	11,63,948
1941-42 Revised Estimates	..	..	12,50,000
1942-43 Revised Estimates	..	..	Nil
1942-43 Accounts	..	..	Nil
1943-44 Estimates	..	..	1,16,000

Details of the accounts figures for 1940-41 are not available, but the original estimates of revenue for 1941-42 were made up as follows:—

	Rs.
Jade, Amber and Rubies	1,50,000
Wolfram	2,50,000
Tin	3,75,000
Mixed Tin & Wolfram	2,000
Other Minerals	2,50,000
	<hr/> 10,27,000

Tin and Wolfram are produced mainly in Tavoy, Mergui and Yamethin (now Pyinmana) districts and at the Mawchi mines in Karenni. Gems come from the Mogok tract in the Katha district, jade from an area north-west of Kamaing and amber from the Hukawng Valley. The last two areas are in war zones and it is not likely that any work was done in the mines.

Newspapers mention the grant by Government of two prospecting licenses in Tavoy in 1943, and there is other evidence of mining there on a small scale, but information regarding Mergui, Yamethin and Mogok is scarce.

The Mawchi Mines and the Mogok Ruby Mines, as well as the Namtu and Bawdwin Mines mentioned below, were reported to have been taken over in 1942 or early 1943 by a Japanese company, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, but in and after May 1943 the Mawchi Mines were being worked by the Kobayashi Mining Co. Ltd, which may be a subsidiary of the former company. The Mawchi Mines were the largest single producer of wolfram in the world, yielding in 1941 2,243 tons of tin and 1,781 tons of wolfram; but the Japanese have ample supplies of tin elsewhere, and though they might need some of the wolfram they could obtain it more easily from mines in the Tavoy and Mergui districts, which are more accessible than Mawchi, and where demolitions were less effective. The former output of Tavoy and Mergui was 4,586 tons of tin concentrates, 1,080 tons of wolfram concentrates and 1,665 tons of mixed concentrates per annum.

At Mawchi the two main hydro-electric plants were put out of action at the time of evacuation, and vital parts of the machinery for concentrating ore were removed. The central power station was still not working in June 1944, though a subsidiary diesel installation capable of running the mine, mill and concentrating plant on a reduced scale was operating in the previous October. Under such conditions it is estimated that not more than 50 tons of 32 per cent. wolfram ore can be produced in a month. Production must also have been hampered by Allied bombing.

About 60 per cent. of the labour force of 4,000 was evacuated to India, but some four or five hundred either remained behind or were caught by the Japanese at Myitkyina and made to return to the mines. Wages are said to vary between Re. 1|- and Rs. 3|- per diem, and facilities are given for buying food at cheap rates.

The Namtu and Bawdwin Mines of the Burma Corporation produced annually about 1,200 ounces of gold, six million ounces of silver, 80,000 tons of lead, 60,000 or 70,000 tons of zinc concentrates, 8,000 tons of copper matte and 3,000 or 4,000 tons of nickel speiss. Burma was formerly Japan's chief source of lead and zinc; nickel can be obtained from the Celebes and the copper available in Burma is not enough to make any large addition to Japan's supplies.

The two hydro-electric installations were disabled before the Japanese occupation, and the pumps then being unworkable, nine out of fifteen mine levels were flooded. The remainder could not be fully exploited without power. The Japanese sent technicians to Bawdwin and attempted to pump out the flood water, which fell to the seventh level, and to clean and repair the machinery and generating plants. They met with little success, for the generating installations were still out of action at the end of 1943, and the concentrating plant, separation and tailing dams were bombed in July of that year. Even in March 1944, though some progress had been made in re-equipping the mines, the power station had apparently not been opened, and without it nothing very substantial could be done. An increase of rolling stock, however, was noticed at Namtu and Bawdwin in May, indicating greater activity.

The owners abandoned at the mine in 1942 30,000 tons of pig lead, 90,000 tons of zinc concentrates and 2,000 tons each of nickel speiss and copper matte. Most of the lead stocks have since disappeared, and large piles of pig lead were seen on the Rangoon docks, presumably for shipment to Japan. The zinc stocks were practically untouched up to July 1943, but there is reason to think that some of them have been more recently removed to Singapore for smelting.

As at Mawchi, many of the Indian labourers either remained behind in 1942 or were stopped during evacuation and sent back to the mines. About 1,000 were employed on the machinery and in the upper levels; the only rates of pay mentioned are Rs. 1/9 a day, later raised to Rs. 2/4, for an engine-driver, and Rs. 1/10 for an assistant station-master on the Corporation's narrow-gauge railway. Food was supplied at concessional rates. Those who could not be employed at once were given Rs. 10|- per month and free food.

The Ministry of Forests and Mines, in its report for 1942-43, comments on Japanese control of the mines as follows:—

“Owing to the exigencies of war the position of mines (both metalliferous mines and oilwells) is still comparatively obscure. Petroleum and metals such as wolfram, tungsten, molybdenum are materials vital for the successful prosecution of war and it is natural that Army Authorities are yet reluctant to hand over the administration of the mines and oilwells completely to the Burmese Government. Partial control of the hand-dug oilwells has been given to the Bureau of Mines so that they are at present administered by the “Warden” of oil fields. In regard to metalliferous mines, it appears that most of the mines producing vital war materials are under the control of Nippon firms under the supervision of the Military”.

At the end of March 1944 the Japanese announced that they had transferred to the Burmese Government all enemy property that had been under the control of the Japanese forces. Mines had been specifically mentioned in earlier broadcasts among undertakings to be transferred, though not in the final announcement, which gave no details of the property. There is reason to believe that the mines were handed over only on condition that they should be worked by joint Japanese and Burmese capital, and it is doubtful whether the oilfields were handed over at all.

All things considered, it is unlikely that the mines will bring much economic or military advantage to the Japanese or much revenue to the Burmese Government. Since 1st August 1943 the Japanese in Burma are nominally subject to the same taxes as other people, and therefore the firms in occupation of the mines should be paying rents, royalties and fees. Whether they do or not is not known, but until production increases the question is more or less academic.

## 6. Excise. (Liquor, Opium and other drugs.)

	1940-41 Accounts	1941-42 Revised Estimates	1942-43 Revised Estimates	1942-43 Accounts	1943-44 Estimates	(Financial adjustment 1942-43)
1. Spirits & liquor ..	53,06,805	60,54,000	10,00,000	24,00,000*	30,00,000	(3,55,133)
2. Opium ..	52,65,273	59,52,000	10,000	Nil*	30,52,000	..
3. Hemp & other drugs	1,23,674	55,000	..	..	..	..
4. Other receipts (net)	1,56,435	1,11,300	..	..	..	..

As under other principal heads of revenue, the relation of the amount shown in the account of financial adjustment between the Japanese Military Administration and the Government to the accounts figures for 1942-43 is not clear. The Summary Statement of accounts for that year lumps together “Excise”

& "Excise Duties" (on salt, petroleum etc.) at Rs. 27,44,997. The Excise Bureau's report says that the total liquor revenue for about 8 months of 1942-43 was a little over Rs. 24,00,000, excluding fees received by Peace Committees and Japanese Military authorities during the interregnum, before the Burmese Executive Administration was established on the 1st August 1942.

*Liquor and Opium.*—Towards the end of 1942 the Excise Department was reconstituted, and took over the administration of liquor and opium, which had till then been partially supervised by local Peace Preservation Committees, the Police and the Japanese military authorities. The place of the Excise Commissioner, as Head of the Department, was taken by the Director of Excise Administration, who was responsible through the Director of General Revenues (formerly Financial Commissioner) to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Putting the Home Minister in charge of Excise was a departure from the previous practice; Excise always used to be treated as a Revenue subject.

According to the broadcast in February 1943 by U Saw Hla Pru, Director of Excise Administration and formerly Excise Commissioner, there were then 18 Superintendents, 50 Inspectors, 150 Sub-Inspectors and 251 other subordinate staff. These, however, were not enough, and it was hoped to expand the Department.

Auction sales of liquor licenses were held in Rangoon and many districts for part of the year 1942-43, and it is claimed that revenue amounting to over Rs. 24 lakhs was realised for about eight months of the year. In Rangoon, which contributed Rs. 9 lakhs to this total, the prices fetched were said to be proportionately higher than in a normal year; and Hanthawaddy, Pegu, Bassein, Myaungmya, Pyapon and Moulmein districts realised over Rs. 1 lakh each. The principal receipts were—*Tari*, Rs. 4.95 lakhs, Country Spirit Rs. 7.57 lakhs and *Hlawzaye* Rs. 11.52 lakhs.

In the absence of imported foreign liquor, country spirit was much in demand, but owing to damage by bombing only one of the two pre-war distilleries could be worked, and the military took up the whole of its outturn. The deficit was met by issuing licenses to possess and work stills and to sell spirit on the premises. Spirit was distilled from jaggery, and as the demand exceeded the supply the price of jaggery rose to something like ten times that obtaining before evacuation. Illicit distillation was common, especially in Upper Burma, and some of the local military commanders obtained their

requirements of liquor "by arrangement with private persons"; in other words, they bought illicit spirit. The Burmese Government protested, but had received no reply from the Japanese Command up to the end of March 1943.

There has been a great increase in drinking, and liquor shops are commoner than they used to be. The newspapers report a number of prosecutions and convictions for excise and opium offences. Both police and excise staff took a hand in detection; for instance, in March 1943 the police raided an opium den in Mandalay. They got their conviction, but were themselves convicted of theft committed during the raid.

In 1942 the Japanese Military Administration prohibited the smoking of opium, and announced its intention of suppressing the smoking habit. Partly for this reason, and partly perhaps because the campaign had dislocated the opium smuggling trade, opium was scarce in that year, except in the Myitkyina district. In Akyab old stocks, whether of Government or smuggled opium is not stated, were being sold at about Rs. 28-8-0 per tola (180 grains), but in September, owing to arrivals from Paletwa (Arakan Hill Tracts) and other sources, the wholesale price fell from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 1,600 a seer (2.057 lbs.) (Rs. 25 and Rs. 20 a tola). At Myebon, Kyaukpyu District, opium bought at An, in the same district, at Rs. 37 per tola, fetched Rs. 60, with the result that many old consumers could not afford it, and took to drink instead. In the Myittha Valley (Chindwin area) the price of opium, where procurable, was Rs. 120 per tola about November 1942, and up to the following June it was recorded that it was scarce in Upper Burma generally, and obtainable only from smugglers.

In the Myitkyina district, however, owing to comparatively easy communications with Yunnan, the market was freer, since the Kachins, among whom the habit is general as a prophylactic against malaria, smuggled out salt obtained from the local salt-licks and exchanged it for opium in Yunnan or at Sima, near the border.

The suppression of opium would be in accordance with respectable Burmese opinion, but the policy was not successful, and had to be modified. Whether the initiative came from the Japanese or from Ba Maw's Government is not known, but U Saw Hla Pru admitted in his broadcast in February 1943 that addicts were obtaining their supplies from illicit sources; and he went on to say that the Burmese Government planned to stamp out the smoking and eating of opium within three years by gradually reducing supplies. In the first instance it would be necessary to open Government shops, but not more than one in each district. Smokers and eaters were to be registered

and the registers were to be closed after a period of three months (Similar steps had been taken by the Government of Burma some years before, when it was found that there were many consumers not on the registers, who were not allowed to buy at the Government shops and therefore increased the demand for smuggled opium) The Shan States authorities and the Japanese Army, said U Saw Hla Pru, were helping to prevent the smuggling of opium from the Shan States (where cultivation of the poppy has been permitted, or at least not interfered with, for many years past) U Saw Hla Pru did not say that the change of policy had been dictated by the Japanese, but the annual report of the Excise Bureau, incorporated in the Financial and Economic Annual, 1943, paints a different picture. It says: "During the year (1942-43) the Military Administration issued an Opium Regulation. Under this, the Burmese Government has to undertake to sell small doses to opium addicts who are registered, and the Military Administration will sell opium to the Burmese Government for this purpose. An indent for 300 maunds of opium was prepared and submitted to the Military Administration through the Home Department, but it is not known when the opium will be received. Receipts under opium were therefore practically nil." It had been decided to open 60 opium shops to serve addicts during the period of preparation for total prohibition—an increase on the scale proposed earlier of not more than one per district.

The opium for the Government shops was probably to be obtained from the Shan States. In May and July 1943 the Japanese were paying high prices for large quantities at Pang-long, in the Wa territory of the Northern Shan States, and it was reported that cultivators in South Hsenwi State were buying seed in the same territory for cultivation in the following winter and sale to the Japanese. In the former case it was said that the opium was to be used for bribing the frontier people, for opium often passes for currency among the Kachins; but it is likely that the shop opium came from the same source. In January 1944 the Government retail rate at Bassein was Rs. 14-4-0 per tola. Illicit opium was still plentiful in Myitkyina district and sold at Rs 4 a tola; while there is also information that Japanese officers were smuggling it from Lashio and selling it in Rangoon at Rs 200 per half viss (1.8 lb.) or rather less than Rs. 3 per tola. The difference between this and the Government rate at Bassein is so great as to suggest that the Japanese made a large profit on their official purchases for the Burmese Government and then proceeded to undersell the Government in illicit trade.

An average retail rate at Government shops before the evacuation of Burma was Rs. 2-8-0 per tola.

*Other drugs.*—The only reference to other narcotics being sold is at Akyab in 1942, where ganja, probably illicit, was sold at Rs 4 per tola. Ganja can be, and was, cultivated secretly in the remoter parts of the Pegu Yomas.

## 7. Registration of Deeds.

Registration of deeds is rather a service to the public than a revenue-producing function ; the net return after deducting expenditure was often less than Rs. 1½ lakhs a year. Gross revenue was—

		Rs
1940-41 (Accounts)	.. ..	2,90,638
1941-42 (Revised Estimates)	.. ..	3,60,000
1942-43 (Revised Estimates)	.. ..	80,000
1942-43 (Accounts)	. . . .	14,118
1943-44 (Estimates)	.. ..	2,22,000

Registration was under the control of the Ministry of Judicial Affairs in 1942-43, but the following year it was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. The Director of General Revenues (formerly Financial Commissioner) is Inspector General of Registration, and District Commissioners and subordinate executive officers have been made *ex-officio* Registrars and Sub-Registrars as before, "in order to re-open the district registration offices as soon as possible". There is no mention of the whole-time Joint Registrars and Joint Sub-Registrars (usually retired Government servants re-appointed for the purpose) who used to do much of the actual work of registration.

## 8. Betting Tax.

		Rs.
1940-41 (Accounts)	.. ..	8,76,316
1941-42 (Revised Estimates)	.. ..	4,00,000

Not mentioned in 1942-43 or later years, and information shows that no race-meetings were held.

## 9. Taxes on Motor Vehicles.

		Rs.
1940-41 (Accounts)	.. ..	7,53,682
1941-42 (Revised Estimates)	.. ..	11,33,000
1942-43 (Revised Estimates)	.. ..	50,000
1942-43 (Accounts)	.. ..	Not separately mentioned.
1943-44 (Estimates)	.. ..	89,000



Traffic along the Burma Road was responsible for the increasing revenue up to 1941-42.

A notice by the Commissioner of Police, Rangoon, gives the following as the half-yearly rates to be collected for the second half of 1943—

Private car, 15 dollars    Motor Cycle, 6 dollars.    Private bus or lorry, 1 ton to 5 tons, from 50 to 90 dollars.

Public Vehicles—4-seater taxi, 15 dollars.    Buses, 8 to above 24 passengers, 30 to 100 dollars.    Public lorries, 1 ton to 5 tons, from 50 to 90 dollars

The Straits dollar is equated to the rupee, but it is not clear why rates should have been prescribed in dollars. Vehicles used for military purposes were exempt. The rates probably include both the Government registration fee and the motor vehicle tax which used to accrue to municipalities.

### 10. Mill production tax.

This was a new tax levied by an Ordinance passed by Ba Maw as Prime Minister on the 12th March 1943, which came into force at once. It was estimated to produce Rs. 14,37,000 in 1943-44, and is levied on the products of rice, saw, oil and wheat-flour mills operated otherwise than by manual labour. Owners of mills are required to deliver monthly returns, and mills are open to inspection. The rates of tax on produce are—

Rice Mills	..	..	Rs. 5 per 10 tons.
Saw Mills	..	..	Rs 5 per 10 tons.
Oil Mills	..	..	Rs. 5 per 100 viss (360 lbs.).
Wheat-Flour Mills	..	..	Re 1 per cwt

The tax is administered by the Director of General Revenues as Chief Revenue Authority ; and a notice issued in Rangoon calling for returns was signed by the District Commissioner.

### 11. Succession Tax.

An ordinance establishing this new tax was under consideration at the end of 1942-43, and the estimated yield in 1943-44 was Rs. 1,00,000. No details are given.

## 12. Stamps.

The revenue is derived from judicial stamps (court fees) and non-judicial (duties on many kinds of documents), but it does not include postage stamps

			Rs.
1940-41 (Accounts)	..	..	34,23,218
1941-42 (Revised Estimates)	..	..	36,94,000
1942-43 (Revised Estimates)	..	..	5,00,000
1942-43 (Accounts)	..	..	1,93,394
1943-44 (Estimates)	..	..	17,64,000

An enhanced duty on applications to Government officers was said to have been levied in Arakan in 1942, and early in 1943 it was learnt that new revenue stamps were being printed, including one anna stamps for receipts (for which postage stamps were formerly used) and "in place of cash". British Government revenue stamps were declared invalid. Sales are effected through licensed vendors as before.

## 13. State Lottery.

		Gross Revenue.	Expenditure.
		Rs.	Rs.
1940-41 (Accounts)	..	27,07,826	1,97,382
1941-42 (Revised Estimates)	..	26,01,000	2,06,000
1942-43 (Revised Estimates)	..	3,00,000	48,000
1942-43 (Accounts)	..	98,008	36,358
1943-44 (Estimates)	..	8,00,000	1,07,692

The gross revenue, both before and after the evacuation of Burma, represents 40 per cent. of the sales of tickets, from which expenditure has to be deducted. In all cases 60 per cent. is distributed in prizes. The proportion of expenditure to the gross revenue was between 7 and 8 per cent. in 1940-41 and 1941-42, but rose to 13½ per cent. in the 1943-44 estimates. In the accounts figures for 1942-43, the first year in which Dr. Ba Maw's Government reopened the State Lottery, expenditure swallowed up 37 per cent. of the revenue accruing to Government.

The prizes advertised in August 1942 were on the same scale as before, namely, out of each 10 lakhs subscribed one prize of Rs. 1 lakh and numerous other prizes amounting to Rs. 6 lakhs in all. Tickets at Rs. 2 were sold in the streets and at the State Lottery office, post offices and Government treasuries and sub-treasuries. The information regarding the

results of the lotteries is incomplete. For the first, drawn in November 1942, the total sales were apparently about Rs. 2½ lakhs (the reports are not very clear) and it was possible to award only one prize of Rs. 50,000, and one of Rs. 20,000, one of Rs. 10,000 and 41 smaller prizes. The sales for the second lottery, drawn in April 1943, amounted to about Rs. 1,91,000 and the prizes are not stated. The third lottery, drawn in August 1943, realised about Rs. 3,81,000 and the prizes were one of Rs. 1 lakh, one of Rs. 30,000 and 90 of smaller amounts, totalling Rs. 2,28,500. Of the fourth lottery, drawn in November 1943, it is known only that the sales of tickets up to the 20th October were Rs. 3,06,000. The fifth lottery was drawn in February 1944 and was much more successful; the sales up to January 8 brought in Rs. 4,08,400, but the prizes amounted to Rs. 4,17,000, which indicates that the final takings were Rs. 6,95,000. A sixth lottery was to be held in May 1944, but there is no information regarding the results.

Though the revenue is gradually increasing, it cannot compare with that drawn from this source before the evacuation. The cultivating class, with their crops unsold, are unlikely to have had money even for a gamble, while the rest of the population, though it had more paper money than it could spend, probably did not at first feel sufficiently confident in the stability of the Government to invest on a large scale. If the size of the deposits made in the State Bank in the early months of 1944 (see "State Bank") is any guide, confidence has increased and may be expected to benefit the State Lottery.

#### 14. State Bank.

Before the evacuation the functions of a Central Bank for Burma were performed by the Rangoon branch of the Reserve Bank of India, which had the custody of the Government balances, issued notes, made ways and means advances to Government and managed currency and the public debt. There was no separate coinage for Burma, Indian coins being in use. In several important towns outside Rangoon the Imperial Bank of India acted as agent for the Reserve Bank and handled the cash transactions of the local treasuries belonging to Government.

When the Japanese Military Administration was established in 1942, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Chosen Bank opened branches in Rangoon, and the former may have performed such central banking functions as were required by the administration. In the next stage, that of the Burmese Executive Administration of 1942-43, the Yokohama Specie

Bank, according to the Financial and Economic Annual, acted as banker to the Government, and was the channel through which credits were given for the ways and means advances made by the Japanese. It also handled the business of the Southern Development Bank, which did not formally begin operations in Rangoon till the 2nd August 1943. From that date until the creation of the State Bank the Southern Development Bank replaced the Yokohama Specie Bank as the agency for ways and means advances; and it was also stated that the Southern Development Bank would administer "all treasury accounts of the Japanese Government in Burma". The meaning of the last phrase is not clear, but an account of the financial adjustment between the Military Administration and the Burmese Government for the previous financial year, 1942-43, seems to show that the Japanese received revenue (export and import duties, excise and postal revenue) and incurred expenditure on the Burmese National Army and on civil administration, on behalf of the Burmese Government. The Japanese Military Administration may therefore have had treasury accounts sent to it for compilation and adjustment, quite distinct from the treasury accounts of the revenue and expenditure directly accruing to and incurred by the Government. If this was so before the State Bank was created early in 1944, there is nothing to show whether the same kind of accounting arrangements continued afterwards, or that the Japanese Military Administration at any time had its own treasuries, other than the treasure-chests that might be expected to accompany units in the field.

To prepare for the organisation of a State Bank and a currency system, Ba Maw in August 1943 formed a committee consisting of Dr Thein Maung (then Finance Minister) and nine other members, among whom were U Set (late of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), U Ba Maung (who was to be the first Governor of the State Bank) and U Hla Shein, I.C.S., Secretary, Finance Department. The committee, which had the help of Japanese financial advisers, reported in October; a State Bank Act, the text of which unfortunately is not available, was passed, the Bank's rules and regulations were approved by the Privy Council, and the Bank was opened with much publicity on the 15th January 1944. U Set's speech said that the Bank, which would be a Central Bank for Burma and the Shan States, would undertake such business as the security of the country's monetary affairs, the circulation of money, receiving and paying out the people's money, issuing currency notes and coins, and encouraging, helping and supervising banks which might come into existence in future (This phrase would ex-

clude the Japanese banks already established in Burma.) The capital of the Bank was Rs. 1 crore, supplied by Government. (In reality it was lent by the Japanese.) For the present, as there were no other banks, it would undertake all the work connected with exchange and trade, though there is other evidence that exchange is managed by the Japanese through the medium of the yen. The Bank, said U Set, would turn the idle money in the people's hands to productive purposes and provide the capital essential for business. He laid great stress on the need for investing savings and so securing the country's financial position, which had never before been in so dangerous a state, and preventing a fall in the exchange value of the Burma rupee. Dr Ba Maw's speech was on the same note, and the need for encouraging public savings was also the subject of propaganda in the press. Dr Ba Maw opened the Bank with a deposit of Rs. one lakh "on behalf of the people", this presumably representing Government or party funds. The Bank also undertook the custody, and apparently also management of the issue, of Savings Bonds, and the custody of insurance policies deposited by the public.

The issue of notes was to begin as soon as they were received from Japan, but no coins appear to have been issued, and the unpopular Japanese notes of small denominations are still in circulation.

The Governor of the Bank was U Ba Maung, the Manager was U Chit Htun, and the other Directors were Ba Maw's brother Dr. Ba Han, who seems to have become something of a pluralist, U Hla Shein (Secretary, Finance Department) and four other Burmans. Three officials of Japanese banks were appointed Chief, Deputy and Assistant Advisers.

U Ba Maung, KSM, a former Senator, had previous banking experience as Manager of the Pegu Central Co-operative Bank, Ltd. He appears to be a man of good education, has travelled in Europe and America and was a shareholder in the newspaper "New Burma". He was a close friend of Dr. Thein Maung. U Chit Htun is closely related to U Ba Maung, and was a probationary officer of the Reserve Bank of India before evacuation. He went to Tokyo about July 1943, probably on business connected with the proposed State Bank, and is described in a Tokyo message as Director of the Burma Banking Bureau at that time.

The Bank was successful from the start, and by the end of January 1944 it had, according to Domei, received deposits amounting to Rs 55.6 lakhs and granted loans of Rs. 3.90 crores.

The bulk of the loans, which exceeded the total of capital and deposits, must have been borrowed from some other source, or provided by issuing paper money. Interest rates were  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for current accounts and 2 per cent. for savings deposits, which seem to indicate a remarkable degree of public confidence in the Bank. An explanation given by an observer who was in Burma is that everyone had plenty of money which could not be spent because there was nothing to buy, and which had therefore lost most of its value. The public therefore made haste to deposit it in the Bank. The abundance of money can hardly have extended to paddy cultivators in 1943, for they still had their crops on their hands ; but they would not in any case be the first section of the population to deposit any savings that they had. Other classes no doubt had money that they could not spend on consumer goods ; but all except a small fraction of the deposits was on current account, the interest on which was meagre. It is reported from other sources that many people, through lack of confidence, were converting their money into precious stones, a far less revolutionary procedure to Burmese ideas than putting it in a bank. The deposit of over Rs. 55 lakhs in a fortnight may therefore consist chiefly of the funds of people in business, who needed considerable liquid assets ; but it would be interesting to know from what classes and communities the depositors were drawn, and whether the State Bank has continued to progress.

There is no detailed information regarding the form of the Bank's assets, the holding of the cash reserves of other banks, remittances, bankers' clearances and its part in treasury business in the districts. The Yokohama Specie Bank has ten branches in important towns, and may possibly conduct the cash side of treasury business there as agents for the State Bank, but this is mere surmise.

The propaganda regarding the investment of savings has not been so effective as to prevent inflation, for as late as May 1944 a special committee including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Finance Minister (U Set), the Governor and the Manager of the State Bank, was appointed to devise a remedy for it.

## 15. Public Debt.

It may be assumed that the Ba Maw Government repudiates the public debt outstanding at the time of the evacuation, including the debt to India, with the possible exception of Post Office Cash Certificates and Savings Bank deposits in the names of people resident in Burma. The Executive Administration of August 1942 started with a loan of the modest sum

of Rs. 10 lakhs, presumably lent by the Japanese Military Administration, but the total of the cash advances made by the Japanese in the eight months from August 1942 to March 1943 is recorded as Rs. 65,90,000. This sum, however, was repaid during the year. The Ways and Means Estimates for 1943-44 provided for advances of Rs. 20 lakhs to supply a working cash balance, and Rs. 5,86,85,140 for the paddy purchase scheme. These were for the whole year, but in August 1943, on the attainment of "independence", a new budget was drawn up, showing a deficit of Rs. 14,60,00,000, including expenditure on the purchase of paddy; and this deficit was to be met by loans from the Burma branch of the Japanese Southern Development Bank. The estimates for 1944-45 similarly showed a deficit of Rs. 18,00,00,000, including Rs. 3,70,00,000 for paddy purchase, to be covered by a loan from the Burma State Bank. In the absence of detailed accounts it is impossible to say what advances were actually taken and repaid up to the end of 1943-44; the prospects of the Government's disposing of Rs. 9-1½ crores worth of paddy in two years are faint. As Dr. Andrus points out, the State Bank had not assets sufficient to meet the deficit for 1944-45. The Japanese banks also could not have had in Burma enough actual capital representing real wealth, so that both the loans, amounting to over Rs. 30 crores, were probably supplied by issuing unbacked paper money. The high level of prices quoted for commodities lends support to the theory that the currency dilution was of this magnitude.

The Post Office Savings Bank was reopened towards the end of 1942; in the following June, those whose had deposited savings under the previous regime were required to produce their pass-books at the nearest post office for inspection. Holders of Post Office Cash Certificates and postal life insurance policies were called on to register particulars in January 1944. It seems therefore that Ba Maw's Government was contemplating some steps to recognise the obligations of the former Government, but there is no news about the result. There appears to have been no new issue of Post Office Cash Certificates.

The only public issue made in Burma consisted of Independence Bonds of the value of Rs. 10 each, which were on sale from August 1943, or (according to "The Burmese Era") from the 20th November, to the end of January in Rangoon and the end of February in rural areas. The amount aimed at was Rs. 20 lakhs. The bonds, which were printed in Japan, were sold by Banks and various Government offices in Rangoon and the mofussil. They were repayable in ten years; apparently they bore no interest, but there were to be half-yearly

drawings for two prizes of Rs. 5,000 each, four of Rs. 1,000 each and 120 of Rs. 50 each. The cost of prizes was thus equivalent to an interest rate of 2 per cent. per annum. "The Burmese Era" of the 1st January 1944 claims that Rs. 17 lakhs worth were sold in the first month, and urges people to buy the remainder while they have a chance. It may be inferred that the sales were flagging, and there are two possible reasons for the bonds being less popular than other forms of investment. One is that the term of the loan, as compared with deposits on current account in the State Bank, was longer than the present administration was likely to survive; and the other is that as a pure gamble for prizes the bonds were much less attractive than the State Lottery. It is noteworthy that in spite of the large deficit in the budget estimates for 1944-45, Domei's summary of them contains no mention of any fresh public loan

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## PART IV.

### 1. Religion.

By U Tin Tut, Bar-at-Law, I.C.S.

The Japanese in Burma continued their policy of hood-wink-ing the people into the belief that the Japanese are not only good Buddhists but also the champions of Buddhism. Buddhist religious ceremonies were organised in Japan to synchronise with ceremonies in Thailand and Burma on important Buddhist days and advantage was taken of these occasions to declare Japan's adherence to the Buddhist faith, which is affirmed as one of the strongest bonds for unity in the New Order in East Asia. The Japanese in Burma started in 1942 the propaganda that Buddhism was on the wane in Burma because of the British regime and that during the British withdrawal in 1942, pagodas and monasteries were destroyed and Burmese monks indiscriminately killed by the British. The alleged bombing of the Shwedagon Pagoda on the 23rd February 1943 by Allied aircraft was made the occasion for indignation meetings at which British "barbarism" was denounced. A Greater East Asiatic Buddhist Conference was convened in Tokyo from the 4th to the 6th July 1943 for the carrying on of "cultural, philanthropic and social work" in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The Japanese in Burma appreciated the influence which the monkhood possesses over the Burmese people and did not hesitate to invite or to compel the assistance of the monks in the carrying out of administrative measures. The Japanese magazine "Nampo Josei" of October 1943 states that Buddhist monks in the Shan States were compelled by a Japanese colonel to preach the killing of rats for the prevention of plague. It does not appear, however, that the Japanese showed marked veneration for Burmese Buddhist monks and it is probable that they distrusted such monks as a possible source of political trouble. The same magazine adds: "The Burmese priests have not been utilised enough as suitable co-operators with Japan. In the future to make a firm coalition with Burma, it is necessary for Japan first of all to secure their co-operation."

Dr. Ba Maw began life as a Christian and though he declared himself from time to time as a Buddhist he was not, before the evacuation, accepted as a genuine Buddhist by the Burmese public. Since his accession to power in Burma he has spared no pains to affirm his adherence to Buddhism. At the

Independence Day ceremony of August 1948 he took the following oath in relation to the Buddhist faith:—

“ I take my refuge in the three Jewels of the Buddhist religion and will defend the Buddhist faith like the royal defenders of old so that it may shine radiant like the sun and the moon.”

On the same day he fed the monks at Government House in Rangoon and declared to an assembly of monks at the Shwedagon Pagoda that his visit to the Pagoda was to announce to the *nats* (spirits) and the people that he would work for the prosperity of the religion in setting up a free Burma. In forming his Cabinet, he allocated a portfolio to “ Religion, Development and Propaganda ” to be held by Bandoola U Sein.

Burmese monks first came into politics in the general election of 1932 and the influence they exerted resulted in the overwhelming success of the anti-Separationists in that election. It should be understood, however, that politically-minded monks were very much in the minority and that the large majority continued with their religious practices without taking any interest in politics. Since that election, party leaders found it necessary to secure at elections the support of some section or other of the politically-minded monks. Thus separated, the monkhood tended to neutralise itself at elections. When the Sinyetha Party amalgamated with the Thakins in 1942 and Dr. Ba Maw, with the help of the Japanese, secured the suppression of all other political parties, the united party that remained was named the Dobama Sinyetha Asi Ayon (Burmese Peoples' Association). One of the branches of this was the Dobama Sinyetha Sangha Asi Ayon (Burmese Peoples' Association of Monks). This branch was a parallel organisation to the three other branches, which were respectively for men, women and for youths. The Monks' branch was not subordinated to the lay branches but was subordinated to the Party Leader, the “ *Anashin Adipadi* ” (Dictator President), Dr. Ba Maw. By this he secured the fusion of the politically-minded monks of Burma in a political organisation of which he was the head.

The last *Thathanabaing*, who was the head of the Buddhist religion but whose jurisdiction did not extend beyond Upper Burma, had been dead for some years and the office was vacant when Burma was evacuated in 1942, though there was in existence a Thudama Council, which in the life time of *Thathanabaings* acted as their advisory council and which performed the duties of the *Thathanabaing* when the office was

vacant. The somewhat shadowy jurisdiction of the *Thathanabawng* and his council did not extend even in Upper Burma to sects not forming part of the Thudama Sect which, however, covered the great majority of Buddhist monks in Burma. The fusion of politically-minded monks achieved by Dr. Ba Maw did not solve the problem of unity in the monkhood as a whole. In May 1943 it was announced in Burmese newspapers that the Chief Minister, Dr. Ba Maw, and his Advisory Committee (possibly the members of the Burmese executive administration which preceded the Burmese Cabinet of the 1st August 1943) had approved a plan for the formation of a Maha Sangha Association (Great Association of Monks) in accordance with royal custom of the past and for the welfare of the Buddhist faith. There was to be a fusion of the sects, viz., the Thudama, the Shwegyin, the Kan and the Dwaya. A special working committee of monks was to be appointed to select District *Sayadaws* and also Chief State *Sayadaws*. The District *Sayadaws* are to be local advisers to the Chief State *Sayadaws* who are to form a national council of monks representing all the well-known sects in Burmese Buddhism. Up to ten District *Sayadaws* would be selected in each district and one of the qualifications for such selection is that the candidate must have been at least twenty years in the priesthood. One of the qualifications for selection as a Chief State *Sayadaw* was that the candidate must have been over thirty years in the priesthood. Burmese newspapers of later dates indicate that selections were made from time to time in respect of both these categories, though the limit of ten District *Sayadaws* per district does not appear to have been observed. The "Bama Khit" of the 26th January 1944 contained an account of a meeting held at the headquarters of the Council of Maha Sanghas (Chief State *Sayadaws*?). The names of U Zatila, Ngadatkyi Sayadaw, of U Kawthala, said to be representing the Chaukiatyi Sayadaw, and of the Bahana Weluwun Sayadaw were mentioned. The object of the meeting was apparently to evolve a new scheme of safeguarding the Shwedagon and Sule Pagodas from "various dangers" (Allied bombing?). The resolutions passed contained a request for assistance from the *Adipadi* and a request to the Burma Government for help to make known to the Buddhists of the world the "outrageous bombing of Pagodas and religious buildings by the Anglo-American enemies". The authority of the Council does not appear to be effective as the meeting placed on record the failure of the Shwedagon Pagoda Trustees to attend.

Previous to the formation of this all-Burma organisation, Lower Burma and Upper Burma appear to have had each a

Supreme Council of Monks. It was announced early in August 1943 that these two bodies, the well-known Aletawya Sayadaw representing the Lower Burma Council and the Nyaungyan Sayadaw representing the Upper Burma Council, had agreed to unite. Though the principal purpose of this union was ostensibly to consolidate the monkhood in Burma, the political purpose was scarcely concealed as it was announced on the 1st August 1943 that part of the purpose of the union was to maintain and consolidate the independence of Burma, to establish the Great Asia Co-operation Sphere and to strengthen the friendship between Japan and Burma.

It was announced in January 1944 that a pagoda enshrining Buddhist relics would be built in Japan at a cost of five million yen in place of the pagodas which have been destroyed by the Anglo-American bombing. The pagoda was to be built on the model of the Botataung Pagoda alleged to have been destroyed by Anglo-American bombing. "The completion of this Pagoda", said the New Light of Burma, "means not only closer religious affinity between Burmans and Nipponese, but would also open the way for stable racial amity." This was evidently part of Japan's idea of making Japan a central place of pilgrimage for Buddhists of all races. Between 200 and 300 relics (*dattaw*) were to be collected including relics worshipped by Kings Alaungpaya, Bodaw and Mindon. When Buddha's body was cremated, much of the residue is said to have taken the form of small circular grains. These are believed to have the miraculous power of multiplication and many families in Burma have small collections of *dattaw*. It is customary when pagodas are built for some *dattaw* to be placed inside them. In spite of this, the Burmese people would scarcely have liked to have parted with *dattaw* having historical connection with past kings of Burma. The scheme was, however, proceeded with. The *dattaw* was apparently kept in the Shwedagon Pagoda prior to its transport to Japan by Dr. Ba Han, the Christian brother of Dr. Ba Maw and head of the Burmese Special Research Mission. On the 30th May at Tokyo there was a ceremonial presentation of the relics by the Burmese Ambassador Dr. Thein Maung to Japanese authorities. Domei announced on the 9th June that the relics were presented to Japan by Burma as a symbol of Japanese-Burmese amity and that they were formally laid at the Wakayuji Temple at Koyasan on that date.

There is no indication that followers of Christianity or other non-Buddhist faiths are being subjected in Burma to any persecution or to any disability. British and American priests are said to have been interned and other foreign priests and

missionaries to be kept under surveillance. It was reported in respect of the latter part of 1943 that there was no restriction on religious worship but that no Christian church services were being held, though Christians were holding services in their villages. The report added that Hindus and Muslims are not restricted in respect of their religious practices.

## 2. Agricultural Credit and Finance.

Economic conditions in Burma are described in Dr. Andrus's report, but it is necessary to refer here to the agricultural loans granted by the Government, presumably under the old Agriculturists Loans Act, and to the paddy purchase scheme. The Burmese executive administration in 1942 gave out loans in Akyab District, at least, to members of the Arakan National Congress. Money-lenders were not doing business in Akyab in 1942; interest on old loans was not being paid nor were tenants paying their rents to landlords. It is not known whether government loans were issued widely in Burma in 1942; the Bank of Chettinad, which was renamed the People's Bank, was re-opened, and though there is no evidence on this point it may have made advances to cultivators. But when all is said and done, it is highly unlikely that there was sufficient finance for the 1942 cultivating season.

Some inducement to cultivation was badly needed, but it does not appear to have been given effectively, either in 1942 or in 1943. Agricultural labourers even at the end of 1943 were reported to be flocking to the towns and Japanese camps to get paid work, partly because the prices of produce were low and those of other commodities high. Very little of the 1941-42 crop had been exported. The paddy crop of 1942-43 produced more than the country needed. Millers are reported to have bought very little and though the Government announced its paddy purchase scheme, it is said that it was not operative. The cultivators were therefore hard hit, and many of them would have sold their lands, but no one was willing to buy. Large areas of land were going out of cultivation because of the lack of plough cattle, lack of labour, which had been drawn off by the Heiho Tat and the Sweat Army, lack of transport between Upper and Lower Burma, lack of exports and lack of confidence generally.

One step taken to keep agriculture going was the Tenancy Ordinance of 1943, which reduced agricultural rents by 50 per cent. for the year 1942-43. It was hoped that the reduction in rent would enable the tenants to attract labour by paying higher wages. In January 1943 the Nippon-Burma Paddy Union

offered to buy all available stocks of the 1941-42 and 1942-43 paddy crops at Rs. 102 per 100 baskets; but by June it was evident that the new crop surplus had not been purchased. As the planting season was beginning, the cultivators' position, with last year's crop unsold, must have been nearly desperate. The Government then announced its paddy purchase scheme, with the five aims, according to the Financial and Economic Annual, 1943, of relieving agrarian distress caused by the absence of markets for paddy; enabling land-owners to pay their land revenue; promoting national self-sufficiency; storing sufficient paddy to meet war needs; and providing supplies for regions of the co-prosperity sphere deficient in food grains.

The scheme included 13 districts in Lower Burma and it was hoped to buy 51,700,000 baskets of paddy at a total expenditure of Rs. 5,58,30,140. The New Light of Burma explained in October 1943 that Government would purchase all the paddy on the market and distribute it in areas where it was scarce. Formerly, it said, sellers of more than 300 baskets were paid half the amount in promissory notes, but now they would be paid cash in full at Rs. 80 per 100 baskets. Government aimed at accumulating a stock of 52 million baskets as a reserve. The price offered was very poor compared with the cost of living, and a critic who is possibly prejudiced against the Burmese Government observed in January 1944 that the scheme had reached a stage where paddy buyers etc. had been appointed and were receiving pay, but no paddy had been bought and no godowns built. On the other hand, the Director of the Propaganda Bureau asserted in October 1943 that the decision to store 52 million baskets had caused the prices of paddy and rice to rise. Government was also to purchase the whole of the cotton crop and distribute it and was considering further schemes for the benefit of cultivators such as the prevention of alienation of small holders, improvement of the relations of tenants and landlords and the administration of ownerless and enemy-owned lands.

There is some discrepancy between these accounts on the point whether the 52 million baskets (1,068,000 tons of paddy) included paddy for export as well as for the national reserve stock. The total amount is only a fraction of the normal exportable surplus.

In addition, the Burmese Government made plans for the issue of agricultural loans for 1943-44. According to the Financial and Economic Annual 1943, the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture proposed to issue agricultural loans to the extent of Rs. 50 lakhs to cover the cultivation of roughly 9.3 million acres of paddy land. The loans were, however, issued

too late in the year to provide for ploughing, sowing and transplanting, and the object was later described as covering the cost of reaping. The rates of interest are given by the New Light of Burma as 8 per cent. for ordinary cultivators and 4 per cent. for cultivator members of co-operative societies. The required sum. was to be raised from the Nanpatsu Safe through the good offices of the Japanese Military Administration. The Nanpatsu Safe is presumably the name of a Japanese bank. The total of Rs. 50 lakhs for agricultural loans is large in comparison with the amounts issued in pre-war years, but obviously a rate of less than 8 annas an acre would not go far towards paying the cost of harvesting. Former Governments have often emphasised their inability to finance the whole of the crop; so, for that matter, did a spokesman of the Co-operative Societies Bureau in January 1943. In the result the amount issued seems to have been reduced. The New Light of Burma had an editorial on the subject of agricultural loans on the 25th November 1943, which stated that Rs. 45 lakhs for 1943-44 was appropriated for 13 Lower Burma districts and that of this sum Rs. 5 lakhs was for members of co-operative societies, Rs. 3 lakhs for tenants of Government Estates and Rs. 37 lakhs for cultivators who were not members of co-operative societies. As mentioned, however, under the heading "The Co-operative Movement", advances to members of co-operative societies, including those in Government Estates, did not amount to much more than a lakh of rupees by January 1944. A change announced in the method of administration was that the distribution was to be made in the villages of the borrowers (and not, as was too often the practice in the old days, by summoning them to township headquarters), and on the joint and several security of headmen and villagers instead of on the security of movable and immovable property. Another account says that while members of co-operative societies were exempted from the need of furnishing security, other borrowers must give joint security in the form of cattle or immovable property. In the draft budget for 1944-45 a reduced allotment of Rs. 3,70,00,000 was made for the purchase of paddy but the price was raised to Rs. 200 per 100 baskets in the districts, and Rs. 250 at the Rangoon docks—an artificial price which was presumably not adopted without some compelling reason, such as the need to ensure that a sufficient area was planted.

It is as yet too early to say to what extent, if at all, the various measures have relieved the cultivators' position and attracted labour to the land. The paddy purchase scheme is an innovation dictated by war conditions, but in the issue of-

agricultural loans the Burmese Government appears to be working more or less on the old lines. Government loans and Co-operative Credit Societies are not the only source—probably not even the main source—of agricultural credit, for it is asserted that both the Yokohama Specie Bank and the People's Bank were making loans in 1943. There is nothing, however, to show that individual Chettians who remained in Burma are carrying on their old business of financing the crops.

### 3. The Co-operative Movement.

The Financial and Economic Annual of Burma of July 1943 contains a history of the co-operative movement in Burma, apparently drawn from pre-evacuation official sources, and as the Burmese Government started to revive the movement under handicaps not entirely of its own making the facts may be briefly recapitulated. The movement made rapid progress until 1925, when there were over 4,000 societies, with a membership of over 90,000, a share capital of Rs. 35,00,000 and a working capital of Rs. 1,78,00,000. Most of the societies were credit societies, co-operative trading, milling and marketing being neglected. The co-operative societies were combined in unions and finance was provided by the Central Co-operative Banks and the Burma Provincial Co-operative Bank. The societies found great difficulty in recovering their dues, and an era of insolvency and liquidation of societies and banks set in. Steps were taken to scale down the borrowers' debts, to secure the reduced amounts on their land, and to extend the term for repayment. By 1940 the number of agricultural societies reconstructed and registered was 1,273 and the overdue loans had been reduced from Rs. 1,16,00,000 to Rs. 22,00,000. There were in that year 10 District Central Co-operative Banks and 3 Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks, increased to 4 in 1941. Before evacuation Government had started a scheme for educating the cultivator in co-operative principles and practice.

According to the report of the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture for 1942-43, there were at the outbreak of the war 2,051 societies of which 1,599 were rural credit societies under the latest by-laws, with a total membership of 81,804 and working capital of Rs. 16,00,000. Their affairs, as a result of the war, had become chaotic, but it is claimed that over 1,000 societies had been inspected by July 1943 and that almost all of these were working. Steps were being taken to recover as much as possible of the loans issued to the societies by the late Government. Recoveries were more easily made in Upper Burma, which had benefited by the high prices of dry zone crops, than in the paddy-growing districts of Lower Burma. It had not



been decided whether to open the land mortgage banks, but the State Colonies (Government Estates) were to be set on their feet again.

A broadcast by U Tin, Information Officer of the Co-operative Societies Department, on the 20th January 1943, fills in a few details. He said that Government was planning to go ahead with schemes for credit and land purchase societies. Records had been lost and a special office had been opened to help reconstruct them. It was intended to accept payment of revenue in grain ; this presumably means land revenue and not repayment of advances.

The New Light of Burma, summarising the report of the Co-operative and Government Estates Bureau for the period from the 1st August to the 15th November 1943, said that a sufficient number of additional appointments had been made in the Bureau to undertake a comprehensive programme of stage-by-stage development. The Rangoon Central Co-operative Trading Society and a number of co-operative retail shops had been established in the Rangoon area to meet a public demand owing to the abnormal rise in prices of consumer goods. It was proposed to set up similar stores in other parts of the country. A Co-operative Training Centre had been opened and there were plans for large numbers of live-stock rearing societies to be started with a Government grant of Rs. 5,00,000. In January 1944, the New Light of Burma reported that the forming of co-operative societies up to the end of December had been fairly successful. There were 1,222 societies, and advances of Rs. 53,201 had been made to cultivator members. Rs. 51,580 had also been advanced to members of Joint Tenant Co-operative Societies on Government Estates. Animal-breeding societies had been started and co-operative stores had been extended to the districts. Japanese broadcasts in June 1944 claim a wide expansion of the co-operative movement in Moulmein, Thaton and Pegu districts, societies being multiplied for the promotion of agriculture and handicrafts. In part, however, the agricultural societies of sugar growers in Thaton seem to have been bound to the Japanese manufacturers who financed them, pure co-operative principles being impaired to this extent.

There are some other references to the Central Co-operative Trading Society and the retail shops. A notice in the New Light of Burma of the 31st March 1943, offering shares for sale stated that the Central Society was established under the auspices of the Welfare Section of the D.S.A.A.; and it claimed that as soon as the plans were in operation goods which had been extremely scarce gradually became available. On

the 5th February 1944, an annual meeting of the society was called to consider among other things the payment of a dividend. A society called the Western Co-operative Trading Society with headquarters in Rangoon, apparently an offshoot of the Central Society, soon got into difficulties ; and in September 1943, it issued a notice to its shareholders that it was about to distribute its balance at the rate of Rs. 1.28 cents per share. The issue price of shares is not stated. As regards retail shops, by the 25th September 1943, 7 had been opened in Rangoon, and within their areas they appear to have sold goods at reasonable prices. A newspaper article in October complained that as there was no co-operative store in East Rangoon matches cost 80 cents a box. The writer urged that a shop should be opened in that area. He also complained that where there were shops the distribution of salt, sugar and matches went by favour of the shopkeeper and some customers could obtain none.

In addition to the Central Co-operative Trading Society the Thakin Party seems to have been responsible for starting the Central Co-operative Training School in 1942, when 70 candidates were admitted. The Financial and Economic Annual stated that the Minister of Lands and Agriculture proposed to convert it into a Government institution. Courses of lectures began on the 1st April and the 1st July 1943 ; the former was to last a month. The subjects included co-operative policy, law and accounts, rice research, kitchen gardens, marketing of cereals, cattle diseases and animal husbandry ; and many of the lecturers were Government servants belonging to the old Agricultural, Veterinary and Co-operative Departments.

An advertisement shows that the pay of Co-operative *Myooks* is Rs. 200—20—500 p.m., which is reasonably high. It is safe to assume that the Co-operative Bureau has started work, but there is nothing to corroborate its figures, or any evidence that co-operative shops outside Rangoon or animal-breeding societies have actually been started. A co-operative trading society reported in August 1943 to have been founded at Yeni, Toungoo District, may have been a retail store.

#### 4. Local Self-Government.

##### (a) THE CORPORATION OF RANGOON.

Summarised from a report by L. E. Mitchell.

Notwithstanding the extensive demolitions and destruction of port, electric power station, transport and industrial installations on the 7th March, 1942, and in spite of arson, looting and wanton destruction, municipal works and

buildings remained almost entirely undamaged. The City's water supply, adequate for a population of three-quarters of a million, was in perfect working order and the Air Compressor Station buildings and plant were intact. Hospitals, dispensaries, laboratory, X-ray Department, etc., were undamaged, except for the Ahlone (Forest Road) Dispensary, which was bombed on the 25th December 1941, and were left complete with most of their valuable equipment. By the 23rd February 1942, all the large fire engines and fire appliances had been evacuated to Upper Burma and were later abandoned one by one as the remnants of the Fire Brigade worked their way through the target areas up to the final evacuation to India. Almost all markets and bazaars, although deserted and in most cases looted, were otherwise ready for occupation. The streets were left in an excellent state of repair but the business quarters were littered with abandoned loot, broken glass, fittings and rubbish. Depots with tools and plant for repairs to roads and for street scavenging and removal of night soil were ready for use, except that Steam Rollers had either been taken over by the P.W.D. or removed to Upper Burma, whilst all motor transport had either been stolen, evacuated or destroyed. The machinery at the Corporation Workshop and Motor Transport Repair Depots was all immobilised and the Stores Depots were set on fire. The Corporation's superior service, inferior service and labour staffs in 1941 were approximately 800, 1,050 and 5,000 respectively, and of these about 600, 600 and 3,000 respectively did not evacuate to India.

The recommencement of any civil administration in Rangoon in March 1942, therefore, must have been handicapped by the absence of the old executive and labour force and by lack of funds, accounts and records ; but as regards property, works, plant and equipment, the only important deficiency was motor transport.

The population left in Rangoon when the Japanese arrived has been quoted through Japanese sources as 20,000 and by the middle of April the population had increased to 100,000. The latter estimate may be near the true figure but the estimate of 20,000 is definitely an understatement. It must have been obvious that for such a large population the rough and ready system of administration being introduced by the untried and untrained administrators of the Burma Independence Army would have serious consequences. The Japanese at first gave the Burma Independence Army a free hand in attempting to restore civil administration in Rangoon, and by the 23rd March a Rangoon Administrative Committee had been appointed under the Presidency of U Tin, the proprietor of the ' New Light of Burma '.

About the middle of April, possibly as a result of communal disturbances, but more probably because the Japanese were now ready to introduce the first stage of their own pacification and administration plans, the Japanese Military Administrator called a meeting of prominent Burmans in Rangoon. At this meeting the Rangoon Public Peace Maintenance Association was formed with U Tin as President and with an all-Burman membership, to serve, amongst other purposes, as a preparatory organisation for the re-establishment of public administration and essential public services. It is not clear that this Association superseded the three-weeks-old Burma Independence Army Rangoon Administrative Committee. Probably being more in accord with Japanese fascist organisation, it was a superior body, one of whose functions was to exercise control over and advise on the actual administration of the City. In any case its administration or influence upon the administration of the City ceased when the Corporation was re-constituted on the 26th September 1942.

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*Rangoon under the Burma Independence Army's Rangoon Administrative Committee and the (Thakin) Rangoon Public Peace Maintenance Association.*

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*8th March to 26th September 1942*

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The Japanese made no attempt to interfere with this administration except where military security was involved, but in such circumstances they were prompt to act. Thus, they very quickly got the Compressor Station working again; the water supply presented no problem as Gyobu Reservoir alone supplied by gravity twenty million gallons per day; the Rangoon Fire Brigade is reported to have been re-formed on the 8th April, with U Hla Gyaw, the least experienced Fire Officer of the Corporation, in charge, and in the middle of August daily classes for training volunteer fire-fighters and first aiders were started under the supervision of this officer; the water front was at once made a protected area and by improvisation and the use of one or two undemolished timber mill jetties, dangerous congestion was avoided; and sufficient electric current for Japanese Military and some Government buildings was obtained quite early, supposedly from the generator at the B. B. T. Co.'s Saw Mill at Duneedaw.

Although very early repairs to the R. E. T. power station were optimistically promised, for many months to come the only means of lighting available to most of the residents of Rangoon were kerosine oil and home-made candles of wax

taken from the B. O. C.'s Syriam refinery. There was no street lighting of any kind during this period and comparatively few residents ventured far from their homes after nightfall. Nevertheless, stalls in the night bazaar remained open, their tenants paying the Thakin administration a weekly rent; and the re-opening of the Scott Market, renamed the 'Victory Market', and the much damaged Soortee Bara Bazaar, followed very soon by the opening of four lesser bazaars, relieved the immediate food problem.

Before the end of April the Rangoon Municipal Administration had managed to put four or five R. E. T. buses back on the roads. The number put back into service was gradually increased but probably never more than twenty were available, and although, as with electricity, early restoration of electric trams and trolley buses was promised, nothing materialised during the life of this administration.

For a long time the debris of damaged buildings lay about the streets except in areas used by the Japanese, and any early attempt at repairs was impossible because of the time taken in proving title to property. There does not appear to be any evidence of any Municipal Schools, hospitals and dispensaries having been re-opened during this period. Parks and Gardens are reported to have been allowed to run to jungle.

A primitive system of taxation was introduced, levying a small tax on the occupier, where the property was connected with the public water supply or water-borne sewage system, but later evidence shows that considerable arrears, as in the case of rents, were allowed to accumulate. With effect from the 1st September 1942, owners of houses were permitted to charge only 60 per cent. of the previous rentals to compensate occupiers for this tax.

The most urgent problem facing the Administrative Committee was the conservancy problem and for this they not only lacked transport, were bound to lose to the Japanese in the quest for cool labour, but also had to contend with several weeks' accumulated debris and refuse which in normal times amounted to more than 400 tons per day. The Japanese attempt to make the residents of each street responsible for its cleanliness had failed. A rapid deterioration in sanitary conditions was inevitable; mosquitos increased, rats and flies swarmed unchecked latrines overflowed, side streets and back drainage spaces piled high with refuse, and air raid shelters and side lanes began to be used as public latrines. It was also inevitable that the influx of Indian coolies who had been turned back by the Japanese after having travelled most of the malaria, cholera and dysentery stricken evacuee routes, should

add to the public health danger. As soon as cholera broke out, however, the Japanese Military Authorities promptly stepped in. Compulsory inoculation centres were established and not only new-comers to Rangoon, but any passing pedestrians were liable to be seized and inoculated forthwith.

About this period Prisoners of War were said to be forced to do street scavenging, to supplement the quite inadequate labour force including some Burmans employed by the Thakin Administration.

Amongst the earliest actions of the Ba Maw Government was the promulgation of an ordinance, with the approval of the Japanese Military authorities, reconstituting the Municipal organisation of Rangoon, with effect from the 26th September 1942. The precise nature of the new organisation has not clearly emerged, but it was obviously fascist in conception with a Mayor and a Chief Executive Officer, appointed by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, in charge of the executive, and they in turn were subject to the advice and control of a local fascist council, composed of three officials and twenty-one non-officials, known as "*Nay-pyi-daw si-pin-ye pyu-pyin-ye a-phwe*," or the "Association for the Reconstruction and Development of the Capital City". This body has been referred to by translators both as the Rangoon Corporation and as the Rangoon Development Trust, but these two older bodies appear to have become merged to a certain extent. The "*Nay-pyi-daw*" administration was made responsible not only for all former municipal services and local civil defence, but also for the public works formerly carried out by the Rangoon Development Trust, and for passenger transport, formerly provided by the R. E. T.

In April/May, 1944, the Burmese Government decided that further change was necessary and the proposals, which may have been effected by the time this review appears, envisaged a re-organisation and a new administrative set-up for Rangoon and thirtyone other Cities, with a Municipal Assembly for each city *chosen from* the citizens of each city. It is quite obvious that the Ba Maw Government has no intention of trusting the citizens to make their own choice even in the distant future, as this latest proposal is to 'complete' the re-organisation of municipal administration.

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Rangoon under the Administration of the "*Nay-pyi-daw si-pin-ye pyu-pyin-ye a-phwe*"

26th September 1942 to the middle of 1944.

Although as regards Municipal Administration, particularly in matters of sanitation and public health, the City was

still in a sorry plight when the "*Nay-pyi-daw*" Administration took over, the City had become more settled and citizens were beginning to adapt themselves to the vastly altered conditions. The Japanese were doing what they could to foster a return of confidence and to encourage people to return to Rangoon; and there were numerous signs that an abundance of Japanese money and freedom from air raids were combining to produce a measure of artificial prosperity and a no less artificial sense of security. Burmese police were patrolling the streets, at times accompanied by armed Japanese Military police. Markets and shops had reopened and an influx of Japanese business houses and traders had commenced. Almost all essential food stuffs were available, but at three to four times the pre-occupation prices; clothing, however, had already assumed almost prohibitive prices and nothing was being imported by the Japanese which could relieve the situation. The Chinese had returned to Rangoon and the steady influx of Burmans and Indians from the Districts was causing a rapid but encouraging expansion of the population.

The few buses available, although badly overcrowded and ill-used, were being run to a schedule which assisted the population in the rush hours. Fares were very cheap compared with the price one had to pay for a tri-shaw, otherwise the commonest means of transport. In spite of the heavy military traffic, roads remained in a fair condition, although no repairs had been carried out except as required by the Japanese to fill up bomb craters. The Rangoon Broadcasting Station re-opened on 26th October, 1942, and a public electricity supply and renewal of the electric Trolley Bus service were promised for the same month, but neither materialised for another eight months.

A bold and vigorous policy pursued by the municipal administration at the height of this restoration of confidence and improvement in public morale could have produced an efficient administration. The times were such, however, that a too vigorous policy might have resulted in a further change of administration. Whatever the reason, the administration in fact showed no vision in dealing with the public health problem and displayed a marked reluctance to enforce punishment of offenders against municipal bye-laws or defaulters in respect of rents and taxes. It is also true that before the "*Nay-pyi-daw*" Administration could have capitalised very much on restored confidence, conditions were again disturbed by the resumption of Allied air attacks on Rangoon, culminating in the heavy bombings of February 1943, in which a large part of the centre of the City suffered heavy damage. A large-scale shifting of the population resulted, people moving from

the town centre to the suburbs. In particular Central and East Rangoon, Botataung and Kandawgalay became deserted, but Tamwe became very much overcrowded. The February 1943 air raids are said to have caused considerable damage to Corporation property, including the City Hall, Central Fire Station, Scott Market and Cattle Market, resulting in a big disruption of the municipal organisation. The administration also had to provide for the shelter and welfare of bombed out civilians. Relief measures were instituted in co-operation with influential persons in each ward and Relief Camps were established in or near Kyaungs and Pagodas. The air raids ceased with the approach of the rains and conditions in the City gradually improved.

The attainment of Burma's so-called Independence, on the 1st August 1943, made little or no difference to the '*Nay-pyi-daw*' Administration, apart from the fact that instead of being responsible to the Japanese Military Administration through the Burma Independence Preparatory Committee it was now directly under and responsible to the Government of Burma.

Against this background of general conditions in Rangoon, the re-development of the more important public local services may now be reviewed.

*Public Health & Sanitation.*—If there had previously been any official complacency about the conservancy situation the experienced officials of the new administration can have had no illusions as to the seriousness of the situation confronting the City with the coming dry weather. Faced with inability to obtain more than four or five old motor lorries to cope with a task requiring probably not less than fifty, they first attempted to ease the problem by building up a fleet of bullock transport and encouraging Burmese labour to assist, possibly with the influence of the Servants of Burma Society, who were nominally concerned with conservancy.

The outbreak of severe epidemic diseases in the middle of the cold weather, particularly of cholera which raged for over two months, coupled with reports of continuing insanitary conditions, is evidence that the new administration failed to solve the problem. This they themselves admitted some twelve months later. Notwithstanding the epidemics, compulsory sanitary regulation (except for inoculation) was not applied, and Public Health notices to the public continued to be more in the nature of invitations to co-operate. In March 1943 Relief Camps were notified how to keep their camps clean and dispose of refuse. Each month during the rainy season the public were cautioned to boil water for drinking, as chlorine was no longer available for chlorinating the water from



Gyobyu and Hlawga reservoirs. These notices are of interest not only as evidence of the inability of the Japanese to supply chlorine but also because the notices show that malaria was very prevalent in Rangoon at this time. In September 1943 an official notice to house owners displays the first signs of firmness—'Latrine receptacles *must* be provided by house owners or the Municipality will do so and charge the owner Rs. 9½.' A belated and, one would imagine, a rather ineffectual effort at mass public health education was devised by a Government Committee consisting of Dr. Ba Maw, U Khin Maung, Dr. Ba Than Chein, U Tun Nyo and U Cho, who decided in January 1944 that the Municipality shall, until further notice, hold three public health classes per day on every day except Sunday.

*Education.*—The state of education in Burma generally is described in Mr. McLean's report. In Rangoon, apart from a school for teaching the Japanese language, only three Municipal schools are known to have been opened in 1942. By January 1943 the administration claimed to have completed arrangements for re-opening 67 vernacular schools in the city, and to be preparing, in consultation with the Government, to re-establish Middle and High Schools. The University of Rangoon started work in February 1944.

*Fire Brigade.*—Of the Municipal services re-established under the Thakin regime, the Fire Brigade appears to have been the most effective or to have made the greatest progress by September 1942. The former Third Officer of the Rangoon Corporation, together with a number of auxiliary fire service personnel who left their posts without permission in Mandalay in March 1942, returned to Rangoon. Three fire engines and equipment are known to have been available for this new Fire Brigade and it is possible that some of the larger fire engines abandoned in Upper Burma may have been salvaged and brought back to Rangoon. The Brigade had a busy period during the dry weather air raids and during one of these on West Rangoon in December 1942, Hla Gyaw was badly injured. In February 1943 the Central Fire Station was damaged in an air raid and the Headquarters from that date have been the Fire Station at Kemmendine.

It is not known what the strength of this Brigade was in September 1942 (it probably included a number of voluntary workers) but in September/October 1943 it was augmented by the appointment of three Officers, fifteen Fire Officers, three Sick Attendants, ten Telephone operators, six Motor Drivers, seven Junior Fire Officers and one hundred and seventy-eight Firemen. The appointment of this large force

was obviously a preliminary step in the formation of a national fire service, and in June 1944 it was decided to re-organise the Burma Fire Fighting Service. Under this ambitious scheme a Bureau of Fire Fighting was established with U Hla Gyaw as its head, and it is intended that there shall be created a Fire Brigade of at least one hundred members for every place with more than three thousand houses. U Hla Gyaw and the Rangoon Fire Brigade are responsible for the training under this scheme. The programme can hardly have gone beyond the stage of wishful thinking, as there is no evidence that the Japanese have done anything to reduce the serious shortage of equipment.

*Passenger Transport & Electricity.*—Although the Municipality, on the Commissioner's initiative, claimed the R.E.T. transport as public property on the grounds that many of the Company's shares were held by Burmans, it is most unlikely that this argument would have prevailed with the Japanese if the buses had been really worth seizing as enemy property or if this form of local passenger transport had been essential to military needs. There was, for example, never any suggestion that the Municipality might be allowed to succeed the R.E.T. in the matter of generation of electricity and when, after fifteen months occupation, a public supply became available, it was produced by an all-Japanese concern. Even as late as April 1944, however, the supply of current was still restricted to consumers with existing installations and cost 45 cents per unit.

The bus service already started by the Thakin Administration was taken over by the 'Nay-pyi-daw' Administration and other old buses were patched up and pressed into service. They were, however, quite insufficient to meet the needs of the public and by May 1943, after being constantly overworked and overloaded, the buses had to be temporarily withdrawn and the service suspended. Before renewing the service, notices were issued, warning the public not to overcrowd the buses nor to travel without paying. By this time not only were the buses beginning to wear out but tyres, which could not be replaced, were beginning to be a serious problem and the difficulty in getting oil or kerosene to run the buses was so great that in July 1943 the Transport Officer was advertising to buy used motor engine oil for the passenger buses.

The availability of a new supply of electric current enabled the Municipality to put four or five Trolley buses back into service on the 18th June 1943. These trolley buses running from Rosebank Road, Ahlone, to Piccadilly Circus (Kyaik-kasan Race Course) somewhat relieved the strain on the

Diesel Buses, which were needed to serve the suburbs of Kamayut, Insein, Kanbe and Thingangyun. By January 1944 it was reported that there were not more than ten or fifteen buses which were fit for use, that owing to shortage of fuel the service was very irregular, and that it was a common occurrence for passengers to have to push a bus to get it started. Up to a recent date the tram lines and overhead equipment were still intact but no trams had come into service and hopes of introducing them appear to have been abandoned.

*Water, Sewers, Roads & Buildings.*—With buildings, works and plant intact and in working order and with ample stocks of coal there was probably very little difficulty in maintaining an adequate service for the first twelve months or so of the occupied period. The first serious difficulties are indicated by the notices about June|August notifying inability to obtain chlorine for chlorinating the water from Gyobu and Hlawga reservoirs. Then before the end of August 1943 advertisements for tenders for firewood for the Air Compressor Station and Yegu Pumping Station show that stocks of coal were exhausted and that the Japanese had not found it possible to replenish them.

Such municipal buildings as were damaged have been patched up temporarily or merely cleaned up and evacuated. Similarly repairs to roads were restricted to essential repairs such as filling bomb craters, but a January 1944 advertisement for the supply of road metal and soling stone indicates that more extensive repairs are at last contemplated.

*Revenue.*—Like their predecessors, the 'Nay-pyi-daw' Administration apparently made no attempt to collect the very considerable arrears of taxes and revenues due to the Rangoon Corporation up to 7th March 1942, although records of those arrears and particulars of all Municipal assessments could have been unearthed by the former officials of the Corporation had they so desired. Vehicle licenses, other than Motor Vehicles, appear to have been re-introduced with effect from December 1942 and made renewable from 1st December 1943. Roadside Stalls also required a licence, and with effect from 1st September 1942 all stall taxes are to be paid monthly during the first half of the month.

In the Scott Market rents were ordered to be paid in order to establish ownership or in default the stalls or shops were to be taken over by the Municipality. This was not enforced on the date contemplated and instead rents were reduced by 50 per cent. and a last notice issued to stall-holders and shop-keepers that they would forfeit the remission of 50 per cent.

and lose their right of occupancy if they did not pay the arrears of rent due by a certain date. Similar 'last warnings' appeared from time to time for several months and it is obvious that the collection of rents in Scott Market, which is almost entirely a Burmese monopoly, has not proved an easy job. The 50 per cent. reduction in rents was extended to 31st March 1944 and a permanent reduction has probably now become inevitable owing to the lack of firmness in enforcing payment.

The Thakin Administration's policy of charging a simple form of services tax upon the occupiers of residential property within the limits of Rangoon City was continued but, with effect from the 1st April 1943, the rates of this tax, known as the Water and Scavenging Tax, were revised. The new rates, strangely enough, press most heavily upon the poorest residents, whose inability to pay even a small water tax was annually protested by all former Burmese Councillors of the Corporation. Either because the unfairness of this method of taxation became apparent or because the Administration was having budget difficulties or perhaps for both reasons, in January 1944 it was notified that the Rules for temporary collection of Service Taxes do not apply to factories, workshops, buildings in which machinery is housed, or buildings which are occupied for conducting a business. On all such buildings taxes, levied in accordance with the City of Rangoon Municipal Act 1922, (*i.e.*, Hypothetical tenant basis) were imposed with effect from 1st April, 1943.

In view of the criticism so frequently levelled as the Rangoon Corporation's Administration by former Thakin Councillors this latest reversion to the old system of taxation must have been agreed to by them or their colleagues with considerable reluctance and it will be surprising if this step does not still further expose the inequalities of the service tax on occupiers so as to make a complete reversion to the old basis almost inevitable.

The monthly meetings of the '*Nay-pyi-daw*' Administration consist of a General Meeting and four committee meetings, all being held on the same day. As the General Meeting starts at 8 a.m., and is followed in turn by each of the Committee Meetings, the last being due to start at 10 a.m., the bureaucratic nature of the Administration is plainly discernible. On the other hand it is difficult to believe that the laxity in enforcing bye-laws and collection of revenue is not almost entirely due to a policy dictated by the controlling body who are themselves doubtful of their own security of tenure and must therefore walk warily.

## (b) OTHER LOCAL BODIES.

In the early days of the Japanese occupation sporadic attempts were made by local administrations to collect municipal taxes and to keep the municipal services alive. For instance, the Secretary, Akyab Municipality, tried to carry on the old system but neither he nor the coolies were paid and he gave up the effort. There was therefore no street cleaning or conservancy at Akyab at the end of 1942, though the Japanese had repaired the water mains and water was available in most parts of the town. There was also a limited electric supply and the Municipal market was open until bombing raids frightened the people away. Myitkyina town also appears to have had an electric supply about the end of 1942. Akyab District Council was not working at that time, but the Deputy Commissioner, Akyab, sold leases or licenses for ferries and markets, some of which may have been in rural areas. Whether legally established or not, markets on a small scale at least were open in many places, the villages having received an influx of people who found the towns unsafe.

The Burmese Executive Administration appointed a Special Officer for reconstruction in municipalities and the Rangoon Development Trust in March 1943, and the Civil List for April 1943 shows that the portfolio of one of the Ministers included Municipalities, besides Education and Health. It appears that the Rangoon Development Trust and the District Councils were absorbed by the Revenue Department at this stage, and that the administration of District Councils and of Municipalities outside Rangoon was in the hands of the local executive officers of Government. For example, the officer in charge of Maubin Municipality who advertised for a Subdivisional Officer, Public Works Department, in April 1943 seems to have been a Government servant; and in December of the same year the District Commissioner, Hanthawaddy, advertised for Lady Health Visitors for Hanthawaddy District Council and Syriam Municipality. The District Commissioner, Pegu, likewise called for scavenging tenders for Pegu town in June 1943.

Owing to changes of the names of the Rangoon Corporation and the Rangoon Development Trust it is not always clear which is indicated in newspaper reports and broadcasts, but it seems that the Rangoon Development Trust was at first in the charge of the District Magistrate and Collector of Rangoon under the direction of the Government, for a notice was issued by him in February 1944 which clearly refers to ground rents payable under leases issued by the Trust. In the same month

It was announced that the Government had created a Trust comprising the Minister of Education, Health and Local Government and 4 members to assist the Rangoon Corporation. This appears to be a revived Rangoon Development Trust, though the Burmese name differs from the old name.

The Municipal Committee of Mandalay seems to have been the first to be re-constituted under the Burma Municipal Ordinance, 1943, after the Corporation of Rangoon had been revived. According to a notice in the 'Sun' of the 17th December 1943 over the signatures of the non-official President and the Municipal *Akunwun* (revenue officer) the Committee proposed to enforce the collection of house, land and water taxes for 1942-43. It may also have drawn revenue from gharries and cycle-rickshaws, which were said to be plying in Mandalay in April 1943. The Gyobingauk Municipality was opened by January 1944.

In May 1944 Domei announced that the Government was to complete the re-organisation of municipal administration in 31 towns outside Rangoon and to set up municipal committees. In the following month a bureau of firefighting services for the whole of Burma was established; in every town of more than 3,000 houses a fire brigade of 100 members was to be created, but this appears to be a State, not a Municipal service.

The Rangoon Port Trust does not appear to have been re-constituted, and all the information points to the Port still being controlled directly by the Japanese military authorities. The University of Rangoon, which was formerly a Local Fund, is dealt with in the Education section of this report.

## 5. Village Administration.

A Government servant of high standing reporting the situation in Arakan at the beginning of 1943 said "All headmen have been abolished and villages are administered by an Okkita assisted by 3 *Thamadis* who are invariably members or alleged members of the Dobama Sinyetha Asi-Ayon. *Okkitas* and the Village Council have the same powers as the old headmen and village committees and at present they have been instructed to collect land revenue as best they can, the Land Records and Assessment Dept. not having been completely organised yet". The wholesale abolition of the old headmen, however, is doubtful though the name may have been changed. A report of July 1942 says that the Japanese formed civil administration parties to arrange for elders of the villages to carry out civil administration, among other

objects, and a broadcast by U Aung emphasised the importance of the village headman in administration. An observer speaking about the end of 1942 says that in each village there was a Peace Committee under the headman, who was empowered to order fines up to Rs. 50. Headmen were still being elected. The system of election must have been abolished some time afterwards, for the Financial and Economic Annual 1943 makes it clear that elections were regarded as too disturbing in present conditions and village headmen were to be selected by the District Commissioner, though with due regard to local opinion. In March 1943 a report from Kyaukpyu said that headmen were being appointed and functioning as before. According to the Home Ministry's report for 1942-43, Village Committees have been abolished, and all their powers are exercised by the headmen. *Okkitas* and *thamadis* are not mentioned. The headmen and Village Committees, sitting together, used to try petty civil and criminal cases: this work will now devolve on the headmen alone, who will presumably retain their duties under the Village Act in connection with law and order, sanitation, human and cattle diseases, and the collection of revenue. Headmen are frequently ordered to supply men, cattle and food when required by the Japanese. There is nothing to show that they are not still remunerated by commission on revenue collections; Ba Maw promised to compensate them for the loss of commission on the 1941-42 collections, the outstandings of which were remitted. The village associations, which are referred to under the heading "Other Non-official Organisations," may have taken over some of the work of the headmen and village committees.

The village headman in Lower Burma was assisted by villagers appointed by him to be ten-house *gaungs*. Under this traditional Burmese institution villages were supposed to be divided into blocks of ten houses, for each of which one *gaung* was responsible to the village headman; but in recent years there were usually only a few ten-house *gaungs* in any given village tract, and they had become general assistants to the village headman rather than heads of groups. Upper Burma had a rather similar arrangement by which *Ywa Gaungs* were appointed by the village headman to help him. The grouping of villages in units of ten households appears to have its counterpart in Japan where, however, under the Tonarigumi system, the groups of householders are required to perform collective public service. On this analogy the ten-house *gaung* organisation has been or is to be widened and strengthened, and it was used both for the purposes of the

Census held by the Japanese and for counter-espionage. The groups are required to attend to the cleanliness of their compounds, etc. and the ten-house *gaungs* are made personally responsible for the behaviour of the villagers under them. Whether this change has actually taken place is not clear. In February 1944 it was announced that the Neighbourhood Associations—a new name for the groups of households—were to be extended to Rangoon and were to be introduced in Insein, Pyapon and Maubin Districts, from which it may be inferred that they had not made much progress. The duties of the associations in Rangoon were to help in the distribution of daily necessities, and under the direction of the Civil Defence Corps to take part in air raid defence and counter-espionage.

## 6. Organisations of the People.

(a) *The Four "Armies"*. A feature of Dr. Ba Maw's Government is the organisation, on the totalitarian plan, of the whole people for the purposes of the war, reconstruction and development. In April 1943 Dr. Ba Maw spoke of the formation of four "armies", which were at first thought to be newly-created bodies but turned out to be only rhetorical names for existing organisations.

The Armies were :—

1. The Blood Army, comprising the Burma Defence Forces ;
2. The Circle Army, which is another name for the National Service Association ;
3. The Leadership Army, which is another name for Dr. Ba Maw's sole party, the *Dobama Sinyetha Asi Ayon* (DSAA) ;
4. The Sweat Army, which either absorbed or was identical with the previous labour corps, and was later known as the *Let Yon Tat*.

1. The Blood Army—consisting of the Burma Defence Army, renamed the Burma National Army in September 1943, the Burmese Navy and the Burmese Air Force, need not detain us in the examination of civilian corps.

2. The Circle Army.—The *Kayaingaungsaung* of Myaungmya said in April 1943, "the *Wa Tat* (Circle Army), alias the National Service (*Wunhtan*) Association, is formed for those who cannot afford to offer help to the Blood or Sweat Armies". It will be referred to in these notes as the NSA, the Burmese equivalent of which is "*Bama Wunhtan Ahpwe*". The NSA was originally formed in December 1942 as a non-official organisation of "voluntary" civilian service



for the public welfare, and directed evacuation and relief during the bombing of Rangoon. According to the Financial and Economic Annual 1943 it was managed by a Board, of which BaMaw was Chairman, and operated through regional, district and group leaders, and district, township and village boards. Its aim was then to supplement the work of the existing services of the Government and the local bodies, though, practically speaking, there were no local bodies outside Rangoon. It established a school for training workers and concerned itself with ARP and relief measures, physical fitness and village sanitation, and also opened hospitals and dispensaries. One day a month was devoted to cleaning out compounds and burning rubbish, and Govt. servants and even Ministers were supposed to take a hand in this sanitary work. The NSA's functions bear a strong resemblance to those of the East Asia Youths League.

Some time in 1943 the NSA became a Government Bureau and was placed under the Minister for Religion, Welfare and Propaganda. The rules published in December make the District Commissioners, DSPs, Subdivisional and Township officers and village headmen officials of the NSA in their jurisdictions. All persons born and residing in Burma, irrespective of sex, may become members, and all Government servants, except those in the Burma National Army or auxiliary units, are obliged to join. There is a section for boys and girls between the ages of 12 and 18.

The functions of the NSA are divided under the heads National Service and Civil Defence, and include assistance to the troops and police, recruiting for the Burma National Army, and guarding lines of communications, besides its former service for the public welfare. Information from Rangoon in January 1944 was that the NSA was a complete failure, mainly owing to the apathy of its officers, who were paid by Government. The people considered that the recruitment of voluntary labour was little better than the Japanese impressment of labour. The official view is put in a report from Myaungmya printed in the 'New Light of Burma' in January 1944; this stated that the NSA throughout the district had been active in measures relating to ARP, evacuation, counter-espionage, public health and physical training and in opening schools and building village roads. It added that the Japanese defence officer was personally directing the Myaungmya HQ Defence Association, and had carried out two ARP exercises. Elsewhere, however, the Japanese district officials do not seem to be closely connected with the NSA.

In September 1943 Bandoola U Sein, Minister for Religion, Welfare and Propaganda, who was in charge of the NSA, formed a Central National Service Advisory Council, and the various managing bodies and committees of the previous National Service Organisation were abolished. It is not known what the previous organisation included; but probably the Womens' National Service Association, the National Girls Association and the Womens' Air Defence Corps came under the direct management of the Advisory Council on this occasion. The Advisory Council included U Ba Gyan, President of the East Asia Youths League; and possibly therefore the Japanese-sponsored league was also made more amenable to the Minister's control. It was claimed by U Sein that the Association had officers in every district. It was with reference to this Advisory Council and the People's War Board in particular that the paper "Greater Asia" on the 7th of October 1943 uttered the significant warning that the mere creation of boards would not produce the desired result; the most important thing was that the boards should see that their plans were effectively put into practice.

3. The Leadership Army. This is not mentioned under this name by the Myaungmya *Kayaingangsawng* in the speech referred to above. After detailing the Blood, Sweat and Circle Armies he adds, "Lastly the *Dobama Sinyetha Asi Ayon*, or *Si-yon-ye* Army, is formed in order to banish party feelings and to create unity among the people". The New Order Plan (August 1943) does not mention this or any of the four "Armies"; but it does include among national units the National Political Organisation, which seems to mean the Party. Again, in the review of the first stage of the New Order Plan (October 1943), Ba Maw says, "The political unit, which is the DSAA, will be completely reorganised. It will be turned into a training ground for leaders". The inference is clear that the Leadership Army, the National Political Organisation and the DSAA are the same thing under different names. The *Dobama Asi Ayon* (Thakin Party) and Dr. Ba Maw's *Sinyetha* Party co-operated for some time before the evacuation of Burma to form the Freedom Bloc. In 1942 they were combined, through the efforts of Thakin Mya acting on Ba Maw's behalf, into the DSAA, so that there might be only one political party in the State. The headquarters body includes six bureaux, for organisation, finance, propaganda, economics, information and miscellaneous affairs, and there are Divisional, District, Township and Village Associations, the leaders of which are called *Gaungsawngs*. The part played by the District (or *Kayaing*) *Gaungsawngs* is described

under the heading "District Administration". Besides the DSAA proper there are sections for *Sanghas* (Monks), women and youths. Membership is open to Talaings, Burmans, Arakanese, Chins, Karens and Shans, and the objects are to create a new order in Burma founded on unity, independence and partnership in Japan's New Order in East Asia. The motto of the Association is "One Voice, One Blood, One Command". Ba Maw is, of course, the Head of the DSAA, and has an Advisory Council, whose advice he is not bound to accept.

The DSAA is mainly political, but its members take part in social service (including the observance of National Service Day, when compounds are cleaned), ARP and relief measures, the recruitment of labour for the Sweat Army and the "Grow more Paddy" campaign.

4. The Sweat Army or *Let Yon Tat*. There were civilian labour corps such as the Reconstruction Army, before Ba Maw spoke of the Sweat Army in April 1943. The Myaungmya speech already mentioned refers to many Sweat Armies or Labour Corps having been formed to construct roads for the transport of goods and of arms and ammunition for winning the war. The Sweat Army had then been established long enough for evasion of service to have become widespread. The speaker told of a case where the headman had been ordered by the Township Officer to produce so many men from his jurisdiction for the Sweat Army, but hid all his relatives and forced his enemies to join. In other cases, headmen took bribes to excuse a man from service, and doctors sold certificates of physical unfitness. It will be seen that service practically amounts to conscription. In view, however, of the state of agriculture (see "Agricultural Credit and Finance") it is probable that many agricultural labourers are glad to get such employment. The ranks include skilled and unskilled workers at varying rates of pay. Service in the labour camps of the Sweat Army is not permanent; labourers are allowed to return home after the works on which they are engaged are finished. Recruitment is conducted by civil officers accompanied by Japanese military officers, and Japanese interest in the labour corps is further shown by the fact that when a prize was offered for a Reconstruction Army song, in May 1943, the entries were to be addressed to the Japanese Military Propaganda Dept. The main task of the Sweat Army was to help in the building of the Burma-Siam railway and road; there was to be a Labourers' Welfare Union and all sorts of amenities, but these are said never to have materialized. There are indications of discontent regarding food, lack of medical attention

and facilities for writing home, and conditions in the camps generally. Desertions were therefore common. The Sweat Army is administered by the Central Labour Board under the direction of the Minister of Co-operation, Labour and Miscellaneous Affairs.

The Sweat Army is to be distinguished from the other labour corps, the *Heiho Tat*, which is enlisted by the Japanese and is part of the Japanese Army. Nominally, at any rate, the members are volunteers and they are paid at the same rates as Japanese soldiers. They act as coolies, pioneers and sometimes transport drivers ; and some reports suggest that they are also used as lines of communication troops, but more often they are unarmed.

Parallel to the Sweat Army is the *Hle Tat* or Cart Corps, for which each village or other area has to supply carts on demand, to be used as Army transport. Bullocks are very scarce, and one informant says that the *Hle Tat* exists only on paper.

(b) *The Kaybotaing Ahpwè* (" *Kai Butai* ").—The *Kaybotaing Ahpwè* was originally a Japanese controlled organisation of volunteers for A.R.P. and general welfare purposes, and was also used as an agency in the rationing of commodities. The name is said to be the Japanese equivalent of " Civil Defence Corps ". *Kaybotaing* Associations seem to have been first formed in Rangoon about the middle of 1943, when it was reported that there was one for every police-station. Police officers took an interest in the organisation, but whether they became members or were debarred owing to their official duties is not clear. The members were trained in A.R.P., including ambulance work, first aid and putting out fires ; and they are reported on one occasion as having arrested a man for profiteering, and on another as sweeping out slit trenches and back drainage spaces. The *Kaybotaing*, the East Asia Youths' League and the National Service Association seem to have co-operated in civil defence, and *Kaybotaing Ahpwès* were formed in various parts of the country. The unit in the Mawlaik District is described as a Home Guard, the members of which were paid, wore Japanese uniform, and were trained as infantry.

On the grant of " independence ", the management of the *Kaybotaing* was transferred by the Japanese to the Burmese Government. In September 1943 occurred what was apparently an attempt to incorporate it in the National Service Association, whose aims and functions were similar. Bandoia U Sei., Minister of Religion, Welfare and Propaganda, held a meeting to consider air-raid defence, and one of the decisions was to

change the name of the *Kaybotaing Ahpwes* in Rangoon, Insein and Hanthawaddy Districts to "National Service Association, Civil Defence Corps". The Rangoon *Kaybotaing* seems to have regarded the change as degrading, especially as a few days later the managing committees of the previous National Service organisations were superseded by the Central National Service Advisory Council—*vide* "Organisations of the People 2. The Circle Army". Not long afterwards the Commander of the Central Civil Defence Corps (or Rangoon *Kaybotaing*) published a notice to members, in which he reproached them for doing their work perfunctorily in their disappointment. He explained that the name had not actually been changed, for "*Kaybotaing*" meant "Civil Defence Corps" and its functions and status would be what they had always been. He also assured them that the Rangoon Civil Defence Corps would not be placed under the control of the Central National Service Association (Advisory Council?), but directly under that of the Minister for Religion, Welfare and Propaganda. Certainly the name *Kaybotaing* was still in use in January 1944, when a battalion was formed at Insein.

The Minister probably intended to take the obvious practical step of uniting two bodies whose functions were much the same, but he may have been defeated by jealousy or wounded pride. Volunteers in Burma are sensitive to any slight, real or fancied; the Mandalay Civil Defence Service was nearly wrecked in 1941 by the Civil Defence Committee's decision that air-raid wardens could only advise, and not compel, people to keep off the streets during a raid.

(c) *The East Asia Youths League*.—The East Asia Youths League is an organisation set up by the Japanese in all occupied territories. In Burma it was formed in May or June 1942 and is said to have 30,000 members and 270 branches in the country; while a Cultural Affairs Department and an International Section are also mentioned as parts of the organisation. The central executive committee and representatives of the branches meet twice a year to deliberate as the "All Burma Youths League Committee". An informant speaking of the situation about January 1944 states that, like the National Service Association, the League is concerned with all civic affairs—e.g., education, ARP, labour, sanitation and dispensaries; but it is more popular than the NSA because the workers are unpaid, and the voluntary organisers receive enthusiastic assistance. Apparently the League does a good deal of work that district officers are supposed to do. It helps to maintain order, organises fire prevention in collaboration with the regular ARP services, gives instruction

in first aid and physical training, holds debates, organises lectures and so on. We hear of a dispensary at Salin run by the League ; and at Taungdwingyi (where price control had driven commodities off the market and the removal of the control in January 1944 had brought them back again at inflated prices) it was the League, and not the district officers, that was reported to be tackling the problem. In Rangoon it organised an entertainment coupled with speeches containing pro-Japanese propaganda ; in June 1944 it is said to have sent a message to the Youths of Japan reaffirming its vow to fight for the liberation of East Asia from the Anglo-Saxon yoke ; but there is some reason to think that the members are mostly anti-Ba Maw, and partly anti-Japanese. Membership is of assistance in travelling and in treatment by the Japanese. Elementary military training was part of its activities at Pegu.

There are two other references to what may be activities of the League, but as they were in Japanese there is some doubt as to the name. The " Young People's Association " is reported in June 1943 to have published nine text-books on Japanese propaganda subjects, to be used in the Association's schools throughout the country—compare the reference to training schools below. A broadcast on the 1st August 1943, speaking of women's branches of the " Burma Youths Federation ", said that women teachers and officers of Women's societies had received special training for National Defence work, including first aid and sanitation.

The existence of women's branches is proved by newspaper reports ; they appear to devote themselves to mental and physical training, cooking, embroidery, hygiene, nursing and other domestic arts and sciences.

Anyone domiciled in Burma may join the EAYL irrespective of race. Ordinary members, between the ages of 16 and 30, pay an entrance fee of Annas 8 ; and special members over the age of 30 pay Re. 1/-. Annual subscriptions are Re. 1/- for ordinary members and Rs. 3/- for special members. Special members are mainly salaried organisers, and there are a few full-time paid ordinary members. Training Schools have been set up and selected students are sent to the Senior School in Rangoon, where they are trained to be district organisers. In the large towns members live in messes, receiving free quarters, food and a small monthly allowance. In the districts the organisation is not so rigid.

It seems that Ba Maw did not regard the League with favour ; at one time a *Dobama* Asiatic Youth organisation appeared, possibly as a rival, but it does not seem to have taken root. In his

review of the first stage of the "New Order Plan", Ba Maw said—"Then comes the Youths' Organisation. This matter seems to require a settlement with the East Asiatic Youths' League. Talks with the League have practically led to an understanding, but the matter must be brought to a conclusion and youths' work *undertaken by the State either directly or indirectly*". The League, originally sponsored by the Japanese, who provided training in Japan for selected leaders, came later under Thakin management, and as it was more effective and more popular than the Burmese Government, it is not surprising that Ba Maw was jealous of its influence. There is nothing to show that it has been displaced by any other youth organisation,\* although the inclusion of its President in the CNS Advisory Council may have been accompanied by an extension of Ministerial control over the League. It appeals to the youthful enthusiasm that used to find an outlet in Volunteer fire-brigades, home guards and town guards in many parts of Burma. The difficulty always was to keep the enthusiasm from flagging; and an ineffective Government, together with a real subjugation more complete than most living Burmans had previously experienced, has probably solved that difficulty.

(d) *The People's War Council*.—This was formed in September 1943 with the object of placing the nation on a war footing and mobilising the entire Burmese people. Its membership included the *Adipadi*, Cabinet Ministers, Privy Counsellors and representatives of Chinese and Indian Associations. It was also to endeavour to increase co-operation among the people, the Government and the Military, to bolster up morale, enforce law, improve transportation and develop sanitation. It seems scarcely to have been mentioned after its formation and it may be that it was simply a propaganda organisation that fell flat. It is not referred to in the New Order Plan shortly before its inauguration, but it is more remarkable that it is not mentioned either in the Review of the First Stage (October 1943) in which Ba Maw detailed a large number of boards and committees. Thakin Mya, officiating Prime Minister, in a speech to the Privy Council on the 16th November 1943, says that, with a view to mobilising all the forces and associations in the country according to the New Order Plan, a People's War Council comprising all nationalities was formed by the people of *Rangoon*, but he is silent about what the Council has done or intends to do. Its functions appear to overlap those of the Central National Service Advisory Council and the National Service Association.

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\* Since this paragraph was written it has been reported that the League was disbanded in August, 1944.

(e) *The Maha Sangha Association*.—The “New Light of Burma” on the 18th May 1943 printed an article headed “Plan of operation for formation of *Maha Sangha Association*”. The Plan, with the approval of Ba Maw and the Advisory Committee (it is not plain which Advisory Committee), provided that the special *Sanghas* Working Committee should arrange for the election of eminent monks from the united sects (Thudama, Shwegyin and Dwaya) as Chief State *Sayadaws*. All religious matters were to be directed by the Chief State *Sayadaws* and carried out by the *Maha Sangha Association*. Up to 10 *Sayadaws* from each district were to be selected to help the Chief State *Sayadaws*. Shwebo District, however, elected at least 25 *Sayadaws*, whose names, together with those of a few from other districts, were published in the newspapers. None of them had been less than 20 years in the priesthood, and many were very old. The Chief Priest of the *Maha Sangha Association* is the well-known Aletawya Sayadaw. In September 1943 the *Maha Sangha Association* made a declaration on the subject of Marshal Badoglio’s surrender; and according to Thakin Mya’s speech to the Privy Council on the 16th November 1943 it announced that the priests regarded the war as a religious war.

The *Sanghas* in Taikkyi Township, Insein District, at a meeting in December 1943, elected head *Sayadaws* for the township and the town, and undertook to obey their orders. On the 14th January 1944 we read of certificates being presented at Thonze to the district head priest, the township head priest and the town pastor. This seems to indicate that the district organisations of priests had been started. A little later a meeting of *Sayadaws* at Thonze decided to send out propagandists to preach on internal peace and order, friendly intercourse with Japan, maintenance of Burma’s freedom, the East Asia New Order, the united organisation of monks of all sects, the acceptance of the five resolutions of the Greater East Asia Conference at Tokyo and moral and religious subjects.

A well-informed observer from Lower Burma states that though one division of *pongyis* (the Mingalun G.C.S.S.) is co-operating with Ba Maw the majority take no interest in administration or national service or the East Asia Youths League. Other sources speak of the mutual distrust of Japanese and *pongyis*.

Though many Buddhists and others would genuinely welcome the reform and unification of the priesthood under religious discipline, it is sufficiently clear that this is not the main object of the Association. From the beginning the Japanese declared their intention of using monks for propaganda purposes, and



the Association is designed for that end. Ba Maw was equally frank in his review of the first stage of the New Order Plan, where he said, "As for the *Sanghas* Association, it has already been very successfully organised. It now remains to use it for State purposes. *Sanghas* can best serve the State in the field of propaganda. The Minister concerned has a scheme for this and action should be taken at once accordingly. *Sanghas* make very good propagandists as all of us know".

A Domei message in January 1944 mentioned a *Sangha* Society which it described as a leading Youths' Association in Burma, supporting the declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference at Tokyo. As the leaders of the *Maha Sangha* Association, as far as we know, are middle-aged or elderly *Sayadaws*, the *Sangha* Society is presumably different. It may perhaps be connected with the former *Yahanbyo Ahpwe*, which was an organisation of young and politically-minded *pongyis*.

(f) *Other Non-Official Organisations*.—Of the many minor organisations little is known except their names. Such as they are, they are listed below :—

1. War Victims Relief Association. Said to be a subsidiary of the D.S.A.A.

2. Civil Defence Corps. This is probably the same as the City Civil Defence Department, which is described as an auxiliary body to the N.S.A. It had an advisory board of Government officers and representatives of the Rangoon Corporation, and ran a training centre for volunteers. It may also be identical with the *Kaybotang*, already described.

3. Commodities Distribution Association. An Editorial in "Greater Asia" dated the 7th October 1943 said that this Association acting with the Burma Chamber of Commerce and the Government was doing its best to solve the food problem. This may be a non-official counterpart of the Commodity Supply Control and Distribution Board, or it may be the body which is reported in February 1944 to have been absorbed into the second Committee of the Japan-Burmese Joint War Co-operation Commission.

4. All-Burma Women's National Service Association. This was headed by Mrs. Ba Maw and was said to have between 5,000 and 7,000 members and about 30 branches throughout Burma. According to Ba Maw's review of the first stage of the New Order Plan its functions included ambulance work, vegetable growing and recruiting female field labour to replace men.

5. Burma Women's Patriotic League. This was inaugurated on the 4th August 1943 at a meeting alleged to have been attended by 7,000 women. It is designed to "modernise the

power of 8,000,000 Burmese women to help Burma to meet its obligations as an independent state and bring the war to a successful conclusion”.

6. Women's Air Defence Corps. There are several references to this body, which may be a branch of the Women's National Service Association. It recruits girls between 17 and 19.

7. National Girls' Association. This is composed of nurses under training and was formed before January 1943.

8. National Voluntary Nursing Unit, Rangoon. Announced October 1943 as about to be formed, and therefore distinct from the National Girls' Association, formed before January 1943. Arrangements to start it were made under the direction of the *Adipadi* by the Minister for Religion, Welfare and Propaganda, in consultation with Mrs. Ba Maw, President of the Burma Women's N.S.A. The Unit may therefore be a subsidiary of the N.S.A. It was to open a training centre, and after training to keep a mobile unit of 50 nurses in readiness day and night.

9. The Strength and Sports Movement. This is mentioned in Dr. Ba Maw's review of October 1943. It was formed to encourage physical training in State camps and Schools and to promote games and exercise generally. All Government servants were to be encouraged officially to take part in this movement. Thakin Mya indicated that this movement is subordinate to the National Service Association. It is an obvious copy of the German "Strength through Joy" movement.

10. Teachers' Association. Mentioned in Ba Maw's review. No details.

11. The Burma Society under Dr. Ba Han is to standardise the Burmese language and compile a dictionary.

12. The Society for Promoting the Pali language. A monastic body formed about May 1943 to replace the Pali-speaking Society.

13. Headmen's Associations. Mentioned in Ba Maw's review without details. In March 1943 we hear of a Headmen's conference held by the Township Officer, Letpadan, presumably on the old lines.

14. Village Associations. According to a Tokyo broadcast on the 14th November 1943 these were established in various districts to see to the fair distribution of food and other commodities, to look after public welfare and arrange air raid precautions. These appear to be non-official bodies, distinct from the official village organisation of *Okkita*, *Thamadis* and *Ten-house Gaungs* (see "Village Administration").

15. The Central Karen Board. Reported by Domei in September 1943 as supporting the war for the delivery of East Asia. Dr. Ba Maw's review says that the Board and the Karen leaders are assisting the State in several departments. The President was Saw Ba Maung and the Board was apparently under the Forest Minister. B Maw said that the Japanese Army had been informed that the Central Karen Board had condemned the formation by the Japanese Military Police of Karen Associations in the Delta districts as likely to foster the old communal antagonism. He added "it is important that action should be quickly taken to abolish these organisations". The members of the Board were reported to have been trying to promote Karen-Burmese relations and the winning of the war. Thakin Mya speaks of *Dobama* Karen Nationals as well, but it is not known whether these were separately organised.

16. Chinese Voluntary War Service Corps

17. Burma Chinese Congress.

} Both these  
bodies were

formed in August or September 1943 to support war aims.

18 Burma Overseas Chinese War Services Association This was in existence before February 1943, and therefore appears to be distinct from Nos. 16 and 17. It is an association of pro-Japanese Chinese, which published a newspaper called "The Real Friendship Daily". It has sections for relief, education, propaganda, scavenging and arbitration of disputes among Chinese, and a police corps to assist the Burma police. It claims to have put down Chinese gambling, and to be the only representative Chinese body to be consulted by the Japanese military administration in Burma. This Association may be the same as the "Chinese Residents' Association", which donated Rs. 2 lakhs to the Japanese Army on the Emperor's birthday, 1944.

19. The Indian Independence League. The Indian Independence League is not specially connected with the Japanese exploitation of Burma or with the Burmese Government, but is a political body extending throughout the Co-prosperity Sphere and descended from anti-British colonies of Indians which were established in the Far East before the war. It is encouraged and organised by the Japanese with the objects of propaganda, espionage and creating disturbance in India. The Burma branch is, of course, supported by the Ba Maw Government, which regards it as a comrade in the march to freedom, and it has subsidiaries all over Burma, Rangoon and Akyab being the most important

centres. The membership includes Gurkhas as well as Indian Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. It has been mentioned in "Burma during the Japanese Occupation", Vol. 1, page 24, that the League has both political and administrative functions: it takes up cases on behalf of Indians, and many Indians in Burma regard the Burma branch more as a useful organisation for mutual protection than as an active anti-British organisation. This is borne out by what was previously known of the characters and political views of a number of Indians in Burma who have joined the League; but the leaders, such as Subash Chandra Bose, the head of the "Provisional Government of India", are definitely anti-British and some of them pro-Japanese.

The League has apparently been allowed to take over the property in Burma of Indians who evacuated, and to hold it in trust till they return. Some recruits joined the League and attended its training schools in order to better their prospects of civil employment; others because Ba Maw ordered all Indians in Rangoon to join in January 1943. Moreover, life was made difficult for those who did not belong to the League, since it had the sole power, under the Japanese, of issuing permits to Indians to travel and trade. Most Indians therefore are members, but membership does not necessarily imply ultra-nationalist views.

The League is closely connected with the Indian National Army, which, also under S. C. Bose, moved its headquarters to Burma in order to carry on operations on the Indian frontier. The I.N.A. is recruited from captured officers and other ranks of the Indian Army and from civilians. The Army has its own courses of military training, while selected members of the League are given instruction in fifth column activities. There is also a Women's section of the League.

## 7. Propaganda.

The Japanese have paid the utmost attention to propaganda of every kind in Burma, and with its aid and the co-operation of the puppet Government they have been able to veil the threat of armed force against Burmans. The nature and direction of their propaganda, how broadcasting is controlled, listening to foreign broadcasts suppressed, the schools degraded and the Japanese language inculcated have been described in "Burma during the Japanese Occupation", Vol. I, pages 18-22, 38 and 42-45. Japanese broadcasts in and to Burma recount their victories and their development of the Co-prosperity Sphere, including Burma, the impossibility of the Allied recapture

of the country (and recently, with less confidence, the threat of the horrors that would follow recapture), the inhuman bombing policy of the Allies, the generosity of the Japanese in granting independence, and denials and denunciations of Allied propaganda. The religious unity of Japanese and Burmans as Buddhists is often emphasised, and, on occasion, Ba Maw and other collaborators are flattered. Foreign broadcasts from Burma aim at creating differences among the United Nations and particular attention is devoted to India, keynotes being the Bengal famine and the coming liberation of the country through the Indian National Army. The Chungking Government is also the target of many attacks in Chinese.

The Burmese Government is allowed its share of broadcasting programmes, and while it echoes Japanese propaganda it also tries to whip up the energy and enthusiasm of the people for harder work, recruitment to the Army and the Labour Corps, the extension of paddy, jute and cotton cultivation, and economical living. Other themes are the character of Ba Maw's leadership, Burmese history and the unity of Burmese races, the work accomplished and intended by the Government and denunciation of bribery and profiteering. These broadcasts are controlled by the Japanese, who maintain censors at the broadcasting station. It is claimed that public loud-speakers are installed in many places (not, according to one source, in Upper Burma), but it is not known how many private wireless sets have been returned to their owners after being adjusted so that foreign broadcasts cannot be received. Some reports say very few. There is evidence of a certain amount of clandestine listening, even in teashops, but probably not enough to have an appreciable effect on public opinion. Owners of unlicensed sets were threatened in January 1943 with trial by Japanese court-martial.

A Japanese Director-General, named Matsuchi, of the Broadcasting Control Bureau, Rangoon, was appointed in January 1943, and is presumably still in office. For the Burmese Government control is vested in the Minister of Religion, Welfare and Propaganda; the association of religion and propaganda is illustrated under the heading "*Maha Sangha Association*" and by references to the ceremonial feeding of *pongyis* on political occasions. The Minister acts through the Director of Propaganda, and there are publicity officers attached to each department of the Government. A Propaganda Advisory Board, consisting of the Minister, a number of newspaper men and representatives of the D.S.A.A., the East Asiatic Youths League and the Central Karen Organisation, was established in October 1943.

*Newspapers.*—Newspapers published in Burma include "The New Light of Burma", "The Burmese Era", "The Sun", "The Mandalay Sun", "Greater Asia", "The Writers' Magazine", "Azad Hindustan", "Sudandara Hindustan", and "Swatantra Hindustan". "The New Light of Burma" and "The Burmese Era" are published in Burmese, and are said to be inspired respectively by the Japanese and Ba Maw. "The Sun" (also written in Burmese) is said by one informant to have a wider circulation than either, and is strongly anti-British, but less pro-Japanese than the first two. Another account makes the "New Light of Burma" the most popular of the Burmese papers. "Greater Asia" is published by the Japanese in English at the former "Rangoon Gazette" press, mainly for the benefit of Indians. "The Writers' Magazine" (Burmese) is issued by the Writers' Club, sponsored by U Thein Maung of "The Sun", and the last three papers in the list are publications of the Indian Independence League, in Hindustani, Tamil and Telugu, respectively. There is also a paper in Japanese, called "The Burma Shimbun", while one of the Chinese associations issues in Chinese "The Chinese Residents' Right Principles Newspaper".

Circulation is increasingly restricted by the scarcity of paper, but daily issues are distributed free to teashops and other places of resort, and copies are posted up in Rangoon for passers-by to read. In the mofussil there are complaints of profiteering over the price.

Information from Burma that the contents of newspapers are censored before issue is supported by internal evidence, but now and again some critical reflection on the state of affairs is smuggled past the censor. One article began by praising the efficiency of commodity control and distribution and went on to report a minor riot, in which bottles were freely used as weapons, in front of an officially appointed shop that could not, or would not, supply its customers' needs. ⑤

Press representatives from all parts of Greater East Asia attended a three-day newspaper conference at Tokyo in November 1943. Burma sent three delegates, U Tun Than, Editor of "Progress", U Tun Pe, Chief Editor of "The Burmese Era", and a third unnamed. The speeches and resolutions were on the usual propagandist lines and a G.E.A. Press Federation was established, of which U Tun Than was appointed one of the directors. He and his companions visited Japanese newspaper offices, and returned to Burma by way of Manila, Singapore and Bangkok. Up to the end of 1943 Ba Maw apparently held press conferences but it was announced there

after that the Minister of Propaganda would relieve him of this work.

*Entertainments.*—The use of the cinema for propaganda has been mentioned under the heading “Amusements”. Dramatic performances, of which propaganda songs are a feature, are equally regimented, and all troupes of players and dancers and all orchestras have to be registered. The “Burmese Era” of the 8th January 1944 attempts to show that registration will protect and raise the standard of the dramatic profession. There is said to be no censorship of stage performances, but a company that oversteps the mark can be disregistered. Opportunity is taken of war anniversaries, the New Year celebrations, etc., to hold meetings, rallies and military displays, and art and other exhibitions are arranged in Burma and Japan at which the two countries exchange exhibits.

The following account of the Burmese New Year celebrations in 1943, broadcast in Burmese, is given as a specimen of the proceedings —

“ On the morning of the 13th April, Dr. Ba Maw’s Sinyetha party and various organisations from all over the city took part in the celebrations of the Burmese New Year, 1305 B.E. Government officials both high and low participated in the processions. The members of different organisations wore their badges, and shouted the usual slogans for victory. At 10 5 the members of the Premier’s council arrived, shortly followed by the Premier’s bodyguard announcing the arrival of Dr. Ba Maw. The people assembled there rose and lifting their right hands gave him a rousing welcome. They also enthusiastically shouted slogans till he reached the dais and returned their salutations.... After this, the audience observed one minute’s silence in remembrance of those Burmese heroes who had sacrificed their lives in the Asiatic war. Dr. Ba Maw then delivered a New Year’s speech, at the conclusion of which he departed, accompanied by his Ministers, to the frenzied cheering of the crowd ”.

Incidental points of interest in this account are the mention of the Sinyetha party as a separate body, though it is supposed to be absorbed in the D.S.A.A., and the Fascist form of salute. The enthusiasm is probably overstated — one informant says that these rallies are attended only by those who have to go.

*Other forms of propaganda.*—Leaflets are distributed by the Japanese, who also issue illustrated weekly papers. The Secretary of the Burma Writers’ Club, Mg Ba Thaug, translated a book on “Bushido” into Burmese, and he and one Kin Maung, described as a noted literary figure in Burma who was

connected with the Education section of the Japanese Military Administration, were invited to Japan to make a thorough study of the war-time structure. A Japanese newspaper awarded a prize to an essay written by a Burman on a theme laid down in some detail for a competition open to all East Asiatics, and the contents of the essay were publicised by the Domei Agency. Students and State Scholars are despatched to Japan from time to time, as well as delegates to youth rallies and exhibitions. In return, Japan sends propagandists of various descriptions, including puppet Chinese, to Burma. A Japan-Burma Cultural Association was formed in Burma in January 1944 under the patronage of Ba Maw and the Japanese Ambassador; the President is U Hla Min, Education Minister, and the members include both Burmese and Japanese writers. The objects of the Association are to encourage and assist the study of the culture of Japan and neighbouring countries; to publish Burmese folk-songs, with notes; to train 36 State Scholars before their departure to Japan; and to promote healthy relations between the two countries. The Association has received little publicity since its foundation. The Writers' Club, besides issuing the magazine already mentioned, arranges translations from the Japanese, and publishes pro-Japanese books and articles and organises broadcast talks. The existence of the Nippon-Burma Friendly Relations Society is known to us only through a newspaper reference to its head, one U Tun E, in November 1943; it seems to be distinct from the Cultural Association. A Japan-Burma Women's Buddhist Society, with a Japanese President, and a Buddhist Central Missionary Association, apparently divided into Upper and Lower Burma branches, received similarly brief mention.

A step perhaps intended to strengthen Japan-Burmese friendship is the building in Tokyo of a replica of the Botaung Pagoda, Rangoon, to hold relics and precious stones collected from Burmese pagodas and sent to Japan ostensibly for safe keeping. There is no news of any opposition to this plan, though the Burmese cannot have liked parting with these treasures.

Literary productions on the Burmese propaganda side include a book on Burma's Independence (1943) by the Minister, Thakin Ba Sein. The Thakins have a "Heroes Commemoration Association", the idea of which Ba Maw incorporated in his cynically frank propaganda scheme in the "Review of the First Stage of the New Order Plan".

One measure that might usefully be adopted to arouse patriotism, he said, was to erect in every district monuments connected with some great historical local hero or event. "For



instance, there might usefully be a simple and impressive monument in Pegu to commemorate Bayinnaung, in Toungoo to commemorate Tabinshwehti, in Tharrawaddy for Saya San, etc..... By a legitimate stretch of imagination the present struggle could be identified with the spirit of that local hero or event, and in this way our people could be spiritually mobilised in support of the State and the war". The Propaganda Ministry took up this question as directed, and District Commissioners were set to ransack the local archives and traditions for some hero fit to commemorate—with what results is not known. The construction of wells, roads and bridges was also proposed by Ba Maw as an appeal to local feelings.

Hero worship as a stimulus to patriotism took shape in great celebrations in Rangoon on the 8th December 1942, the anniversary of the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War. Ba Maw brought down some of the traditional "Soil of Victory" from Shwebo and planted it on a hill near the Royal Lakes, where a monument is to be erected to commemorate Burmese independence. Some reports say that this monument will be placed on the site of King Edward VII's statue, removed by the Japanese; but that was not on a hill. The monument may or may not be the same as the contemplated Heroes' Shrine near the Shwedagon Pagoda, but the motive behind both is identical. This shrine is to house the spirits of Burmese patriots who have lost their lives since the first Anglo-Burmese war (1826), and is expected to give birth to a new spirit of patriotism, "just as the Japanese have grasped firm national power through respecting their Gods and ancestors". Ancestor-worship is foreign to Burmese belief, and the whole idea is copied from Yasukuni Shrine near Tokyo, which contains the spirits of Japanese soldiers who died for their country. There is no news of whether the Heroes' Shrine has actually been built, but a committee to collect subscriptions and to organise the design and building has been set up, some reports say under the Defence Ministry and others under the auspices of the D.S.A.A.

The erection of a statue to Ba Maw at Pyapon and of a pagoda and a public library at his birth-place, Maubin, has also been suggested.

*Effect.*—The combined effect of all this propaganda and the suppression of news from abroad has no doubt been considerable, and there is evidence that the hopes that many Burmans and others set on the return of the British dwindled as the war proceeded. Perhaps the most effective measure to support pro-Ally hope and courage, since few people can listen to foreign broadcasts, is the dropping of leaflets and the newspaper *Lay-*

*nat-tha* (Spirit of the Wind) from the air. They are eagerly read wherever copies can be had, in spite of the penalties threatened by the Japanese. Both this paper and Allied broadcasts are sufficiently important to be denounced and contradicted in Japanese propaganda, but recently, it seems, the people are not so easy to persuade of the certainty of a Japanese victory. The Rangoon broadcasting station, which had a word for "those people who still contrive to put their trust in the British and the Americans" in December 1942, had in March 1944 to urge "you fear-stricken Burmese" to keep in mind ultimate victory and bear a little suffering and hardship. The admonition was not without cause, for an agent speaking of the state of opinion about the end of 1943 said,—“There has been doubt for some time that the Japanese can win the war, and this is hardening into conviction, mainly associated with the fact that the Japs have not made good their promise to invade India. It is obvious to the people that the Japs are short of petrol and lubricating oil, that they have no shipping and no resources, for they cannot even clothe their troops properly, and they cannot stop our bombers”.

The attitude of the people, however, is too wide a subject to be summarised here, and will be dealt with in another report.

## 8. Amusements.

Amusements for the people of Burma have been provided as a matter of policy, and they may therefore be included among Government activities. They are partly used for propaganda, but it was also stated in a Rangoon broadcast in Tamil in January 1943, announcing the programmes of cinemas, that the Japanese authorities had arranged these entertainments to ease the nervous strain caused by air raids. At the cinemas, news reels portraying the war and events in Japan and East Asia were shown and there is mention of a Tamil film, entitled the "Women's Movement". A Japanese broadcast on the 18th May 1944 said "Japan's motion-picture enterprise in the south is being undertaken jointly by the Japan Motion Picture Co. Ltd, and the Japan Motion Picture Distributing Co. Ltd. They have branches at Saigon, Hongkong, Bangkok, Manila, Rangoon, Batavia, Kuching, Banjarmasin and Padang. At present Japanese, Chinese and locally produced motion pictures are being shown in the South, but the Japanese pictures are decidedly superior to the others and are the most popular of them all. Japanese pictures are recorded in Malay, French and other languages to suit the respective countries in the South". A Japanese detective film was shown at Mergui and one informer saw in Rangoon in March 1944 a propaganda film

regarding the fall of Singapore. He says that the film, whose theme was the bravery of Japanese soldiers, was well received by the audience. Besides old Burmese films which were seen at Moulmein, among other places, British and American films left behind at the time of evacuation must have been shown at first, since the "New Light of Burma" on the 10th of August 1943, contained the following notice :—

"The showing of films produced in enemy countries will in future be strictly prohibited. Though the showing of such films was prohibited they were being shown in many picture houses. On the 25th July the Nippon Army issued an order under 'Military Administration Law' regarding the showing of films produced in enemy countries, which was to take effect immediately. Films produced in India and China are not included in this category, but if they contain anything contrary or detrimental to the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere the showing must be strictly prohibited. As such films will be seized by the Army, they should be surrendered to the Propaganda Department of the Nippon Army not later than the 31st August. Contravention of this order will entail enquiry by the Military Court and punishment by the Army".

It will be seen from this extract that film censorship is in the hands of the Japanese Army.

A talk in Burmese on the film industry on the 26th March 1943 appeared to encourage the making of Burmese films with a war setting ; but directors were warned against misleading the public with regard to politics or the war. According to one report, however, no new Burmese films were being made owing to shortage of photographic material.

Most of the large cinemas in Rangoon were destroyed by bombing, and in March 1944 only two were open, one in Canal Street and one in Myenigon. Two cinemas were open in Mergui. Many cinema actors and actresses took to acting stage plays, which were performed indoors on account of air raids, and a company formed to tour Lower Burma was advertised. Po Sein, who has become an official Director of Entertainments, and his son Kenneth Sein still appear on the boards, and they performed a special dance in honour of the meeting of Ba Maw and S. C. Bose. In October 1943 it was stated that since the Japanese occupation no festivals had been celebrated in Upper Burma.

There is plenty of money to spend in the towns, and a great increase in restaurants, drinking, prostitution and other means of indulgence is reported. Many new restaurants advertise for attractive young women to act as waitresses. An earlier

report said that in Rangoon the Savoy and Maxim's restaurant were open to all, while the Pegu Club, Broadway and the Silver Grill were reserved for Japanese officers. The Japanese import Geisha girls for their own use, since it is their policy to prevent any hostility arising from outrages against Burmese girls. In January 1944 a letter to the New Light of Burma complained of drunkards insulting girls near the Shwedagon Pagoda and urged that the liquor shop at Bahan near the pagoda should be removed. Gambling dens flourish under the protection of the Japanese. The Rangoon Zoo was reopened in January 1944. Football, tennis, *chinlon*, boxing and walking are mentioned in broadcasts and appear to be part of the activities of the "Strength and Sports Movement". Race meetings do not seem to have been held, for the Army has commandeered most of the ponies.

## PART V

## The Burma National Army.

By Colonel R.L. Shaw.

1. *FORMATION*.—Vol. I of “Burma during the Japanese occupation” gives an account of the Burma Independence Army (B.I.A.), which was disbanded by the Japs on the 24th July 1942, and of the “Burma Defence Army” (B.D.A.), which succeeded it on the 26th August 1942 under strict Jap control. The account closed at the date, the 16th September 1943, when the Burma Defence Army in turn changed its name to the “Burma National Army” (B.N.A.)—following the grant by the Japs of so-called “Independence” to BURMA on the 1st August 1943. The intention now is to give, as far as is possible, a more recent account of the B.N.A., but before doing so, it is desirable briefly to recapitulate its inception and previous history.

In 1941 thirty young traitor Burmans (known by the B.N.A. as the “30 heroes”) stealthily left their native land under the leadership of a young Thakin named AUNG SAN who, in succession, became the commander of the B.I.A. and B.D.A. and was promoted by the Japs to the rank of Major General and who was finally, in August 1943, (at the age of about 30), further elevated to the appointment of “Minister for National Defence”. These 30 young heroes in 1941, with the aid of false passports, reached HAINAN Island in the China Sea as Jap subjects, and there they were trained in sabotage and guerilla tactics by Jap instructors—ostensibly with the object of subsequently leading a rebellion in BURMA against the British, but at the propitious moment the Japs used these 30 young men to lead their advance on VICTORIA POINT and TAVOY in December 1941, and in their wake they gathered the forces which became known as the Burma Independence Army. In the initial stage of their invasion the Japs furnished 1,000 rifles for this motley crowd and subsequently these were augmented by weapons picked up on battlefields. This Burmese Independence Army was officered by Thakins and young Nationalist idealists, but the rank and file were mainly hooligans, dacoits and cut-throats, who joined in for obvious reasons. The Administrations set up in the territory overrun by the Japs were operated by these young upstart Burmans, who were entirely devoid of experience and training and who made themselves thoroughly objectionable, and when to this is added the looting, murders, and acts of rape by the rank and file, it is little wonder that they became as thoroughly unpopular with the majority of their countrymen as they were with the Japs, whom they ignored and whose orders their leaders refused to obey.

Consequently the Japs obtained a favourable reaction from Burmans as a whole when they disbanded this unruly mob and discredited the Thakin administrations which it had set up. Thus on 24th July 1942 the Japs astutely assembled the B.I.A. under the pretext of re-equipping and re-clothing it, but, in actual fact, disarmed and disbanded it; and on the 26th August 1942 they inaugurated the "Burma Defence Army" for the defence of BURMA, and were careful to have the inconvenient word "Independence" dropped. This new Burma Defence Army (now the B.N.A.) has been born and bred under strict Jap control and the Japs, needless to say, were very careful whom they engaged from the rank and file of the disbanded B.I.A. Thakin AUNG SAN, the leader of the "30 heroes", was appointed as Commander of the B.D.A., an Officers' Training School and recruits' training centres were set up, and from a carefully controlled (by the Japs) beginning has emerged the present B.N.A. of some 9 or 10 battalions.

2. *TITLE*.—The official explanation for the change of title of this Jap controlled Burmese Army to the "Burma National Army", on the 16th September 1943, is contained in an account of an interview, on the 6th August 1943, between Jap and Burmese journalists and Colonel NAY WIN (*alias* Thakin SHU MAUNG), who had just become the Commander of the B.N.A. in succession to AUNG SAN, who had been elevated to the position of Minister for National Defence upon the formation of the Supreme Council on the 1st August 1943 (see para. 4 below). The relevant extract is as follows:—"Like the Nippon Army the Burma Army is now not for defence but for attacking the enemy with courage and determination. As we intend to conduct offensive operations it will be necessary to delete the word 'Defence' from the name of the Army. Therefore it will be necessary to find a new designation for the Burma Army."

In other words, the Japs had once and for all torpedoed the Burma "Independence" Army and its "inconvenient" title, but AUNG SAN, NAY WIN and their satellites a year later found the title "Defence" Army pricking their national Burmese pride, so it may be assumed that the Japs compromised with them and decided upon the present title as they had no intention of making the Burmese Army inconveniently "offensive" (as indicated by NAY WIN above). In this connection it is therefore convenient now to make mention of the role of the B.N.A.

3. *ROLE*.—The rôle of the B.N.A., other than that of A|A defence of certain vital points (*e.g.* the GOKTEIK Viaduct),

and towns—which affords excellent propaganda for Burmese consumption (e.g. “Brave Burmese soldiers defending the country against the dastardly British bombs”)—is that of “Garrison” and “Internal Security” troops inside BURMA and evidently, and generally speaking, that of reconnaissance troops on the INDIA-BURMA frontier. It is doubtful whether the Japs will ever entrust any portion of their actual front line to the B.N.A., but they evidently intend to make full use of it to obtain information [see TRAINING (iii). Infantry—in para. 7 below] and local supplies and to act as shock-absorbers and cannon fodder as, in the words of a Chindit officer, “The Japs put the B.N.A. out in front both on the move and in defensive positions.”

4. *THE SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL* was inaugurated on the 1st August 1943 and is composed of Army leaders together with the Vice-President of the Burmese Privy Council, U BA HLAING, and certain Cabinet Ministers and is presided over by Dr. BA MAW as Supreme Commander and head of the Puppet Burmese Government. The chief military members are as under:—

President and Supreme Commander.	Dr. BA MAW.	
Minister for National Defence	Major-General Thakin AUNG SAN (alias BOH TEZA).	Leader of the “30 heroes” and previously Commander of the B.D.A. Burma listed agitator No. 5. Jap trained B.I.A.
Vice-Minister for National Defence.	Colonel E Thakin AUNG THAN (alias BOH SET KYA).	Previously 2nd-in-command of the B.D.A. Burma listed agitator No. 15 Jap trained B.I.A.
Commander of the B.N.A.	.. Colonel F (now probably Major-General) Thakin SHU MAUNG (alias BOH NAY WIN).	Jap trained B.I.A.
Chief of the General Staff	.. Colonel (?) Thakin HLA MAUNG (alias Thakin KURAMA alias BOH ZEYA).	President, Students’ Union 1940-41. Shot in the leg in MANDALAY riots 10 Feb. 39. Jap trained B.I.A.
Chief of the Operations Dept.	Lt.-Col. BOH YAN NAING (alias Student MAUNG TUN SHEIN (THAN-MANI).	Previously commander of a Battalion of the B.D.A and A.D.C. to Dr. BA MAW. Jap trained B.I.A.

On the 2nd September 1943, the Burma Defence Army pledged full loyalty to the nation in the presence of Dr. BA MAW and all the Cabinet Ministers. Major-General AUNG SAN, Minister for National Defence, took an oath of allegiance to Dr. BA MAW and pledged loyalty to him as Supreme Commander. Dr. BA MAW addressed the assembled officers and men and told them to obey the commands of their superior

officers and to refrain from interfering in political matters. In other words, he gave the coup de grâce to any inconvenient (to the Japs and to himself) Thakin party politics in the Army by AUNG SAN and his satellites, and politely but firmly told them to get on with playing at soldiers but to cease meddling with politics. It is therefore particularly interesting to note that AUNG SAN is said to have struck BA MAW at a Cabinet meeting and that, unfortunately for BA MAW, he cannot sack AUNG SAN because the latter received his commission from the Emperor of JAPAN. It is obvious that there is no love lost between BA MAW & CO. and the leaders of the B.N.A.—mainly Thakins. Hence the Japs are cleverly playing the game—said to be a British monopoly—of “Divide and rule”.

5. ORGANISATION.—(i) *General*.—The B.N.A. is, needless to say, organised on Japanese lines, but its organisation appears to be limited to a battalion basis (see “Order of Battle” in para. 6 below)—and this conforms with the rôle in which battalions are to be used (see para. 3 above) and the obvious Jap intention of keeping rigid control and of minimising any threat to themselves at any future and inconvenient date. B.N.A. Headquarters have evidently moved from Prome Road, RANGOON, to PEGU, and consist of some sort of miniature equivalent to our own various branches of an Army Headquarters. They appear to have a “Military Preparation Department”, which in turn is subdivided into branches, one of which is the “Organisation Branch”, and it appears that they have Departments to deal with Finance, Ordnance, Engineering, Transport, Medical, Veterinary, Legal and Signals, though personnel representing these various Corps or Departments are very thin on the ground. There is little doubt that, generally speaking, the organisation and administration of the B.N.A. leave a lot to be desired and this is not to be wondered at when it is led and controlled by very inexperienced and insufficiently educated young upstart officers, headed by the Minister for National Defence, Major-General AUNG SAN (aged about 30), and the Commander of the B.N.A. Colonel (now presumably Major-General) SHU MAUNG (NAY WIN)—also 30 years of age or less—and Battalion Commanders who are all young Thakins and/or college students. The B.N.A. leaders proclaimed that they had acquired a Burmese Army of their own—the B.N.A. leaders probably think otherwise now—whereas in the days of their subjugation by the British they cried out in vain and were only taught to “left-right, left-right”. The Japs appear cunningly—as usual—to have set up this young and inexperienced Burmese Army to mollify Burmans as a whole and to be of use to themselves as occasion arises, but so organised and controlled (by themselves) that it



will cause them (the Japs) a minimum of inconvenience during any future difficult times.

(ii) *Unit*.—Unit organisation is on a battalion basis of which there appear to be 6 (or more) infantry battalions now in existence and an A/A battalion, a “Pom-Pom” battalion (distributed at certain vital points such as the SITTANG Bridge) and an Engineer battalion and now, possibly, a “Motor Vehicle” battalion. The organisation of the latter battalions is not known (see, however, para. 8, “ARMS”, below), but that of an infantry battalion appears, from conflicting documents captured in March 1944, probably to consist of 3 Rifle Coys. plus a M. G. Coy. and with a Recruits Coy. stationed at whatever station the battalion is based upon (*e.g.*, MANDALAY for the 4th Battalion). This probable organisation is given diagrammatically in the accompanying Appendix “A” and attention is also invited to Appendix “B”, which consists of a copy of the 4th Battalion Armourer’s statement of the scale of arms and ammunition of that Unit early in 1944—and therefore provides a good indication of the authorised establishment of an infantry battalion.

6 *ORDER OF BATTLE*.—The following Order of Battle has been evolved from the latest available information :—

1st Bn. (Infantry)	.. ARAKAN and RAMREE Island.
2nd Bn. (Infantry)	.. Stationed at Ahlone, RANGOON, in March 1944.
3rd Bn. (Infantry)	.. INDAW-BANMAUK-PINBON-MANLU road. in April 1944.
4th Bn. (Infantry)	.. AUKTAW, 7 miles NE of INDAW, Katha District, in April 1944.
5th Bn. (Infantry)	.. TOUNGOO. in March, 1944.
6th Bn. (Infantry)	.. PYINMANA, in March 1944.
7th Bn. (Pom-Pom Bn.)	.. One Company guarding SITTANG Bridge.
	One Company at PYINMANA.
	One Company at GOKTEIK (near the Bridge).
	Other Companies—Not known.

- 8th Bn. (Heavy A. A. Bn.) .. Scattered all over the country.  
One Company known to be  
at YWATAUNG, Sagaing  
District, in March 1944.  
and another at Myetpa  
Quarter, MANDALAY  
(Note—One may be at KALE-  
WA, if Domei can be  
believed.)
- 9th Bn. (Sappers & Miners) .. INDAW BANMAUK area.  
(Note.—Captured documents  
refer to a company of 354  
Engineers passing through  
WUNTHO in January  
1944.)

NOTES :—(i) The above does not indicate battalions' Recruits Coys. which are located at the station upon which the battalion is based. *Eg* the 4th Battalion's Recruits Coy. is stationed at MANDALAY.

(ii) A "Motor Vehicle Coy." has evidently been formed and is presumably located by sub-units according to requirements. There is also a "Pony Transport Section".

#### 7. TRAINING.

(i) *Officers.*—The OFFICERS TRAINING SCHOOL, which the Japs opened at MINGALADON (the military cantonment 14 miles North of RANGOON) on the 1st September 1942 for the training of potential officers for the B. D. A., has held a succession of courses of approximately 6 months' duration with intervals of 2 to 4 weeks in between courses. Those of the 300 cadets of the 1st Course, who survived the treatment of the Jap instructors, graduated on the 31st March 1943 and 30 of the best graduates were subsequently sent to the Jap Military Academy at TOKYO for further training to fit them for the higher ranks of the B. D. A. The second batch of cadets graduated on the 14th October 1943 and the fourth batch are now evidently under training. The best graduates of each course appear to be sent to TOKYO for further and special training. All instruction at the, now B. N. A., OFFICERS TRAINING SCHOOL is imparted in Japanese, and it is believed that—due to harsh and humiliating treatment—a number of the cadets disappear or fall by the way side before the course terminates ; and this is not to be wondered at because Burmans are not obsequious by nature and would resent the harsh treatment and insults that accompany the hard work and strict discipline imposed upon them by their Jap Instructors.

There is also an ELEMENTARY MILITARY TRAINING SCHOOL at MINGALADON to educate youths of 14 to

16 years of age to become future cadets of the OFFICERS TRAINING SCHOOL (see para. 3 of Annexure I).

(ii) *Other Ranks*.—In the early stages Other Ranks evidently were trained (as recruits) at training centres located at MINGALADON, PYINMANA, MANDALAY and MAYMYO, with particular attention to PYINMANA, where it appears that N.C Os' Courses are held and from which a number evidently desert due to the treatment meted out to them by their Jap instructors and custodians. The best of the survivors are sent on to the OFFICERS TRAINING SCHOOL, MINGALADON, as Cadets. Battalions now having been formed, each evidently has a 5th or a Recruits' Training Coy., which remains at the station upon which its battalion is based, and it is presumed that Other Ranks' training—other than N. C. Os. Schools (of which there now appears to be one at MAYMYO as well as at PYINMANA)—is now the normal and natural responsibility of battalions.

(iii) *Infantry*.—Normal training in the use of infantry weapons and in tactics is imparted, though more attention is given to Defence than to Attack. Methods of infiltration, however, play a large part in their training and they are taught to foster the goodwill of civilians so that, after infiltration, they can merge into the civil population and avoid identification by the enemy and utilise their position to spread rumours and to create consternation. The role of the three B. N. A. battalions which are now on the INDIA-BURMA frontier therefore appears obviously to be that of Reconnaissance Units, in the broadest sense, and their duties are obviously subservient to their Japanese masters, who have an "Adviser" with each battalion of the B. N. A. The duties of these units include the provision of supplies from the countryside for the Japs and for themselves (all of whom live on the land wherever and however possible) and the provision of local coolies for road repairs. From captured documents it appears that Sections are *trained* to adopt the following formations when on the move, but it is obvious that mortar and rifle sections do not, in fact, possess such a quantity of Mortars and Tommy guns, respectively :—

(a) *M. G. Section*.—

	8	7	6	5		4	3	2	1		12	11	10	9	
	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	
Left Look-out	Rifle.	Sniper.	Rifle	Commander.		Rifle.	Ammunition.	Machine Gun.	Siter		Msg.	Supply	Ammunition	Pneumably	Right look-out

(b) *Mortar Section* of 12 men has 4 mortars and 8 rifles. The section deploys into 4 squads of 3 men each, each squad having a mortar.

(c) *Rifle Section* of 12 men has 4 tommy guns and 8 rifles. It splits into 4 squads of 3 men each, each squad having one tommy gunner who, flanked by 2 rifles, leads the advance.

Apart from reports of the general dissatisfaction in the B. N. A. at the shortage of arms and equipment, the 4th Battalion Armourer's Statement (see Appendix "B") early this year gives the number of mortars (small) in a *battalion* as only 3 and the number of tommy guns in a company as only 9. However, the above gives an indication of the ideal aimed at—a pious hope !

(iv) *Other Arms*.—There is no available information concerning the training of Other Arms except that personnel are given A|A training at SITTAUNG and the Sappers and Miners battalion appears to have been trained in MAYMYO in 1943-44. The B. N. A. have been seen with Pack Artillery this year, but this is the first mention of any artillery in connection with the B.N.A.—it was probably a Jap unit. A "Motor Vehicle Coy." has evidently been formed and trained and is presumably used within the B. N. A. according to requirements.

8. *ARMS*.—Information obtained from various sources is conflicting and, with regard to M. Gs. and L. M. Gs., it is particularly difficult to ascertain the authorised scales per unit due to the fact that the same Burmese word applies to M. Gs. and L. M. Gs. and even Tommy guns. One such source early this year states that each battalion has a heavy M. G. Coy., a Mortar Coy. and an A|A Coy. and that each *Section* is equipped with a Bren (or Lewis) gun. It is probable that this report gives a confused description of the organisation of the Heavy M. G. Battalion or the Pom-Pom Battalion or a mixture of both. It is thought that the battalion weapons indicated in the accompanying Appendices "A" and "B" give a fair idea of the approximate scale of arms and ammunition of an infantry battalion. To this must be added a certain number of grenade dischargers and hand grenades, also smoke bombs, etc. (for A|Tank action). Three hand grenades per man is the scale laid down, but a Battalion Armourer's statement early this year shows about 11 per Coy., and a prisoner who was captured in April this year, states that "Section Commanders and more senior officers were provided with one hand grenade each". This typifies the shortage of arms and equipment in the B. N. A. and is one of the several causes of discontent and particularly of desertion in the face of the enemy

(though numbers desert long before they face us !). Other than these infantry battalion weapons, there appear only to be the heavy M Gs. and Pom-Poms of the 7th and 8th Battalions (see " Order of Battle " in para 6 above), and it is presumed that each of these battalions has a proportion of Mortars, L. M. Gs., etc., for ground defence.

9. *UNIFORM* is, practically speaking, identical with that of the Jap army in BURMA, and apparently only one of each article (*e.g.*, one shirt) is provided—which is not likely to please the Burman very much. The badges of the B. N. A. are, however, distinctive. On the Jockey Cap (largely worn in Training Stations and back areas) a 5-pointed blue star is worn on a yellow background, with a yellow band around the crown of the cap. The badges of rank are identical with those of the Jap army, but the badges are surmounted on a green background (*i.e.*, have a green edging) and the national badge of a " Peacock in its pride " is worn adjacent to and in the rear of the badges of rank ; also a small patch of national colours of red, yellow and green, in horizontal bars, is worn on the left breast of tunics. However, it is doubtful whether much of this finery will be seen in Forward Areas.

10. *DISCIPLINE* meted out by Jap Instructors at the B. N. A. Officers Training School and N. C. Os. Schools is evidently harsh and unsympathetic and this, generally speaking, similarly applies to the Jap treatment of the B. N. A. throughout. Discipline within the B. N. A. is evidently unsatisfactory for the obvious reason that they are very discontented (see *MORALE* in para. 14 below), and it is open to doubt whether such punishments as " 30 lashes given to a Private (in February 1944) in the presence of all men of the two Companies stationed in the locality " tend to foster better discipline or increased desertion.

11 *RECRUITING AND DESERTIONS*.—The fuss made about recruiting and the honour of being a soldier, the glory of living a hard life on low wages for the benefit of the country, etc., etc., is out of all proportion to what would be required if sufficient recruits were forthcoming. The numbers at the Officers Training School, MINGALADON, and at the Training School at PYINMANA, who either resign or fade away before completing the courses are evidently considerable. They expected smart uniforms, good food and the rest of the conditions which they knew existed in the British Army training colleges and schools, but they were disappointed. This must reflect adversely upon the rank and file and there is evidence of a very high rate of desertion amongst recruits and trained men

(and N. C. Os.). Apart from their dissatisfaction at their low rates of pay (a 3rd Class Private was still getting Rs. 7-0-0 per month in February 1944), their food, uniform, etc., the B. N. A. suffers with an inferiority complex, due to their treatment by the Jap, and they complain that they are ill-equipped for modern warfare and that their short training does not fit them for the role of fighting troops. Intensive recruiting drives have had little or no success and it appears that all able-bodied males in BURMA are now being conscripted and drafted to the B. N. A. or to the "Sweat Army" (the Burmese Labour Corps, which helped to build the BURMA-SIAM Railway), whichever is the more suitable, and the statement of a B. N. A. Section Commander, who was captured this year, that he joined up in the B. N. A. to avoid being conscripted as a coolie, evidently typifies the spirit of a large percentage of the personnel of the B. N. A. The early glamour of a "Burmese" Army has evidently been thoroughly damped in the light of actual realities and continual slights by the Japanese.

**12. ANCILLARY SERVICES** are conspicuous by their comparative absence and this is particularly the case with regard to the supply of rations, of which there is no regular supply or authorised scale. It is the duty of the B. N. A. not only to feed themselves off the land but also to forage for and provide the Japs with food. It appears that there is "always rice, but that vegetables, meat, etc., are uncertain, and that it depends on what food can be procured" (Statement by a captured N. C. O. of the B. N. A.—30 April 1944). This state of uncertainty and absence of meat, vegetables, etc., is scarcely conducive to contentment and high morale amongst Burmans who are not partial to a low standard of living and monotonous meals of solely rice.

**13. RESERVE.**—The B. N. A. is now said to have a "Reserve in which all Government servants must serve". Its value would appear to be negligible.

**14. MORALE AND FEELING VIS-A-VIS THE JAPS.**—The MORALE of the B. N. A. is, generally speaking, low but, in view of all the disadvantages from which it suffers, this is not to be wondered at. Not only does it suffer from poor and inexperienced leadership, poor food and pay, and lack of arms and equipment for modern warfare, but superimposed on all this and other inconveniences and disappointments is this constant maltreatment and mishandling of them by the Japs of which mention has already been made. Instances are many, but, to give the reader a further insight of the morale and feel-

ing in the B. N. A. some of the typical slights and insults administered by the Japs are given below.—

On the railway the passenger carriages are evidently reserved for the Japs, and it is scarcely conducive to *esprit de corps* and a higher state of morale when not only civilians and soldiers but also officers are forced to travel in baggage wagons.

Private soldiers of the B. N. A. have to salute not only Jap officers and N.C.Os., but all Jap *Privates* too, and N.C.Os. have to salute Jap N.C.Os. as well as officers. Conversely, even Jap Privates seldom salute B. N. A. officers.

A *verbatim* extract from a report, dated 4 May 1944, of a captured N. C. O. is enlightening :—(i) “ If B. N. A. soldiers fail to salute, the Japs slap them, but the same can not be done by the B. N. A. officers.

(ii) The B. N. A. are not satisfied with the type of independence given by the Japs who are really controlling all affairs. Real independence, they think, can only be achieved by expelling the Japs.

(iii) The Japs are permitted to visit B. N. A. lines, but B. N. A. are not permitted to visit the Jap lines.

(iv) Jap rations are better than B. N. A. rations, *e.g.*, Japs get sugar and B. N. A. get jaggery.

(v) Arms seized from the British were sold to the B. N. A. The B. N. A. are not as well armed as the Japs, who have only sold them old British weapons.

(vi) The B. N. A. object to Japs marrying Burmese women. There is a rumour that the Japs have already produced 10,000 children with Burmese mothers.

(vii) They object to Japs entering their pongyi-kyaungs with boots and quartering troops in monasteries and near pagodas ”

Then, with regard to the B. N. A.'s skirmish with our troops at AUKTAW early this year, this same N. C. O. admits to having fired 60 shots into space towards our positions, but says that he was so frightened that he does not know whether he hit anyone. He and his companions hid in a trench and, when spotted by our advancing troops, surrendered.

The Japs order the B. N. A. around and regard them as a very inferior force and, in fact, do practically everything which tends to lower a force's morale. There have been a number of quarrels with the Japs and some deaths have resulted. Not only does the B. N. A. resent the Japs' treatment of themselves but, as is typified by the action of a B. N. A. officer, who shot a Jap Sergeant at NYAUNGLEBIN (Pegu District) on the 25th November 1943 after trying to prevent him from

assaulting a Burmese bus driver, they equally and deeply resent the Japs' treatment of their kith and kin.

From March 1944 onwards, a considerable number of the B. N. A. also have evidently deserted because they were afraid that they would be made to fight against Allied Troops, and B. N. A. officers—at last realising that they are being utilised to suit Jap interests—are evidently delivering secret lectures to their men warning them that the day is not far off when they would have to fight against the Japs. In this connection a report, dated June 1944, concerning a Sgt.-Major MAUNG TUN KYAING (presumably of the 4th Battalion) at PINBON (Katha District), who stated that the Burmese hated the Japanese and expressed himself in the following manner :— “ We are the children of the British ; they will come back soon and we will go over to them ”, is interesting.

When the Burman is on the winning side his morale is high, but when he is on the losing side—as is now the case—his morale quickly deteriorates. This has already become evident as, in the words of a Chindit Officer, “ They (the B. N. A.) soon abandon their positions ”. It is evident that the morale of the B. N. A., which is already low, will be more of a liability than an asset to the Japs in the near future.

15. *SUBSIDIARY UNITS AND FORMATIONS.*—Notes on these, (also of the mooted Air Force), are given in the attached Annexure I. It is important to realise that these Levies, etc., do NOT form a part of the B. N. A. and it is essential to have a brief knowledge of them in order to complete the picture and to grasp the present position of the B. N. A. *vis-a-vis* the Japs and *vice versa*.

16. *CONCLUSION.*—The apparent present paper strength of the B. N. A. is approximately 10,000. There are talks of a Five Year Plan to train 50,000 in 5 years and of forming mixed Divisions of Japs and Burmans. However, comment on this is scarcely necessary.

The Jap object with the B. N. A. evidently is to produce a replica of the bogus and puppet armies in occupied CHINA and MANCHUKUO. They wish to give an appearance of liberality and freedom, and consequently have raised the B. N. A., which is being trained on Jap lines under Jap control and which can be relied on to maintain internal security whilst not constituting a threat to Jap occupation ; and, in order to assuage Burmese pride, certain battalions are being made use of on the INDIA-BURMA frontier. The B. N. A. is evidently not really an army in anything like the proper sense.



of the word. It lacks an Air Force and artillery and many essentials, and obviously could not act independently as a whole. So the Japs will only have to deal with individual battalions in the near future when they scurry out of BURMA.


Though the "Thakin" or "Master" party, which furnished the majority of the officers and N. C. Os., always has been very anti-British and—generally speaking—there is only a little pro-United Nations feeling at present, there is now almost cent per cent anti-Jap feeling; and it is probable that most of the B. N. A. will come over to our side when we have got the Japs properly on the run—in self-defence if for no other reasons.





[Appendix A.]

## PROBABLE ORGANISATION OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION (TAT YIN)



## NOTES.

(i) The above has been evolved from various sources of conflicting information and is probably nearly correct. One source states that each Battalion has a heavy M.G. Coy., a Mortar Coy., and an A/A Coy. (and that each Coy. is equipped with L.M.Gs.), but this is doubtful and particularly in view of the B.N.A.'s shortage of arms and equipment—it may, however, apply to the Heavy A-A. Bn or to the Pom-Pom Bn.

(ii) According to a notebook of a PYINMANA-trained member of the 4th Battalion B.N.A., which was captured at WUANTHO in March 1944—"Every Tat Boh is to form 4 Anti-Tank Sections of 2 to 3 daring men each". Tat Boh is a very loose expression but it may be assumed that there are at least 4 of these Anti-Tank Sections in a Battalion and probably in each Coy. and perhaps in each Platoon, as they are only armed with "grenades, dynamite and anti-tank bullets".

(iii) It is not at all certain that platoons have a L.M.G. Section, though one source states that "every section is armed with one Bren-gun (probably "Lewis gun")". Possibly there is just one L.M.G. Section with each Coy. H.Q.

[Appendix B.]  
4th B.N. (B.N.A.) ARMOURER'S STATEMENT—EARLY 1944.

	Dahs.	Rifles.	Belts.	Large Ammunition Pouches.	Small Ammunition Pouches.	Rifle Ammunition.	Tommy Guns.	Tommy Gun Ammunition.	Small Mortars.	Small Mortar Ammunition.	Large Machine Gun.	Large Machine Gun Ammunition Boxes.	Large Machine Gun Ammunition.	Revolvers.	Revolver Cartridges.
Battalion Headquarters	3	13	49	13	26	1,560	1	480	..	..	.	.	..	2	24
No. 1 Coy.	6	123	130	123	246	14,760	9	4,320	1	16	..	..	..	3	36
No. 2 Coy.	6	123	130	123	246	14,760	9	4,320	1	16	..	..	..	3	36
No. 3 Coy.	6	123	130	123	246	14,760	9	4,320	1	16	..	..	..	3	36
Machine Gun Coy.	6	24	87	24	48	2,880	..	..	.	.	4	32	28,800	9	108
Total	27	406	526	406	812	48,720	28	13,440	3	48	4	32	28,800	20	240

NOTES.

(i) Each rifleman is said to carry only 20 rounds, but this seems to be very improbable except in back and base areas, otherwise the balance of his 120 rounds, i.e. 100 rounds, has to be carried by other means—of which there are little or none except forced labour.

(ii) A fifth Coy. of recruits of the 4th Battalion is stationed at MANDALAY, and is not included above.

## ANNEXURE

### 1. Irregular Forces.

(i) "*Kachin Hill Levies*"—This irregular force was raised by the Japs with the assistance of the Quisling KANSI SINWA NAWNG, a disgruntled Kachin Chief of the Jade Mines. It is (or was) composed of SHANS and BURMANS and operated in the HUKAWNG VALLEY and now evidently operates further South. The men are armed with any weapons which they can find and which the Japs will permit them to keep and use. They have no particular uniform but evidently most of them wear a red badge, shaped like a shield, in which is written in English "*Kachin Hill Levies*" in white lettering. However, some of these badges have Jap characters and some Burmese, also some are white with black lettering and some are of the Dobama (National) colours of red, green and yellow, but there is usually English lettering on them all. It appears that these levies have been used by the Japs mainly as an irregular police force and for village defence and particularly for imposing restrictions to movement. Any movement by the local KACHINS resulted in the burning of their dwellings and they (the KACHINS) are, or were, abiding their time to deal with this Quisling SHAN-BURMAN force.

(ii) *Jikidan* is the title that the Japs gave to the irregular force of Scouts or Levies which they raised in the Upper Chindwin area. The word "*Jikidan*" apparently is the Japanese term for a "Volunteer Corps" and therefore is a complete misnomer for this force of locals which was obviously conscripted. The Japs' method of conscription was to order village headmen to produce so many (*e.g.*, 20) suitable young men or to conscript a proportion of the men of every household. Suitable leaders were appointed and known by the Japanese name of DAN CHAW. Sub-Leaders are called TAIK CHAW. They have no uniform, but evidently have epaulettes of white cloth on which are horizontal red stripes (similar to R.A.F. Officers' shoulder badges of rank) and Jap characters embroidered in red. DAN CHAWS wear 3 stripes and the Jap words DAN CHAW, TAIK CHAWS wear 2 stripes and the Jap words TAIK CHAW, and the remainder wear one stripe and the Jap characters for JIKIDAN. They evidently have few, if any, arms except the DAN CHAWS and TAIK CHAWS who appear to have shot guns and 12 rounds of ammunition—if they are lucky. They are obviously part of the Jap Intelligence system but appear to be mostly concerned with village defence. Some reports indicate that all members of the JIKIDAN attend Jap language classes daily and that some have probably been trained in jungle warfare as

far as it affects them. The reliability of this irregular force is very doubtful. A number of reports state that the villagers objected to being enlisted and had to be warned by the Japs that they would be severely dealt with if they refused. Nevertheless, fear of the Japs and their ruthless methods probably make them quite a useful Intelligence organisation. One report, however, states that as a military force the JIKIDAN is non-existent.

(iii) *Letyon Tats*. A "Bama Letyon Tat", or "Burmese Volunteer Corps" was raised by a *Thakin* pongyi, named U NANDIYA, in the Chindwin area immediately after the Jap occupation of BURMA. This irregular force was evidently stationed mainly in the KALEMYO area (Lower Chindwin), and its duties appear to have been almost entirely confined to village defence and not assistance to the Japs. Nothing further is known of it at present, but it should not be confused with (i) and (ii) above, which were raised and controlled by the Japs, whereas this "Bama Letyon Tat" is a Burmese enterprise—though the Japs are probably making use of it now. Evidently there are other LETYON TATS, which are paid by the Japs and the members of which are used by the Japs for patrol, intelligence, and all the other duties for which they obviously are very useful.

(iv) *Arakan Defence Force*.—Information concerning this Force is confusing, but there is no doubt that a volunteer irregular force composed mainly of Arakanese, Jap trained, volunteers has served the Japs for some time past. They appear to be armed with an assortment of weapons ranging from L.M.Gs. to shot guns, and in some cases are formed into detachments with one or two L.M.Gs. per detachment. They are used by the Japs in Advance and Rear Guard actions and as guides and, of course, for watching our every movement and keeping the Japs well informed. They are also employed as Coast Guards and as police and they patrol the villages. Some wear Jap uniform with a round white cloth badge on the breast with a red disc in the centre, others wear no uniform but arm bands of green-yellow-red stripes or a white "VI" on a khaki background on their shoulders, and some will probably be found wearing an assortment of our own uniform. Generally speaking, there is evidently little or no pro-British feeling amongst these volunteers, but in some cases secret parties are being formed to escape during any major operations and to join up with us.

(v) *Shan States*.—Evidently a considerable number of local inhabitants have been conscripted to assist the Japs to maintain order.

## 2. Other Units.

(i) *The Shingbeng Battalhon* is a Burmese battalion of the *Japanese Army* and has no connection with the B.N.A. A "Shingbeng" soldier is treated in the same way as a Nippon soldier and receives the same food, uniform and pay. The word "Shingbeng" appears to be a Jap word meaning either "newly changed" or "inaugurated" or perhaps "a new benefit" or "a new convenience". The information concerning this unit is conspicuous by its absence and it is possible that it may be the same as the HEHO TAT which is described below; however, it is also possible that it may be an M.T. battalion for the use of the Jap army or may in some way be connected with a corps of interpreters. The probability is that the Japs have utilised the Burman's aptitude for lorry driving and that this is in fact an M. T. battalion incorporated into the Jap army and officered by Japs.

(ii) *The Heho Tat* is evidently a Burmese Labour Unit and is directly under Jap officers and Jap control. It has no connection with the B.N.A. The Burmese rank and file are said to be volunteers and to be paid at a very considerably higher rate than those of the B.N.A. Evidently they are clothed in Jap uniform, well equipped and well fed, are on an equal footing with Jap soldiers and enjoy all their privileges, and offences are apparently overlooked—whereas offences committed by personnel of the B.N.A. are severely dealt with. There appear to have been frequent clashes between personnel of the B.N.A. and those of the HEHO TAT and feelings between the two are very strained and they evidently cannot bear the very sight of one another. B.N.A. leaders are said to have warned their men not to speak to men of the HEHO TAT as they suspect it of being a secret service group under the guise of a Labour Corps. Japs seem to have encouraged this movement and to have been responsible for this split.

(iii) *Miscellaneous*—Apart from the "Sweat Army" (forced labour), for which the male population of BURMA is being conscripted alternately with the B.N.A. and which is so unpopular that youths now join the B.N.A. in order to avoid being engulfed in it (the Sweat Army), there are evidently other formations such as the HTIN KWE organisation, which, however, may be a part of the Sweat Army. It is probable that this is a firewood splitting (htin kwe) organisation as there have been numerous references to the shortage of firewood for railways, etc.

Burmans have also this year been exhorted to join the PINT-KHO forces to augment the defence of BURMA and



for the defeat of the British and American forces in co-operation with the Japs. It is not known what this force is, but it is obvious that, quite apart from the B.N.A., the Japs and their satellite BA MAW have raised various organisations to serve the Jap army.

### 3. Elementary Military Training School.

This was opened by the Japs at MINGALADON on the 1st April 1943 for Burmese youths of 14—16 years of age with the purpose of giving them 3 years training to prepare them to become officers of the B.N.A. and at the same time "to develop a noble inner spirit" (!). This School is, or was, run entirely by the Japs and the students are given similar training to that imparted at Military Preparatory Schools in JAPAN and, upon graduation, those who are considered suitable are due to undergo further training in JAPAN as candidates for commissions before being finally admitted into the B.N.A. They evidently wear "natty uniforms with the jockey cap and star badge of the B.N.A., short sleeved khaki shirts and shorts in the hot weather, with a bayonet strapped to the waist, and the B.N.A. peacock insignia on their tunics, also the shoulder straps of their uniforms are fringed with red similar to students at the Military Preparatory Schools in JAPAN."

The number selected to undergo the first Course, which commenced on the 1st April 1943, appears to have been 30. On the 30th October 1943 applications were advertised for for the second Course and, of selected applicants, 50 were to be admitted to this "Elementary Military Training School" and 50 to the "Signalling Class". The duration of this second Course is to be approximately 2 years instead of the 3 years of the first Course, so it is possible that both Courses of these Nipponised youngsters are due to terminate together.

### 4. Air Force.

This is non-existent at present, but it is reported that the Japs are training a Burmese Air Force at ANISAKAN, near MAYMYO; and it is interesting to note that BA MAW's son, now 16 years old, arrived in TOKYO in July 1943 to enter the Jap Military Academy with the intention of training as an Air Pilot.

## PART VI.

BURMESE ECONOMY DURING THE JAPANESE  
OCCUPATION.

BY DR. J. RUSSELL ANDRUS.

## A. GENERAL STATEMENT AND SUMMARY.

By 1941 Burmese economy was integrated with world economy to a very large extent. A vast transformation in the economic life of the country had taken place since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Prior to that time a village or a group of villages connected by a five-day bazaar were approximately self-sufficient. Since that time, however, there has sprung up a great one-crop area in Lower Burma, Tenasserim and Arakan in which rice is the only agricultural product of importance. Clothing and other foodstuffs except fish and salt had to be imported from abroad or from Upper Burma.

In Upper Burma itself many farmers specialised in the production of cotton, beans or sugar-cane and had to purchase most of their foodstuffs, textiles, etc., in the markets. However, the typical Upper Burma farmer grew a little rice if he had any land which was suitable and probably grew two or three dry zone crops<sup>1</sup>. Even when cotton was among his crops, however, it was normally taken to the gin, the proceeds being used to buy imported cloth and other commodities.

The horse-shoe of hills which surrounds the more economically important part of Burma—the Irrawaddy Valley—is sparsely populated by peoples who were only slightly connected by economic dealings with the world market. Some of these engaged in forestry while others were miners. In many cases, however, transportation facilities were so poor that hill tribes were necessarily self-sufficient except that they normally bartered pigs, honey and vegetables for rice, cloth, salt and *daks*, wherever possible.

Although Burma had had a small amount of trade for centuries with India, Ceylon, China and other countries, the needs for cloth, household utensils, etc., were predominantly met by handicraft production. Prior to the British period of Burmese

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<sup>1</sup>Cotton was the principal non-food crop in the dry zone, but was sown on only 405,000 acres, whereas over six million acres were planted with food crops, including two million acres under rice. Sugar-cane was grown on 19,000 acres, mostly in Yamethin district.

history it is certain that those needs were not met as well as they have been met in recent years by imported textiles and other commodities. Imported machine-made commodities have had the market almost to themselves in the more accessible parts of the country for two or three generations and as a result handicrafts have declined considerably. However, the 1931 census listed 235,000 persons as engaged in cotton spinning, sizing and weaving, 66,000 as "lacquer workers and makers of baskets, cages, etc., of bamboo, cane and other woody materials" and smaller numbers in several other handicrafts. It is thus evident that when the Japanese occupation of Burma cut off almost all foreign trade there was still a fair number of handicraft workers to help alleviate the resulting economic distress. Most of these, however, carried on handicrafts as a part-time occupation, the main occupation of the family being agriculture.

Foreign commerce resulted in an increase in living standards and a change of consumption patterns. Machine-made textiles, bicycles, flash-lights and many other commodities hitherto unknown in Burma became commonplace in the average village. The world-wide depression of the 1930's emphasised Burma's new economic relationship to the rest of the world, for paddy prices fell catastrophically and the lives of most Burmans were adversely affected by events which took place thousands of miles away.

1. *Burma's orientation definitely westward.*—The facts of economic geography made India the chief customer for Burma's exports and the chief supplier of textiles and other commodities imported by Burma. Burma's land frontier was not crossed until 1939 by any modern means of communication, the age-old caravan trails to China never having carried a significant volume of goods. Hence Burma's trade nearly all took place through Rangoon and a few subsidiary ports. The Indian ports of Calcutta and Madras were closest to Burma and in addition to this fact, Indian immigrants to Burma took up business there while maintaining trade contacts in India. Moreover, the teeming Indian population provided much the greatest import demand for rice of any country in the world just as Burma exported approximately 40% of the rice entering world trade. Furthermore, cheap Indian labour was combined with Indian and British capital to produce a great range of commodities capable of selling at the cheap prices appropriate to the Burma market. Ceylon, the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe were also important in the Burma trade leaving but a small proportion, roughly 10 to 15 per cent. of Burma's trade, for the countries of Far Eastern Asia occupied by Japan in 1942.

2. *Dislocation of trade, 1941-42, greater than anywhere else in "Greater East Asia".*—No other part of the Japanese conquered area had such a large proportion of its trade with Western Nations. This is but natural in view of the much shorter distance from Japan to Thailand and Indo-China—countries with economies very similar to that of Burma. Even without Imperial Preference and various other political and economic developments which tended to place Burma's trade in Empire channels, there was no reason to expect that country to have a significant proportion of its trade with the Far East. It is from Japan and under the Japanese that it has been least able to find substitute markets and supplies—largely because of the tremendous transportation problem involved and Japanese conspicuous weakness in the entire field of transport. Thailand and Indo-China appear able to supply Japan with more rice and teak, for instance, than the latter country can transport. Even had Japan had an export surplus of consumer goods, which it clearly has not had since the outbreak of the war, transport of those goods to Burma in significant quantities would not have been feasible, all available transport being required for the transport of the army and its supplies. It is probable, therefore, that Burma's foreign trade is less than 5% of normal if strictly military traffic is omitted. The effect upon urban living standards has been very great.


3 *Decline in living standards, growth in handicrafts.*—It is obvious that such a catastrophic decline in foreign trade would upset the living standards of nearly everyone in Burma except a few remote hill tribes which had not yet become integrated with world economy. Prices of remaining stocks of such commodities as flash-lights went up to fantastic heights and before long became simply unobtainable. Presumably, the upper classes and town dwellers generally have been more affected than have peasants whose living standards never rose very high and who still in most cases have all the rice they can eat and are able by their own efforts to secure a few fish, other small animals and vegetables from nearby jungle areas.

Handicrafts as indicated above had never disappeared and by common consent the Burman must be considered ingenious, clever with his hands and a good craftsman. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the Japanese and Burmese authorities are having a fair measure of success in their highly advertised campaign to promote hand textile industries and a number of other handicrafts. Given five or ten years it is quite possible that a position of relative stability would be achieved, handicrafts and an increased planting of cotton supplying the Burmese nation with a regular flow of consumption goods as

they did until less than a century ago. For the present, however, numerous and consistent reports of consumer shortages and extremely high prices indicate great hardship and a drastic decline in living standards. Adjustment to a lower, handicraft stage of existence is slow and painful.


Newspaper pronouncements of Burmese cabinet members and others have spoken of plans for the rapid industrialisation of Burmese economy and Domei has reported the shipping of some machinery, particularly cotton spinning machinery, to Burma. There is no evidence, however, that Burma's small factory industry, employing about 90,000 workers in normal times, has even held its own. Demolition, burning and shortage of raw materials and fuel have almost certainly more than offset the small output of the few additional factories. In other words, Japan's inability to make sufficient investment in Burma prevents that country from being of much economic advantage to the conqueror. The oilfields and mines are producing but a small fraction of their normal output.


4. *Transport the outstanding problem.*—Almost every part of Burmese economy has suffered during Japanese occupation but the most basic problem of all appears to be lack of transport. The railways are run by the Japanese army with very little space available for civilian passenger or freight traffic. Very little steam launch traffic is being carried on in the Irrawaddy Delta or as far as Prome, and some owners of small rivercraft are afraid to ply on the main waterways for fear of Japanese requisitioning their boats. The highways are of much less use than normal because of shortage of petrol. Even the ubiquitous bullock cart appears to be less in evidence on the Burma roads than in normal times. This is due to Japanese requisitioning of cattle for transport purposes and slaughter. Moreover, there are numerous reports of unusually heavy attacks of rinderpest and other cattle diseases. Finally the price of fish has risen more than the price of beef with resultant increase in slaughtering by Burmans. With all normal types of transport functioning at less than normal efficiency it is not to be wondered at that the 1943-44 crop was selling at Re. 1 per 75 lb basket in Bassein, more than Rs. 5 in Rangoon and Rs. 20 to Rs. 30 in various parts of Upper Burma. Chart A shows the pattern of rice prices where recent reports are available. Prices can be taken as only approximately correct and the time varies from October '43 to March '44. However, the price differences are so great that complete breakdown in internal transport and trade is clearly indicated. Charts B and C tell a somewhat similar story in regard to sesamum and cotton *longyis*.

Rice Price Pattern.75 lbs. basket Prewar Rs. 3-8-0.CHART. A.

Sessamum Oil Pattern  
10. Viss R77 Pre-war Rs 8/-

CHART. B.



Cotton Langyis. Pre-war Rs. 1/8CHART. C.



5. *Other reasons for local food shortages.*—It is evident from the map just referred to that contemporary Burma suffers from a glut of rice in some parts of Lower Burma and a shortage which the Burmese Government fears may lead to food riots in Upper Burma. Transportation is not the only factor responsible for food shortages, however. The Japanese appear to have issued vast quantities of military notes with no backing and no regard to the effect on the price level or the economy generally. There being few manufactured commodities which the peasant could purchase with the money received for his crop, money has ceased to provide an adequate incentive to effort on his part. Moreover, lack of law and order and of confidence that the farmer who grows a crop will be able to reap it and use or sell it contribute to a psychological state quite inimical to normal agricultural production. Furthermore, the cattle shortage referred to above in connection with transportation makes itself felt in an insufficiency of cattle for normal ploughing operations. Moreover, Japanese demands for labour have resulted in a manpower shortage in many agricultural regions.

Finally the large-scale emigration of Indians and Chinese in 1942 has seriously handicapped domestic trade. Whereas the Burmese are important in actual retailing of commodities, the country's brokerage, wholesaling and provisions for the transport of commodities from one place to another were normally in the hands of non-Burmans, many of whom are absent. Thus the technical skill in taking advantage of price differences throughout the country has been seriously depleted.

6. *Extension of State Control.*—There is evident in Burma a tendency to rely more than ever before upon State activity for the fostering of small industrial projects, for the spread of cooperation, for rationing and price control, for new public works and for banking. This is but a natural tendency in view of the slight experience of Burmans in these fields and the emigration of skilled foreign specialists in 1942. The reported purchase by the Government of over a million tons of rice is but one case in point. Dr. Ogawa, ex-Professor of Economics in Tokyo Imperial University, may be expected to shape Governmental policies in the economic sphere in particular. Moreover, the recent visit to Japan by an Economic Planning Commission headed by Dr. Ba Han, brother of the *Adipadi*, indicates more far-reaching plans involving State control. The Commission having been made permanent as a Planning Board its further activities may be watched with interest.

7. *Burma and Japanese War economy.*—It is thus evident that the brief period of Japanese occupation of Burma has brought a precipitous fall in the living standards of nearly all

except the poorer and more remote cultivators. Internal economy has been broken into a number of slightly-connected fragments, none of which can, within so brief a time, make a satisfactory adjustment and become self-sufficient. In the pre-British period, it is true, local handicrafts helped stabilize economic life, on a low level, but they cannot be fully revived in one or two years, after generations of neglect.

Japanese troops in Burma, however, appear to be doing rather well, at least as far as food and transport are concerned. Regardless of local shortages of rice and other food their requisitioning has hitherto been able to keep them well supplied. Transport is almost a complete military monopoly, and since the completion of the Thailand-Burma Railway their minimum transport needs, at least, appear to have been satisfied.

There is no evidence, however, that the rich mineral, forest and agricultural resources of Burma are being used either to produce munitions or supplies other than food for the Japanese army in Burma or to provide exports to the more industrialized portion of "Greater East Asia". Pre-war stores of zinc, lead, tungsten and other metals have probably been sent to Japan, but present mineral production is but a small fraction of pre-war output. Exports of rice, teak and cotton are very small, both because of insufficiency of shipping and because of small internal production relative to minimum internal demands for military and civilian use. Burma, in other words, is a very doubtful economic asset to Japan.

## B AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS.

1. *Tenancy*—Half the rice land of Lower Burma was let to tenants by absentee landowners. The level of rents had been a subject of Governmental enquiry and an unsuccessful governmental attempt at regulation. As, however, one-fourth of the total land of Lower Burma was owned by Chettians and other Indians many of whom fled in 1942, the tenants were faced by the not very vexing problem of inability to contact many landlords and pay the rent which they owed. Furthermore, the general decline in rice acreage consequent upon loss of the export market and other upsetting factors placed the tenants in a stronger position than ever before. The Government issued a Tenancy Ordinance in 1943 providing for a 50% reduction in agricultural rents for 1942-43. How influential this Ordinance was in actual practice is not known at this time. Perhaps economic factors prevented the landlords from receiving even half the normal rent but it is doubtful if the Government in 1943 was able to implement its Act any more successfully than was the previous Government in 1939 and 1940.

2 *The Chettiards*.—With an estimated 750 million rupees investment in 1930—which investment in total probably remained intact to 1941—the Chettiards were the most important foreign investors in Burma by a wide margin. Two-thirds of their capital was believed to have been invested in loans on agricultural land. Since that time—particularly during the world depression after 1930—they were forced to foreclose many mortgages to protect their investments, and by 1936 they owned 25% of the agricultural land in the thirteen leading rice-growing districts, and probably continued to hold mortgages against another large area. Thus the *nature* of their rural investment changed radically, although its estimated total probably changed little. Between 1936 and 1941 Chettiar holdings did not increase to any appreciable extent, further foreclosures being balanced by sales to Burmans and others. Few new loans were made after the depression.

Some of the Chettiards left Burma in 1942, but others remained at Rangoon. They have reportedly received reduced rents for such of their lands as have remained in cultivation, but they are believed to have received little or no payments for interest or principal on loans. Naturally, they make no new loans under present circumstances.

Burmese tenants and others have reportedly destroyed some of the records and taken possession of Chettiar lands. One source suggests that Telugu and Oriya coolies have suddenly become landowners. Verification is not available, but if the report is correct the land was presumably purchased from Chettiards. U Than Tun, until recently Minister of Lands and Agriculture and reportedly a serious student of Lenin, appears to have followed the example of the latter in dealing with estates of emigré landowners. The Rangoon radio announced in February, 1944, that before the 10th of March the Department of Agriculture would “arrange the distribution of land previously owned by enemies and all unclaimed land. . . . to cultivators who have been working it. . . .”. Another report in early March, 1944, said that land not rented or otherwise provided for by 31st March, would “be turned over to cultivators for cultivation purposes”. Chettiards are probably not treated as enemies by the Japanese, for purpose of land seizure. This is thought to be because of a desire to foster good relations with India. However, the lands of absentee Chettiards can be brought under cultivation on the grounds that they are not otherwise provided for, questions of ultimate ownership being deferred.

Photographs of agricultural lands in Lower Burma in the fall of 1943 showed a heavy incidence of uncultivated paddy

land in areas where Chettians owned a large part of the total acreage. Presumably it was this lack of cultivation of much Chettian land which led the government to embark on the policy of letting uncultivated land to tenants. Such a policy might have the following advantages from the standpoint of the Burmese puppet government and the Japanese military regime :

- (a) It would win popularity with Burmese peasants.
- (b) It would tend to substitute a Burmese peasantry for absentee foreign landlords.
- (c) It would prevent the threatened shortage of rice.
- (d) It would increase land revenue.

3. *Other Government Activities.*—An interesting and rather successful experiment by the previous Government of Burma was a number of State Colonies principally along the Lower Sittang River. The Supervisor of Government Estates rented the land on an annual basis and assisted in marketing through the agency of Government-sponsored co-operative societies and mills. The present Government appears to have left this system intact, for a reported 1943-44 plan for agricultural credit states that Rs. 300,000 will be allotted to tenants of Government estates. The total allotment for agricultural credit was to be Rs. 4,500,000 of which Rs. 500,000 will be distributed through co-operative societies while the remaining Rs. 3,700,000 will be loaned directly to cultivators by Government officials who would go to the villages for this purpose securing jointly signed notes instead of the customary mortgages.

Another reported Government activity in the agricultural field was the advance of Rs. 5,000,000 to hire labourers for reaping the 1943-44 crops.

There is abundant evidence that the Japanese, Thakins and others are fostering co-operatives, ordinarily along lines worked out in the last few years by government officials and others. A long Domei dispatch of 2nd June, 1944 describes the successful efforts of Thakin Min, the District Commissioner of Thaton, and others in setting up a series of co-operatives.

### C. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE.

Burma is a predominantly agricultural country. It has always been practically self-sufficient as to food, the only imports of foodstuffs having been salt, sugar, cooking oil and a few minor products including food and drink for Europeans and for Burmans with Europeanised tastes. In recent years sugar production increased sufficiently to make the country self-sufficient in that product. There was a considerable local salt

production but a small portion of the country's salt consumption was imported. Burma was the world's largest exporter of rice by a considerable margin, the 3 million ton annual export amounting to about two-fifths of the total rice entering world trade. There was little export of other food products, however, with the exception of pulses, two-thirds of which were sent to India.

1. *Dry Zone and Delta agriculture complementary.*—Although Burma as a whole normally produced more than twice enough rice for local consumption, the Central Burma Dry Zone was deficient in this product, absorbing the surplus from the rice growing district known as the Upper Burma wet zone and sometimes importing a considerable quantity from Lower Burma. On the other hand although 80 to 85 per cent. of the cooking oil used in great profusion by Burmese cooks was locally grown, the production was concentrated in the Dry Zone. Similarly vegetables, gram and a number of other products widely consumed in Lower Burma originated in the Dry Zone which region in turn consumed *ngapi*, dried and salted fish, etc., originating in the Delta and along the sea-coast. Neither part of Burma, in other words, was self-sufficient as to food, hence the almost complete breakdown in civilian transport and trade produces the greatest distress in particular areas due to shortage of customary items of diet even when the country as a whole has a fairly adequate food production.

2 *Total estimated population*—The population in 1941 was 16,823,000 according to the decennial census. No reliable estimate is available for the present population but it seems reasonable as a working hypothesis to assume that the Japanese forces and Japanese and other civilian immigrants had not quite balanced in numbers the approximate half million Indians and others who evacuated Burma in 1942. Wartime disturbances, casualties and the reported high incidence of disease in certain areas may have prevented the population from increasing at a normal rate of 1.4% per annum. If the total population is slightly less now than in 1941, this fact is probably balanced by the greater capital consumption of food by Japanese troops.

3 *Rice.*—Nearly two-thirds of Burma's cultivated land is normally planted to rice. No other crop of importance is grown in areas like Lower Burma where the rainfall suffices for rice. The 1941-42 crop was nearly all harvested before the Japanese entered Burma. The surplus above normal consumption was estimated at 3.4 million tons. It is not known how much of this rice was destroyed during the fighting, burnt in sheds adjoining the rice mills during local disturbances or was left in the open during the 1942 monsoon due to inadequate village

storage capacity. The suggestion is made that more than half the surplus was destroyed in one of these ways. Only some 200,000 tons from this crop is estimated as exported to Japan and there is no knowledge of any other export. Naturally, the price of rice fell catastrophically, and the Government talked frequently of purchasing surplus rice to relieve village distress. There is no evidence that any of the 1941-42 surplus was purchased by the Government, however.

Having experienced a drastic fall in the price of their crop, and much of it being unsaleable, while some of their cattle and labour force were requisitioned, the paddy farmers reduced their crop in 1942-43 to four or five million tons of paddy instead of the normal seven and one half million tons. Throughout this season there were numerous Government announcements regarding a wide-scale scheme for the purchase of over 50 million baskets of paddy at Rs. 60 to 80 per 100 baskets. There is only a little support from ground sources for the belief that any paddy was purchased even at this low price. Much publicity was given in May 1943 to the statement that the Government would purchase the rice surplus within the next four months. The official publication "Financial and Economic Annual, July 1943," mentions the purchase of 51,700,000 baskets for Rs. 55,830,140 but does not state that the purchase had already been made at that time. It is thought that the timing of the publicity campaign was due to a Japanese desire to prevent the 1943-44 crop from falling below total domestic needs. It is evident that the cultivator was tempted by economic circumstances to plant only "*wunsa*" paddy sufficient for the use of his household only.

The 1943-44 crop showed a still further decline. Aerial reconnaissance in the fall of 1943 showed approximately 60% of the paddy land near rail lines, towns, etc., to be under cultivation. Climatic conditions were not very favourable and in such areas as those in Northern Burma where military operations had taken place, fear had driven many cultivators away from their land so that rice culture was a very small fraction of normal. Moreover Japanese requisitioning of rice for small payment in an inflated currency was by 1943 well known to most Burmans. The 1943-44 budget showed an allotment of 58 million rupees for paddy purchase and there were announcements of the appointment of officials to carry out the purchase. Up to February 1944 there was no independent evidence of the provision of adequate storage facilities for such a scheme nor of actual purchase. The reported price to be offered under Dr. Ba Maw's 1944-45 "Grow More Paddy Scheme" was raised to Rs. 200 per 100 baskets in the districts or Rs. 250 at the Rangoon docks.

There is reason to believe that some of the reduced 1943-44 crop was not reaped. Frantic advertisements continued to appear throughout the reaping season suggesting that volunteering for paddy reaping was a patriotic duty. Considering the customs and habits of the town Burman and the disturbed local situation, it is very doubtful if this campaign achieved complete success. From Yamethin District, however, come glowing reports of successful campaigns to persuade town Thakins and others to reap the local paddy crop in 1943-44. Newspaper reports from Mandalay speak of an increase in the wages of paddy reapers from a customary Annas 12 per day to Rs. 4 per day. Total available evidence suggests that the crop actually reaped amounted to about 2,500,000 tons of paddy or 1-1/2 million tons of rice—a million tons short of consumption needs. In spite of this the Irrawaddy Delta in particular had its customary surplus of rice and in parts of Basscin district rice prices were as low as Re. 1 per basket in spite of prices of Rs. 5 at Rangoon, Rs. 20 to Rs. 30 in Upper Burma and as high as Rs. 200 in Myitkyina after the Chindits cut the railroad below Mogaung.

That the estimated 1943-44 production was far short of consumption requirements does not necessarily indicate an overall shortage of rice this year. The Government claimed to have purchased some of the 1941-42 and 1942-43 crops and in so far as this claim is true there was a surplus with which to make up the deficit in production. Moreover rice culture is fairly widespread throughout Burma and hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of households may have hoarded away two, three or four times the normal amount of paddy or rice in view of the exceptional circumstances. Disturbed conditions of early 1942, for instance, when there was known to be an exceptionally large unsaleable surplus, may have contributed to a great but unknown increase in local and family hoards.

Although rice is the customary food of nearly all the peoples of Burma, inhabitants of the Dry Zone have never ceased to use millet as a supplementary food and to shift over from rice to millet completely whenever forced to do so by a shortage of their favourite food. The Japanese campaign to increase cotton acreage may, however, have resulted in planting that crop on some millet land although there is no evidence of such a shift. Famine in the Dry Zone can be prevented or at least postponed by the use of grass seed—a food which few Burmans like but which has frequently in the past been the salvation of the poor in times of distress. There have been unverified reports of the offer of boat-owners in Upper Burma to go to the Delta and bring back quantities of rice if Dr. Ba Maw's Govern-

ment could guarantee them against Japanese seizure of boats and contents. It is reported that no such guarantee has been forthcoming although newspapers have occasional reports of goods shipments by boat to the Dry Zone.

4. *Jungles from rice land?*—Some of those interested in economic problems in Burma have wondered if parts of Burma's ricefields may not return to jungle. The Director of Agriculture, Burma, is of the opinion that most of the rice land of Burma has been under cultivation so long that two or three years absence of cultivation would result chiefly in the growth of heavy *khaung* (grass) which could be removed by a little extra work in the first season. Moreover, there would be the customary increase in fertility resulting from the fallowing of the land. In the case of the relatively small portion of land recently reclaimed from jungle, live roots may be expected to send up shoots which will require extra work during the first season. If cattle are available for ploughing, however, even such lands can be brought under cultivation without delay.

While general considerations would lead to the suggestion that it is marginal lands, either far from the market or having poor fertility, which would go out of cultivation first, it is known that some of the best land in Pegu district—that around the Waw Canal—was idle during 1943-44. These lands were owned by Chettiars—presumably those who fled when the Japanese entered Burma and as the Chettiars are known to have owned land much better than the average it is likely that there was more good land uncultivated than poor land during the past season.

5. *Cotton*—The Japanese repeatedly announced a plan to increase Burma's cotton crop, estimated at 18,000 tons annually, to three or four times that figure. Expert opinion does not doubt the possibility of such an increase provided there is sufficient time and provided the cultivators cooperate wholeheartedly in the programme. Cotton is grown in rotation with other crops and normally gives the smallest cash yield per acre of the main Dry Zone crops. Perhaps 2 million acres are capable of growing cotton although few seasons have seen as much as 500,000 acres planted with cotton at a time. Seed is generally available and cultivators throughout the Dry Zone have some experience in the growth of cotton.

In spite of these natural advantages there is no evidence that the Japanese have made any increase in the outturn of cotton. In fact it is possible that the crops since their advent have been below normal. The climate has been blamed but it is possible that lack of law and order has been equally responsible for the present failure of the Japanese programme. A Japanese



Company has been given a monopoly on the purchase of cotton and one source, not very reliable, reports the purchase price at Rs. 60 per 100 viss of kapas against a normal Rs. 15 to 20. It is probable that the chief reason for a lack of Burmese cooperation with the Japanese plan for cotton production is the general inflationary conditions throughout the country. Even if the price increased to 30—40 times normal the money may not buy normal imports of rice, fish, textiles and other needs of the cotton farmer. Moreover, although the amount of cotton reaching the Japanese purchasing company may be no more than normal it is quite possible that the drastic clothing shortage throughout Burma may induce many of the farmers to hide part of their crop and spin it and process it for the use of the household. The Japanese are reportedly using the entire crop for military and other purposes. Burma's total consumption of cotton was estimated at 178,000 bales of 400 lbs. each against a local production of 92,000 bales. Hence a doubling of pre-war production would be necessary for Burma to have a net export surplus after providing for the needs of the Burmese people on the pre-war scale.<sup>1</sup>

6 *Other fibres*.—Occasional newspaper advertisements and announcements suggest that Burmese and Japanese ingenuity is being devoted to the discovery of practicable uses for such fibres as roselle and *sunna* hemp as well as the combination of rubber with hemp or jute to make rice bags. The Japanese claim that 10,000 acres were planted with jute in the Irrawaddy Delta for the 1943-44 season, and that the acreage will be increased to 18,000 in 1944-45. A Domei Despatch of 1st July, 1943 was as follows :—

“ It has been decided to cultivate jute in Burma for the first time this year, and since Japanese firms to be in charge of planting and the assembly of materials were officially named last April and the Burma HEMP GUILD was formed, planting plans have been made, after taking into account the snags of the first trials. All the firms have been making preparations to plant in the first place a certain acreage, have ordered seeds from Formosa, sent managers to each of the districts of which they are in charge, and, pressing on with the education of the farmers have been making contracts. Finally, with the arrival of the present rains, contracts were

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<sup>1</sup>An increase in production would depend on a large importation of spinning machinery besides an increase in the consumer goods available. Hand-spinning alone could not meet the clothing needs of the population and in any case the short-staple cotton grown in Burma is unsuitable for any but the coarsest cloths.

concluded for the acreage aimed at, sowing was started, and, reaching its height in the first 10 days of this month has now been completed. The 3 types of seed are Formosan Aokawa, Hakuro, and Tanko, and the cultivation areas are in the five provinces (prefectures) of MAUBIN, HENZADA, IRRAWADDY, BASSEIN & PYAPON. Nearly all the cultivation is on former ricegrowing paddy land."

There is, however, no confirmation of these claims from ground sources and practically no confirmation from aerial reconnaissance. The Director of Agriculture states that climatic conditions in the Irrawaddy Delta differ from those in the Ganges Delta to such an extent as to make jute cultivation impracticable. This was proved after the last war by actual experiments. Moreover, the Irrawaddy Delta does not, like the Ganges Delta, have numerous large tanks with fresh water for use in retting and in any case it is doubtful if the Burman will take kindly to the labour required in jute cultivation and retting.

There are unsupported claims of considerable hemp and some ramie production. These claims are not unreasonable in view of the fairly large acreage of *sunh* hemp prior to the Japanese invasion. Secondhand gunny bags are reported by one ground source to cost Rs. 1.50 each. Other sources give the price of new gunny bags as high as Rs. 30. The great reduction in the Burma rice crop and the almost complete cessation of rice exports greatly reduces the need for gunny bags, however. Domestic shipments of rice are reported to take place in the loose.

7. *Vegetable Oils*.—Burmese culinary demand is 11.2 lbs. of vegetable oils per person per annum according to a calculation of the Director of Agriculture. In normal times there was a ten to twenty per cent. deficiency in spite of the fact that over a million acres was planted to sessamum and roughly 750,000 acres to groundnuts. There is every evidence of a great shortage of vegetable oils in nearly every part of Burma and high prices prevail even in the Dry Zone. It is interesting to note that whereas cotton and sessamum are alternative crops on the same land, in many cases neither one appears to have increased in total acreage and both may have decreased. The shortage is evidenced by the prices quoted in newspapers and secured through ground sources. Recent prices are set forth in Chart B at the beginning of this study. A ground source reports that one reason for the shortage is Japanese use of vegetable oils as "engine oils". On the other hand the "New Light of Burma" on 7th January 1944, says that shortage is due to soap-making. In any case there are occasional reports

of the planting of small quantities of *sessamum* and ground-nut in Lower Burma to provide oil for the individual household.

8. *Sugar*.—Burma was practically self-sufficient in the production of sugar by 1941. The gross return per acre of sugar-cane land was ten to thirty times as great as that for other dry zone crops after the introduction of improved Javanese and Indian cane, and though most of the cane was grown on land that would otherwise have been under rice, not dry crops, there was a rush to press sugar-cane in many parts of Toungoo, Yamethin and Pegu districts so that production greatly outran milling capacity. There were many small bullock-operated cane crushing mills and evaporation plants, however, which produced *kyan-ta-ga* or jaggery. Scanty information suggests that there has not been a great change in the sugarcane production since 1941.

9. *Other food crops*.—The prices of chillies, potatoes, peas, beans and vegetables generally have all increased several-fold. In other words, prices suggest an insufficiency of nearly all food and other crops. The answer may be that the currency is inflated and prices give only a little hint as to the true situation. The Director of Agriculture for the present Ba Maw Government, U Thet Su, stresses the need for widespread planting of vegetables and the late Minister of Lands and Agriculture, U Than Tun, has often spoken in a similar strain.

An advertisement in the official paper "*Bama Khit*" 23rd January 1944, asks for "large coffee seeds" from the Toungoo and Karenni area suggesting the possibility that the Japanese plan to increase coffee production in that area. Production hitherto has been small.

10. *Rubber*.—Rubber plantations appear to be operating to a fair extent, although some are reportedly not being cared for. The Indian-owned rubber factory at Kamayut, suburb of Rangoon, is in operation. Solid crepe rubber tyres are made for bicycles and sold at Rs. 30 each, approximately the pre-war price for motor tyres. Rubber is used to make an evil smelling petrol substitute selling at Rs. 10—12 per gallon, sometimes used for buses.

11. *Irrigation*.—About 60 *per cent.* of the rice land in the Burma Dry Zone is irrigated and canals in this area antedate the British period of Burmese history. Photographic reconnaissance and available newspapers agree that most of the canals are in order. Tokyo broadcast in March 1944 a grandiose scheme for damming the Irrawaddy to provide more irrigation. The announcement is believed to be without foundation in fact.

12 *Livestock*.—As Burma does not have the dense rural population of Bengal, Tonkin or China, the use of plough cattle was almost universal. One team of cattle would be used for 10 to 15 acres. Competent authorities estimate the present cattle population of Burma at not much over two-thirds of normal. There have been numerous reports from newspapers as well as ground sources of outbreaks of rinderpest and other diseases unchecked apparently by the highly advertised Japanese veterinary service. The Japanese have requisitioned cattle on a large scale for slaughter as food. Moreover, the tremendous increase in the price of fish for a time at least made it profitable greatly to increase the slaughter of cattle as a food, beef taking the place of fish in the diet of many Burmans. Reports are to be found in numerous newspapers of a Buddhist sponsored anti-slaughter campaign coupled with the suggestion that the cattle are needed for other purposes. Moreover, cattle are requisitioned by the Japanese for military transport and the breakdown of other types of transport is believed to have thrown a great additional burden upon the humble bullock cart, still further depleting the available supply of cattle for farm-work. Some cattle are reportedly hidden from the Japanese but such action does not permit them to be used in a normal way for farm-work. Japanese propaganda reports refer to horse-breeding and cattle-breeding on scientific lines, but there is no evidence that such activities alleviate the disastrous livestock situation.

The cattle shortage is believed to be much the greatest single reason why the Burmese farmers cannot produce as much rice as normally even should monetary and other factors be so remedied as to give them the will for greater production. This situation is receiving the closest study by those responsible for post-war planning in Burma. It is estimated that it will require four or five years after the expulsion of the Japanese from Burma before the normal increase in the number of cattle can bring conditions back to normal. The widespread use of tractors in the Dry Zone and the shift of Dry Zone plough cattle to the Delta where tractors are less practicable may be necessary as a temporary expedient.

13. *Fish*.—Fish constitute the most universal element in the Burmese diet after rice and salt. They are used fresh, dried and salted and in the form of *ngapi*, a special type of sauce. Burma's numerous streams, canals and rice fields produce considerable quantities of fish and the long coast-line is also productive, although Burmans have never developed modernised deep-sea fishing. Present fish production is obviously far below normal, reportedly because of lack of twine for nets and also because some of their boats have been requisitioned

by the Japanese for use for transport. Fish prices are high even in Lower Burma, as indicated above. They rose even more rapidly than did beef prices. It is interesting to see, however a suggestion in the "Sun" newspaper of the 26th January 1944, suggesting fish oil as a substitute for sessamum oil. The former sold in Lower Burma at the high price of Rs. 8 per viss (3.65 lbs.), however. The Bureau of Mines and Fisheries, part of the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, had a scheme in 1943 for "industrialisation of fishing". It is not known if this plan is referred to in the Domei report of 7th March 1944 of "newly developed fishing along the coast". In view of the continued shortage of textiles, yarns and twines of all sorts as well as of all types of boats this report is not very convincing.

14. *Salt*.—Considerable quantities of salt were imported in normal times from India, Aden, Germany, etc., hence the cessation of trade with these countries might be expected to cause an increase in the price of salt. There was, however, a considerable production by evaporation along the sea-coast and from a number of salt wells scattered throughout the country. Probably production has increased to some extent and the price of salt generally seems to have increased little more than the price of other commodities, except in Upper Burma areas which have no salt wells.

#### D. FORESTRY AND SAWMILLING

The situation in this regard has been well summarised by Mr Morehead in the section under the heading "Forests".

In view of reports of large scale use of Indo-Chinese forest resources by the Japanese, it is not surprising that Burma's forest products appear to be used exclusively within the country and possibly in Penang and Singapore. A minor exception is a report that the Iida Company planned to ship 500 tons of tannin to the Ni Tannin Company, Tokyo in the fall of 1942.

#### E. MINERAL REFINING AND METALLURGY.

It was in this field that the greatest Burmese aid to Japan might have been expected. Japanese-occupied Asia is believed to be deficient in production of zinc, antimony and possibly tungsten, lead, copper and other metals produced in Burma. The Bawdwin Mines produced enough lead in normal times to place Burma sixth among world producers while the zinc output of the mine was also outstanding. Japan's estimated imports plus production of zinc in 1936 amounted to just over 80,000 tons, a fair portion of which was produced

in Korea and Manchuria but much of which came from outside "Greater East Asia". The estimated metal content of the zinc produced at Bawdwin in that year was around 43,000 tons. Not only might Japan have been expected to make great use of the output of the Bawdwin Mine and perhaps of the tungsten of the Mawchi Mines, the petroleum production of Burma might naturally be expected to supply motive power for many forms of Japanese transport in Burma and the adjacent waters.

There has been some evidence of Japanese efforts to restore production of all of Burma's mineral products and to commence production of coal and possibly of antimony, the latter not having been produced on a commercial scale under British rule except as a minor by-product at Bawdwin. Japanese success in the restoration of Burma's mineral production has, however, been very meagre, according to numerous and fairly reliable reports.

1. *Petroleum*—Burma's pre-war petroleum output amounted to about 300 million Imperial gallons, nearly all in the Dry Zone near the Irrawaddy River, with Chauk and Yenangyaung as the chief centres. A 325 mile pipeline connected the oilfields with the large modern Burma Oil Company refinery at Syriam which handled five-sixths of the country's total petroleum production. Considerable publicity has been given to the expert and highly satisfactory job of demolition carried out by retreating British forces. In 1942, the Japanese turned over control of Burma's petroleum industry to the Nikka Company and on August 1st, 1943, when many items of enemy property were turned over to the "independent" government, it is noteworthy that petroleum remained in Japanese control.

Many aerial photographs and some other information prove that the Japanese have made strenuous efforts to restore petroleum production. Their efforts have been impeded, however, by intermittent United Nations bombing attacks as well as by lack of normal machinery and other imports. A proof of the inadequacy of the recent Japanese petroleum production was the arrival in October 1943 of a ship from Sarawak thought to carry petrol and aviation spirit. Petrol reportedly sells for at least Rs. 35 per gallon where available, against a pre-war price of less than Re. 1 plus tax. The pipeline may have been restored to operation perhaps by the use of portable emergency pumps, but other reports suggest the transport of petroleum in drums carried in ordinary goods wagons. Highly successful bombing attacks on the pipeline and three or more pumping stations were made in April and May 1944. The Syriam refinery is not believed to have continued in operation long in

view of successful and fairly recent bombing attacks. The Thilawa refinery, third largest in the country, is believed to have operated fairly continuously in spite of bombing attacks. It probably produces kerosene, fuel oil and diesel oil. A small refinery at Yethaya, about 16 miles below Minbu on the Irrawaddy, is believed to be in operation as are topping plants at Yenangyaung, Chauk and Thegon. Estimated annual rate of production of the 6 small Dry Zone plants at the end of 1943 was 81,000 tons, of which gasoline amounted to 15,330 (long) tons. The Japanese have obviously been making use of pipes and other stores abandoned at Yenangyaung and Chauk, have built blast walls to protect some of their installations and have camouflaged some of the storage facilities as well as repaired damage from previous bombing raids. They have not restored the 20,000 kilowatt power station at Thitabwe in Yenangyaung but appear to have made use of smaller stations in order to carry out a minimum of production. Estimated production at Yenangyaung at the beginning of 1944 was 800 barrels per day against 440 barrels per day at Chauk. Pre-war production was over 8,000 barrels per day at Yenangyaung and nearly 12,000 barrels per day at Chauk.

In view of these facts it is not surprising that there are rumoured plans to start the production of alcohol from rice as a motor fuel while rubber has been distilled to make an inferior motor fuel as mentioned above. Bus and lorry traffic continues but is confined largely to the military. For some reason charcoal burners have not been introduced widely in Burma as they have in Indo-China and in Japan itself. It is obvious that the shortage of petroleum products is a serious brake on Burmese economy generally, particularly since all other means of transport are suffering at the same time. Most Japanese military transport in Burma is thought to burn low-grade Burma gasoline, but at the end of 1943 it was estimated that normal Japanese military needs for gasoline amounted to 18,000 tons per annum—50 per cent more than estimated current production.

2. *The Bawdwin Mine*—The Mitsui Company is believed to be in charge of or interested in the Bawdwin Mine. They have removed a large part, if not all, of the unusually large stock of zinc concentrates captured at Namtu. This stock was estimated at 90,000 tons. Considerable quantities of lead ingots and other Bawdwin products were also captured and are believed to have been shipped to Japan. There is some evidence of partial restoration of activity. There is contradictory evidence as to whether the Konnyaung power plant which generated 8,205,000 kilowatt hours in 1939 is in operation. However, the main hydro-electric plant at Mansam 26 miles

from Namtu, has not, according to our available information been placed in operation. Its 1939 output was 45,415,200 kilowatt hours. In August 1943 it was learnt that a Japanese ship carrying a number of engineers and technicians was sunk and it is possible that this may partially explain the lack of greater Japanese activity at Namtu and Bawdwin. The 2 ft. gauge company rail-road from Namtu to Namyao on the Burma Railways is reportedly in operation but it is doubted if important quantities of ore are being removed from the mine and processed at Namtu. However, aerial photographs in the spring of 1944 showed an increase in rolling stock on the Bawdwin-Namtu section of the railway. Employees are mostly Indians, and their numbers are variously estimated at 1000 to 3000. There is evidence that Japanese engineers, and perhaps a German engineer, visited the mine and Namtu in 1942 and 1943, and that equipment has been despatched from Japan.

3 *Tin and Tungsten Mines.*—The Mawchi Mines, greatest tungsten mine and perhaps the third greatest tin mine in the entire world has been turned over to the Kobayashi Mining Company which has been producing a reported 7 tons of concentrates per month, as against 400 tons per month in normal times. It is connected with Toungoo by an all-weather road said to be in operation by 1943. One ground source says that there are 500 employees, most of them being Gurkhas while another source states that the employees are mostly local Karens. An advertisement in the "New Light of Burma" for 18th May 1943 asks for several technicians to work at Mawchi. It is presumed, therefore, that although Malaya and other areas under Japanese control can much more than satisfy any possible Japanese need for tin, the need for tungsten from Burma is fairly acute. Malaya, for instance, the world's leading tin producer, had a tungsten production in 1939 of only about 500 tons of concentrates.

There is evidence that the Japanese are finding difficulty in providing motor transport from Mawchi to Toungoo and rail transport from Toungoo onwards for they are believed to have made enquiries and possibly plans looking toward the use of the Salween river from Kemapyu to Moulmein. This, incidentally, was the original route used by the Mawchi Mines Limited before all-weather roads were available.

Approximately half of Burma's tin and tungsten was produced in a number of smaller mines and by a few dredgers in Tenasserim. There is some evidence of partial restoration of work in the mines but they are not believed to be operating at anything like normal capacity.



4. *Other mineral developments.*—There are reports of Japanese development of coal deposits in the Akyab region. Several deposits of coal were known to exist in Burma during the British era but exploitation of it further was never found profitable because of the low quality of coal. The Japanese, however, being much more hardpressed for supplies of coal for ships, if not for railways, may be expected to produce some coal regardless of quality. There are reports of a fairly high quality of coal being mined in Mergui district many years ago, the mining having ceased when the one vessel belonging to the Company was lost. There is no evidence, however, that the Japanese have developed the Mergui mine.

Japanese propaganda announcements concerning metals produced in Burma almost invariably mention antimony. The Geological Survey of India had located a number of antimony deposits but it is believed that the only commercial production of this metal in Burma was that of the Bawdwin Mine where a small quantity of antimony occurred along with lead, zinc, silver, copper, nickel and cobalt. It is not impossible, however, for the Japanese to have developed one of the known antimony deposits.

## F MANUFACTURING AND POWER.

1. *Handicrafts.*—Until a few generations ago, handicrafts supplied the Burman with all processed materials, suffering no competition from the factory-made product. While the impact of modern economy upon Burma has resulted in a tremendous decline in the scale of handicraft operations there were still in 1931 large numbers of people engaged at least part time in handicrafts as shown by the following table based on the 1931 census.

### *Workers in Burmese Cottage Industries<sup>1</sup>*

<i>Industry.</i>	<i>Persons engaged</i>
Cotton spinning, sizing and weaving ..	234,892
Lacquer workers and makers of baskets, cages, etc., of bamboo, cane and other woody materials ..	66,462
Tailors, milliners, dress makers and darners ..	51,190
Silk spinning and weaving .. ..	45,908
Carpenters, turners and joiners .. ..	42,260

<sup>1</sup>The greater part of the persons listed were part-time weavers. The spinning of yarn was on a very small scale and was almost confined to one factory at Myingyan. Power-driven spinning and weaving machinery would be essential before Burma could fully utilise the local cotton crop.

<i>Industry.</i>	<i>Persons engaged.</i>
Toddy (native liquor) drawers .. ..	36,434
Manufacturers of tobacco .. ..	24,296
Makers of jewellery and ornaments .. ..	21,680
Blacksmiths and other workers in iron .. ..	12,997
Potters and makers of earthenware .. ..	12,454
Workers in other metals, except precious metals	9,988
Boot, shoe, sandal and clog makers .. ..	8,394
Sweetmeat and condiment makers .. ..	8,164
Makers of hats, caps, umbrellas and other articles of dress .. ..	6,213

It is generally admitted by those who have come in contact with him that the Burman naturally has considerable manual skill and is quick to learn new techniques. In fact those acquainted with the Burman prior to 1941 might have expected a much more rapid expansion in handicraft industries as a result of the current shortage of all types of manufactured goods than has actually taken place. It is highly possible that the shortage of raw materials and of transport coupled with unsettled political conditions and lack of elementary security prevented this development from taking place to the expected extent. As weaving was much the most important pre-war cottage industry while textiles are the most important manufactured commodity in the typical Burmese village, it is not surprising that most of the reports, plans, claims and achievements in regard to handicraft industries centre around spinning and weaving.

Probably not over a tenth of Burma's cloth was locally produced prior to the Japanese invasion, hence a mere doubling or trebling of handicraft production would still leave most of the local needs for cloth unsatisfied. Domei in April 1943 claimed that 250,000 to 300,000 looms were in operation in Burma. In view, however, of the disappointing outturn of raw cotton and of Japanese intention to use most of that cotton for the making of uniforms within Burma or for export, one is a bit puzzled as to what will be done with the large number of looms claimed. Japanese uniforms around Myit-kyina at the beginning of 1944 were reportedly green in colour and were woven around Pyinmana and Thazi by villagers, from local materials. High wages of Rs. 6 to Rs. 8 per day were reportedly paid for this work.

It is possible that much of the cotton is spirited away from the cotton fields at night or otherwise escapes the Japanese collectors. Certainly villagers would have every economic incentive to withhold cotton from the market until their own most

pressing needs for cloth had been met by domestic manufacture. The writer visited 23 cotton villages in the Dry Zone a number of years ago and discovered looms, a few spinning wheels and some hand gins in practically every village. In addition to the old women, some young girls normally knew how to operate these implements. Although many of them were not in use at the time of the visit and in a sense were relics of a previous economy when machine-made *longyis* were not so cheap and popular, it is reasonable to suppose that the knowledge of how to construct gins, spinning wheels and looms is widespread throughout the country and that there are enough teachers available to instruct the necessary number of villagers in how to carry on these operations. The limiting factor in other words is more likely to be the *production* of raw cotton rather than its *processing*.

The Financial and Economic Annual, July 1943, mentions a Cotton Cloth Relief Scheme for introducing hand-spinning at the chief centres of ginning in order that 4,700,000 *longyis* might be made in 1943 of a permitted 36 in. length instead of the customary 44 in. Ground sources report seeing no exposed ankles or other evidence of the weaving of short *longyis* nor do such sources or *longyi* prices confirm the reported production of such a large number of *longyis*.

Newspaper editorials sometimes belabour the public for preferring imported cloth to "*pinni*" or hand-made cloth. There was an announcement in the "New Light of Burma" on the 1st January 1944 that "the Government have carried out the experimental weaving of *longyis* in Myingyan and other weaving centres 50,000 *longyis* have been obtained and will shortly be sold to the poor destitutes at Rs. 4 each". One cannot help wondering if the 50,000 *longyis* referred to at the end of 1943 do not represent the actual achievement out of the 1943 weaving goal of 4,700,000. The "Sun" of the 26th January 1944 reports a rise in the Rangoon cotton price to Rs. 90—100 per viss although cloth cost Rs. 35—40 (presumably per yard) while villagers were taking up weaving. Well, they might, if they can get the yarn!

A ground source comments that women in one district at least wear *longyis* made of gunny bags and jackets of mosquito-netting. A Karen girl reportedly committed suicide from shame when she was completely without clothing. Some families reportedly have but one presentable *longyi* in the entire family and hence venture out in public in turns and only one at a time.

The Adamjee Hajee Dawood Match Factory in Mahlwagon, Rangoon, is presumed to be in operation although the Swedish Match Factory's plant at Mandalay has been destroyed. Toa.

and other Japanese firms are reportedly interested in the match industry. Matches are also made at Pegu, Bassein and Monywa according to a statement in the "New Light of Burma" for 20th January 1944. Inferior matches were produced at Insein from Japanese chemicals, in early 1944, according to a ground source. The price of matches is very high, nevertheless, and there has grown up a hand industry of manufacturing lighters with flints. A recent reduction in excise duty on lighters is said to have been the result of the Government's fiscal policy aimed at helping this small industry.

The E. C. Madha Soap Factory at Kamayut, an old institution, is believed to continue in production, a bar of poor quality soap costing ten to twenty times the normal price. Soap is reportedly made from the soap-sand commonly found in Upper Burma, according to an editorial in the "New Light of Burma" on the 5th September 1943. This soap-sand is the evaporated deposit of waters with a very high alkaline content, and consists of sodium salts, mostly carbonate. It was used by villagers in normal times as soap for household purposes and for rinsing silk. As much as 9000 tons have been collected annually.

The Director of Propaganda has stated that kerosene is made from tung oil, rubber and crude oil in Tenasserim and in Bassein. The fact that other substances are used in the manufacture of kerosene rather than Burma's petroleum sheds light on the state of the petroleum industry. There is evidence that the kerosene supply is utterly inadequate for light needs as candles are used wherever available and kerosene itself, according to ground sources, is often absent from the bazaar. The oil of the *kanyin* tree is being produced in some quantity for use as an illuminant according to newspaper reports. The *kanyin* tree is found in fairly large numbers in Tenasserim and the Pegu Yomas. Since a large portion of the electric light and power industry of Burma is idle, it is presumed that many houses are unlighted at night.

The Japanese and Burmese are both fairly skilful at adaptation and a Domei despatch dated 22nd December 1943 states that the laboratories of Mandalay Agricultural College had been particularly active producing cigarettes, paper, soap and gunny bags. It is likely that local craftsmen are encouraged to use the formulae thus developed. U Tun Nyein of Rangoon was reported by the "New Light of Burma" for August 1943 to be manufacturing bowls and plates from resins. Domei on the 7th March 1944 reports new or expanded industries including paint, gunny bag, soap, substitute cement, leather, shoe, caustic soda, ice and tobacco manufacturing. How many of

these commodities are actually being produced in significant quantities is another question, but there is every reason to believe that there is a drastic need within Burma for greater quantities of every one. A ground source states that canvas shoes with crepe soles are produced at Insein and sold at Rs. 15 per pair. Handicraft economy is obviously less vulnerable to the vicissitudes of war than is factory economy. It makes much less use of modern transportation and commercial and financial organisation and is largely impervious to aerial attack. It seems reasonable to suppose that if sufficient time were allowed, Burma's handicraft industry would return to its pre-industrial size. This would entail, of course, a considerable drop in the standard of living but it might easily supply sufficient commodities to prevent outright privation. No doubt the longer the Japanese continue in control of Burma the greater will be the development of handicraft industries.

2. *Rice Mills*.—Pre-war rice mills, like pre-war sawmills, were of two principal types. Many small mills were scattered throughout the rice or timber producing regions and were owned by Burmans or resident Chinese or Indians. They sold most of their produce in the local market. On the other hand, a few large Rangoon mills, supplemented by a few others at Moulmein, Bassein and minor ports, produced rice and timber chiefly for the export market. These mills were owned by large European Companies and in the case of rice, by many individual Indians. Many of these mills were destroyed or damaged in 1942 but two of the large Rangoon mills were reportedly operating in March 1944. A few of the sawmills were burned down in the riots and disorders incident upon military operations in 1942 but, so far as is known, the great majority of such widely distributed establishments are intact. In view of the enormous decline in the quantity of paddy produced, it is obvious that remaining mills have quite sufficient capacity to process the present crop. Paddy husks were normally used for fuel and local labour manned the mills during the operating season. Repair of machinery would seem to be the only difficult problem for the mill-owners provided they can buy paddy delivered at the mill. In view, however, of the oft-mentioned breakdown of transport, it is not unlikely that many of the mills are without the normal quantity of work.<sup>1</sup> Some ground reports indicate prices of rice seven or eight times as high as the prices of paddy at the same time and

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<sup>1</sup>Propaganda encouraging the hand-pounding of paddy in the villages, and a reported shortage of lubricating oil support the view that the mills were not in a condition to meet all requirements. Lack of spare parts is probably an additional difficulty.

place. Normally a basket of rice cost  $3\frac{1}{2}$  times as much as a basket of paddy. The great difference would suggest inadequate milling capacity at that particular place.

3. *Cotton Textiles*.—Most of Burma's cotton production was normally exported to Japan and other manufacturing countries. There was no pre-war weaving of cotton except by hand methods and a few Government-owned demonstration power looms. The only mechanical spinning was that at the Steel Brothers mill at Myingyan with 1286 employees in 1940 and a production of 3,582,422 lbs. of yarn in 1938-39. Nine-tenths of this yarn was coarse, being in a range 11S—20S. Handloom weavers within Burma used practically all the output. The extent of Japanese reconstruction and attempts at operation may be judged from the following report of the American Military Attaché, New Delhi, dated August 6th, 1943.

“ Air photographs taken up to October 1942 showed that the denial measures applied at time of evacuation to factories at Myingyan resulted in a total stoppage of industrial activity there. Since October 1942 considerable construction work has been undertaken but a review of photographs taken following bombing attacks up to 17th July shows that only three buildings at the Japan Cotton Mill, two on the adjacent mill site and two at Steel's Cotton and Ginning Mills, were serviceable. All, with the exception of one building were considered to be godowns. There were no serviceable buildings at Steel's South Cotton Mill but at the Spinning Mill, where all buildings were destroyed in 1942, five new buildings had been built and two were being repaired. Further construction appeared to be intended but it is not thought that spinning was being carried out at the mill.”

At Singu just north of Insein, Messrs. Ebrahim Bros. & Company operated the Violin Hosiery Works, a rather large and modern knitting factory, which produced little or no hose but specialised in under-jackets. It is believed now to be operating for the Japanese Army. There have been numerous reports of imports of spinning machinery from Japan and “ New Light of Burma ” of October 1943 mentions a social and religious function involving the employees of the Fujigaku Cotton Mill at Campbell Road, Rangoon. Another Japanese mill mentioned in the “ Sun ” of 8th December 1943, is in Hanthawaddy Road, Rangoon. A Domei message in Japanese, dated 8th November 1943, stated that two cotton mills with imported machinery commenced operations, on November 7th, 1943, and that others were expected to open shortly. A ground source gives a suggestion, not very definite, of a clothing factory or textile mill of some kind near Insein and Link Roads. In any case the

price of cotton *longyis* shown in Chart C above is ample proof that the output of the textile industry both by machine and by handloom is utterly inadequate to supply the Burma market.

4 *Sugar Factories*.—There were two sugar refineries in operation at the time of the Japanese invasion. An Indian firm headed by Mr. Sinha had a large modern mill at Zeyawaddy, between Pegu and Toungoo. It employed about 800 workers during the milling season against 500 for the Finlay Fleming & Co.'s Mill at Sahmaw near Mogaung. Production from the two mills in 1940-41 was 38,252 long tons of white sugar. Imports were about 8,000 tons and total consumption about 48,000 tons. There was a small factory at Hninpale in Thaton district, which had been idle for some years before the war. The Zeyawaddy Factory in particular was completely unable in the years just before the Japanese invasion to cope with the great and growing quantities of sugar-cane offered for sale. The surplus had to be made into *kyan-ta-ga* or jaggery. The Ensuiko Company, perhaps a Mitsui subsidiary, was reportedly placed in charge of the Zeyawaddy Factory and although Mr. Sinha is in India two of his leading engineers are believed to be assisting the Japanese in carrying on nearly normal operations. In the season 1943-44 there was, however, much uncut cane in the vicinity of the mill in spite of the fact that the deficiency of rail transport would be expected to prevent as much Pyinmana cane from being transported to Zeyawaddy as in previous years. The Sahmaw Mill resumed production with the forced technical assistance of its British engineer. It was bombed out of production, however. The Hninpale mill reportedly recommenced operation in February 1944 in charge of the Nippon Sugar Manufacturing Company. Under present conditions, if our information is correct, Hninpale may be producing up to 1,500 tons and Zeyawaddy 8,500 tons.

The Japanese are reportedly very fond of sugar and are said to requisition all or nearly all of the output of the Zeyawaddy mill for army use. Sugar is frequently unobtainable by civilians who are able, however, to secure supplies of jaggery at a price which is inflated less than many other prices.

5. *Cement*.—The Burma Cement Company (Steel Brothers) plant at Thayetmyo was the only plant of its kind in Burma and supplied 93.05 per cent. of the total Burma cement in 1939-40, besides supplying nearly all of the 7,283 long tons shipped from Burma to Malaya and other countries in that year. The plant is believed to have been put out of operation and while available reports conflict, the preponderance of evidence is that it is not operating at the present time. It may be assumed that only very great difficulties such as successful demolition and

bombing would prevent the Japanese from making use of this economic asset.

6. *Engineering*.—There has been evidence of Japanese efforts to restore dockyards, arsenals, machine shops and motor assembly and repair shops. All of these facilities were increased considerably by the British between 1939 and 1941 due to the war. The Japanese were not successful, however, in restoring facilities at the large Irrawaddy Flotilla Company dockyards at Dalla for a long time, at least. A ground source suggests that the Ahlone Foundry of the same company was in operation in the summer of 1943 and another source intimates that it was heavily guarded but is not sure whether it was being used as a foundry. In 1944 there was reportedly a foundry at Thamaing where none existed before the war. It is thought that this might be a small establishment removed from Rangoon. Possibly the drastic shortage of machine tools in both Burma and Japan plus the shortage of transport and raw materials keeps the engineering industry from being as large as would be indicated by the important Japanese military operations in this sphere.

The Insein Technical Institute is reportedly used as a workshop by the Japanese. An estimated 2,000 workers are employed, under Japanese supervision, in assembling airplane engines. Most of the parts are new, but salvaged parts are also used. An estimated 150 planes were reported in a dump nearby early in 1944. Working hours at the plant were from 7-30 A.M. to 10 P.M., so it is presumed that two shifts were worked. Four hundred of the employees were Indians, the rest being Burmese. Wages were at the low level of Re. 1 for coolies and Rs. 2 to Rs. 2.50 for foremen.

The Insein Jail was reportedly used as an ammunition depot. The fact that it was well equipped for the training of inmates in various handicrafts would suggest that some of the equipment may be of use to the Japanese.

7. *Paper*.—For many years past there was mooted the erection of a paper factory in Arakan or elsewhere, to use bamboo or some of the other available Burmese woods as raw material. Such a factory has never materialised either under British or Japanese rule. A very small amount of handicraft paper was produced by the Shans and the boast has been made that the "Mandalay Sun", circulation unknown, was printed on, or is being printed on, Burma made paper. Presumably this industry is a handicraft one, however.

8. *Breweries, Distilleries and Aerated Water Factories*.—The Japanese have reportedly commenced the manufacture of *sake*



in Burma with 7 per cent. alcoholic content. It is not known whether the brewery under Japanese control at Mandalay is the one which previously existed there or is a new plant. One report suggests that there is a new Japanese distillery in Rangoon. The Financial and Economic Annual, 1943, says that there were two breweries before the Japanese occupation but at that time only one was being operated and that on a reduced scale. The Diamond and Imperial Mineral Waters and Ice Factories have reportedly resumed operation.

9. *Rubber*.—The Indian-owned rubber factory at Kamayut is believed to have resumed operation and a combination of rubber and hemp is reportedly used in the transport of minerals by the spring of 1944. Crepe rubber bicycle tyres have been advertised for sale at Rs. 30 each.

10. *Other Factories*.—The Jeewanlal Aluminium Works at Thamaing, near Insein, were reported in operation in December 1943, as were the U Thaw Pottery Works, nearby. The latter reportedly had accepted Japanese as "partners", but the pottery produced was said to be below pre-war standards.

11. *Power*.—Before evacuation major electrical undertakings with a capacity of 300 kilowatts or more, existed in Syriam, Lanywa, Dunneedaw, Insein, Mandalay, Moulmein, Myitnge, Namtu, Rangoon, Tavoy and Thittabwe (Yenangyaung). Nearly all small towns had their own electric supply plants, often of Chinese ownership. Most of the large plants mentioned above were destroyed either by Japanese bombs or by demolition squads and in some cases United Nations bombers have visited the installations since withdrawal from Burma. In Rangoon the Japanese appeared to have used the power plant of the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation sawmill at Dunneedaw for the supply of the most essential needs in Rangoon. There is also some evidence that by the end of 1943 the large Ahlone plant of the Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Co. had resumed operations. Some plants have reportedly been restored to operation in the oilfields but not the large station at Thittabwe. The Moulmein Electric Company station was demolished but a local sawmill reportedly has supplied power between 6-30 and 1-1 P.M. daily. Ground reports indicate lack of electric light in small towns where there is no knowledge of bombing, or demolition. It is presumed that shortage of fuel or of replacement parts is responsible for absence of activity.

12. *Other Utilities*.—Conservancy appears to be on a normal and therefore not a very satisfactory basis. There had been occasional reports of prisoners-of-war being forced to do the conservancy work, but it seems likely that the numerous Indians

gathered in Rangoon for safety carry on conservancy as previously. A notice in the "New Light of Burma" of 21st September 1943 by the Commissioner of the Rangoon Corporation asks that water be boiled before drinking as chlorine was not available to disinfect water from Gyobu and Hlawga. This would suggest that these large reservoirs and the pipelines connecting them with the Rangoon water system have remained intact and that United Nations bombers have obeyed international law by avoiding them.

The unusual deterioration of machinery customary in war-time is superimposed in Burma upon wartime hazards and lack of repair facilities. In view of these facts it is probable that such factories in Burma as are not burnt or destroyed before reoccupation will be so damaged as to require overhauling or complete rebuilding.

### G. LABOUR.

As an unindustrialised country with smallscale agricultural and commercial institutions the labour problem was never very acute in Burma outside of Rangoon. Recent events, however, have affected the supply of labour available to the small farmer or have caused him to withdraw his own labour supply.

1. *Agriculture*.—Labour was normally supplied by the tenant farmer himself or by the peasant owner of the land. In some one-crop areas, however, particularly Lower Burma, operations were on a somewhat larger scale and there was considerable hiring of outside labour. Sometimes Indians were hired in gangs but more often neighbours were hired when they were needed.

The decline of rice production suggests a considerable decline in the need for agricultural labour. This comes at a time when many, if not most, Indian farmers and agricultural labourers have either returned to India, been killed in various uprisings, or fled to Rangoon for protection. In any case the Indians were a very small part of the agricultural labour having numbered 178,208 in 1931 against 2,450,918 Burmans, according to the 1931 census.\* It is assumed that production now must be carried out almost entirely by peasant-proprietors or by tenants.

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\*The census, however, was held in February, when most of the field work was over. The majority of the Indian labourers would by then have returned to India or gone to the mills and the docks, where they would not have been recorded as agricultural labour. The strength of Indian agricultural labour in December would be several times the recorded figure, but no accurate computation has ever been made.

with their own labour and that of their families and neighbours. In some cases Japanese demands for labour for the Sweat Army or the *Heiho Tat* have reportedly resulted in a shortage of labour for planting and reaping operations

2. *Industry*—Destruction of many large industrial plants wherein Indians were the predominant labour force coincides with withdrawal of tens of thousands of Indians from the labour market. In many factories outside Rangoon and in a few such as the Adamjee Hajee Dawood Match Factory within Rangoon, Burmese labour was already an important factor. It is likely, therefore, that the available labour supply is more than equal to available factory capacity.

3. *Public Works and Military Projects*.—Undoubtedly the chief Japanese use for Burmese manpower has been construction projects and other humble undertakings rather than the Burma Independence Army. Wages of coolies have gone up from around Annas 8 per day to as high as Rs 4 per day. In the fall of 1943 both Burmese and Indian coolies in Rangoon reportedly received Rs. 1-8-0 per day except for those working near docks and airfields who received Rs. 2 per day "because of danger by bombing". There are reports of a basic wage of Rs. 3 per day in 1944. The Sweat Army, National Labour Service Corps, *Let-yon Tat*, etc., reportedly recruited 50,000 Burmans for work on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Desertions were said to be numerous and some ingenious Burmans made a profitable and precarious living by volunteering to go as part of the village quota in place of someone who would pay them from Rs. 50 to Rs. 100. After leaving the village they would desert and repeat the process. Stern Japanese measures have reportedly been taken against this type of fraud. All Burmese district officials are reported to be engaged chiefly in labour recruiting. One of them reportedly refers to himself as "head cooly" in view of the fact that the chief use which the Japanese had for his services was bringing pressure to bear upon headmen to fill labour quotas. With the completion of the Burma-Thailand Railway in October-November 1943 there apparently has been no let-up in the demand for labourers. The building of railway spurs, roads, the rebuilding of bombed bridges, the building or repair of docks and other activities seem to keep busy as many labourers as the Japanese can requisition. In the Kachin areas of northern Burma labour was requisitioned by the Japanese at Re. 1 per day in March 1944, but ground sources state that even that low wage was not always paid.

The wife of *Adipadi Ba Maw* is reportedly President of the "Women's National Service Movement" and a Tokyo broadcast suggests that she has great ambitions indeed in first aid, in

reconstruction, hygiene and other good works. There is good evidence, however, of restiveness on the part of public officials who believe that much of the labour supply furnished to the Japanese under conditions which offend the Burmese psychology is, nevertheless, wasted. There can be no doubt that the subject of forced labour is a suitable target for psychological warfare activities.

The "*Bama Khit*" for 19th January 1944 reported that :

"In every district census of skilled labourers, unskilled labourers, field labourers, factory labourers and railway labourers will be taken. It is only after the census has been taken that surplus cultivators from certain areas can be drafted to deficit areas, arrangements can be made for equitable distribution of labourers for different undertakings big and small and labourers with working capacity can be obtained.

"In particular the unemployment problem can be successfully tackled and now a labour inspector has been appointed. Census of the educated unemployed is being taken now. We must be in a position to carry out all repairs and to exchange front-line labourers with labourers at the base.

"Besides the privileges indicated above for the members of the labour corps measures have been taken to find employment for labourers on their return. Employment will be found for them either in Government service, Nippon companies or other firms."

Evidence of the common Fascist practice of setting up government-controlled labour unions is found in a "*New Light of Burma*" announcement of 22nd January 1944, to the effect that government had appointed a minister and eleven others, mostly high officials, as officers of the "*Central Labour Union*".

## H. DOMESTIC TRADE.

1. *Retail Trade* —There is a mass of material both from newspapers and from ground sources on this subject. Details are probably inaccurate in parts but the general picture is fairly clear. Trade has been handicapped by disorders, looting and by Japanese requisitions. From the standpoint of personnel it has been impeded by the removal of all European and many Indians and Chinese. It was members of these races who ordinarily engaged in wholesale trade and kept the price levels throughout the country fairly even by large-scale shipments of goods from one area to another. It is believed that Burmans are less able to carry on these countrywide activities than the day-to-day bazaar selling in which Burmese women in particular have long been engaged.

In Rangoon, the Suratee Bazaar, former Indian stronghold, is probably burnt out and has little trade, but Indians carry on considerable business in individual but rather scattered shops. The trading centre is now the "Victory Market", the new name for the Scott Market. No licenses are issued to Indian merchants in this market. It should not be assumed, however, that the Indian share of Rangoon retail trade is small for it seems likely that the immigration of Indians from rural areas to Rangoon for purposes of protection has more than offset the possible additional influx of Burmese Government workers and hangers-on. It would not be surprising, therefore, to find that the Indian proportion of Rangoon population is even higher than the normal 60 per cent. in the pre-war period. If this is the case, Indians may be expected to buy from their fellow countrymen wherever possible and the scattered Indian shops may do considerable business if they are able to find goods to sell.

The shortage of commodities, on the other hand, reduces the number of people needed to carry on retail trade and makes the livelihood of remaining traders more problematical. Newspaper complaints clearly indicate the impossibility of securing goods at many shops unless one goes early in the morning, while some commodities are unobtainable for long periods.

It should not be assumed, however, that Burmans have failed to take advantage of opportunities for profit by retail trade. A special correspondent of the "Sun" writing in the issue of 26th January, 1944, states that during a tour along the Irrawaddy and Pan-hlaing rivers he witnessed large numbers of sampans, junks and other vessels belonging to traders. His story proceeds :—

"Traders from Pantanaw and Nyaungdon areas buy vegetables from various villages and townships and sell them at Tadachaung, Payachaung, Pain Chaung, Innain and Kaw-In. Transactions are not by money but on the barter system. Dried fish, *ngapi* and fresh fish are carried in boats and sampans and bartered for vegetables.

"Chillies and maize are seen to be grown on a wide scale in Pantanaw and Nyaungdon. It is learnt that chillies, maize and onions will appear in the market about *Tabodwe* and *Tabaung* (roughly February & March). It being the time past harvest along the river banks heaps of paddy and hay are seen in the fields.

\* \* \* \*

"Goods which are sent to Rangoon from riverine places in Lower Burma are mostly *ngapi*, dried fish, pigs, fowls.

radish (leaves) *nān-nān* leaves, tomatoes, *dawna* flowers, cucumbers, watermelon and bananas. The Irrawaddy River used by traders is a peaceful and pleasant place."

Numerous newspaper announcements have appeared regarding the Burmese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and in particular the Burmese Merchants' Association. Both organizations (and it is not clear whether they are two separate organizations or different names for the same) have Burmese, Indian and Chinese members, and presumably a Japanese "adviser" or two, but the Burmese appear to hold nearly all the offices. The following "Plan of action for Burmese prosperity" appeared in the "New Light of Burma" for 8th September, 1943 :—

"The following are the details of a plan of action laid down by the Burma Merchants' Association for Burmese prosperity :—

1. To work with a full staff including a qualified Secretary.

2. (a) To promote contacts between rich and educated Burmans for the enhancement of Burmese prosperity.

- (b) To promote contacts between educated Burmans and the Burmese Government and the Burmese companies and merchants.

3. (a) To open classes on handicrafts, industries and commerce.

- (b) To open the eyes of the country by holding essay competitions on Burmese prosperity.

- (c) To awaken the whole country by means of lectures and pamphlets.

4. To open a Research Department for handicrafts, industries, science and commerce.

5. To open a museum that will be useful for handicrafts, industries and commerce at the earliest possible time.

6. To hold and encourage competitions in handicrafts and industries in the various districts of Burma.

7. To open a Foreign Department in order to get a footing in commercial intercourse with foreigners.

8. To send goodwill missions to countries in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in order to promote harmonious and strong commercial relationships with those countries.

9. To welcome cordially and to entertain commercial goodwill missions sent from the countries in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

10. To co-operate as much as possible with the Government of the country in the successful prosecution of this great war which could be called the war for Burma's survival.

"The above items will be acted upon as opportunity arises. Already numbers 1 to 6 have been acted upon. In response to requests of members of the Association, the Press has given a promise that they will encourage and support this work as much as possible."

A ground source suggests that the Burmese Merchants' Association (*Bama Kon The Gyi Athin*) is merely a front for Japanese control of Burmese economic life. There can be little doubt, however, that the newspaper announcements of the association have outlined a fairly comprehensive and intelligent programme, including recipes for the manufacture by domestic industry of carbon paper, absorbent cotton, etc., the opening in January, 1944, of a School of Commerce, and negotiations with all relevant branches of the government regarding the economic life of the country.

2. *Rationing and Price Control* :—The Burmese Government has shown considerable ingenuity in attempting to solve an almost insoluble problem caused by shortage of transport and of imports and by a profusion of Japanese-issued paper money. The official Financial and Economic Annual, Rangoon July 1943, describes Government efforts as follows :—

"Commodity and Price Control.

"Since the formation of the new Burmese Government the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has distributed sugar, salt, matches, cigarettes, kerosene, cooking oil, piece-goods and sundry goods to the civilian population in Rangoon and the districts with the co-operation of the Nippon Military Administration and the Commodity Distributing Association of Burma. In spite of inadequate supplies and serious transport difficulties, the Ministry has been able to maintain regular distribution of essential commodities to the civilian population at Government controlled prices.

"The Control of Prices Order of 1941 which was issued under Rule 81 of the Defence of Burma Rules was enforced during the year under report. The Director of Commodity Control and the Deputy Directors of Commodity Control were appointed as Controller and Assistant Controllers of prices in addition to their ordinary duties. Prices of essential commodities and foodstuffs were brought under control in consultation with the Military Administration. Action was also taken to educate the public in their civic duties and to obtain

their co-operation in making the price control scheme a success. Suitable punishment was given to tradesmen who failed to comply with the Government Price Control Order. It is gratifying to note that the Ministry has received good co-operation from the Press, the Police and the various public spirited organizations in its difficult task of commodity and price control during the year.

“ Distribution of Essential Commodities.

“ Distribution of essential commodities in Rangoon and the districts is made by the Ministry with the close co-operation of the Commodity Distributing Association of Burma. Under the present distribution system, a suitable number of wholesale distributors are appointed by Government for each district in consultation with the District Commissioner. As a rule no person or firm is appointed as wholesale distributor of more than one essential commodity. The District Commissioners are authorized to appoint as many retail distributors as are considered necessary for the even and efficient distribution of essential commodities in their districts. It was made clear in the instructions issued by the Ministry in respect of each essential commodity that it is the duty of the District Commissioner to see that wholesale and retail distributors appointed for his district carry out their work honestly and efficiently and that the commodities are sold to bona fide residents of the district strictly at Government controlled prices. Reports of misconduct and profiteering on the part of wholesale and retail distributors were investigated promptly by the District Commissioner and suitable disciplinary action was taken against them.

“ Experience of the working of the above scheme has however shown that in practice very little quantity of essential commodities such as salt, sugar and matches gets to the villages. The system of distribution was therefore revised recently and distribution is now made through the agency of ward headmen and township leaders of the Dobama Sinyetha Asiayone in towns and through the agency of village headmen and village leaders of the Dobama Sinyetha Asiayone in villages. Officers of the Bureau of Commodity Control were also sent out from time to time to watch the progress of distribution and to report on the general market conditions prevailing in the districts.

“ Distribution of piecegoods, sundry goods, kerosene and cooking oil is made in Rangoon and the districts by ration card system. The Ministry takes this opportunity to



acknowledge with thanks the kind co-operation received from the Dobama Sinyetha Asiayone, the National Service Organization and the East Asiatic Youth League in the work of distribution of ration cards to needy people in Rangoon for purchase of essential clothing and sundry goods. The Women's Branch of the National Service Organization has also been very helpful...."

The commodity agencies mentioned in the foregoing quotation were not entirely successful in 1943, for the *Adipari* accused them at the end of the year of abusing their trust in order to gain wealth at the expense of the general public.

It is apparent that "Neighbourhood Associations" were freely used as a means of issuing ration coupons, acquainting the general public with government plans and otherwise implementing the price control programme. In spite of all efforts, however, there is little doubt that the black market flourished and that evasion was extremely widespread. Rationing was temporarily withdrawn on 22nd August 1943 and a disgusted editorial in the "New Light of Burma" of a few days later states —

"....As soon as prices were controlled everything disappeared. As soon as the control is lifted the goods will reappear suddenly."

A similar report of the game of hide and seek was contained in the "Greater Asia" newspaper of 29th August. The authorities appeared to have made every effort possible to make the system work and the "New Light of Burma" for 29th January 1944 reports that "cases of sellers arrested for selling at exorbitant prices have been assigned by the Judicial Department to the Fourth Additional Magistrate, Rangoon, for trial....so that such cases can be disposed of expeditiously". There is also mention of a similar tribunal at Insein to handle cases originating in the Rangoon suburbs

Burmans long practised their literary arts in writing letters to newspapers denouncing the former government. It now being unfeasible thus to criticise the present government directly, great literary talent is expended in writing of the abuses under price control and rationing. One such complaint tells of "raffles" by bazaar-sellers to determine who among a large group of would-be purchasers of a scarce commodity may actually purchase the small available supply.

That efforts are continuing perhaps with greater chance of success is indicated by more recent reports. For instance, "Greater Asia" of 6th January 1944 contains the statement, "Mr. Y. Nakano (Japanese) Manager, Distribution Depart-

ment, Commodity Distributing Association of Burma, writes, 'the public are informed that the Association has arranged to supply one coupon either for textile goods or sundry goods through elders to each family.''' The "New Light of Burma" hitherto critical of the price control situation, reported the success of price control in Rangoon in its issue of 20th January 1944 and stated that Government planned the extension of the scheme to the districts. An experiment was made during the preceding week in fact, prices having been fixed in Taungdwingyi on the 15th January but, for reasons not adequately explained, control was withdrawn on the 19th.

3. *Prices* :—The fact that the general price level has increased to 10—20 times the pre-war level under Japanese control is borne out by the almost unanimous testimony of newspaper price lists and ground sources alike. In the prices set forth in Appendices B and C, however, it must be realised that sources are much less accurate than those upon which Governments ordinarily based price lists and index numbers. Ground sources obviously had very imperfect opportunity to learn prices. Newspapers sometimes quote "controlled" prices which may be much lower than "black market" prices at which most business is transacted. Prices shown in the charts at the beginning of this study, however, lend support to the supposition that ground sources which had to be used almost entirely for prices outside Rangoon, are approximately correct. The fact that rice and sessamum prices are quoted as lowest in the areas of origin and higher in more remote regions lends support to the belief in the accuracy of the reports as a whole. On the other hand, the Tharrawaddy price of sessamum and the Pakokku price of rice seem to be quite out of line with other prices in those regions and may best be disregarded.

Rangoon prices of a number of commodities are given in Appendix B. Nearly all the prices were taken from lists published in the "New Light of Burma" and other newspapers. They are thought ordinarily to refer to the prices at which transactions actually took place. Most of the commodities in fact did not have controlled prices. It will be seen that a great increase took place in the prices of almost all commodities proving the presence of inflation on a very large scale. A newspaper report on the 12th February 1943 tells of the arrival of a shipment of onions at the Kemmendinge bazaar. The onions were sold at the controlled price and the resulting crush of would-be onion purchasers was so great that the dealers allegedly lost their breath—an unusual condition for a dealer in that commodity!

An interesting feature of price-fixing at the present time is the effort to secure voluntary co-operation from all concerned on the basis of patriotism and the common good. The Burmese Merchants' Association of Rangoon is a very active organization, if one may judge by the frequency of references to it in the Rangoon press. "*Bama Khit*" of 15th December, 1943 contains the following :—

" U Ba E, Vice Chairman of the above association is its representative member on the Prices and Commodities Control Board set up by the Government during last September.

" The Price Control Orders have now been issued. Before the issue of these orders the association's representative successfully moved a resolution to take the traders, big and small, with practical experience, into consultation with a view to the successful working of the scheme this time and bearing in mind the lessons learned on the previous occasion when prices were controlled. This being so it can be assumed that the present fixed prices should satisfy both the buyer and the seller. As it is the opinion of this Association that no price control scheme can be successful without the co-operation of the public, this association appeals to its members to co-operate in conjunction with their friends by urging the buyers and sellers to stick to the controlled prices in their transactions."

" Burmese Merchants' Association "

Presumably it is the same U Ba E who figures in the following item appearing in the "*New Light of Burma*", 15th February, 1944 :—

" U Ba E, who was mentioned in the newspapers as being prosecuted and fined Rs. 500|- for selling above the controlled prices is U Ba E, Secretary of the Price Control Advisory Board....."

" Prices in the various districts are given in Appendix C. Newspaper prices were seldom available so that ground sources have to be relied upon. They are inevitably sketchy and in some cases disagree among themselves so that the most credible source has been the one selected for the table. It will be noted that in few cases commodities are sold at pre-war prices or at only three or four times pre-war prices. Outstanding examples are rice in the Delta, salt along the sea-coast and beef in several areas. The wholesale issue of paper currency by the Japanese has obviously resulted in a tremendous increase in prices throughout the country although the increase has not been uniform for lack of transport facilities.

4. *Other Government activities and plans.*—Domei on the 2nd November, 1943, reported Government intention to sell rice to the public at a fixed price. Other sources failed to confirm any large-scale sale of the kind reported, however.

When Burma was first occupied, considerable stocks of goods suspected of belonging to enemy aliens were confiscated in many centres. In Myitkyina, for instance, the "Peace Preservation Committee" reportedly distributed such goods.

An editorial in the "New Light of Burma" on 18th January 1944, mentions a Government scheme to send rice to Upper Burma in exchange for vegetables. This suggests that inflation had gone so far that Government itself was beginning to fall back on barter. The same paper on the 7th of January quotes the Director of Propaganda as follows :—

"The Department of Commerce and Industry have made arrangements for opening four main centres in Myingyan, Sagaing, Yenangyaung and Pyawbwe where sales, purchases and exchanges of goods from Upper and Lower Burma can be effected."

A ground source at about that time reported that Adipadi Ba Maw had asked the Japanese for railway wagons to mitigate local shortages and was allotted one wagon per day. One wonders if the newspaper and ground source are referring to the same scheme. The "New Light of Burma", however, reported on the 2nd February, 1944, the reopening of Yame-thin Railway station for civilian traffic after eight months of military monopoly, and added :—

"It is thought that it will now be possible for goods from Upper Burma to be sold cheaply in Lower Burma".

Reference has been made above to the possibility that Government has purchased great quantities of rice. There is a curious report in "*Bama Khit*" of 27th January 1944 announcing the cessation of forcible purchase of rice in Magwe as that was not a surplus rice district. This would seem to imply that forcible purchase was carried out elsewhere although it is thought that any wide scale movement of the kind would have been reported from other sources. Quite possibly the forcible purchase in Magwe was Japanese requisitioning.

A Domei report in April 1944 states that Thakin Than Tun who changed from the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture to the newly created Ministry of Commodity and Supply had stated that the Commodity Control and Distribution Bureau would work through co-operative societies in the distribution of goods wherever possible. This is in line with the reported

Government plans in relation to the co-operative movement generally where there is a tendency greatly to foster co-operative credit, agricultural operations, industry and trade.

The existence of destitution on an unusually wide scale is suggested by the report in "*Bama Khit*" of 24th December, 1943, of Dr. Ba Maw's Relief Fund for War Destitutes with a million rupees contributed by the Nipponese Government and a quarter of a million by Bose's "Free India" government. The "*New Light of Burma*" reported on the 27th January, 1944, that "relief money for the month of January will be distributed without discrimination among classes on the 2nd and 3rd of February at the office of the Director, Accounts and Audit Department, Cantonment Gardens."

### I—FOREIGN COMMERCE.

India was the source of 55.35 per cent of Burma's normal Rs. 250,000,000 worth of imports in 1939-40 while the United Kingdom supplied another 17.2 per cent. The Bay of Bengal provided a short passage between the ports of Burma and eastern India whereas Burma's land frontiers were all mountainous, sparsely inhabited and almost untravelled. Hence, although the people of Burma are racially and socially more akin to the Chinese, Burmese economy was closely linked to India prior to the war and the sudden disruption of that trade had the most serious repercussions on Burmese economy. Burma is much the largest rice exporter in the world, accounting for nearly 40 per cent. of the rice entering world trade, while India is normally the world's greatest rice importer. Moreover, the development of Indian industries in recent years has made possible the supply to Burma of large quantities of cheap textiles, iron and steel, paper, soap, cigarettes and a long list of other commodities well adapted to the Burmese market. It is thus evident that powerful geographic and economic forces have directed Burma's trade toward India and that both countries have suffered due to the sudden cessation of that trade:

It has been quite impossible for trade within "Greater East Asia" to replace to any significant extent Burma's foreign trade with India, Ceylon and Europe. In the first place, ocean transport and transport via the new Burma-Thailand Railway have been barely sufficient for the minimum military needs of Japanese forces in Burma. In the second place, Indo-China, Thailand and other countries of South-east Asia can supply more rice, timber, and rubber than the Japanese need or at least

more than they are in a position to transport. Burma being at the extreme end of the Japanese supply line, would naturally be utilised as a source of supply only when absolutely necessary. In the third place, the other countries of South-east Asia are quite unable to supply Burma with the commodities formerly imported from India and the west, while Japanese industry has been much too busy in making munitions to care for the needs of civilian populations in conquered territories.

Ground sources agree that Burma's first important export immediately after Japanese occupation of Rangoon was large quantities of scrap metal, motor vehicles, refrigerators and other furniture, scientific instruments and many other types of loot. The Japanese even removed well-known statues of King Edward VII and Sir Harcourt Butler, for shipment to Japan as scrap. A few Japanese Companies immediately took over the small trickle of civilian traffic which remained. Fragmental reports speak of the importation of some sugar from Java, spinning machinery from Japan, silk from Singapore, cotton, textiles, etc., from Penang, cigarettes from Japan and Thailand. Mitsui at the end of 1942 had a staff of 43 Japanese employees plus 20 or more Indians and many Burmans. There is a report of doubtful credibility that this firm imported machinery for a cigarette factory. It has been engaged in the rice trade and reportedly made *saki* of 7 per cent. alcohol content. In 1942 it exported relatively small quantities of rice, maize, beans and bran. With other Japanese firms it appears to comprise the "Resources Supply Association" which is connected with the Army. Aside from an export of 200,000 tons of rice in 1942 (against a normal 3,000,000 tons exports) it is unlikely that much, if any, rice has been exported.

Mitsubishi is believed to be interested in timber, rice and maize, while Ataka is reportedly involved in the timber, metals, machinery and mining trade. The Japan Cotton Trading Company and the Oriental Trading Company complete the known list of commercial concerns, the former believed to be linked with the Fuji interests. Tokyo Radio on the 19th March 1943 stated that Burma's zinc exports were more than sufficient to meet the requirements of Japan's war industry. Other broadcasts speak of exports of pigs, pork, poultry, fruits and tobacco. It is assumed that the small quantities of tungsten produced are exported perhaps via the Burma-Thailand railway. There is no evidence, however, that other imports or exports begin to compare with the pre-war level and as a result, Burma is quite unable to provide much economic support for Japan's war.

The Goods Distribution Union of Burma started operating on 1st July 1942, sponsored by the Japanese Military Administration. Its object was to distribute food and other necessary commodities imported from Japan and eastern countries. According to newspaper reports, its six branches were as follows :—

1. The Director of the Union is the President of the Nippon Administrative and Handcraft (sic) organisation.
2. Piecegoods and materials, under the Secretary of the Sankoka Bushike Kaisha.
3. Firewood, Kerosene oil, petroleum, candles, under the Secretary of the Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha.
4. Hardware and machinery under the Secretary of the Ataka Company.
5. Foodstuffs under the Secretary of the Japan Cotton Trading Co.
6. Scientific and other instruments under the Secretary of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha.

According to an announcement in the "New Light of Burma" on 24th October 1943, "The Goods Distribution Union of Burma has decided to issue sewing machine needles to all tailors and dress makers. Those who wish to avail themselves of this offer should apply to the Manager, Publicity Department, Goods Distributing Union, 8 Tamwe Road, giving (1) name and address, (2) name of shop or place and address, (3) the number of sewing machines in use, (4) type and number of needles required. The needles will be issued after enquiries have been made." This potent Japanese sponsored organisation appears to have wide scope for the same paper on 26th December 1943, stated that "an appeal is made again by the parties concerned to report any fraud in the weights of salt and sugar received from the agents appointed by the Burma Goods Distribution Association to the above association at No. 8 Tamwe Road, Rangoon."

The full list of Japanese firms believed to be operating in Burma and culled from many sources is as follows. It should be mentioned that most of them come from Burmese script and numerous mistakes in the spelling are unavoidable :—

- | <i>Name of Company.</i>                     | <i>Type of business, etc.</i>                                  |
|---|--|
| 1. Asa Union                                | .. Jute cultivation and gunny manufacture.                     |
| 2. Ataka Sanjo (Isn ?)<br>Kabushike Kaisha. | Timber, Metals, Machinery, Mining<br>Operates an iron foundry. |
| 3. Best Shokai                              | .. Medicines.  |

<i>Name of Company.</i>	<i>Type of business, etc.</i>
4. Burma Byuha Co. ..	Sells newspapers.
5. Burma Fishery Corporation.	
6. Burma Shimbun ..	Japanese newspaper.
7. Dai Maru K. K. ..	Gunny manufacture.
8. Dai Nan Koshi ..	Rubber, tung oil, insurance.
9. Ensuiiko Sugar ..	Operating Zeyawaddy Sugar factory.
10. Fujigasu Boseki Kaishe Ltd.	Cotton spinning.
11. Goshō ..	Jute and scrap iron.
12. Hata Co. ..	House agents and auctioneers.
13. Iwai Co. ..	Exported scrap iron and interested in all agricultural produce. Left Burma in November 1942.
14. Iida ..	Tannin and scrap iron.
15. Ida ..	Advertised for paddy sampans for purchase or hire.
16. Japan Cotton Trading Co.	Rice and cotton. Given food section of Burma Goods Distribution Association.
17. Japan Motion Picture Co.	
18. Japan Motion Picture Distributing Co.	
19. Kanabo Co.	Marketing Toungoo coffee.
20. Kane ..	Soap and crystal.
21. Kanegafuchi Jitsujō KK ..	Runs some kind of factory. Advertises for 3 ins. & 12 ins. cotton belting.
22. F. Kanematsu Co. Ltd.	"Hides, livestock and all pastoral products".
23. Kobayashi Mining Co.	Operating the Mawchi Mines.
24. Kokusai Denkin Sushir Kaisha Ltd.	International Telecommunications Co.
25. Kinoshita ..	Cotton and rice.
26. Maruyi Kabushiki Kaisa.	Buys old clothing. Advertised for blacksmiths, moulders, fitters, etc., for factory in Insein.



<i>Name of Company.</i>	<i>Type of business, etc.</i>
27. Men Nichi	.. Amalgamation of all firms interested in Menka, Nichi Nichi and Osaka ed in Burma's cotton—Toyo mentioned.
28. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha	Interested in :— Tobacco—establishment of cigarette factory—no confirmation of this. Sugar—manufacture of candy—no confirmation. Rice, Maize, Beans and Bran. Liquor— <i>saki</i> from rice. Silk and Textiles. Timber—special auxiliary called Mitsui Mokuzai set up. Mining—seem to have taken over the Bawdwin mine and Namtu smelters, etc., of Burma Corpora- tion Ltd. Ship-building. General Imports & Exports—Im- port of refrigerators and provi- sions and export of meat mention- ed. Given scientific and other instruments section of Burma Goods Distributing Union. Biscuit manufacture—no confirma- tion.
29. Mitsubishi Kaisha.	Shoji Interested in :— Timber. Rice and maize. Import of printing presses. Match factories. Import of charcoal gas plants for automobiles (no confirmation of actual imports). Given firewood, kerosene, petrol and candles section of Burma Goods Distributing Union.
30. Mitsui Trust Co.	.. Took over all " enemy " property.
31. Maezawa Menka	.. Timber.

<i>Name of Company.</i>	<i>Type of business, etc.</i>
32. Mori Romubu Rangoon Shuchosho.	Shipping.—Advertises for small boat crews 4 Captains, 4 mates, 16 seamen, 4 Chief Engineers, 4 oilers, 4 firemen, etc. Also advertised for botanist, zoologist, anti-malaria experts, doctors, office staff, tailor, photographer, artist, chemist, mechanics, glass blowers, etc., etc.
33. Naka Muya Buntai ..	
34. Nichi Miyit Zujo Kabushiki Kaisha.	
35. Nichimen ..	Timber.—Probably Jap. name of Nippon-Burma Timber Union.
36. Nikka Yushi Kaisha ..	Oil.
37. Nippon-Burma Rice Union.	An amalgamation of the firms dealing in rice—MBK, MSK, and Japan Cotton Co.
38. Nippon-Burma Timber Union.	An amalgamation of (four?) firms interested in timber MBK, MSK, Maezawa Menka and Ataka.
39. Nippon Movie Film Co.	(May be same as No. 17).
40. Nippon Cotton Co. ..	(May be same as Japan Cotton Co. No. 16).
41. Nippon Tannin Co. ..	Tannin.
42. Nippon Rosan Kaisha Co.	Reported working in Mergui.
43. Nippon Sugar Manufacturing Co.	Probably operating the sugar factory at Hninpale.
44. Nippon Tsu-Un Kabushika Kaisha.	Railway and road transport.
45. Nippon Typewriter Co.	
46. Okura .. ..	?
47. Sankoka Bushiki Kaisha.	Given piece-goods and materials sections of Burma Goods Distributing Union.
48. Senda .. ..	River steamer transport.
49. Sonoda .. ..	?
50. Takke Butai Co. ..	Operates a factory of some sort.
51. Toyo Menka ..	Cotton.

<i>Name of Company.</i>	<i>Type of business, etc.</i>
52. Toyo Shokai ..	Exploiting E. M. de Souza & Co's " Dah " brand medicines.
53. Yamaguchi Bicycle Manufacturing Co. Ltd.	
54. Yamashita Kishen Kaisha.	River transport.
55. Yagi Kikai Zanzo Sho- ten (of Kobe).	Cotton ?

There is a reference to the Nango Kaihatsu Kinko Industry Syndicate of which one Ishida is Manager.

## J. NAVIGATION.

1. *Ports.*—The relative pre-war importance of the various Burma ports is fairly well indicated by the following table showing number of vessels entering Burma ports in 1940 exclusive of intra-Burma traffic.

<i>Port.</i>	<i>Number of vessels in 1940.</i>
Rangoon .. .. .	528
Kyaukpyu .. .. .	99
Akyab .. .. .	78
Bassein .. .. .	45
Moulmein .. .. .	30
Tavoy .. .. .	27
Mergui .. .. .	21

The foregoing table probably tends to exaggerate the importance of Kyaukpyu and possibly Akyab since these were more often way ports between Chittagong and Rangoon. However, Rangoon with five-sixths of the country's foreign trade was undoubtedly the predominant port and with Moulmein it remained under effective Japanese supervision until the formation of the puppet Government in August 1943.

Largely successful demolition was carried out at Rangoon and that port has been visited on a number of occasions by United Nations bombers. In spite of this fact, however, and in spite of the sinking of two ships by bombers in November 1943 and other ships at other times, Rangoon harbour appears still usable. At least one of the three dredgers working there before the war was still in use at last report. Possibly the absence of the other dredgers means a considerable reduction in the maximum draught of vessels visiting the port. Cranes appear not to be in use, and only a very small part of pre-war warehouse space was usable in May 1944. There has been a

very great decline in the quantity of shipping using the port. In 1942-43 reconnaissance normally spotted 6 to 12 ships in the harbour at a time with estimated total tonnage of 30,000 to 60,000. Five transports with cargo and troops entered the harbour in October 1943 but few, if any, modern vessels have been sighted there since that time. There are reports of the presence in the harbour of a number of small wooden ships but whereas a not-too-reliable source reports the presence of a thousand such vessels in Penang early in 1944, engaged in trade with Rangoon and way ports, no such number has been credibly reported as frequenting the Rangoon harbour.

Mergui, hitherto seventh in the list of Burma ports may have leaped into second place (or possibly even first place) because of its position far down toward Penang where it is relatively inaccessible to United Nations bombers and is relatively easily reached by vessels from Penang and Victoria Point. There are reports of a new railway spur across the Isthmus of Kra which may mean the shipment of goods by that route and then by a short sea route from near Victoria Point to Mergui. Mergui is connected by all-weather roads of a sort with the rail-head at Ye. Considerable shipping was observed there in February 1944 by which time shipping in Rangoon had decreased. A ship arrived about every four days early in 1944 and they were coasters of 1000 to 1500 tons each. New jetties and a landing stage were under construction in April 1944, but the 1000-ton vessels may still be unable to anchor alongside. Increased use of this port underlines Japanese preference for land transport over the ordinarily cheaper but more vulnerable sea transport.

One ship per month was reportedly visiting Tavoy at the end of 1943, while Moulmein port continued to do a fair amount of business.

2. *Ship-building*.—Mitsui Bussan Kaisha is reportedly interested in ship-building at Rangoon. Some 20 to 30 small boats, presumably of wooden construction, were reportedly under way near Thamaing in the spring of 1943. One hundred such craft were supposedly to be built in the Rangoon area in 1943, the Japanese to supply outboard motors. It is highly improbable that so many boats were completed. An advertisement in the "Sun" of the 7th August 1942 called for engineers and ship-builders for the Nippon Military Ship-building yards at Dawbon across Pazundaung creek from Rangoon. Presumably operations are carried on at the old Government Dockyard. Burmese shipwrights are capable of undertaking the construction of small wooden vessels and are available throughout the

Delta, but the Japanese claim to have built so many riverine vessels that they have more river traffic than in the pre-war period appears highly improbable. For some time there was little or no activity at the Irrawaddy Flotilla Co's dockyard at Dalla across the Rangoon river from Rangoon. However, recent reports suggest that three to five partly finished vessels abandoned at Dalla in 1942 are being completed. There are believed to be three or more shipyards around Rangoon now engaged in the construction of wooden vessels, ten of which are believed to have been launched up to March 1944.

3. *Inland Water Transport*.—Most of the steam and motor launches of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company were sunk, burnt, sabotaged or removed to India so that less than half the Company's 600 vessels were probably available to the Japanese unless they were able to salvage a number of sunken vessels. The Senda Company at first undertook the restoration of inland water transport but the Yamashita Kishen Kaisha appears to have achieved a near-monopoly of launch traffic on the Irrawaddy. A regular mail-steamer service between Rangoon and Mandalay was announced by the "Sun" in August 1942 but all available reports suggest that very little civilian steamer traffic takes place and that is on restricted schedules, for instance between Bassein and Rangoon. No steamers ply the Salween except those which operate the rail-ferry between Moulmein and Martaban, according to reports. An advertisement appeared in the "New Light of Burma" on 31st August 1943 wherein apparently a Burmese Company advertised a launch service between Rangoon and Moulmeingyun every second day. The Chindwin river is of great importance for the supply of Japanese troops in the Chin Hills and Manipur. Even there not many large steamers have been reported. Those which have plied the streams of Burma in recent months have been tied up to the banks under trees or other camouflage for long periods. Frequent United Nations bombing of Myingyan suggests extensive use of that rail-river point for transfer of goods prior to the voyage up the Chindwin.

There were multitudes of widely-owned sampans, barges, etc., throughout the Delta and along the banks of the streams and for this reason it is extremely unlikely that civilian traffic has suffered severely in those areas as it has along the railway. Frequent newspaper references are made to arrival of fish and *ngapi* at Rangoon in "junks" and the purchase of cooking oil by the traders in the junks. One report states that all boats above the size of small sampans have been liable to Japanese seizure but a quotation has already been given from

a Burmese newspaper telling of large numbers of traders carrying on normal trade in the Delta with the use of native boats. A ground source states that a sudden and unexpected storm destroyed 200 cargo sampans and other vessels in Danubyu, the boats lost being valued at Rs. 100,000.

## K. RAILWAYS.

The Burma Railway had 2,060 miles of track in 1940 all of which was of metre gauge as were the railways of all neighbouring countries or areas. Considerable damage was done to the railway by Japanese bombing and during the fighting that accompanied the occupation of Burma. Considerable additional demolition was done and it is estimated that only 126 of the 350 locomotives were left in a condition to be used by the Japanese. The Ava bridge—the only bridge across the Irrawaddy—was so badly damaged that it may not have been restored to use even yet. The Sittang River bridge on the important Pegu-Moulmein branch was destroyed and subsequent bombing attacks destroyed a new substitute bridge and then one recent attack destroyed the original bridge after it had been repaired by the Japanese. Ground reports indicate that passengers between Rangoon and Moulmein must walk three miles on the west side of the Sittang and one mile on the east side unless they can find some type of bus or cart transport.

The Japanese restored at least partial operation on the main line within a few months of occupation, however, and have shown considerable skill in repairing bridges, such as the one at Myitnge, in spite of persistent allied bombing attacks. Railway shops at Insein, Myitnge and Kanbalu were restored to operation but the Insein shops were reportedly badly damaged by bombing around December 1st, 1943. One source suspected the building of new railway shops at Wanet-chaung, 30 miles from Rangoon on the Prome line. Nevertheless, they were operating at least on a reduced scale in the spring of 1944. Locomotives appeared to have been converted from the use of coal to the use of wood. In fact some available pre-war stores of coal have not been used.

It is believed that the reduced railway operations are approximately sufficient for essential Japanese military traffic and in addition 100 civilians per day are permitted to leave Rangoon by rail. An item in the "New Light of Burma" on 28th December 1943 mentions trains so overcrowded that people ride on top and are knocked off by low bridges. Regular service, however, was maintained between Rangoon and Man-

dalay, and Rangoon and Prome and Mandalay and Myitkyina until recent military operations threatened the Myitkyina line. The Rangoon station has been bombed so successfully that a new station has reportedly been opened near Kanbe.

The business side of the Railways operations was reportedly turned over to the Nippon Tsu Un Kabu Shika Kaisha.

Thirty locomotives have reportedly been brought in from Malaya and it is possible that additional locomotives from Malaya, Thailand or French Indo-China have been imported since the completion of the rail link with those countries. Trains often run only at night, the engine being detached from the train and run off to the end of the spur or otherwise camouflaged against bomb attacks during the day time. It appears that available supplies of goods wagons are more than sufficient for Japanese military needs but every effort is made to protect the dwindling supply of locomotives.

The completion of the Thailand-Burma Railway in November 1943 means that from 800 to 1500 tons daily may be carried in each direction unless bombing or other difficulties prevent normal operation. It is paralleled however, by an all-weather motor road so that transshipment is easily possible during repair. Such a road is obviously unable to cope with "normal" rice, teak and oil exports of Burma but it may be of great military importance for the supply of the army, estimated at 175,000 men at the beginning of 1944. It should take out all the metals, raw cotton, lac, etc., which the Japanese can secure in Burma. Its usefulness is reduced by ferries over the Salween and Sittang rivers and unremitting efforts to keep one or the other of the Sittang River bridges in operation in spite of United Nations bombing attacks testifies to the importance placed by the Japanese upon the use of this road. Some carriages seen at Moulmein are reportedly marked "Pnom-Penh-Moulmein" and suggest through traffic from Burma to the Mekong river in Indo-China. Japanese locomotives have been seen at Moulmein, and occasionally a Thai diesel engine. Much Malayan rolling stock is reported. Trains consist of ten carriages or forty 5-ton wagons.

Aerial photographs in April, 1944, showed increased rail traffic over this route, while enlargement of the Moulmein locomotive shop and the building of a 355 foot jetty at Martaban are other evidences of the growing importance of the railway to Japan's military plans. This road is sometimes referred to by Burmans as "the Japanese escape door". The building of the new railway was apparently accomplished by means of rails removed from the second track between Rangoon and

Toungoo. The map which accompanies the Financial and Economic Annual of Burma, July, 1943, omits the Myingyan Paleik chord, and this unimportant line may have gone to provide rails and equipment for the new international line.

Aerial reconnaissance has proved the development of a highway or possibly of a railway between Jumbhon on the Thai State Railways and Ranong or some other place opposite Victoria Point along the Kra Estuary. It is not known whether the rails observed in the photographs are those of a projected railway or are only for temporary use by the contractor engaged in construction of the highway. In any case an alternative will thus be provided for traffic between Tenasserim and Thailand. Obviously the more direct and important route will be that *via* the Three Pagodas Pass either by rail or highway. It will also be possible apparently to ship goods or troops by rail to Jumbhon, by road (or rail) to Ranong and then by small coastal craft to Victoria Point and Mergui. From Mergui an all-weather road, albeit crossing several streams by ferry, leads through Tavoy to Ye, southern terminus of the Burma Railways. The Japanese thus have a second "escape door".

Rangoon local transport has apparently been in a chaotic state and it is doubtful if tram traffic has been restored, in spite of frequent promises to that effect. Rangoon's trackless trams recommenced operations in June, 1943, according to fairly credible reports.

#### L. HIGHWAYS.

There were about 17,000 miles of vehicular road in 1938 of which something over one-third were surfaced all-weather roads. An equal mileage was considered motorable in the dry season. There was a fair amount of road-building between 1938 and 1941.

Reports indicate considerable road-building by the Japanese but as might be expected, practically no roads were built except those with an obvious military significance. Perhaps the most important are the connections with Thailand.

1. *Roads to Thailand*.—An all-weather road runs beside the new Burma-Thailand Railway line. It is obviously of importance to the railway in case successful bombing makes transshipment necessary. It is not known, however, if any important quantity of traffic is being carried over the road at the present time. Another road connecting Moulmein with Pitsunalohe on the railway in Central Thailand was used in the Japanese invasion of Burma. The Burmese portion of the road as far



as Myawaddy was barely motorable in 1941 but it is thought that the entire route has been considerably improved since that time. By May 1944 a strategic road between the Thai Railway terminal at Chiengmai and a point opposite Kemapyu on the Salween was reportedly well advanced. Kemapyu is the point at which the road from Toungoo and Mawchi Mines touches the Salween and turns north through Loikaw to connect with the main east-west road of the Shan States at Hopong. Conceivably the Chiengmai-Kemapyu road may be used for the export of tungsten and perhaps tin from Mawchi Mines. The only pre-war road connection between Burma and Thailand was that from Kengtung south to Lampang on the Thai Railways. This road was used to a minor extent in the invasion of Burma but there is no information to indicate that it has been improved by the Japanese.

2. *Arakan Roads*.—A barely motorable road existed between Prome and Taungup for many years before the war. It has undoubtedly been made into an all-weather highway. Another road reportedly leads northwest to Arakan from near Bassein. Taungup is connected with Sandoway to the south and with Akyab to the north by roads which are partly new and partly the improvement of pre-war routes. It was previously found more feasible to carry on trade between Burma and the Arakan coast by sea and the great stress recently on road connections with Arakan is one more evidence of Japanese weakness in sea transport.

3. *Upper Chindwin*.—Numerous strategic roads were built in 1943 in the Chin Hills and the Upper Chindwin district obviously in preparation for the large-scale push toward Imphal, Kohima and Dimapur in early 1944. Most of these roads appeared to have been motorable in the dry season only.

4. *Northern Burma*.—Some Japanese road-building activity has been noticed in the Shwebo-Katha-Myitkyina area, particularly the construction of a motor road on the east bank of the Irrawaddy between Bhamo and Myitkyina.

5. *Pegu-Kyaukse*.—At the outbreak of war there was no road connection between Tenasserim and the rest of Burma, all communication being by rail or water. A motor road had been planned by the British and it is believed that such a road is at least under construction by the Japanese if it has not been completed.

6. *Factors limiting Japanese exploitation*.—The upkeep of roads and bridges is very difficult according to an official re-

port of the Public Works Bureau because of lack of tar, nails, etc. Secondhand nails, for instance, are reportedly a fairly important commodity in the bazaars where new nails are practically unobtainable by civilians. The official report continues :—

“ From the difficulty now being experienced it may well be imagined what the conditions of the roads will be in a year or two.”

The Japanese are believed to have kept most of the stores remaining from the previous regime, and to be using them only on public works with a definite military significance. There is no evidence of the presence of modern re-building machinery but the requisitioning of great quantities of labour has sufficed in the building of the most essential roads.

A more important factor limiting Japanese use of the Burma Highways is the shortage of vehicles. There have been very few motor vehicles imported and although the Japanese were undoubtedly able to use such M.T. as they captured in 1942 it is likely that a large number of pre-war vehicles have worn out by this time with no replacements in sight. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Japanese have imported spare parts for repair and repair facilities may well be occupied in other directions deemed more essential by the military authorities. Finally, the use of petrol from distilled rubber is one more evidence of a drastic shortage of petroleum products. Lubricants appear to be in as short supply as petrol, and the use of inferior lubricants probably hastens the scrapping of many of the vehicles. Tyres are scarce and high in price and tyres of various sizes may be seen on the same decrepit bus.

Reports from many parts of Burma by ground sources intimate the great difficulty which civilians encounter in attempting to secure rides in buses. Groundnut and sennamum oil normally arrived at the Rangoon markets in buses in December, 1943. The number of buses plying is seldom more than that in the pre-war period while fares have greatly increased. The fare on the occasional buses plying the formerly popular road between Rangoon and Insein was Re. 1 a few months ago against Annas 3 in the pre-war period. Yet there is no evidence that the Japanese military do not have sufficient motor transport for their immediate needs. It may be, however, that their policy of monopolising transport as well as other scarce items will contribute to a breakdown in civilian economic life and morale which will have disastrous indirect repercussions upon Japanese military plans.

## M. COMMUNICATIONS

1. *Telegraph Service*.—On the 20th October 1942 telegraphic communications were reportedly reopened between Rangoon, Pegu and Moulmein, presumably by the Japanese Military Administration. From November 25th, 1942, service was restored between Rangoon and Toungoo, Moulmein, Pegu, Prome, Mandalay, Myingyan, Taunggyi, Bawdwin, Mawchi and other Japanese occupied areas such as Hongkong, China, and "Manchukuo". By early 1943 telegraphic service was opened to Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and the Philippines. The service between Burma and Thailand was restored at least by 1943. There were, of course, considerable wartime restrictions upon civilian use of the telegraphic services and a ground source states that at Tavoy in 1943 telegraphs, posts and telephones were not available for civilian use. So far as is known, there have been no extensions of telegraphic service but merely restoration of most of the pre-war services. An advertisement in the "New Light of Burma" for 15th February, 1944, called for 100 qualified telephone and telegraph linesmen.

2. *Telephones*.—Very little information is available on this subject but a report from Kyaiklat printed in the "New Light of Burma" on 26th January 1944, states that "officials from the telephone unit of the Nippon Army came to Kyaiklat and with the assistance of the postal officials they repaired the telephone system. It is learnt that before long it will be possible to speak on the telephone between Dedaye, Kyaiklat, Pyapon, Bogale, Moulmeingyun and Maubin."

3. *Radio and Wireless*.—There were 13 radio stations in operation in 1941 with 23 transmitters, 32 receivers, 2 broadcast transmitters and 6 direction finders. The Mingaladon station was the only important broadcasting station. The Japanese appear to have considerably enlarged radio facilities at Mingaladon for a Japanese broadcast of April 27, 1943, states that :—

"Commemorating the birthday of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor which falls on tomorrow April 29th, expansion of the broadcasting facilities on a large scale will be carried out in the Rangoon Broadcasting station.....Especially noteworthy is the expansion of broadcasting hours directed to India from the Rangoon station. The languages used in the broadcast number as many as 13....."

Monitoring in India of broadcasts in various languages from the Rangoon Radio supports the announcement just quoted. In addition there have recently been erected, according to reports, two new Japanese wireless stations in the Rangoon area south and south-east of Mingaladon.

The Japanese have attempted in Burma as elsewhere to prevent listening to enemy broadcasts, one announcement frequently appearing in the newspapers reading,

"In order to put the people's mind in peace by cutting off the source of alarming rumours caused by propaganda spread by the enemy, a general reconditioning of all radio sets in Burma was carried out with the help of the Military Administration....."

Ground sources indicate that the number of radios in the hands of Burmans, always small, has still further decreased since the outbreak of war.

4. *Posts*.—The Japanese have announced a widespread resumption of service throughout the chief towns of Burma and between Burma and most other parts of "Greater East Asia". By December 1943, 260 post offices were reportedly opened against 572 in the pre-Japanese period. There is some evidence that the quality of service had deteriorated greatly under the Japanese. According to the "Sun" of the 11th January 1944, a mail service was about to be opened with Thailand.

## N. MONEY AND BANKING

1. *Currency*.—The Japanese immediately commenced the issue of military yen in Burma as in other parts of South-east Asia. It was equated with the Chinese dollar, the Straits dollar, the Sumatran dollar, the Javanese guilder, the Thai baht, the Indo-Chinese piastre, etc., In other words exchange at par was normally established throughout the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" but exchange could only be made through Japanese sources and in practice little exchange business seems to have been done except by Japanese. The decimal system was adopted and the Burmese name "*kyat*" was adopted for the rupee and "*pya*" which formerly meant three pies or one-sixty-fourth of a rupee reportedly has come to mean one cent.

Paper money is issued for amounts less than one rupee and since the rupee has lost most of its purchasing power it is obviously easy to be burdened with a large bundle of currency without having more than enough to transact one's ordinary shopping in the bazaar. The paper is of poor quality, the colours are not fast, there is no promise to pay, no coin has been introduced to back the currency as under the previous regime and the pagoda is (or was) used as part of the design. Burmans have often objected to the circulation of this money but objections have promptly been overruled by force and recent reports suggest that circulation takes place without much difficulty. No coins have been issued by the Japanese and pre-war small coins have practically disappeared from the market through hoarding.

At different times various exchange rates have been quoted between the British and Japanese-sponsored Burmese rupees. Shortly before the capture of Myitkyina by United Nations forces in June 1944, a British paper rupee was reported by ground sources to be equal to two Japanese-sponsored rupees, while a British silver rupee would fetch as much as 4 or 5 Japanese rupees. On the other hand, at Katha, less exposed to United Nations attack, 100 British Burma paper rupees reportedly equalled Rs. 150 in Japanese sponsored Burmese money in March 1944. The premium on British rupees was less further south. However, recent rumours that the British would redeem Japanese currency caused some hoarding of that currency for this purpose, according to reports. These reports need to be accepted with caution, however, in view of the reported absence of most commodities from the bazaar. It is quite possible currency accumulates in large quantities in the hands of many Burmans simply because they have no way to spend it. There is the surprising report that some coolies at Myitkyina hoarded Rs. 2,000 each although the more intelligent of them tried to get gold, jewellery, silver rupees or small coins. Wages around Myitkyina, as reported by ground sources, would not enable a cooly to save Rs. 2,000 in less than two years. A ground source states that prosperous local residents held as much as Rs. 30,000 each in Japanese-sponsored currency hoping for British redemption thereof.

There can be no doubt that the Japanese Military authorities have printed vast quantities of rupees and issued them without regard to possible redemption or effect upon the future economy of the country. The prices quoted in the preceding section and set forth in Appendices B and C are impressive evidence of the degree of inflation. Moreover, the unbalanced state of the Burmese budget as shown in Appendix A can hardly avoid exerting an inflationary influence. It was only on 15th January 1944 that Burmese currency management was turned over to a Central Bank and as the Bank undertook to finance the Government deficit, its resources of Rs. 10 million plus its probable deposits would appear to be utterly inadequate for the responsibilities which now fall upon it. There can be no doubt that the Ba Maw Government realises the disadvantages of inflation for a Domei despatch of 17th May 1944 announced the appointment of a special committee consisting of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and the Governor and Manager of the State Bank "to map out the necessary measures to prevent inflation ... It will be remembered that to absorb their savings the Burmese Government has been encouraging people to buy lottery tickets, invest in national bonds and accumulate

postal savings." In connection with the last part of the quotation it is to be noted that income from the State Lottery has been very disappointing while sponsors of the bond drive mentioned Rs. 2,000,000 as the goal—an insignificant sum compared to the size of the deficit. The drive lasted from 1st August 1943 to the end of February 1944. Meanwhile provisions have reportedly been made for the import from Japan of bank notes to be issued by the new Central Bank.

2. *Banking*.—The Yokohama Specie Bank returned to Burma with the conquerors, setting up an office in Rangoon and branches at Moulmein, Bassein, Mandalay, Myingyan, Lashio, Toungoo and three other centres. It perhaps assisted in the setting up of the Southern Regions Development Bank. Foreign exchange and all sorts of normal banking transactions appear to have taken place through these banks. Firms needing to raise a capital of Rs. 100,000 or more were reportedly required to approach the Southern Development Bank through "Burmese City Banks" (sic), and "upon authorisation they will receive their loans from Japanese financial organs". The Bank of Chettinad—most important of the 1,500 odd Chettiar firms in Burma—was metamorphosed into the People's Bank of Burma in May 1943. The Yokohama Specie Bank, the Burmese Government and the Japanese Military Administration all participated in the reincarnation. The 45 branches can be of great assistance to the authorities. Four Indian (probably Chettiar) directors were retained, presumably to furnish technical assistance rather than to guide banking policies. Information from Bassein in September 1943 was that none of the 30 Chettiar firms previously functioning in that centre was doing business at that time. However, a Chettiar managed the local branch of the People's Bank. It was thought that this branch made no new loans but accepted deposits and presumably attempted to make collections on outstanding obligations.

A Domei despatch dated 9th June 1944 mentions an Azad Hind Bank as having offices in Burma. Total deposits in Burma of all Japanese banks and the Azad Hind Bank were given as Rs. 78,000,000.

One of the first Japanese actions was to "control" the Chettiars and other money-lenders by the "People's Credit and Money-lenders Ordinance of 1942". The Chettiars had loaned practically no new capital at least on agricultural land for many years prior to Japanese occupation and there is no evidence that they have recommenced lending operations. Reliance, therefore, appears to be placed upon the direct Government loans as described in an earlier section and upon an expansion of co-operative banking. By mid-1943, 1,222 co-operative credit

societies were reorganised and placed in operation against 1,599 such reconstructed societies in the pre-war period. Loans in 1943 amounted to only Rs. 53,201—an insignificant amount—particularly considering the price level. The Thakins had a school for co-operation and at the suggestion of the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture this school was taken over in 1943 by the Government. It is interesting to note that in spite of very slight achievements to date the Burmese nationalists still cling to the hope that co-operation may be the solution of Burma's credit problem. Many other students of the problem have also persisted in their support of co-operative credit.

Willingness to follow the British examples is further evidenced by the plan to open 5 land mortgage banks by mid-1943. The issuance of agricultural loans of Rs. 5 million was deemed sufficient for the reopening of 9,300,000 acres of paddy land—a rather small loan per acre compared with the Rs. 5 to Rs. 10 per acre often loaned by landlords to their tenants. This money was to be raised through the Southern Development Bank.

The Burma State Bank was opened on January 15th, 1944. The President of the Board of Directors, U Ba Maung, predicted the opening of many branches. U Ba Maung himself had a long and rather distinguished career as Manager of the Pegu Central Co-operative Bank and may be regarded as Burma's outstanding financial figure. His younger brother, U Chit Htun, is Manager of the Bank after training in Japan and previous experience in Rangoon and Bombay with the Reserve Bank of India. The deposits on current account in the first ten days were reported at Rs. 5,461,983.97 and savings deposits Rs. 11,825. One wonders if the low level of the latter type of deposit is indicative of lack of faith on the part of the people in the bank's future, and in the stability of price levels. The capital of the bank was to be Rs. 10 million, advanced by the Government, but loans by the end of January reportedly amounted to Rs. 39 million or considerably more than capital and initial deposits. Since the Bank was also saddled with the responsibility for an unknown but undoubtedly large currency supply as well as the underwriting of a colossal Government deficit the brothers U Ba Maung and U Chit Htun appear to have undertaken a hopeless task.

## O. PUBLIC FINANCE

In the Financial and Economic Annual, 1943, the Minister of Finance complains of the British removal of records which makes it impossible for him to publish as detailed a budget as might otherwise be expected. In spite of this handicap,

however, there is evidence in the official Budget as reproduced in Appendix A herewith and in the accompanying descriptions that he attempted to follow the methods of the previous Government as far as practicable.

1. *Salient Policies*.—In his first annual report made just before Burma received “independence” the Minister lists a number of achievements during his first year under the Japanese-sponsored regime. In the first place the 1941-42 land revenue was reduced by various percentages up to 50 per cent. “in deserving cases”. Due to a number of protests, which the Minister does not mention but which were contained in contemporary newspapers, as well as to the apparent impossibility of collecting the amounts demanded, the official report mentions the cancellation of 1941-42 land revenue when collection “was found to be too hard on the cultivators”. Another reform claimed by the Minister was the collection of land revenue in kind. Presumably, the existing inflation as well as a desire to build up a fair stock of paddy against emergencies contributed to the adoption of this policy. Another activity of the Ministry was “fractional reduction in the rates of land revenue assessment for 1942-43 in Insein, Hanthawaddy, Pegu, Maubin, Pyapon, Thaton and Moulmein by 20 per cent.”. The one new tax introduced by the Ministry was the Mill Production Tax Ordinance 1943 levied on “the production of rice mills, saw mills, oil mills and wheat flour mills”. This innovation was expected to yield Rs. 1,437,000 in 1943-44. The rates of the taxes are given in Appendix A herewith.

The Income-Tax Ordinance of 1942 yielded Rs. 2,207,222 in the eight months of 1942-43 and was expected to yield Rs. 8,024,000 in 1943-44. In April 1944 a Super-tax was levied on incomes of over Rs 40,000 the rates varying from 40 per cent. to 50 per cent. Presumably smaller incomes are taxed on a progressive scale of 3 per cent and up as under the pre-war regime. There is some evidence that a few merchants and others will be required to pay large sums under this Act in view of the existing inflation.

The Money-Lenders Ordinance of 1942 was another achievement mentioned by Minister Dr. Thein Maung although it is doubtful, as indicated above, if it made much difference.

Excise duties appeared to have been enlarged in scope and to have covered, salt, sugar, matches, mechanical lighters, cigarettes, kerosene, motor spirit, silver, iron and steel.

2. *Revenues*.—The expected revenue for the year 1943-44 amounted to Rs. 68,732,000 according to the detailed budget reproduced in Appendix A. In October 1943, however, there



was a report of a new budget for August 1st, 1943, to March 31st, 1944 in which the total estimated revenue was Rs. 42,000,000. The budget for the year ending 31st March 1945 approved in March and revised by the Privy Council on 27th April 1944, provides for revenues of Rs. 69,000,000, according to a Domei despatch of the latter date. These totals compared with a 1941-42 revenue estimate of Rs. 171,318,000 for the last budget prepared by the old regime. It will thus be seen that a catastrophic decline in revenue is admitted at a time when expenditures have obviously increased more than admitted expenditures. The 1941-42 revenue estimate included an item of Rs. 40,000,000 for Customs whereas the recent budget omitted that item entirely. Even income-tax amounted to nearly 2-1/2 times as much in the last pre-Japanese budget as in the 1943-44 budget reproduced in Appendix A. Excise and excise duties are now estimated at about one-third their previous figures. Forests formerly produced Rs. 13,000,000 or more per year but have shrunk to under Rs. 8,000,000 while land revenue has declined from around Rs. 50,000,000 to Rs. 32,000,000. The only additional item of importance appearing as a source of revenue is the tax on mills as mentioned above.

Land revenue, the source of approximately half the revenue of the existing government, included the collection of 7,000,000 baskets of paddy in 1943-44 according to a report believed to be reliable. In Myitkyina District, due to poor cultivation, etc, land revenue for 1942-43 was remitted and that for 1943-44 was expected to be reduced. At first Rs. 5 (one report says Rs. 7) was levied per acre on all land whether cultivated or fallow. In June 1944 Domei announced that fallow land would only be taxed Rs. 2 (another report said Annas 8). If as aerial reconnaissance indicates, 1943-44 paddy crops were only 60 per cent. of normal a further drastic reduction in revenue is indicated. A pathetic note is sounded in the Financial and Economic Annual where it is mentioned that efforts to persuade the Nipponese Military Authorities to pay a tax on liquor for Army use proved unavailing.

The Domei despatch of April 1944 calls attention to the tremendous deficit and states that

“ In order to help cover up this deficit the Burma Government has enforced the imposition of taxes on the Japanese residents and also announced the revision of the income-tax regulations on March 10 and April 10 ”.

3. *Expenditure*.—The expenditures officially reported for the 8 months ending 31st March 1943, amounted to Rs. 13,987,083

against the original 1943-44 budget estimates of Rs. 129,417,140 as listed in Appendix A. In October 1943, however, this estimate was increased to Rs. 188,000,000 for the 8 months August 1943—March 1944. It was pointed out that of the resulting deficit of Rs. 146,000,000 exactly half was accounted for by the Paddy Purchasing Scheme, the Central Bank Capital and the loans for paddy cultivation. It is true that previous announcements had put these three items at Rs. 58,000,000, Rs. 10,000,000 and Rs. 5,000,000 respectively which thus totalled Rs. 73,000,000 or half of the budget as claimed. The 27th April despatch from Domei listed expenditures for the year ending 31st March 1945 as Rs 250,000,000 thus leaving a deficit of Rs. 181,000,000 of which rice purchase was expected to account for Rs. 37,000,000. In view of the propaganda claims to have purchased large quantities of paddy in 1942-43 it is notable that no such expenditure appears in the budget for that year. However, the 1943-44 and 1944-45 budgets include large sums as indicated above. One report suggests that paddy purchase money in 1942-43 was borrowed from the Nippon Military Administration.

Comparing the budget expenditures listed above with pre-war figures, the estimate for 1941-42 was Rs. 182,768,000 and only Rs. 154,006,000 in 1938-39 the last year before the outbreak of the war in Europe. It is thus evident that expenditures have increased considerably over the normal pre-war level. Available evidence indicates that senior government salaries are moderate and possibly under the pre-war scale in some cases but many officials are reportedly idle and come to Rangoon only to draw their pay. Junior salaries have been increased to about twice the pre-war level.

The items under expenditure for the Burmese Army and extraordinary charges as given in Appendix A seem suspiciously low in view of the great publicity given to the recruiting of men for the Burmese Independence Army and in particular for the various labour corps or Sweat Armies. Ground sources support the claim that large numbers of men have thus been recruited for special service. In the absence of budgetary provision for such unusual expenditure, the conclusion seems inescapable that the Japanese print additional money themselves in order to pay the members of the Sweat Army and similar groups. A recent Japanese announcement that its currency both old and new had the same value supports this conclusion. The Japanese are known to bring practically no food to Burma except perhaps salt and some sugar so the local communities are forced to sell them other items at Japanese-

fixed prices. It is significant that there is nothing in the Burmese Budget to suggest that the Japanese Army receives its money through that budget. The inevitable conclusion is that Japanese money printing presses make up the difference.

Expenditure on defence is Rs. 30 million for the year 1942-43 or Rs. 40 million, according to two different Domei reports in November, 1943. It seems likely therefore that the items for Burmese Army, etc., as shown in Appendix A were probably revised upwards. An expenditure of Rs. 10 million was also reportedly made as capital for the Central Bank.

4. *Deficits*—No deficit was admitted for the year 1942-43 but subsequent budgets indicate that not over a third of total expenditure has been covered by revenues. Most recent advice is that the Central Bank will advance the Rs. 181 million necessary to cover the 1944-45 deficit. The Southern Development Bank was to lend the Burma Government enough to cover the previous year's deficit, according to Domei. As indicated in the previous section there is no reason to believe that the Bank can raise this money in any other way except steady use of the printing press.

A ground source in the spring of 1944 states that traders are forced by the civil authorities to buy large numbers of Rs. 10 bonds, printed in Burmese and bearing the signature of Dr. Thein Maung, the Finance Minister. Bonds are repayable after the war but the rate of interest, if any, is not known. Some annual drawings take place and 62 prizes are given. This should not be confused with the State Lottery the success of which, taking propaganda broadcasts at full value, has been very much less than under the previous regime. It is reported that compulsion is necessary in the sale of ordinary Burmese war bonds.

It will be noted that figures given above and in Appendix A are in millions rather than lakhs and crores. The modernisation of Burma by the Japanese has involved the increased use of the metric system and the use of the international system of counting. In regard to public finance, however, such slight merits can hardly offset the outstanding weaknesses of recent budgets or long postpone complete loss of confidence in the financial integrity of the government and of its currency.

## APPENDIX A.

## GOVERNMENT OF BURMA ACCOUNTS AND BUDGET

(SOURCE—*Financial and Economic Annual: Rangoon, July 1943.*)

## REVENUES.

	Rupees. 1942-43* <sup>a</sup>	Rupees. 1943-44* <sup>b</sup>
Customs .. .. .	177,295	* <sup>c</sup>
Income-tax .. . . .	2,207,322	8,024,000
Excise .. . . .	2,744,997	6,052,000
Excise duties .. . . .		5,348,000
Registration <sup>d</sup> .. . . .	14,118	222,000
Registration of motor vehicles .. . . .		89,000
Other taxes and duties .. . . .	68,333	10,000
Land revenue .. . . .	6,484,220	32,281,000
Forests .. . . .	462,324	7,623,000
State lottery .. . . .	98,008	800,000
Stamps .. . . .	193,394	1,764,000
Administration of justice .. . . .	272,923	780,000
Police .. . . .	446,846	421,000
Miscellaneous (special) .. . . .	5,700	..
Adjustment with Nipponese Military Administration .. . . .	6,590,000	..
Miscellaneous (Peace Preservation Committee, etc.) .. . . .	1,261,751	100,000
Local rates and taxes .. . . .	580,780	..
General administration .. . . .	78,097	..
Jails .. . . .	10,160	..
Medical .. . . .	2,164	215,000
Public Health .. . . .	3,691	..
Education .. . . .	3,680	391,000
Stationery and printing .. . . .	21,404	20,000
Agriculture .. . . .	16,894	..
Irrigation .. . . .	74,929	608,000
Civil works .. . . .	9,456	..
Co-operative credit .. . . .	2,283	..
Industries .. . . .	70	..
Posts .. . . .	5,264	2,146,000
Taxes on mills .. . . .	..	1,437,000
Succession tax .. . . .	..	100,000
Interest .. . . .	..	100,000
Recovery of old loans and lost funds .. . . .	..	200,000
Brought forward .. . . .	..	1,000* <sup>e</sup>
Totals .. . . .	21,836,103	68,732,000

\*<sup>a</sup>. Eight months ending 31st March, 1943. Actuals.\*<sup>b</sup>. Year ending 31st March, 1944. Estimates, possibly far from the actual results.\*<sup>c</sup>. "Customs revenue is not shown in the budget for 1943-44; but it is likely that a considerable sum is forthcoming as the revenue realized under this head for the previous financial year is nearly Rs. 3 millions."\*<sup>d</sup>. Rates of tax:

1. Produce of Rice Mills .. . . . Rs. 5 per 10 tons.
2. Produce of Saw Mills .. . . . Rs. 5 per 10 tons.
3. Produce of Oil Mills .. . . . Rs. 5 per 100 viss
4. Produce of Wheat Flour Mills .. . . . Re. 1 per Cwt.

\*<sup>e</sup>. After this budget was made up it was discovered that the balance brought forward was about Rs. 4,500,000.

APPENDIX A—concl<sup>d</sup>

## EXPENDITURE.

The expenditures reported officially for the eight months ending 31st March, 1943, amounted to Rs. 13,987,083, broken down into 68 items, the chief of which were :—

	Rupees.
Police (5 items) .. .. .	4,108,859
Local District Commissioners .. .. .	1,514,646
Public Works Bureau .. .. .	920,031
Bureau of Education .. .. .	868,655

Budgeted expenditures for the year ending 31st March, 1944, were officially reported as follows :—

	Rupees.
Prime Minister's Department (Propaganda etc.) ..	5,101,832
Ministry of Finance .. .. .	2,364,080
Ministry of Home Affairs (Police, etc.) .. ..	17,064,971
Ministry of Lands and Agriculture .. .. .	3,091,354
Ministry of Reconstruction and Public Works ..	5,254,168
Ministry of Commerce and Industry .. .. .	665,995
Ministry of Judicial Affairs .. .. .	4,493,925
Ministry of Forests and Mines .. .. .	3,133,868
Ministry of Commerce, Labour & Industry ..	5,810,443
Ministry of Education, Public Health and Municipal Affairs	9,649,906
Civil Defence Services .. .. .	190,935
Burmese Army .. .. .	12,087,050
Extraordinary charges .. .. .	1,473,473
Capital outlay on Paddy Purchase Scheme .. ..	58,685,140
Loan to Corporation of Rangoon .. .. .	250,000
Miscellaneous .. .. .	100,000
Total ..	129,417,140

## SUMMARY.

	1942-43	1943-44
	Rupees.	Rupees.
Revenues .. .. .	21,836,103	68,732,000
Expenditures .. .. .	13,987,083	129,417,140
Surplus .. .. .	4,661,743*	..
Deficit .. .. .	..	60,685,140

\*This sum is not the difference between the two previous items, because Rs. 10,353,433 was paid to the Nipponese Military Administration, against a credit of Rs. 7,166,156 from the same source.

APPENDIX B.  
*Rangoon Market Prices—Source : Burmese Newspapers only.*

Commodity.	Unit of measure	Pre-war price	August 1942.	Dec./Jan. 1942-43.	March 1943.	June 1943	September, 1943	December 1943	January 1944	February 1944
Rice (Sabanek best quality).	Bag of 3 baskets.	Rs. 18	Rs. 9	Rs. 9-50	Rs. 10-11	Rs. 10-12	Rs. 14-15	Rs. 15-25	Rs. 27-30	Rs. ..
Cooking oil.	10 viss	7	25	27 50	26-27	45	80-95	95-140-105	140-170	200 Controlled @ 35-37(15-144),
Groundnut.	"	8	20-30	28 50	32	55	95-100	120-140	140-170	200-175
Sesamum	" 100 viss.	15	70	62-37	60-80	100-150	250	350-400	.	3* Controlled price 50 cents.
Potatoes	" 1 viss	2 1/4 as.	9 as./11	.	.	12 as.	12 as.	1 1/2	.	.
Salt	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Beans	.	.	825-900	1100	1100	1250	1300-1500	3000	1500	.
(Sedaw)	100 baskets.	180	875-400	400	400	400	475-500	.	.	.
(Pegya)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
(Gram)	.	.	425-450	230	380	..	800-900	1050-2800	2100	2150
(Pelun)	.	.	350-400	350	350	.	1150-1200	1600	2600	2300
Fish	10 viss	15	..	.	60	.	300	350	.	.
Dried fish	100 viss.	40-60	.	.	600-025	.	700-1100	900-1400	700-1000	Controlled @ 300-350
Chilies	"	37-40	140-160	.	260	260	260	500	250	Controlled @ 300-1200
Onions	"	25	40-70	60-85	65-95	110-200	300-450	1100	600	Controlled @ 300-350.
Garho	"	65	200	..	300	300-400	575-600	1400	370-400	Controlled @ 350 small and 450 large.
Ngapi	"	40	.	200	220-300	230-330	400-650	350-425	1000-1200	Controlled @ 550
Sugar	"	40	300	..	..	..	.	800	500	Controlled @ 300-450
Jaggery	"	30	65-95	75-85	95-105	120	165-190 (325-375 in October).	270-300	200-285	Controlled @ 11 as a viss (88 1/2 per 100 viss).
Kerosene	4 gal. tin.	3-1/8	Sept. 42 Rs. 48*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

\*Ground source.

## APPENDIX C.

*Sample prices outside Rangoon.*

Commodity.	Unit.	Place	Date	Price	Pre-war Rangoon price
Jaggery ..	100 viss	FOOD. Akyab	Sept 42	Rs 600	Rs 26
Chilies ..	100 viss ..	"	Feb 44	800	40/30
Sugar ..	100 viss .	"	"	5000	43
Sessamum oil	100 viss .	"	"	2000	72
Salt ..	100 viss ..	"	"	62½	12½
Beef ..	per viss .	"	Sept. 42	1½	¾
Dhall ..	100 viss .	"	"	75	19½
Potatoes .	100 viss ..	"	"	87½	11½
Rice ..	100 baskets	"	"	233	350
Paddy ..	100 baskets	"	"	40	130
Kerosene ..	per tin ..	FUEL Akyab	Feb. 44	48	3-1/8
Rice ..	per basket	FOOD. Yamethun	Feb. 44	Rs 18/19	Rs. 3½
Gram ..	100 baskets	"	June 43	400	.
Dhall ..	100 viss	"	"	42½	19½
Potatoes .	"	"	"	85	11½
Salt ..	"	"	"	140	12½
Groundnut oil	"	"	"	525	78
Beef ..	per viss .	"	"	1½	¾
Sessamum oil	100 viss .	"	"	650	72
Chilies ..	"	"	"	350	40/50
Jaggery .	"	"	"	150	26
Groundnut oil	100 viss	FOOD. Myingyan	Dec 43	Rs 700	Rs 73
Jaggery ..	"	"	"	210	26
Chilies ..	"	"	"	315	40/50

APPENDIX C—*contd.*

Commodity.	Unit	Place	Date.	Price	Pre-war Rangoon price.
Rice ..	per bag ..	FOOD Munbu	Jan. 44	Rs 45½	Rs 10½
Paddy	100 baskets	"	"	550	
Beef	per viss .	"	"	3	½
Fish ..	per 10 viss .	"	"	80	15
Prawns (dried)	100 viss	"	"	2,500	200
Ngapi ..	"	"	"	1000	40
Sessamum oil	"	"	"	950	72
Chilies .	"	"	"	750	40/50
Rice ..	100 baskets	FOOD. U. Chindwin	Jan. 44	Rs 2700	Rs 350
Salt .	100 viss ..	"	Feb. 44	600	12½
Sessamum oil	"	"	"	2500	72
Ngapi .	"	"	Sept. 43	700	40
Jaggery	"	"	"	800	26
Sugar .	"	"	Jan 44	500	45
Paddy ..	100 baskets	"	April 43	50	
Groundnut oil	100 viss ..	"	"	400	78
Dhall ..	"	"	March 43	125	19½
Beef .	per viss ..	"	"	1½	½
Cotton Longyi	each	TEXTILES. U. Chindwin	Feb. 44	40	1½
Cotton shirts	"	"	Sept. 43	35	1½
Kerosene .	per tun ..	FUEL. U. Chindwin	Feb 44	48	3-1/8
Fish ..	10 viss .	FOOD Tharrawad- dy.	Dec. 43	Rs. 100	Rs. 15
Beef ..	per viss ..	"	"	3/4	½
Sessamum oil	100 viss ..	"	"	800	72
Chilies	"	"	"	600	40/50
Salt ..	"	"	"	118	12½



## APPENDIX C—contd.

Commodity.	Unit.	Place	Date	Price.	Pre-war Rangoon price.
Rice	per basket (75 lbs.)	FOOD Moulmein	March 44	Rs 10	Rs 3½
Salt	1000 viss	"	"	250	141½
Chilies	per viss	"	"	15	½
Sugar	per viss	"	"	25	½
Sessamum oil	10 viss	"	"	200	7½
Ngapi	per viss	"	"	7	½
Longyi, cotton	each	TEXTILES. Moulmein	"	45/125	1½
Shirts	"	"	"	30	1½
Kerosene oil	4 gallon tin	FUEL Moulmein	"	20/25	3-1/8
Rice	Basket	FOOD. Shwebo	April 44	Rs 30	Rs. 3½
Salt	per viss	"	Oct. 43	2½	2 as.
Longyi, cotton	each	TEXTILES. Shwebo	April 44	60	1½
Rice	Bag (22½ lbs.)	FOOD. Pakokku	March 43	Rs 18	Rs. 10½
Salt	per viss	"	"	1½	2 as.
Sessamum oil	100 viss	"	July 43	500	72
Groundnut oil	"	"	"	400	78
Kerosene oil	per tin	FUEL Pakokku	Feb 43	70	3-1/8
Soap	per cake	MISCELLANEOUS Pakokku	Feb. 42	½	1a. 3 ps.
Jaggery	100 viss	FOOD. Bassein	Feb 44	Rs 1,000	Rs. 26
Chilies	"	"	"	1,500	40/50
Salt	per viss	"	"	1	2 as.
Rice	basket (75 lbs.)	"	"	1	3½
Sessamum oil	100 viss	"	"	2000	72
Paddy	100 baskets	"	"	110	..

APPENDIX C—*contd.*

Commodity.	Unit.	Place.	Date.	Price.	Pre-war Rangoon price.
Longyi, cotton	each	TEXTILES. Bassein	Feb. 44	Rs. 55	Rs. 1½
Shirts	"	"	Nov. 43	40	1½
Kerosene oil	4 gal tin	FUEL. "	"	48	3-1/8
Beef	per viss	FOOD. Henzada	Jan. 44	Rs 3	Rs ¾
Chilies	100 viss	"	Feb. 44	1,500	40/50
Cooking oil	"	"	"	1,800	72
Rice	Bag	"	Dec 43	15	10½
Paddy	100 baskets (50 lbs)	"	"	100	
Fish	per viss	"	Jan 44	7	1½
Jaggery	100 viss.	"	Feb 44	600	23
Chilies	100 viss	FOOD. Pegu	March 43	Rs 260	Rs. 40/50
Jaggery	"	"	"	95	23
Dhall	"	"	"	38	19½
Ngapi	"	"	"	175	40
Longyi, cotton	each	TEXTILES Pegu	March 43	17½	1½
Rice	Basket	FOOD Magwe	Feb 44	Rs 15*	Rs 3½
Sessamum oil	100 viss	"	"	370*	72
Fish	per viss	"	"	5*	1½
Rice	75 lb basket	FOOD Mandalay	Feb. 44	Rs. 20	Rs. 3½
Paddy	100 baskets	"	Jan 44	400	
Sessamum oil	100 viss	"	"	1300	72
Groundnut oil	"	"	Feb 44	1,000/1,500	78
Salt	"	"	July 42	125	12½
Sugar	"	"	"	50	45
Fish	10 viss	"	Feb. 44	70	15
Beef	per viss	"	"	5	¾

\*These are controlled prices and are the only ones in Magwe.

## APPENDIX C—concl'd.

Commodity.	Unit.	Place	Date	Price	Pre-war Rangoon price.
Cotton longyis	each	TEXTILES Mandalay	Feb 44	Rs. 8	Rs. 1½
Cotton shirts	"	"	"	25	1½
Rice	Basket	FOOD Promo	Jan 44	Rs. 5	Rs. 3½
Paddy	100 baskets (50 lbs)	"	"	100	40/50
Chillies	100 viss	"	Sept 43	300	78
Groundnut oil	100 viss	"	June 43	470	72
Sessamum oil	100 viss	"	"	550	72
Beef	per viss	"	Sept 43	2	1½
Fish	per viss	"	"	7	1½
Salt	"	"	"	1½	2 as.
Prawns	"	"	"	25	2
Soap	per cake	MISCELLANEOUS Promo	Feb 43	1½	1a 3 ps
Rice	100 baskets	FOOD Myitkyina	April 44	Rs 3,300	Rs 350
Paddy	"	"	"	"	"
Salt	100 viss	"	"	1,200	12½
Sessamum oil	"	"	"	4,000	72
Sugar	"	"	Jan 44	1,000	45
Potatoes	"	"	Nov 43	100	11½
Beef	"	"	Aug 43	3	½
Fish	10 viss.	"	"	30	15
Chillies	100 viss.	"	April 43	2,000	40/50
Prawns (dried)	"	"	Jan. 43	1,200	200
Jaggery	"	"	"	200	28
Longyis, cotto	each	TEXTILES Myitkyina	Jan. 44	30	1½
Shirts, cotton	"	"	Feb 44	30	1½
Kerosene	per tin	FUEL Myitkyina	Jan. 44	120	3-1/8

# APPENDIX I.

## THE CONSTITUTION ACT OF BURMA NO. 1 OF 1305 B. E.

### THE STATE.

- (1) 1. Burma shall be a fully independent and sovereign state.
- (2) 2. Burma shall be a co-equal member of the community of sovereign states forming the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere.
- (3) 3. All powers of Government and all authority legislative, executive and judicial are derived from the people and the same shall be exercised in accordance with the scheme hereunder.

### HEAD OF THE STATE.

- (4) 1. Burma shall be ruled over by the Head of the State who shall have full sovereign status and powers.
- (5) 2. Succession to the Headship of the State before the Constitution comes into operation shall be settled by election, if possible within 30 days after the occurrence of the vacancy, at a joint session of the Cabinet and the Privy Council presided over by the President or Vice-President of the Privy Council or, in the absence of both these persons, by a member of the Privy Council elected by the Privy Council for that purpose.

### CABINET OF MINISTERS.

- (6) 1. There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers presided over by the Prime Minister.
- (7) 2. The Ministers shall be appointed by the Head of the State on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
- (8) 3. The Cabinet of Ministers shall conduct the Government of the State in responsibility, both collectively and individually, to the Head of the State.
- (9) 4. Ministers of the State shall hold office during the pleasure of the Head of the State.
- (10) 5. The affairs of Government shall be conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations duly made for that purpose.

### PRIVY COUNCIL.

- (11) 1. There shall be a Privy Council to advise the Head of the State in such matters of public importance as may be referred to them.

The following matters shall be referred to the Privy Council :—

- (a) Taxation, (b) Annual Budget, (c) National Loans, (d) Ordinary Legislation, (e) Peace Treaties, and such other treaties, conventions and agreements as require ratification before they are ratified.
- (12) 2. The number of Privy Councillors shall not be less than 20 and not more than 25.
- (13) 3. The Privy Council shall be an advisory body.

(14) 4. The members of the Privy Council shall be appointed by the Head of the State after consultation with the Cabinet of Ministers.

(15) 5. The Ministers shall have the right of participation in the sessions of the Privy Council without being members thereof.

(16) 6. There shall be a President and a Vice-President elected by the members of the Privy Council.

(17) 7. Members of the Privy Council must possess the qualifications of an elderly and experienced politician.

(a) The minimum age shall be 40 years.

(b) They must have rendered public service or must be competent to represent important interests of the country by virtue of their distinguished educational qualifications and ability.

(18) 8. Subject to the approval of the Head of the State the Privy Council shall make rules for regulating its procedure and for the conduct of its business.

### LEGISLATION.

(19) 1. The responsibility for legislation shall belong to the Head of the State who shall ordinarily exercise it after consultation with the Cabinet of Ministers.

(20) 2. In the case of ordinary legislation, the Cabinet of Ministers shall, before tendering their advice to the Head of the State, first obtain the views of the Privy Council.

(21) 3. However in the case of extraordinary legislation the Cabinet of Ministers may act without reference to the Privy Council.

*Explanation :—*Extraordinary legislation shall deal with such matters as maintenance of public safety or prevention of public danger or matters which are as important as matters of life and death due to war conditions.

(22) 4. All extraordinary legislation restricting civil liberties shall be reviewed as early as practicable after the termination of the war.

(23) 5. All the existing laws in force in Burma immediately before the commencement of this scheme shall, so far as it does not conflict with this scheme, continue in force in Burma until altered or amended by competent authority.

### FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF BURMESE NATIONALS.

(24) 1. The liberty of the person shall be inviolable and no Burmese National shall be deprived of his personal liberty except in accordance with law.

(25) 2. No Burmese National shall be deprived of his property except in accordance with the law.

(26) 3. The dwelling of every Burmese National is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered except in accordance with law.

(27) 4. Every Burmese National shall, subject to public order and morality, enjoy freedom of religious belief and practice.

(28) 5. Every Burmese National shall, within the limits of law and morality, have the right of free expression of opinion as well as the right to assemble peaceably and without arms and the right to form associations and unions.

### **JUDICIARY.**

(29) 1. The Supreme Court of Burma now in existence shall continue and shall be the highest Court of Record. It shall consist of a Chief Justice and such number of other Judges as the Head of the State may deem it necessary to appoint.

(30) 2. The administration of law and constitution of law courts shall be in accordance with the existing laws.

(31) 3. (a) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Head of the State after consultation with either the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned.

(b) Other Judges shall be appointed by the Head of the State after consultation with either the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice or with the Minister concerned and the Chief Justice.

(32) 4. The Judges of the Supreme Court shall not be removed except for proved misbehaviour\* or for infirmity of mind or body.

\*Misbehaviour includes misbehaviour towards the State.

(33) 5. All Judges shall be independent in the exercise of their judiciary functions and shall be subject only to the laws in force.

(34) 6. The decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive.

(35) 7. Judges and Magistrates shall have jurisdiction over all persons within their territorial jurisdiction regardless of their nationality except

(a) those who enjoy extraterritoriality under Public International law ;

(b) Members of the Burmese armed forces in respect of offences punishable by military courts ; and

(c) Members of Allied armed forces in respect of military offences for trial of which provision to the contrary has been made, under any treaty or agreement between the Burmese Government and the Nippon Government.

### **LANGUAGE.**

(36) Burmese shall be the official language of the new State of Burma.

### **STATE SERVICES.**

(37) 1. All appointments in the services of the State shall be derived from the Head of the State.

(38) 2. There shall be a State Services Board, the Chairman and other members whereof shall be appointed by the Head of the State after consultation with the Cabinet of Ministers.

(39) 3. The Head of the State shall, by regulations made after consultation with the Cabinet of Ministers, determine the number

of members of the Board, their tenure of office and their conditions of service.

(40) 4. The Board shall be responsible to the Head of the State.

(41) 5. The Board shall deal with such matters relating to the State Services as are delegated to them under the rules and regulations duly made for the purpose.

(42) 6. The Board shall be independent in the exercise of its proper functions and duties.

(43) 7. All Burmese nationals who are in Government or Municipal service on the day of the inauguration of Burmese Independence shall be deemed to have been appointed on the same terms and conditions of service in the New State subject to their taking the oath of allegiance to the New State on a day which is to be fixed for the purpose by the Head of the State soon after the inauguration of Independence.

### **AUDIT AND ACCOUNTS.**

(44) 1. There shall be an Auditor-General of Burma who shall be appointed by the Head of the State after consultation with either the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned.

(45) 2. The conditions of service of the Auditor-General shall be such as may be prescribed by the Head of the State after consultation with the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned, and he shall not be eligible for further office in Burma after he has ceased to hold his office without the approval of the Head of the State.

(46) 3. The accounts of the Government of Burma shall be kept in such form as the Auditor-General may, with the approval of the Head of the State, prescribe.

(47) 4. The reports of the Auditor-General relating to the accounts of the Government of Burma shall be submitted to the Head of the State who shall cause them to be laid before the Cabinet of Ministers and the Privy Council.

### **ARMED FORCES.**

(48) 1. The Head of the State shall be Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese Armed Forces.

(49) 2. There shall be a War Minister directly responsible to the Head of the State for organisation, administration, and training of the Armed Forces.

(50) 3. All commissions in the Burmese Armed Forces shall be granted by the Head of the State on the recommendation of the War Minister.

(51) 4. The Supreme Commander shall be advised by the War Cabinet in all military affairs. It shall consist of the War Minister, the Chiefs of General Staff concerned, the Vice-Minister for War, the Chief of General Headquarters, Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff, the Director of military Training and such other members of the Armed Forces as may be added on by the Council. The Prime Minister or any Minister representing him, the Finance Minister

and either the President or the Vice-President of the Privy Council shall have the right to speak in and otherwise the right to take part in the proceedings of the Council without the right to vote.

(52) 5. The Chief of the General Staff concerned shall be responsible for the Executive Military Command of his branch of the Armed Forces.

(53) 6. The War Minister shall have the power to inspect the General Staff or Staffs and the troops and other forces under their command.

(54) 7. (a) With a view to ensuring the stability of the State, the armed forces shall be outside politics.

(b) The War Minister shall be appointed always from among high Military Officers on the active list.

(55) 8. The Military Accounts shall be audited by a Special Auditing Board directly under the Head of the State.

### CONSTITUENT BODY.

(56) 1. A Constituent Body shall be convened by the Head of the State, if war conditions permit, not later than one year after the inauguration of Burmese Independence, and in any case not later than one year after termination of the war.

(57) 2. The Constituent Body shall be so constituted as to be truly representative of the Burmese people and of its opinion.

(58) 3. The Head of the State shall appoint the Members of the Constituent Body and settle all other matters relating thereto in consultation with the Cabinet of Ministers and the Privy Council.

*Explanation* :—Members of the Burma Independence Preparatory Committee intended that the words “in consultation” should have a similar meaning to “after consultation”, with the following exception :—

*Exception* :—The words “in consultation” convey the meaning “mutual discussions in agreement for the sake of clarification”.

*(Translation doubtful).*

(59) 4. The Constituent Body shall elect its own Chairman and make rules for the regulation of its business and procedure.

(60) 5. The Constituent Body shall determine all matters relating to the Constitution of Independent Burma and in doing this it shall have all the powers and duties of a Constituent Body including the power to institute a referendum on questions relating to the Headship of the State. It shall also be free to act independently of all outside influence.

(61) 6. There shall be freedom of speech in the Constituent Body and no member thereof shall be liable to any proceeding in any Court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Body or any Committee thereof and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of the Head of the State of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.



(62) 7. The Constituent Body shall determine the period within which the Constitution shall come into operation and the rule of the new Head of the State shall commence.

(63) 8. The rule of the Head of the State shall terminate with the coming into operation of the Constitution and the tenure of office of all Ministers and the Privy Councillors shall terminate therewith.

(64) 9. Burma shall be governed in accordance with this interim Constitution until such time as the Constitution comes into operation.

It can be amended as follows :—

(a) with the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers ;

(b) if at a special meeting of the Privy Council attended by at least three-fourths of its members two-thirds of those present at the meeting vote for the amendment.

## APPENDIX II.

## [One Voice.

## One Blood.

## One Leader.

## DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF BURMA.

To-day, after more than fifty years of British occupation Burma resumes her rightful place among the free and Sovereign nations of the world. She proudly occupied that place throughout a very long stretch of unbroken history during which her glory shone like the sun and the moon in the Heavens. Her empire once extended far beyond the hills to the North, South, East and West ; many among her people were famous and mighty ; the strength of her arms also was acknowledged to be great ; and she contributed in her time worthily to the progress of mankind. Pagan and its architecture still mark a peak in that progress.

Throughout all their long history before British aggression the Burmese people maintained their independence unbrokenly after subduing every enemy sooner or later in incessant wars.

Fifty years or so ago Burma lost her independence for the first time as a result of three Anglo-Burmese Wars. Britain waged these wars in pursuance of her predatory design upon Asia at a time when Asia was divided and unprepared and the whole weight of sea power, superior war equipment, and the vast newly discovered resources of the industrial revolution was on the British side. To these she further added her traditional weapons of intrigue, bribery, and every conceivable fraud and device. The result of this unequal contest was that most of the small Asiatic Nations were destroyed by British cunning and material superiority. It was Burma's tragedy to be among those small nations which were overpowered by this material superiority.

The years of British occupation were indeed sorrowful for Burma. She entered into a long bondage, and dishonour and disruption ate deeply into her flesh. The Burmese people were slowly expropriated, losing, as time went on, most of their national substance, their vast material resources and opportunities, their culture, their language and even their own way of living, while Britain, according to whose plans these were happening, derived the evil gains.

However, the Burmese national spirit remained uncorrupted by the darkness of those years. The struggle against the aggressor continued in one form or another as opportunity allowed or weapons were available while British greed and tyranny kept the fire in every heart raging. Periodically the people broke loose in their desperation, there were mass risings, slaughter, destruction, and then the most violent British reprisals followed : whole Burmese villages went up in flames, the men were taken away for ever and their homes left desolate. But still the struggle went on, gaps were slowly filled, new patriots came forward to suffer, in a spirit of utter dedication, the same repressions, imprisonment, exile, torture and often death itself. These heroes suffered and even died so that Burma might live. Their names and deeds shall be remembered always.



While the fortunes of this desperate unequal struggle rose and fell the Asiatic consciousness appeared for the first time in Burma. The Burmese people began to look around and abroad and then at themselves, and found that they were Asiatics and that Asiatics must stand together if Asia is to rise again. Looking for the Leadership which would unite and save Asia the Burmese found it in the great Nippon Empire. Thereafter Burma began to turn her face towards the East.

With the outbreak of the present war for the liberation of East Asia the Burmese struggle came at last to a turning-point. The irresistible forces of Nippon, after utterly breaking the enemy everywhere, swept through all East Asia and finally reached Burma where the entire people, who had long waited for this hour, rose unitedly to march side by side with Nippon's great army of liberation against the Anglo-American enemies. East Asia had at last come together, her enemies were swiftly expelled from Burma and elsewhere, and the joy of the Burmese people was unbounded. From that day onwards they had given themselves completely to the cause of East Asia. Their gratitude to Nippon as the leader of East Asia is profound. They bow too in gratitude and homage to the war heroes, both Burmese and Nipponese, who have died in this war so that East Asia may conquer and live, so that Burma also may be free.

To day the Burmese people will at last reap the harvest which was sown for many years with ceaseless struggle and sacrifice. They will come once more into their own rights. They will solemnly proclaim their independence and sovereignty and enter into all the rights and obligations of a free people. Nippon's strength and heroism, Nippon's nobility of purpose, have made this possible. With an entire nobility which is in keeping with the spirit of her national foundation, Nippon, who conquered Burma from the British, has promised to recognise Burma's Independence. Burma desires to place on perpetual record her gratitude to Nippon for this act of supreme service to her.

The Burmese people therefore, by this solemn declaration made in their name and in accordance with their national will by a Constituent Assembly representing them, publicly proclaim that from this day and for ever Burma is a fully independent and sovereign State and that she has severed herself completely from Britain and the British Empire. Burma, as an independent State, is further declared to be established upon true ethical principles which will always represent the spirit of her national foundation. The Burmese people are convinced that such principles alone will preserve them and make them great and prosperous.

Burma also declares herself to be a member of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. She enters into this free and equal partnership so that, by the united resources, will and work of East Asia as a whole, a new Asiatic Order and Economy may be established as a part of the new World Order which will ensure justice, peace and prosperity to all peoples. Burma pledges herself with her entire will to the fulfilment of this great task.

The New State of Burma is also established upon the principle of Burmese unity in one blood, one voice, one leader. It was national disintegration which destroyed the Burmese people in the past and they are determined that this shall never happen again.

Burma is now not only Burmese but East Asiatic as well and she must bear her part of the burden in accordance with this new conception and order while at the same time the rest of East Asia bear their part of the burden towards Burma in the same spirit. Burma must construct the new order in her territories in accordance with a plan which will ensure strong administration, stability, justice, self-sufficiency and strength in all directions. A strong, stable and self-sufficient Burma is the greatest contribution that Burma can make to the East Asiatic order and economy, and Burma, owing to her geographical position, must be strong if East Asia is to be strong. The New State of Burma will pursue this policy resolutely.

Burma, in her foreign policy, will also promote peace, justice and the establishment of a new world order. She will endeavour constantly to maintain the closest relations with all friendly powers on the basis of justice and reciprocity.

Regarding the present Great East Asiatic War which is being waged against the Anglo-American enemies and their allies the Burmese people solemnly declare that it is also their war, a war which will decide the issues of their own independence, their prosperity, their very survival as a people. It concerns them as Burmese and also as East Asiatics, for it is further a war which will definitely settle the fate and fortune of the East Asiatic peoples for a very long time. The Burmese people further declare their strongest resolution to support this war together with the other East Asiatic powers under Nippon Leadership till the enemy is reduced to utter submission. They will support this war with all their resources, both material and moral, whatever may happen and however long the war may last. The great heroes whose sacrifices have redeemed Burma and made Burmese Independence possible have passed away but their work still remains unfinished. The work of Burmese independence also still remains unfinished. The work of making East Asia safe for East Asiatics also remains unfinished. All these tasks, which are so vital to the Burmese people, can only be finished by winning the present war. The Burmese people therefore dedicate themselves completely to the cause of winning the present war.

Finally, it is declared that the new State of Burma will be governed in strict accordance with the laws and constitution which are in force for this purpose. All peoples in Burma are in this manner assured of good government, justice, and of all their just and lawful rights.

The Burmese people, acting through a Constituent Assembly representing them for this purpose, have here made a solemn declaration of Burmese Independence and of the principles upon which the new State of Burma is founded and will be governed. This declaration represents the whole national will of the Burmese people and it shall be faithfully maintained. The Burmese people pledge themselves to the utmost to this end before all *devas* and men who are witnesses to this solemn act and declaration.

## APPENDIX III.

### DECLARATION OF WAR.

Burma has now become an independent country. Therefore, it has become the paramount duty of Burmans to resist the enemies who are making immediate preparations to subdue Burma once again. If we desire (to see) our nation, our language, and our religion firmly established, we must break and crush these enemies, so that they may never recover. Therefore Burmans must pay in blood, sweat, and wealth, to the utmost, to purchase the stability (of their independence).

Taking all factors into consideration, the present Great East Asia War is Burma's war also. It is a war for Burma's existence. It is also a war (on which depends) the existence of the whole of East Asia, in which Burma is included. We must parry with the sword, the sword of the enemy, who plans to subdue and destroy us Burmans a second time. We Burmans must draw our sword and step forward on the side of Nippon and (her) allies, who are fighting against the British and the Americans, the enemies of all.

The acts of violence of the British, the Americans, and the Dutch, done to the Burmans, as well as to the other peoples of East Asia, may be compared to the acts of the worst criminals in the history of the world, who are insolent and who swallow flesh and blood. They have chewed and swallowed up, not only the countries in East Asia but the whole of the East Asia continent. They have swallowed and destroyed the flesh, blood and spirit, the culture and civilisation, the peace and prosperity of this continent.

For over a hundred years we Burmans have suffered under this kind of punishment. Acting on their policy of Imperialism, the British have dried up our flesh and blood. They have destroyed our freedom. They have taken away our wealth. They have turned upside down the whole of our history, our civilisation and our culture. While our country was one of the richest in the world, our nation became one of the poorest. Although we had vast resources for industrial development, we had no industries at all. Although we have distinguished ourselves in history by our skill and courage in war, there was no Burmese army. In learning and knowledge we attained the highest ranks in the world, but we were unable to put that learning and knowledge to their fullest use. They continually suppressed us by the use of force, and barefacedly went on swallowing the essence (of our national wealth). In truth, their actions were inconsistent with their pious utterances, and while talking of justice, went on committing acts of injustice on all Burma. They have swallowed our spirit, together with our flesh and our blood. In addition, while using specious phrases usually employed in Democracy, they, at the same time, declared that the Burmans will never be permitted to rise from slavery.

Next, the British and the Americans used the Chungking Chinese as a tool, as they desired to act in accordance with the wicked, base and depraved feelings they had nurtured (in their hearts) against the whole of East Asia, and particularly against the Nippon Empire. In

spite of repeated protestations, they dragged Burma in to take joint action with them. In order to establish their position in East Asia more firmly than ever, they constructed the Burma-China Road out of Burma's revenues, to strengthen the Chungking Army, and to make use of it by flattering it. This meant nothing but turning Burma into a base (so that they may carry out their intention) to control and govern all East Asia. Also this meant that Burma was made a permanent base, a permanent line of communication, so that the British and the Americans may achieve their aim of governing and controlling East Asia.

Then, when the Great East Asia War reached Burma, the barbarous cruel, robbing, and destroying British and American vampires, together with their Chinese ally, wrought frightful havoc in order to destroy this country. We Burmans will never forget this cruelty. When their troops were retreating in disorderly confusion, they had no time to fight the Nippon Army, but they found much time to destroy Burmese towns and villages, and the property of Burmans. In the path of their retreat they left a trail of blazing towns, the corpses of murdered priests and laymen, and homeless women and children. Even now, their aircraft are cruelly bombing and destroying undefended towns and small villages of no military importance. Therefore, they have been the first to begin this work of destroying the whole Burmese nation beyond recovery.

The British and the Americans have, by the use of force, destroyed the other countries in East Asia, just as they have destroyed Burma. In enacting this drama in every country, this violence, this dacoity, this internal destruction have plainly shown in history that during the past two hundred years they have been the enemies of East Asia. Therefore, if East Asia wishes to regain what belongs to her, these enemies must be broken and destroyed, and driven out of East Asia. This is the only way of saving East Asia. If we desire the (continued) existence and the future peace and prosperity of East Asia we must fight and win this war. Only if we pay this price will we gain.

As has been explained above, those enemies are now fighting us Burmans with their utmost strength. Recently they re-entered our Burmese territory and forcibly, basely and insolently committed acts of destruction. They carried away as much as they could of whatever property they found, and what they could not take away they destroyed. They also boasted that they would suppress us again. Even now they are unceasingly bombing our towns and villages. As this amounts to insolent aggression by force of arms, a robbing back of our country, and an act of war on us, we must retaliate by war. We must fight them with all our strength and all our determination. We must fight till they are utterly crushed and destroyed. We must fight till the position of our Burmese nation is secure. We must fight shoulder to shoulder with Nippon and with the allies of Nippon. Our strength lies in this unity. (This unity) is our path to victory. Nippon and her allies have proved to the world, in this war, the justice of their cause, the solidarity of their military strength, the invincibility of their morale. In war, the side which has a righteous

mind, which follows the true path, and which has strength, inevitably wins. Therefore, we shall certainly win this war. When this war is over, a New World Order will appear, not only in the East, but in the West also. Then will we certainly prosper. Therefore, in fighting this war we are strengthened on all sides. Our cause is just; our war aims are noble; our leaders in battle is strong. Nippon, Germany and Italy have an immense war strength which the enemy cannot withstand. When we win this war we shall enjoy blessings that will last for ever. Is it not true that we Burmans have waited many years for this opportune moment? Let us then use this great opportunity, bearing in mind the maxim "Dust if we die—golden umbrella if we live" (defeat can only mean death—success will bring the highest rewards). We shall bear unwavering feelings of friendship for those countries which are friendly to us. We shall keep faith with them. We shall fight the British and the Americans until we have decisively defeated them.

I therefore announce that a state of war exists between Burma and the Anglo-Americans today, at this time. Burma, with Nippon and her allies, united in fighting spirit, in military strategy and operation, will fight till the insolent British and Americans are vanquished.

(Sd.) BA MAW,

*Bama Naing-ngan daw Adipadi.*

1st Waxing of Wagaung 1305.  
(1st August 1943).

## APPENDIX IV.

### FORM OF OATH TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT SERVANTS.

I . . . . ., do hereby solemnly swear that I will be faithful and loyal to the people of Burma and also to the Supreme Head of the Burmese people, the Anashin Adipadi.

I will also be faithful and loyal to the Government of Burma, to the law of the Constitution and other laws. I shall faithfully and loyally observe the principles so clearly explained in the Proclamation of Independence. I shall faithfully and loyally carry out the duties of my office.

In accordance with this oath I shall at all times serve the people of Burma in love and loyalty and with all my heart.

I solemnly swear that in accordance with this oath I shall give faithful service without fear or favour.

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